The Iranian regime may emerge from a war with the United States still in power, only to find itself facing its most difficult test of survival at home. A settlement that halts the strikes and eases sanctions could buy Tehran some time, but it would also bring long-standing bread-and-butter issues back into focus, questions the leadership had failed to answer even before the war.
How can people cope with soaring prices? How can the state provide water and electricity? Can the authorities regain the trust of a society that has grown weary of unfulfilled promises? This is where the regime's fragility lies, and this is where change could begin if the leadership proves unable to address these crises.
Abroad, Tehran is betting that a combination of military pressure and negotiations can improve its bargaining position. It is returning to talks with Washington even as attacks on vessels passing through the Strait of Hormuz continue.
Iran's leadership wants to demonstrate that it can disrupt shipping and raise the costs of continuing the conflict, while making clear that any agreement must take its demands into account. Yet the pressure that strengthens its hand at the negotiating table could also prompt Washington to respond more forcefully, especially if an attack results in significant American casualties.
Tehran appears convinced that losses suffered by the Trump administration in the midterm elections have made it more willing to offer concessions. Those election results may indeed increase pressure on the US president over a war that has become less popular and encourage him to seek an agreement he can defend before the American public.
Nevertheless, he still retains broad authority over foreign policy and military decisions. If negotiations falter, or if he believes Tehran is trying to exploit his political circumstances to impose terms he cannot accept, the option of large-scale strikes could quickly return to the forefront.
Each side possesses assets that could help it endure. Iran benefits from its strategic position along the Strait of Hormuz and its capacity to withstand a prolonged conflict, while its recent discussions with Russia add a new factor to Washington's calculations. In contrast, the US administration is relying on maritime pressure and economic sanctions to weaken Tehran's ability to sustain the confrontation. Yet that strategy requires time, and the White House's ability to wait may diminish after the elections. As a result, a negotiated settlement remains the most likely outcome, particularly if both sides can find a formula they can present to their respective audiences as an acceptable exit.
The danger to the regime becomes clearer, however, when one considers what awaits it after the fighting ends. Iran's economy was struggling before the war, inflation was eroding household incomes, and chronic water shortages and power outages were weighing heavily on daily life. The conflict has only added to the burden on a state that needs resources for reconstruction and improved public services.
Easing sanctions could provide the government with some of those resources. The key question is how they will be used, and whether ordinary people, who have borne the cost of the crisis for years, will actually see any improvement in their lives.
A deal with Washington could give the authorities an opportunity to portray the end of the war as a victory. But Iranians will ultimately judge the outcome by what they see in markets and in their homes. If prices continue to rise and water and electricity shortages persist, the government will find itself confronting demands that have been building for years.
As external tensions recede, the leadership will increasingly be forced to answer for its management of the economy and national resources, as well as for the decisions that contributed to deepening these crises. It may struggle to contain public anger if people return to the streets while centers of power argue over how to respond.
That competition within the ruling establishment further complicates the picture. Mojtaba Khamenei's role in decision-making remains uncertain, as does his ability to impose a single direction on Iran's competing power centers.
It is possible that some of the apparent contradictions in Tehran's behavior, simultaneously engaging in negotiations while continuing escalation, reflect disagreements among factions preparing for the post-war era. The more intense the competition for influence becomes, the harder it will be to reach consensus on difficult economic and political decisions at a time when the country needs leadership capable of acting swiftly.
Even so, it is difficult to conclude that the regime's collapse is imminent. The authorities have demonstrated an ability to endure, and a settlement could provide them with both time and resources to navigate the first phase after the war.
Their long-term prospects, however, will depend on what they do with that opportunity. If resources are directed toward improving services and easing the burden on the population, a measure of stability could be restored. But if the policies that deepened poverty and squandered resources continue, protests could expand and become increasingly difficult to contain, especially if accompanied by divisions within the leadership over responsibility for the crisis and how to resolve it.
This is why the terms of any agreement will matter so much. The lifting of some sanctions could open the door to much-needed economic assistance for Iran in exchange for meaningful changes in Tehran's policies and verifiable commitments.
Accepting such concessions will be difficult for factions that view them as a threat to their influence, even as the government needs them to reduce domestic pressure. Every delay in making these decisions narrows the authorities' room for maneuver and increases the cost of reform for a society that has exhausted much of its capacity for endurance.
The irony may be that the end of the war marks the beginning of the regime's most difficult phase. If the leadership emerges from the confrontation believing that simply remaining in power is enough to close the chapter on the crisis, it may repeat at home the same mistake it made in assessing its adversary abroad. It will then face a population waiting for tangible improvements in everyday life.
If the government's inability to provide basic necessities converges with expanding protests and growing fractures within the leadership, the prospect of regime collapse could become real. At that point, the Iranian street, carrying years of accumulated grievances and deferred demands, may become the force that ultimately determines the country's future.