Amid a sharp policy divide between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who advocates for a full occupation of the Gaza Strip, and Israeli Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir - who warns against it due to the risks of military exhaustion, economic strain, and the threat to hostages’ lives - the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) this week published an in-depth study analyzing Israel’s strategic options in Gaza.
The study, authored by Kobi Michael of the INSS at Tel Aviv University and Yossi Kuperwasser, head of the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security and visiting professor at the University of South Wales in the UK, offers a detailed assessment of Hamas’s capabilities and outlines three possible strategic paths for the Israeli government, with their respective advantages and drawbacks.
Hamas Capabilities
According to the report, despite heavy losses, Hamas continues to maintain two operational brigades - the Gaza Brigade and the Khan Younis Brigade - along with active commanders, intact military infrastructure, and an ongoing ability to recruit and arm new fighters.
The study warns that Hamas has restored its local weapons manufacturing capabilities, making use of unexploded Israeli munitions and undamaged production facilities.
It cautions that unless Hamas is dismantled as the de facto governing authority in Gaza, no viable civilian alternative will emerge, reconstruction will stall, and the security situation will remain unstable. The threat of cross-border raids, rocket fire, and civilian disruption in southern Israel will persist, making it difficult to persuade border communities to return home.
Dismantling Hamas, the study underlines, does not mean eliminating every member or destroying every rocket, nor erasing its ideology from Palestinian society. Rather, it means ending its ability to operate as both a military and governing authority in Gaza, including control over law enforcement, civil services, humanitarian aid distribution, and local taxation.
Option 1: Intensified Military Pressure
The first option calls for ramping up military pressure to push Hamas toward accepting the ceasefire proposal drafted by mediators and already approved by Israel.
This approach would involve weakening Hamas’ financial base and grip over the population, encouraging movement toward a designated “humanitarian city” in southern Gaza, tightening control over aid distribution, and supporting local groups — such as Yasser Abu Shabab’s faction in eastern Rafah — to gradually replace Hamas in certain areas of civil governance.
While this option buys time for negotiations and eases tensions with Washington, the researchers suggest that it remains uncertain that Hamas will agree to the US-brokered proposal by envoy Steve Witkoff, which includes the release of about half the hostages in exchange for a two-month ceasefire, an Israeli pullback from northern Gaza, the release of high-risk Palestinian prisoners, and the start of serious talks to end the war.
If Hamas rejects this path, the study points that escalating military pressure could eventually collapse its military and governing capabilities, potentially enabling hostage releases without negotiations, all without imposing full Israeli military rule.
Option 2: Accept Hamas’ Terms
The second option would be to agree to Hamas’ conditions for releasing all hostages, which would end the war on Hamas’ terms: a complete Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, Hamas remaining the dominant military force in the territory, and the release of additional Palestinian prisoners.
According to the study, this option addresses demands of hostage families and public opinion, halts casualties, reduces military and civilian fatigue, eases financial burdens, and improves Israel’s global image.
However, at the same time, it leaves Hamas intact militarily and ideologically, allowing it to portray itself as victorious, boost morale, and rebuild strength later. The idea of replacing Hamas with an Arab, Palestinian, or international civilian authority tied to reconstruction seems overly optimistic.
Option 3: Full Occupation and Temporary Military Rule
The third option, viewed as a last resort if other strategies fail, is the full occupation of Gaza and the establishment of a temporary military administration lasting about two years.
Under this plan, Israel would meet the population’s basic needs, lay the groundwork for civilian alternatives, begin reconstruction, and seek international and regional backing. Local governance models or a hybrid federal structure keeping Gaza as one geographic unit could be explored.
The study also mentions a partial implementation of US President Donald Trump’s “voluntary migration” plan.
For success, this option would need to be framed not as a continuation of the war, but as its end phase with a clear Israeli declaration of no intent to establish settlements in Gaza, and the stated goal of preventing Hamas’s return to power while enabling civilian governance and rebuilding.
This scenario could dismantle Hamas’ military and administrative capacity, reduce the terrorist threat, and allow border communities to return safely. On the other hand, the two researchers note that such a plan would require at least four brigades, incur major costs, burden Israel with governing 2.2 million people, strain its international standing, inflame domestic political tensions, and face ongoing Palestinian armed resistance.
The study makes no mention of the human and material toll this option would inflict on Gaza’s civilian population, nor of the worsening humanitarian crisis and risk of famine.
