All indicators suggest the region is on the precipice of a wide-scale war that will compound losses and tragedies. The Americans have tightened the naval blockade, initiated steps to impose a land blockade and close the Caspian Sea, and resumed the destruction of air defenses established by Tehran in areas overlooking the Arabian Gulf. Meanwhile, successive statements from Iran declare full readiness, reiterating threats attributed to the "hidden" supreme leader about an "unrestricted geographic response," and asserting that the coordinated "unity of fronts" will "reshape the political and security architecture of West Asia!"
Against the backdrop of diplomatic initiatives failing to achieve any breakthrough, a full-scale war may reflect an American vision that views conflict as an inevitable path to secure President Trump's political legacy by consolidating gains. The foundation of these gains is the structural overhaul triggered by the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation in Gaza, the "support" wars in Lebanon, and the emergence of a new Syria, which effectively dismantled what was once the crown jewel of the Persian Crescent.
Concurrently, at the apex of the mullahs' regime, there remains an inability to read the dimensions of field realities or to absorb the lessons of the past three years following the Al-Aqsa Flood; instead, they believe the Iranian expansionist project is ascendant and on the verge of establishing political regimes orbiting its sphere of influence!
Amid this landscape, what is expected for Lebanon? What is the fate of the opportunity that revived hopes for the establishment of a capable sovereign state? These hopes were launched by the formation of a new administration 22 months ago, driven by the implementation of an agenda set by the November 2024 ceasefire agreement, centered on dismantling illicit weapons after the agreement included Hezbollah's consent to relinquish its arsenal.
This opportunity was renewed a second time with the "Framework Agreement," which rested on a "land-for-weapons" formula. Under this setup, Israel committed to redeploying outside Lebanese borders, restoring sovereignty and dismantling the security belt project. However, the non-negotiable prerequisite remains full disarmament and the complete dismantling of the parallel military, security, financial, educational, and social infrastructures that enabled the mini-state to systematically encroach upon the state.
From the presidential oath of office and the ministerial statement to the August 5, 2025, directives restricting arms control, followed by the March 2, 2026, decree banning Hezbollah's military and security activities, the government has consistently maintained that Lebanon's resurgence and the restoration of its sovereignty hinge on a single voice, a single weapon, and a single army, with the authority over war and peace resting solely with the state. Domestically, the public wagered on the implementation of these mandates, banking on the premise that no force stands above state legitimacy. Externally, Lebanon's regional allies and international friends awaited concrete operational steps. Ultimately, however, the results failed to live up to those towering expectations.
Beirut has been repeatedly notified of the need to move past mere declarations of intent and establish an implementation roadmap that can be executed in phases. No internal or external actor has called for waging a violent confrontation, particularly given that unlawful forces lack the actual capacity to drag the country into a civil war. Instead, demands have centered on the need to kick off steps to assert effective territorial control, both in towns not subject to Israeli occupation, as well as in the capital, Beirut, and other Lebanese regions.
Such a trajectory would secure the borders and prevent the transport or storage of weapons - a move that would confine arms to legitimate state forces, therefore leading to the end of the Israeli occupation on one hand, and the termination of Iranian influence on the other. This remains the core of the Framework Agreement, in which the US is a partner.
On the eve of the US midterm elections, the administration was well aware that the results would not alter the priority of disarmament - an arsenal that failed the test of defending its holders, invited occupation once again, and brought the greatest catastrophe upon southern Lebanese. It became clear that achieving this is the path that will prevent Hezbollah from dragging Lebanon into a new "support" war for Iran. Here, it is worth noting that the "unity of fronts," which the statement attributed to the supreme leader referred to, aims in essence to defend Iran's investment in its proxies.
In the face of excessive adherence to wait-and-see policies, the "Friends of Lebanon" appeal was issued by the embassies of Britain, the US, Canada, Australia, and Japan, carrying notable messages regarding the international approach to the issues of arms control and sovereignty. While the statement commended the government's official stance on sovereignty, it demanded a practical roadmap to translate rhetoric into action. It called on the entire political establishment, including parliament and political parties, to abandon the sidelines and adopt unequivocal positions to build a broad consensus around confining weapons to the state to demonstrate true capacity to implement these decisions.
Crucially, the appeal coincided with a precise statement by US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, in which he indicated that Washington entered the mediation track on the condition of disarmament.
Waiting is dangerous, and even more dangerous are the same grey policies. While Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam has asserted that "the necessary condition for the state to restore its role, and indeed its existence, is by extending its authority over its entire territory through its own forces," and that "there is no sustainable stability without sustainable security," what is truly needed now is a tangible, operational shift on the ground. At the very least, such action must address the mounting grievances of citizens from within the Shiite community itself, who flatly refuse to allow southern Lebanon to serve as a geographical safety valve for Iran's failures or a mere card in the calculations of regional conflict.
