At a debate held at Georgetown University in Washington a few days ago, two former national security advisers from US President Donald Trump’s previous administration, John Bolton and Robert O’Brien, took part. Both left their posts after sharp disagreements with the president and have since become among the staunchest critics of Trump’s thinking and approach.
Bolton and O’Brien agreed that the military campaign against Iran would intensify after the midterm elections, regardless of the outcome. They also argued that the US policy of rapprochement with Russian President Vladimir Putin and the lifting of sanctions on Russia are aimed at achieving several objectives, foremost among them neutralizing Russia in the US-Iran confrontation in exchange for halting military support for Ukraine, launching a process to end the war, and stopping the Russian bloodletting that has continued for more than four years.
The two former officials also agreed that resolving the confrontation with Iran militarily is no longer an option but a necessity. The survival of the Iranian regime would effectively amount to a defeat for the United States, something no one expects to happen.
Yet Trump’s personality, which O’Brien described as bordering on narcissism, will influence his future decisions and could make him more aggressive should the Republican Party lose the midterm elections. During the remainder of his term, the US president will be focused on his political legacy, and he will not accept being remembered as the American president who failed most conspicuously to deliver on the promises and objectives he pledged to achieve.
On the other hand, the Iranian regime ultimately fails to recognize that its people are exhausted, its economy is bankrupt, and its regional influence is shrinking. What remains of that influence is being steadily dismantled as the leaders of its proxies are assassinated, their positions destroyed, and their weaknesses and falsehoods exposed.
Iranian state media argue that the Strait of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab are cards the Trump administration failed to take into account, and that using them will lead to a rift between Washington and its allies, especially the Europeans, who are already grappling with economic, social, and political difficulties.
But the regime has failed to study carefully the experience of Gamal Abdel Nasser, who played the cards of closing the Straits of Tiran and the Suez Canal and blockading the port of Aqaba. The result was the catastrophe of the Six-Day War in June 1967, whose repercussions the Arab world continues to endure.
Just as the late Arab leader believed that the Soviet Union, under a mutual defense treaty, would come to his aid and would not allow a major war to be launched against the United Arab Republic, the pillars of the Iranian regime believe that Russia and China will prevent its collapse and stand firmly behind it against American “imperialism.”
Yet Iran’s leaders, particularly the commanders of the Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), fail to understand that the interests of major powers, a club to which they certainly do not belong, take precedence over treaties, values, and principles. Nasser was not saved by his defense treaty with the Soviet Union, which was seeking to bring the Cold War to an end and had entered into complex secret negotiations with the US to reach a strategic arms limitation agreement. Nor will the Russians intervene to rescue Iran while they are seeking Trump’s help in ending the war in Ukraine.
The Iranian regime, which is effectively run by IRGC commanders, continues to seek to export its revolution and expand its influence. Iran’s deputy foreign minister calls for arming the Lebanese people to resist, while Hezbollah, an arm of the IRGC, attempts to restore its influence through motorcycles that spread chaos and fear through Beirut’s neighborhoods, as though the world around the group had not changed.
The Syrian supply route has been permanently cut off, Israel has come to control most of southern Lebanon, with no deterrent and no one to restrain it, financial resources have diminished, and the budgets of many affiliated departments and institutions have been cut. Meanwhile, the group’s support base, both privately and increasingly in public, has neither the desire nor the ability to continue enduring the hardship.
As in Lebanon, so too in Yemen: the IRGC launches its missiles at civilian targets in Saudi Arabia through the Houthi group, seeking to sow chaos and confusion in the Kingdom and send a message to the US administration that the security of the Gulf and the wider region, from the sea to the river, is in its hands, regardless of whether the price is further destruction and death in Yemen and Lebanon.
Saudi Arabia, however, understands well what the IRGC is seeking to achieve and is proceeding with wisdom and restraint. It also recognizes that the Iranian regime is crumbling and acting recklessly, much as Saddam Hussein did during his withdrawal from Kuwait, when he set Kuwaiti oil facilities ablaze. American companies specializing in extinguishing oil fires ultimately benefited from his actions, receiving around $750 million for their work.
According to a security official, the US can rein in the Houthis by strengthening Saudi Arabia’s defensive capabilities and disrupting the group’s weapons supplies, while maintaining its military focus on confronting Iran and avoiding being drawn into a prolonged war of attrition in Yemen.
This approach begins with improving early-warning capabilities, expanding intelligence sharing with Riyadh, and linking surveillance and interception systems within an integrated defense network. It also requires ensuring a steady supply of interceptor missiles, enabling Saudi Arabia to counter simultaneous attacks targeting civilians, airports, and oil facilities while maintaining its operational readiness.
At the same time, Washington and its partners could tighten monitoring of smuggling routes, disrupt financing and supply networks, and prevent missile and drone components from reaching the Houthis. Weakening the group’s ability to replace its losses and manufacture its own weapons would reduce the frequency of attacks and limit the need for continuous US strikes that deplete munitions, aircraft, and reconnaissance assets.
The same security official added that direct military intervention should, when necessary, be restricted to exceptionally important targets, with any strikes based on precise intelligence and a clear military benefit, while carefully assessing the risks of escalation and protecting civilians.
The official warned that demonstrative strikes could unravel the de-escalation between Washington and the Houthis and trigger a chain of confrontations that would divert US resources from the Iranian front.
Supporting Saudi Arabia’s defenses, choking off Houthi supply lines, and carefully selecting limited operations would therefore make it possible to protect the Kingdom and weaken one of Tehran’s instruments without dispersing US military power or giving Iran an opportunity to prolong the war and drive up its cost for the United States and its regional partners.
