Advanced US Radar and Special Israeli Unit to Hunt Hamas Leader, Sinwar

Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar holds the son of an Al-Qassam Brigades member who was killed in fighting with Israel, during a rally in Gaza City, May 24, 2021 (AFP)
Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar holds the son of an Al-Qassam Brigades member who was killed in fighting with Israel, during a rally in Gaza City, May 24, 2021 (AFP)
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Advanced US Radar and Special Israeli Unit to Hunt Hamas Leader, Sinwar

Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar holds the son of an Al-Qassam Brigades member who was killed in fighting with Israel, during a rally in Gaza City, May 24, 2021 (AFP)
Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar holds the son of an Al-Qassam Brigades member who was killed in fighting with Israel, during a rally in Gaza City, May 24, 2021 (AFP)

By Mark Mazzetti, Ronen Bergman, Julian E. Barnes and Adam Goldman

 

In January, Israeli and American officials thought they had caught a break in the hunt for one of the world’s most wanted men.
Israeli commandos raided an elaborate tunnel complex in the southern Gaza Strip on Jan. 31 based on intelligence that Yahya Sinwar, the Hamas leader, was hiding there, according to American and Israeli officials.
He had been, it turned out. But Sinwar had left the bunker beneath the city of Khan Younis just days earlier, leaving behind documents and stacks of Israeli shekels totaling about $1 million. The hunt went on, with a dearth of hard evidence on his whereabouts.
Since the Oct. 7 attacks in Israel that he planned and directed, Sinwar has been something of a ghost: never appearing in public, rarely releasing messages for his followers and giving up few clues about where he might be.
He is by far Hamas’s most important figure, and his success in evading capture or death has denied Israel the ability to make a foundational claim: that it has won the war and eradicated Hamas in a conflict that has decimated the group’s ranks but also destroyed the Gaza Strip and killed tens of thousands of civilians.
American and Israeli officials said Sinwar abandoned electronic communications long ago, and he has so far avoided a sophisticated intelligence dragnet. He is believed to stay in touch with the organization he leads through a network of human couriers. How that system works remains a mystery.
It is a playbook used by Hamas leaders in the past, and by other leaders like Osama bin Laden. And yet Sinwar’s situation is more complex, and even more frustrating to American and Israeli officials.
Unlike bin Laden in his last years, Sinwar is actively managing a military campaign. Diplomats involved in ceasefire negotiations in Doha, Qatar, say that Hamas representatives insist they need Sinwar’s input before they make major decisions in the talks. As the most respected Hamas leader, he is the only person who can ensure that whatever is decided in Doha is implemented in Gaza.
Interviews with more than two dozen officials in Israel and the United States reveal that both countries have poured vast resources into trying to find Sinwar.
Officials have set up a special unit inside the headquarters of Shin Bet, Israel’s domestic intelligence service, and American spy agencies have been tasked with intercepting Sinwar’s communications. The United States has also provided ground-penetrating radar to Israel to help in the hunt for him and other Hamas commanders.
Killing or capturing Sinwar would undoubtedly have a dramatic impact on the war. American officials believe it would offer Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel a way to claim a significant military victory and potentially make him more willing to end military operations in Gaza.
But it is less clear what effect Sinwar’s death would have on negotiations for the release of hostages seized on Oct. 7. Removing him might make his successors far less willing to make a deal with Israel.
Communicating with Sinwar has become more difficult, said Israeli, Qatari, Egyptian and American officials. He used to respond to messages within days, but the officials said that it has taken much longer to get a response from him in recent months, and that some of his deputies at times have been his proxies in those discussions.
Sinwar, who is 61, was declared the group’s top political leader in early August, days after Ismail Haniyeh, the previous political chief, was killed in an Israeli assassination plot in Tehran.
But, in reality, Sinwar has long been considered Hamas’s de facto leader, even if the group’s political operatives based in Doha held the official leadership titles.
The pressure on the Hamas leader has made it far more difficult for him to communicate with military commanders and direct day-to-day operations, although American officials said that he still has the ability to dictate the group’s broad strategy.
It was weeks after the Oct. 7 attacks, which killed at least 1,200 people, when a special committee of senior Israeli intelligence and military officials approved a kill list of top Hamas commanders and political officials. Many of the men on the list, including Haniyeh, have been killed in the months since.
With each assassination, the Israeli defense minister, Yoav Gallant, has put an “X” over a name on the diagram of the Hamas leadership he keeps on his wall.
But Sinwar, the most important of all, remains at large.
Life Underground
Before the war, Sinwar was a towering presence in Gaza.
He gave interviews, presided over military exercises and even made a televised appearance to present an award to a show depicting a Hamas attack on Israel — an eerie precursor to Oct. 7.
During the first weeks of the war, Israeli intelligence and military officials believe that Sinwar was living in a warren of tunnels beneath Gaza City, the largest city in the strip and one of the first targeted by Israeli military forces.
During one early raid on a tunnel in Gaza City, Israeli soldiers found a video — filmed days earlier — of Sinwar in the midst of moving his family to a different hiding spot under the city. Israeli intelligence officials believe that Sinwar kept his family with him for at least the first six months of the war.
Back then, Sinwar still used cellular and satellite phones — made possible by cell networks in the tunnels — and from time to time spoke to Hamas officials in Doha. American and Israeli spy agencies were able to monitor some of those calls but were not able to pinpoint his location.
As Gaza ran low on fuel, Gallant pushed for new shipments to Gaza to power generators needed to keep the cell networks running so that the Israeli eavesdropping could continue — over the objections of ultra right members of the Israeli government who wanted the fuel shipments cut off to punish the residents of Gaza.
During this period, the spy agencies gained glimpses of his life underground, including his voracious consumption of Israeli news media and his insistence on watching the 8pm news on Israeli TV.
In November, a freed Israeli hostage described how Sinwar had addressed a large number of Israeli captives not long after the Oct. 7 attacks. Speaking in Hebrew, which he learned during his years in an Israeli prison, Sinwar told them that they were safe where they were, and that no harm would come to them, according to the hostage’s account.
Israeli officials said that all Hamas operatives hiding underground, even Sinwar, must occasionally come out of the tunnels for health reasons. But the tunnel network is so vast and complex — and Hamas fighters have such good intelligence about the whereabouts of Israeli troops — that Sinwar can sometimes come above ground without being discovered.
Sinwar eventually moved south to Khan Younis, the city where he was born, Israeli and American officials believe, and probably occasionally traveled from there to the city of Rafah through a stretch of tunnel.
By the time the Khan Younis bunker was raided on Jan. 31, Sinwar had fled, Israeli officials said.
He stayed one step ahead of his pursuers, who sometimes made boastful comments about how close they were to finding him.
In late December, as Israeli military units began excavating tunnels in one area of the city, Gallant bragged to reporters that Sinwar “hears the bulldozers of the Israeli army above him, and he will meet the barrels of our guns soon.”
It appears Sinwar fled the Khan Younis bunker in some haste, leaving the many piles of Israeli shekels behind.
Shared Interests
Almost immediately after the Oct. 7 attacks, Israeli military intelligence and Shin Bet, Israel’s domestic security service, established a cell inside Shin Bet headquarters with the singular mission of finding Sinwar.
The CIA also set up a task force, and the Pentagon dispatched special operations troops to Israel to advise the Israel forces on the looming war in Gaza.
The United States, which considers Hamas a terrorist organization, and Israel established channels to share information about the location of Sinwar and other top Hamas commanders, and the hostages.
“We’ve devoted considerable effort and resources to the Israelis for the hunt for the top leadership, particularly Sinwar,” said Jake Sullivan, the White House national security adviser. “We’ve had people in Israel sitting in the room with the Israelis working this problem set. And obviously we have a lot of experience hunting high-value targets.”
In particular, the Americans have deployed ground-penetrating radar to help map the hundreds of miles of tunnels they believe are under Gaza, with new imagery combined with Israeli intelligence gathered from captured Hamas fighters and troves of documents to build out a more complete picture of the tunnel network.
One senior Israeli official said American intelligence support had been “priceless.”
The Israelis and Americans have a mutual interest in locating Hamas commanders and the dozens of hostages, including Americans, who remain in Gaza.
But one person familiar with the intelligence-sharing arrangement, who discussed it on the condition of anonymity, describes it as often “very lopsided” — with the Americans sharing more than the Israelis give in return. At times, the person said, the Americans provide information about Hamas leaders in the hopes that the Israelis will direct some of their own intelligence resources toward finding the American hostages.
Rise to the Top
During the 1980s, in the years after he was recruited by Hamas’s founder, Sheik Ahmed Yassin, Sinwar’s influence in the group grew steadily.
He took over as the head of Hamas’s internal security unit, a group charged with finding and punishing Palestinians suspected of collaborating with Israeli authorities as well as anyone who commits blasphemy.
He spent years in an Israeli prison but was released in October 2011 along with more than 1,000 other prisoners as part of an exchange for Gilad Shalit, an Israeli soldier captured by Hamas.
In 2017, Sinwar was named Hamas’s leader in Gaza.
While he has had an outsized impact on decision-making within Hamas, Sinwar has shaped his positions in close coordination with a group of Hamas political and military leaders in Gaza, according to analysts who have studied Hamas.
The circle of confidants has included Marwan Issa, a Hamas military commander killed in March; Rawhi Mushtaha, a member of Hamas’s political office in Gaza; Izzeldin al-Haddad, a senior commander in the military wing; Mohammed Sinwar, Sinwar’s brother and a top official in the military wing; and Muhammad Deif, the leader of the military wing, according to Ibrahim al-Madhoun, an Istanbul-based expert who maintains a close relationship with Hamas.
But Sinwar’s network of advisers has been steadily shrinking: Some top Hamas commanders have been killed, some captured, and others were outside of Gaza when the war began and have not been able to return since.
Deif was the most senior adviser to Sinwar, but was less disciplined than his boss. He came above ground far more regularly, allowing Western intelligence agencies to pinpoint his whereabouts.
It was on one of those occasions, Israeli officials say, when he was killed in an airstrike.

 

The New York Times



Iraq’s Badr Organization Demands Reopening of Border Crossings with Iran

The Shalamcheh border crossing with Iran in Basra, southern Iraq. (AFP)
The Shalamcheh border crossing with Iran in Basra, southern Iraq. (AFP)
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Iraq’s Badr Organization Demands Reopening of Border Crossings with Iran

The Shalamcheh border crossing with Iran in Basra, southern Iraq. (AFP)
The Shalamcheh border crossing with Iran in Basra, southern Iraq. (AFP)

Iraq’s Iran-aligned Badr Organization, led by Hadi al-Amiri, expressed anger on Sunday over remarks by Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein concerning the closure of land border crossings with Iran.

The closure of the al-Sheeb crossing in the southern province of Maysan continues to draw opposition from Tehran-aligned groups and businesses whose livelihoods depend on cross-border trade. The dispute also involves networks that exploit weak oversight and security procedures to smuggle prohibited goods.

Truck drivers have staged repeated protests demanding the reopening of the crossing.

The controversy resurfaced after Hussein told Al Jazeera that the US had formally asked Iraq to close all its border crossings with Iran except two.

Some political sources believe the request may have been conveyed during Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi’s meeting with US envoy Tom Barrack last week, or during an earlier telephone conversation between al-Zaidi and President Donald Trump.

According to the prime minister’s media office, the call addressed the importance of coordination and consultation between Baghdad and Washington on current challenges and efforts to support regional stability.

Al-Zaidi reaffirmed Iraq’s position on respecting state sovereignty and preventing its territory from being used to launch attacks against neighboring countries.

Iraqi authorities closed the al-Sheeb crossing on October 21, citing the need to review security arrangements and procedures, as well as inadequate technical infrastructure and surveillance equipment requiring upgrades.

The decision drew criticism from parties and groups allied with or close to Iran, which portrayed it as compliance with US pressure and the economic blockade imposed on Tehran.

An official at Iraq’s Border Ports Authority confirmed to Asharq Al-Awsat that four of the five crossings with Iran remained open, with al-Sheeb the only one still closed.

Security sources, however, suggested that the shutdown was linked to sensitive security concerns, particularly reports that the crossing had served as a route for carrying out missile attacks against Saudi Arabia on October 10.

Badr rejects US demands

In a statement, the Badr Organization said it had followed recent developments, particularly Hussein’s disclosure of American requests and what it described as dictates to close border crossings with Iran.

The Badr parliamentary bloc categorically rejected those demands, insisting on Iraq’s national sovereignty.

“What the minister’s remarks contradict the previous technical justifications and exposes agendas targeting our resistance-minded south and interfering in sovereign decision-making,” the bloc declared.

The statement referred to the government’s earlier explanations for closing the crossing.

Badr maintained that Iraq was a fully sovereign state and that its people and national political forces would not stand idly by in the face of any violation of sovereignty or submission to foreign agendas harmful to the country’s interests.

The Iran-aligned organization also denounced what it called policies of economic blockade and the starvation of populations, underscoring the longstanding ties between Baghdad and Tehran.

“Iraqi-Iranian relations are deep-rooted, forged through the blood shed for liberation and in confronting terrorism,” it stated.

“We categorically reject Iraq becoming a tool in a campaign to besiege the Muslim Iranian people. Participation in such efforts would betray our fraternal commitments and squander the sacrifices of the martyrs.”

Badr argued that the continued closure of major border crossings, particularly al-Sheeb, had inflicted significant economic hardship on residents and disrupted livelihoods.

The organization urged the government to uphold Iraq’s declared policy of staying out of regional conflicts and avoid being drawn into “hegemonic policies” and “illegal wars” that fuel regional tensions.

It demanded the immediate reopening of border crossings, insisting that the interests of Iraqi citizens and national sovereignty take precedence over foreign pressure.


Syrian Foreign Ministry Appointments Mark a Break with Diplomatic Tradition

President Ahmad al-Sharaa with Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani and Interior Minister Anas Khattab last February (SANA). 
President Ahmad al-Sharaa with Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani and Interior Minister Anas Khattab last February (SANA). 
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Syrian Foreign Ministry Appointments Mark a Break with Diplomatic Tradition

President Ahmad al-Sharaa with Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani and Interior Minister Anas Khattab last February (SANA). 
President Ahmad al-Sharaa with Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani and Interior Minister Anas Khattab last February (SANA). 

Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa has appointed three young deputy foreign ministers as part of efforts to restructure state institutions, breaking with a longstanding tradition of reserving senior diplomatic posts for seasoned officials.

The appointments come as many diplomats who defected from the former regime are still awaiting the resolution of their employment status.

The changes have sparked debate in political circles in Damascus over appointments to senior positions in key ministries, amid unconfirmed reports of a possible cabinet reshuffle involving sensitive portfolios and the reassignment of prominent officials.

Wael Alwan, a researcher and executive director of the Jusoor Center for Studies, told Asharq Al-Awsat that there was speculation about Interior Minister Anas Khattab taking over as head of National Security, with Maj. Gen. Abdul Qader al-Tahhan potentially succeeding him.

“There is similar talk concerning the Defense Ministry, but no precise information is available so far,” Alwan said.

He added that he had no knowledge of reports suggesting Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani might be moved to another position.

An Unprecedented Move

On Saturday, al-Sharaa issued three presidential decrees, numbered 205, 206 and 207 of 2026, appointing deputy foreign ministers responsible for consular affairs, international cooperation and executive affairs, respectively.

The appointment of three deputies simultaneously is unprecedented in Syria’s diplomatic history and signals a departure from an administrative structure that has prevailed for decades.

Traditionally, the Foreign Ministry has had two permanent assistant ministers overseeing diplomatic, political and administrative affairs, alongside a deputy foreign minister.

A third assistant was occasionally appointed under exceptional circumstances, while specialized responsibilities were sometimes assigned to advisers. The two-assistant structure, however, remained the norm.

Alwan described the latest appointments as a restructuring of the ministry.

“The country’s new administration is not bound by established practices. It is completely separate from the previous system of government,” he explained.

Ordinarily, senior officials would be selected through institutional promotion, established career paths or extensive diplomatic experience, he noted.

“In a transitional government, however, things are different. Trust, in the sense of loyalty, takes precedence over competence,” Alwan said, attributing the controversial approach largely to security considerations.

Asked whether experienced diplomats who defected from the former regime could be brought back into senior positions, he acknowledged that this was possible but not essential.

Priority, he stressed, would go to trust and alignment with the current administration’s approach.

Young Appointees with Limited Experience

The three newly appointed officials were born between 1988 and 1996 and have backgrounds in public policy, law, international cooperation and administration.

Muhammad Yaqub al-Omar, born in Idlib in 1993, was appointed deputy foreign minister for consular affairs.

According to local media, he holds a master’s degree in public policy from the University of Idlib, a bachelor’s degree in political science from Al-Shamal University, and a degree in agricultural engineering from the University of Idlib.

Qutaiba Ali Kadish, born in Damascus in 1988, was named deputy foreign minister for international cooperation.

A law graduate of Damascus University, Kadish previously headed the Foreign Ministry’s international cooperation and protocol departments.

He also served as deputy minister of development and humanitarian affairs in the Syrian Salvation Government and directed its humanitarian and development projects department.

Obadah Khaled Diab, born in Damascus in 1996, was appointed deputy foreign minister for executive affairs.

He holds an executive master’s degree in development policies from the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva and a bachelor’s degree in foreign service, specializing in international economics, from Georgetown University.

According to the Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA), Diab previously headed the foreign minister’s office and directed the ministry’s strategic planning office.

His professional background also includes work as an information management and labor market research expert at Qatar’s Ministry of Labor and as a data specialist at the Center for Humanitarian Data of the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).

Despite the Foreign Ministry’s decision to reinstate diplomats who defected from the former regime, and the appointment of several to head diplomatic missions in regional and international capitals, many cases remain unresolved.

A substantial number are still awaiting the settlement of their employment status and the completion of administrative reviews.

Peace Adviser Appointment Sparks Debate

The presidential appointments came alongside a separate decision by Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani to name broadcaster Muzna Mamdouh al-Atrash, a native of Sweida, as an adviser for peace affairs.

Some viewed the appointment as a potential boost to national reconciliation efforts, particularly those concerning Sweida.

Others criticized the creation of what they described as a vaguely defined position covering “peace affairs.”

Critics also cited al-Atrash’s previous political positions, noting that she had supported former President Bashar al-Assad and the Syrian army’s actions during her work at state television.


Lebanon Rushes to Avert Security Vacuum as UNIFIL Mandate Nears End

UNIFIL's mission expires on December 31. (UNIFIL)
UNIFIL's mission expires on December 31. (UNIFIL)
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Lebanon Rushes to Avert Security Vacuum as UNIFIL Mandate Nears End

UNIFIL's mission expires on December 31. (UNIFIL)
UNIFIL's mission expires on December 31. (UNIFIL)

Lebanon is intensifying diplomatic efforts ahead of the expiration of the UN peacekeeping mission’s mandate in South Lebanon at the end of the year, fearing a security vacuum that could undermine its internationally recognized southern border, deprive it of independent documentation of Israeli violations and isolate residents of Christian villages in the Bint Jbeil district.

The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) announced that its mandate would expire on December 31, under UN Security Council Resolution 2790, after which it would begin a phased withdrawal.

Diplomatic sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that the full withdrawal would take several months, with peacekeepers leaving their positions gradually rather than evacuating all three operational sectors - western, central and eastern - simultaneously. The aim is to avoid leaving entire areas without an international presence.

Lebanon’s concerns are compounded by Israel’s continued occupation of parts of the South following its advance deeper into Lebanese territory between March and June 2026 during the latest war with Hezbollah.

During that period, the Lebanese Army gradually withdrew from dozens of positions south of the Litani River, redeploying to unoccupied areas north of the virtual Yellow Line imposed by Israel that remain within UNIFIL’s area of operations.

Border markers and international monitoring

Security sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that the consequences of UNIFIL’s departure would extend beyond the immediate security situation. A principal concern is the potential loss of border markers that UNIFIL and the Lebanese Army have worked to establish since the Blue Line was identified in 2000.

The sources warned that the absence of international observers could encourage Israel to intensify violations of Lebanon’s internationally recognized border, which Israel accepted under the 1949 Armistice Agreement.

UN peacekeepers are currently the only international witnesses in occupied areas, they explained, where Lebanese state institutions, including the army and security forces, are absent amid widespread displacement and destruction.

“The only witness today in the occupied area is the United Nations force,” the sources said, describing UNIFIL as a credible international witness and a longstanding source of support for Lebanon.

Its presence allows Israeli actions and attacks to be independently documented and recorded at the United Nations, preserving an international account of the conflict that Lebanon fears losing.

“Amid Israeli claims, international accounts and documentation cannot be called into question,” the sources stressed.

They also recalled UNIFIL’s role since 2006 in assisting the Lebanese Army’s deployment south of the Litani River and supporting legitimate state institutions.

According to the sources, the mission has fulfilled its obligations under Security Council Resolution 1701, with 45 countries contributing to those efforts over the past two decades.

Christian villages face growing isolation

The sources warned that withdrawing UNIFIL without replacing it with another UN mission or internationally backed force would leave Lebanon “at the mercy of the Israeli hyena,” alone in confronting Israel.

The repercussions would be particularly severe for hundreds of families who have remained in occupied areas, including residents of the three Christian villages of Rmeish, Debel and Ain Ebel in Bint Jbeil district.

Residents currently rely on UNIFIL escorts when traveling through occupied areas toward the Lebanese interior. Beyond those areas, they continue under the protection of both UN peacekeepers and the Lebanese Army until reaching territory north of the Litani River. Without UNIFIL, they would have to navigate Israeli security procedures on their own.

The sources revealed that Israel had rejected a Lebanese proposal to establish a safe corridor allowing residents to travel freely to and from their villages under Lebanese security escort.

The proposed route would have passed through Tebnine toward Beit Yahoun and Ain Ebel, providing access to communities surrounded by Israeli-occupied territory.

Lebanon also fears losing what remains of the international framework governing security arrangements in the south.

The trilateral talks between Lebanon and Israel under UN auspices in Naqoura were discontinued, followed by the termination of a five-party mechanism that included France and the United States, was chaired by a US general and convened at UN headquarters in Naqoura.

Lebanese concerns now extend to the possibility that the United States, as guarantor, could declare its mission complete, leaving Beirut to deal directly with Israel - an arrangement the Lebanese government rejects. Lebanon and Israel are technically in a state of war and have no diplomatic ties.

UNIFIL currently maintains some 36 permanent military positions south of the Litani River. Security sources fear Israeli forces could occupy some of these sites or destroy others following the peacekeepers’ departure.

The mission also conducts hundreds of patrols daily. Before the 2024 war, it carried out as many as 410 patrols a day across its area of operations.

In its statement, UNIFIL stressed that peacekeepers from 45 countries would continue their regular activities throughout South Lebanon until the mandate expires.

These include monitoring and reporting developments, liaising with the parties, supporting the Lebanese Army and facilitating humanitarian operations.

Diplomatic push for an alternative

Lebanese diplomatic efforts to secure an alternative international presence are continuing ahead of UNIFIL’s departure.

President Joseph Aoun has repeatedly warned of the dangers of a security vacuum and welcomed the deployment of any international force capable of helping maintain stability in the south.

On Friday, Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri reaffirmed Lebanon’s position during a meeting with EU Ambassador Sandra De Waele.

He stressed that Resolution 1701 remains the legal guarantee of Lebanon’s right to recover all its territory up to its internationally recognized borders, while UNIFIL provides the operational framework for implementing the resolution in full.

Lebanon has proposed expanding the mandate of certain UN observers, but Israel rejected the suggestion.