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Report: China Could Launch Military Drills Near Taiwan over President’s Pacific Visit

Taiwan President Lai Ching-te waves to the crowd on national day to mark the 113th birthday of the Republic of China, Taiwan's formal name, in Taipei, Taiwan October 10, 2024. (Reuters)
Taiwan President Lai Ching-te waves to the crowd on national day to mark the 113th birthday of the Republic of China, Taiwan's formal name, in Taipei, Taiwan October 10, 2024. (Reuters)
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Report: China Could Launch Military Drills Near Taiwan over President’s Pacific Visit

Taiwan President Lai Ching-te waves to the crowd on national day to mark the 113th birthday of the Republic of China, Taiwan's formal name, in Taipei, Taiwan October 10, 2024. (Reuters)
Taiwan President Lai Ching-te waves to the crowd on national day to mark the 113th birthday of the Republic of China, Taiwan's formal name, in Taipei, Taiwan October 10, 2024. (Reuters)

China is likely to launch military drills in the coming days near Taiwan, using President Lai Ching-te's upcoming trip to the Pacific and scheduled US transit as a pretext, according to assessments by Taiwan and regional security officials.

Lai will start a visit to Taipei's three diplomatic allies in the Pacific on Saturday, and sources told Reuters he was planning stops in Hawaii and the US territory of Guam in a sensitive trip coming shortly after the US election.

China, which views democratically governed Taiwan as its own territory and the most important issue in its relations with Washington, has a strong dislike of Lai whom Beijing calls a "separatist".

Lai's office has yet to confirm details of what are officially stop-overs in the United States, but is expected to do so shortly before he departs, sources familiar with the trip have previously said.

Beijing could conduct military maneuvers around or shortly after Lai's trip which ends on Dec. 6, said four officials in the region briefed on the matter, who declined to be identified due to the sensitivity of the matter.

China's defense ministry did not respond to a request for comment, though the government has urged the United States not to permit Lai to transit.

Chen Binhua, spokesperson for China's Taiwan Affairs Office, said on Wednesday that Lai's transit stops were "essentially provocative acts that violate the one-China principle".

Taiwan's defense ministry and the White House did not respond to a request for comment.

China has already staged two rounds of major exercises around Taiwan this year to pressure Taipei, one in May and one in October, dubbed "Joint Sword - 2024A" and B, respectively.

China could "repackage" ongoing regular military activities in the South China Sea or the East China Sea, moving them closer to Taiwan and rebranding them "Joint Sword - 2024C," according to a Taiwan security official.

Beijing could expand the size of its regular "joint combat readiness patrol" that typically involves naval and air force drills near Taiwan during Lai's visit and launch a "targeted" exercise towards the end of the trip, the source said.

Between 20 and 30 Chinese naval vessels are involved in the ongoing military maneuvers this week in the South China Sea, the source added.

'RED LINE'

Beijing wants to show the incoming US administration of President-elect Donald Trump that the first island chain is "China's sphere of influence" and Lai's trip could become a "pretext", the official said, referring to an area that runs from Japan through Taiwan, the Philippines and on to Borneo, enclosing China's coastal seas.

"Beijing hopes to draw a red line and establish its power" during the US government transition and extend its sphere of influence, the official said, adding the military drills were meant for the United States and its allies.

A second source, a Taiwan-based regional security official, said the drills would probably be more limited in scope than the two earlier rounds this year given unstable winter weather conditions in the Taiwan Strait.

A third source, familiar with security assessments around Taiwan, said China could use exercises in the coming weeks to test the bottom line of the Trump administration.

Two of the sources said more favorable weather conditions may prompt an earlier or delayed display of force in the days around Lai's trip.

Taiwan presidents typically take advantage of stop-overs in the United States going to and from far-flung allies to give speeches and meet with friendly politicians. Lai will be visiting the Marshall Islands, Tuvalu and Palau, three of the 12 remaining countries maintaining official diplomatic ties with Taipei.

It would not be unprecedented for China to respond militarily to this trip. It did so in August of last year when then-Vice President Lai returned from the United States, and in April of last year upon then-President Tsai Ing-wen's return from California.

Lai and his ruling Democratic Progressive Party reject Beijing's sovereignty claims, saying only Taiwan's people can decide their future.

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How Likely Is the Use of Nuclear Weapons by Russia?

This photograph taken at a forensic expert center in an undisclosed location in Ukraine on November 24, 2024, shows parts of a missile that were collected for examination at the impact site in the town of Dnipro following an attack on November 21. (Photo by Roman PILIPEY / AFP)
This photograph taken at a forensic expert center in an undisclosed location in Ukraine on November 24, 2024, shows parts of a missile that were collected for examination at the impact site in the town of Dnipro following an attack on November 21. (Photo by Roman PILIPEY / AFP)
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How Likely Is the Use of Nuclear Weapons by Russia?

This photograph taken at a forensic expert center in an undisclosed location in Ukraine on November 24, 2024, shows parts of a missile that were collected for examination at the impact site in the town of Dnipro following an attack on November 21. (Photo by Roman PILIPEY / AFP)
This photograph taken at a forensic expert center in an undisclosed location in Ukraine on November 24, 2024, shows parts of a missile that were collected for examination at the impact site in the town of Dnipro following an attack on November 21. (Photo by Roman PILIPEY / AFP)

On 24 February 2022, in a televised speech heralding the Russian invasion of Ukraine, President Vladimir Putin issued what was interpreted as a threat to use nuclear weapons against NATO countries should they interfere.

“Russia will respond immediately,” he said, “and the consequences will be such as you have never seen in your entire history.”

Then on 27 February 2022, Putin ordered Russia to move nuclear forces to a “special mode of combat duty’, which has a significant meaning in terms of the protocols to launch nuclear weapons from Russia.”

Dr. Patricia Lewis, director of the International Security program at Chatham House, wrote in a report that according to Russian nuclear weapons experts, Russia’s command and control system cannot transmit launch orders in peacetime, so increasing the status to “combat” allows a launch order to go through and be put into effect.

She said Putin made stronger nuclear threats in September 2022, following months of violent conflict and gains made by a Ukrainian counterattack.

“He indicated a stretch in Russian nuclear doctrine, lowering the threshold for nuclear weapons use from an existential threat to Russia to a threat to its territorial integrity,” Lewis wrote.

In November 2022, according to much later reports, the US and allies detected manoeuvres that suggested Russian nuclear forces were being mobilized.

Lewis said that after a flurry of diplomatic activity, China’s President Xi Jinping stepped in to calm the situation and speak against the use of nuclear weapons.

In September 2024, Putin announced an update of the 2020 Russian nuclear doctrine. The update was published on 19 November 2024 and formally reduced the threshold for nuclear weapons use.

According to Lewis, the 2020 doctrine said that Russia could use nuclear weapons “in response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and/or its allies, as well as in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy.”

On 21 November 2024, Russia attacked Dnipro in Ukraine using a new ballistic missile for the first time.

She said Putin announced the missile as the ‘Oreshnik’, which is understood to be a nuclear-capable, intermediate-range ballistic missile which has a theoretical range of below 5,500km.

Lewis added that Russia has fired conventionally armed nuclear-capable missiles at Ukraine throughout the war, but the Oreshnik is much faster and harder to defend against, and suggests an escalatory intent by Russia.

Nuclear Response During Cold War

In her report, Lewis said that nuclear weapons deterrence was developed in the Cold War primarily on the basis of what was called ‘mutually assured destruction’ (MAD).

The idea behind MAD is that the horror and destruction from nuclear weapons is enough to deter aggressive action and war, she added.

But the application of deterrence theory to post-cold war realities is far more complicated in the era of cyberattacks and AI, which could interfere with the command and control of nuclear weapons.

In light of these risks, presidents Biden and Xi issued a joint statement from the 2024 G20 summit affirming the need to maintain human control over the decision to use nuclear weapons.

The US and Russia exchange information on their strategic, long-range nuclear missiles under the New START agreement – a treaty to reduce and monitor nuclear weapons between the two countries which is set to expire in February 2026.

But, Lewis said, with the US decision to exit the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in 2019, there are no longer any agreements between the US and Russia regulating the number or the deployment of ground-launched nuclear missiles with a range of 500-5,500 km.

She said short-range nuclear weapons were withdrawn and put in storage as a result of the 1991 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives but are not subject to any legal restraints.

The 10th NPT Review Conference was held in 2022 in New York. The issue of nuclear weapons threats and the targeting of nuclear power stations in Ukraine were central to the debate.

Lewis noted that a document was carefully crafted to finely balance concerns about the three pillars of the treaty – non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. But Russia withdrew its agreement on the last day of the conference, scuppering progress.

“It was believed that if Russia were to use nuclear weapons it would likely be in Ukraine, using short range, lower yield ‘battlefield’ nuclear weapons,” she said, adding that Russia is thought to have more than 1,000 in reserve.

“These would have to be taken from storage and either connected to missiles, placed in bombers, or as shell in artillery,” Lewis wrote.

Increasingly the rhetoric from Russia suggests nuclear threats are a more direct threat to NATO – not only Ukraine – and could refer to longer range, higher yield nuclear weapons.

For example in his 21 September 2022 speech, Putin accused NATO states of nuclear blackmail, referring to alleged “statements made by some high-ranking representatives of the leading NATO countries on the possibility and admissibility of using weapons of mass destruction – nuclear weapons – against Russia.”

Putin added: “In the event of a threat to the territorial integrity of our country and to defend Russia and our people, we will certainly make use of all weapon systems available to us. This is not a bluff.”

There have been no expressed nuclear weapons threats from NATO states.

NATO does rely on nuclear weapons as a form of deterrence and has recently committed to significantly strengthen its longer-term deterrence and defence posture in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

The current UK Labor government has repeatedly reiterated its commitment to British nuclear weapons – including before the July 2024 election, according to Lewis.

Therefore, she said, any movement to ready and deploy Russian nuclear weapons would be seen and monitored by US and others’ satellites, which can see through cloud cover and at night – as indeed appears to have happened in late 2022.

Lewis concluded that depending on other intelligence and analysis – and the failure of all diplomatic attempts to dissuade Russia – NATO countries may decide to intervene to prevent launch by bombing storage sites and missile deployment sites in advance.