عربي English Türkçe اردو فارسى
Logo
Latest News
Arab World

Report: Imports Ongoing to Hodeidah Following Israeli Attacks

Ships are docked at the Red Sea port of Hodeidah, Yemen July 31, 2024. (Reuters)
Ships are docked at the Red Sea port of Hodeidah, Yemen July 31, 2024. (Reuters)
TT
20
TT

Report: Imports Ongoing to Hodeidah Following Israeli Attacks

Ships are docked at the Red Sea port of Hodeidah, Yemen July 31, 2024. (Reuters)
Ships are docked at the Red Sea port of Hodeidah, Yemen July 31, 2024. (Reuters)

Food imports are ongoing to Houthi-controlled areas following the recent Israeli attacks on vital infrastructure and facilities at the Ras Isa and Hodeidah ports in Yemen, an international report revealed.
According to the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET), early analysis indicates an overall low concern for the potential for meaningful disruptions to food and fuel import volumes.
On September 29, Israel targeted vital infrastructure and facilities in Hodeidah for the second time in retaliation for Houthi attacks on Israel. The attacks involved oil tanks at the Ras Isa port (north of the western city of Hodeidah), the port of Hodeidah (the target of the first attack in July), and the governorate’s two main power stations.
According to officials, the airstrikes killed five civilians and wounded 57.
FEWS said the damage to power stations resulted in power outages, including in Hodeidah and parts of Sanaa. It noted that as of the end of September, the power stations remained non-operational. Ras al-Khuthayb power station (the largest) reportedly incurred the most damage, with boilers destroyed by the bombing.
The Network affirmed that three of four oil tanks in Ras Isa were damaged, while Houthis officials reported that the fuel tanks had been recently emptied in anticipation of Israeli strikes.
FEWS also said significant damage at Hodeidah port has not been reported.
Houthi officials report that impacts of the strikes were insignificant.
According to available information, food and fuel imports are ongoing following the attacks. FEWS said it continues to triangulate available data and information sources in the aftermath of the strike and will provide an updated analysis of any expected impacts on acute food insecurity in the forthcoming October Food Security Outlook report.
However, it said, early analysis indicates overall low concern for the potential for meaningful disruptions to food and fuel import volumes.
The report also showed that given poor purchasing capacity and the continued pause of WFP-provided humanitarian food assistance in areas controlled by the Houthi-based authorities, millions of poor households are likely to continue to face food consumption gaps across Yemen, with particular concern for internally displaced persons (IDPs), flood-affected households, and poor households that depend on daily wage opportunities.
FEWS said that across the country, Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse outcomes are expected to persist through January 2025, with some Houthi-controlled governorates likely to continue facing Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes amid the food assistance pause and the impacts of recent devastating flooding.
“Above-average rainfall in July and August contributed to favorable growing conditions for crops and rangeland resources (pasture and water for livestock) in many areas,” the FEWS report said.
However, it added, severe flooding has negatively impacted crop production in affected areas. According to a rapid assessment conducted by FAO in August, around 99,000 hectares (ha) of farmland have been impacted.
The vast majority of this impacted farmland was in Hodeidah (77,362 ha) and Hajjah (20,717 ha), representing approximately 12% and 9%, respectively, of the total farmland.
Meanwhile, around 279,000 sheep and goats were potentially impacted, according to the same FAO assessment.
Hodeidah, Hajjah, and Al Jawf were the most affected, with an estimated 6% of sheep and goats impacted Hodeidah (106, 361), followed by 4% Al Jawf (50,664) and 4% in Hajjah (46,424).
Worst-Affected Households
FEWS said that according to the 2021 Food Security and Livelihoods Assessment, these areas are important livestock suppliers and pastoralism is an important livelihood system, particularly in Al Jawf, where an estimated 20% of households considered livestock to be their primary source of income.
Due to losses of key sources of food and income amid the ongoing assistance pause, some worst-affected households in severely affected areas have likely experienced losses of livestock assets and damage to livelihoods, it noted.
The report also revealed that households worst-affected by flooding in both pastoralist and agropastoral areas are likely unable to meet their minimum food needs in the absence of assistance.
According to the report, September marks the start of the main cereal harvest season in Yemen when poor households experience a seasonal boost in food availability from crop production as well as income from labor opportunities along crop production and marketing chains.

 

 

Most Viewed

 
Arab World

Syria’s al-Sharaa Under Trump’s Spotlight, Admiring ‘Strong’ Leaders

Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa (AP)
Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa (AP)
TT
20
TT

Syria’s al-Sharaa Under Trump’s Spotlight, Admiring ‘Strong’ Leaders

Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa (AP)
Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa (AP)

A hundred days after Ahmed al-Sharaa was sworn in as Syria’s president, US officials are still proceeding with caution regarding his administration. There are concerns about the potential for chaos, which could create fertile ground for extremist groups and allow Iran to maintain its foothold in the country.

Additionally, there are growing anxieties over Türkiye’s expanding influence across Syria and its implications for Israel.

These points were highlighted in discussions with Robert Wood, a former US ambassador who held various positions at the State Department and served at the US Mission to the United Nations; Robert Ford, former US ambassador to Syria; Henri Barkey, senior fellow for Middle Eastern Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations and former government official; and Ayman Abdel Nour, a Syrian-American political analyst and journalist.

While caution is urged in evaluating al-Sharaa’s leadership, it remains unclear whether his actions will translate into meaningful governance.

According to Wood, the current situation in Syria can be described as highly complex, especially considering recent violence, and experts are watching closely to see how al-Sharaa navigates these challenges. While his hosting of a national unity conference has drawn some positive attention, concerns remain about the broader implications of his leadership.

Ford shares a similar perspective, acknowledging that Shara's actions often align with what one would expect from a head of state. Notably, his agreement with Mazloum Abdi, leader of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), is seen as a potential step toward greater internal stability, provided it is properly implemented.

However, Barkey emphasizes that Abdi controls a much larger force than other groups like Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which likely made it necessary for al-Sharaa to strike a deal with him. If Abdi forms alliances with other minority groups, such as the Druze, he could become a key figure of opposition to al-Sharaa’s rule. Additionally, al-Sharaa faces the challenge of reducing his reliance on Turkish support, while also proving his ability to act independently on the international stage.

US diplomats, however, remained cautious about al-Sharaa's leadership, with some expressing skepticism about his ability to lead effectively. While he appears to be acting presidentially, concerns persist regarding his control over extremist factions within his government, as well as recent security violations in Latakia and Tartus. Experts note that despite his ascent to power, Sharaa has yet to unite the country, with some pointing to the collapse of the regime’s military as a key factor in his rise.

A significant point of criticism from Barkey is al-Sharaa’s appointment of former jihadists as governors in key areas, including Latakia and Tartus, as well as his reliance on family members and loyalists within his government.

While some US officials argue that Sharaa’s government may not be directly involved in recent incidents, uncertainty remains about who in his administration might be complicit.

For his part, Abdel Nour highlights a shift in public perception of al-Sharaa since the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024.

Initially, Syrians—including Alawites—were relieved by Assad's ousting, but nearly 100 days into Sharaa's presidency, tensions have risen due to discrepancies between al-Sharaa’s rhetoric and the reality on the ground, particularly in relation to key figures like Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shibani and mid-level officials.

Key Questions Raised on Accountability and Rule of Law

Ford echoed concerns about al-Sharaa’s ability to address critical issues, including accountability and the rule of law, especially following the unrest in Latakia and Tartus.

Despite al-Sharaa’s formation of a committee to investigate the incidents, Ford questions whether those responsible for violations will be held publicly accountable, stressing that such actions are crucial for maintaining trust within security forces and the broader public.

Wood acknowledged the significance of al-Sharaa’s national unity conference yet remains deeply concerned about the potential agreements Sharaa may strike with the SDF. While he sees positive signs, he underscores the importance of thorough investigations into recent killings, as the identities of those responsible remain unclear.

US Perspectives on al-Sharaa’s Leadership

Abdel Nour describes two prevalent perspectives in Washington regarding al-Sharaa’s leadership. One, held by military and security figures with experience in Iraq, doubts that the new Syrian leadership will bring significant change, regardless of its outward appearance. The other viewpoint suggests giving al-Sharaa several months to adjust to the new reality.

Fears Over ISIS Prisoners and Regional Stability

A significant concern raised by Wood is the potential release of approximately 9,500 ISIS fighters currently held in over 20 prisons across Syria, should Sharaa reach a deal with the SDF. These fighters could pose a serious security threat not only to Syria but to Iraq and the broader region.

Ford added that al-Sharaa’s past, particularly his involvement with jihadist factions like Jabhat al-Nusra and ISIS, raises questions about his true political motivations. Ford wonders whether al-Sharaa used these groups for political leverage.

Iran’s Influence and Regional Dynamics

Both Wood and Ford emphasize the importance of monitoring Iran’s role in Syria. Ford warns that further instability could provide Iran with opportunities to rebuild its influence in certain Syrian communities, which he believes would not align with US national security interests.

Wood stresses that neighboring countries, including Israel and Türkiye, have a strong interest in a unified Syria to avoid further regional instability.

Professor Barkey cautions that while Iran's influence in Syria has not been eliminated, Tehran will likely continue to pursue ways to reassert its presence.

Türkiye-Israel Tensions and the Future of Syria

Concerns over a potential Turkish-Israeli confrontation in Syria are growing. Ford points out that Türkiye, a key player with growing ties to al-Sharaa’s government, could play a significant role in Syria’s future. He worries that a direct conflict between Turkish and Israeli forces, potentially involving airstrikes or proxy engagements, could escalate tensions in the region.

However, Barkey believes that such a scenario is unlikely to escalate into direct military confrontation. Instead, he suggests that the Turkish-Israeli rivalry will remain largely political, with both countries focusing on strategic interests in the region, particularly in Syria’s south where Israel is concerned about the resurgence of Hezbollah or other new actors.

In discussions surrounding Syria’s new constitution, Ford sees little value in UN Security Council Resolution 2254 and the Constitutional Committee led by UN Special Envoy to Syria, Geir Pedersen. Similarly, Barkey shares Ford’s skepticism, noting that he sees limited potential for the UN to bring about meaningful change unless Arab countries step in with support.

Barkey also echoes the view held by many that US President Donald Trump was unpredictable in his decision-making. He added that Trump had a deep admiration, though not fascination, for Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, viewing him as one of the “strongmen” capable of shaping the future of their countries as they see fit.

Looking ahead, Barkey remains uncertain about Syria’s future, acknowledging that the situation is highly unpredictable. He suggests that if Syria were to experience another war or a severe collapse of law and order, it is highly probable that ISIS could resurge.

The US government, Barkey speculates, is likely deeply concerned that without American forces acting as a buffer or deterrent, the stability of the region could be further jeopardized in the event of a breakdown in Syria.