Report: Imports Ongoing to Hodeidah Following Israeli Attacks

Ships are docked at the Red Sea port of Hodeidah, Yemen July 31, 2024. (Reuters)
Ships are docked at the Red Sea port of Hodeidah, Yemen July 31, 2024. (Reuters)
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Report: Imports Ongoing to Hodeidah Following Israeli Attacks

Ships are docked at the Red Sea port of Hodeidah, Yemen July 31, 2024. (Reuters)
Ships are docked at the Red Sea port of Hodeidah, Yemen July 31, 2024. (Reuters)

Food imports are ongoing to Houthi-controlled areas following the recent Israeli attacks on vital infrastructure and facilities at the Ras Isa and Hodeidah ports in Yemen, an international report revealed.
According to the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET), early analysis indicates an overall low concern for the potential for meaningful disruptions to food and fuel import volumes.
On September 29, Israel targeted vital infrastructure and facilities in Hodeidah for the second time in retaliation for Houthi attacks on Israel. The attacks involved oil tanks at the Ras Isa port (north of the western city of Hodeidah), the port of Hodeidah (the target of the first attack in July), and the governorate’s two main power stations.
According to officials, the airstrikes killed five civilians and wounded 57.
FEWS said the damage to power stations resulted in power outages, including in Hodeidah and parts of Sanaa. It noted that as of the end of September, the power stations remained non-operational. Ras al-Khuthayb power station (the largest) reportedly incurred the most damage, with boilers destroyed by the bombing.
The Network affirmed that three of four oil tanks in Ras Isa were damaged, while Houthis officials reported that the fuel tanks had been recently emptied in anticipation of Israeli strikes.
FEWS also said significant damage at Hodeidah port has not been reported.
Houthi officials report that impacts of the strikes were insignificant.
According to available information, food and fuel imports are ongoing following the attacks. FEWS said it continues to triangulate available data and information sources in the aftermath of the strike and will provide an updated analysis of any expected impacts on acute food insecurity in the forthcoming October Food Security Outlook report.
However, it said, early analysis indicates overall low concern for the potential for meaningful disruptions to food and fuel import volumes.
The report also showed that given poor purchasing capacity and the continued pause of WFP-provided humanitarian food assistance in areas controlled by the Houthi-based authorities, millions of poor households are likely to continue to face food consumption gaps across Yemen, with particular concern for internally displaced persons (IDPs), flood-affected households, and poor households that depend on daily wage opportunities.
FEWS said that across the country, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse outcomes are expected to persist through January 2025, with some Houthi-controlled governorates likely to continue facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes amid the food assistance pause and the impacts of recent devastating flooding.
“Above-average rainfall in July and August contributed to favorable growing conditions for crops and rangeland resources (pasture and water for livestock) in many areas,” the FEWS report said.
However, it added, severe flooding has negatively impacted crop production in affected areas. According to a rapid assessment conducted by FAO in August, around 99,000 hectares (ha) of farmland have been impacted.
The vast majority of this impacted farmland was in Hodeidah (77,362 ha) and Hajjah (20,717 ha), representing approximately 12% and 9%, respectively, of the total farmland.
Meanwhile, around 279,000 sheep and goats were potentially impacted, according to the same FAO assessment.
Hodeidah, Hajjah, and Al Jawf were the most affected, with an estimated 6% of sheep and goats impacted Hodeidah (106, 361), followed by 4% Al Jawf (50,664) and 4% in Hajjah (46,424).
Worst-Affected Households
FEWS said that according to the 2021 Food Security and Livelihoods Assessment, these areas are important livestock suppliers and pastoralism is an important livelihood system, particularly in Al Jawf, where an estimated 20% of households considered livestock to be their primary source of income.
Due to losses of key sources of food and income amid the ongoing assistance pause, some worst-affected households in severely affected areas have likely experienced losses of livestock assets and damage to livelihoods, it noted.
The report also revealed that households worst-affected by flooding in both pastoralist and agropastoral areas are likely unable to meet their minimum food needs in the absence of assistance.
According to the report, September marks the start of the main cereal harvest season in Yemen when poor households experience a seasonal boost in food availability from crop production as well as income from labor opportunities along crop production and marketing chains.

 

 



Jordan Moves to Ban Muslim Brotherhood as ‘Illegal’ Group

Jordanian government spokesman Mohammad Momani announces details of terrorist cell arrests in Amman. (Petra)
Jordanian government spokesman Mohammad Momani announces details of terrorist cell arrests in Amman. (Petra)
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Jordan Moves to Ban Muslim Brotherhood as ‘Illegal’ Group

Jordanian government spokesman Mohammad Momani announces details of terrorist cell arrests in Amman. (Petra)
Jordanian government spokesman Mohammad Momani announces details of terrorist cell arrests in Amman. (Petra)

As the fallout continues from Jordan’s recent security crackdown on a militant cell accused of manufacturing missiles and drones, officials remain tight-lipped about why a court-banned branch of the Muslim Brotherhood continues to operate freely.

The group, declared illegal by a final court ruling in 2020, has maintained its political activities with apparent impunity—a contradiction analysts say points to selective enforcement of the law.

While Jordanian authorities have detained extremists over what was described as a “chaos plot,” they have avoided confronting the unlicensed movement. The Brotherhood’s continued presence, despite Article 159 of the penal code criminalizing illegal associations with potential jail sentences, has puzzled observers.

Analysts say the government’s “soft containment” approach reflects a broader political culture in Amman that avoids clashes with groups enjoying popular support, even if that means ignoring binding court decisions.

Critics argue the state’s flexibility towards the Brotherhood undermines legal consistency and raises questions about the rule of law, especially as other groups face swift and public consequences.

Jordan’s government appears to have taken a markedly tougher stance following the recent exposure of the militant cell allegedly backed by foreign actors and accused of planning attacks with home-built missiles and drones targeting domestic sites—not under the pretext of “supporting the resistance in Gaza”.

The discovery of the plot has prompted a reassessment within the country’s decision-making circles, which are now closely watching for verdicts from the State Security Court—the judicial body with jurisdiction over terrorism and national security cases.

While authorities have clamped down on the immediate threat, they have stopped short of confronting the unlicensed Muslim Brotherhood group and its political wing, the Islamic Action Front.

Analysts say officials are treading cautiously, wary of provoking parliamentary unrest or street mobilizations that the faction could spearhead if directly challenged.

The government’s current posture suggests a strategic pause—one that balances national security concerns with the potential political fallout of taking on a well-rooted opposition force.

Jordanian decision-makers, however, are stepping up preparations on multiple fronts as the country braces for a possible legal showdown with the Brotherhood.

Authorities are weighing the implications of formally designating the Brotherhood as an unlicensed entity, a move that would entail shutting down its activities, seizing its assets and properties, and treating any political statements or public events linked to its members as violations subject to prosecution under the penal code and counterterrorism laws.

Behind the scenes, government institutions are working to draw a legal and operational distinction between the Brotherhood and the Islamic Action Front, which remains registered under the country’s political parties law.

This delicate balancing act hinges on upcoming hearings at the State Security Court, expected to begin next week. However, officials fear that any legal escalation could spark backlash, including street protests or social media campaigns led by the Islamic Action Front.

Analysts say such a scenario could force authorities to take more decisive measures, including dissolving the party itself, in a bid to dismantle what critics view as a monopolized Islamist platform and reassert control over religious political representation in the kingdom.