Syria has moved since early this year from internal unrest in the northeast, the coast, and the south to relative calm and attempts to impose a new security and political order, most clearly seen in the security file and in an agreement with the Syrian Democratic Forces.
But the shift has set up an undeclared race with ISIS across multiple regions and social environments.
ISIS has re-emerged as a destabilizing force, seeking to regain a foothold by exploiting gaps in security control. It is leaning on an aggressive narrative and targeted attacks that intensified from mid-February, eased in early March, then picked up again.
The Jazira region, spanning Deir al-Zor, Raqqa and Hasaka, is the main test ground for the group in 2026. Damascus’s takeover of areas east of the Euphrates in late January, after a US troop repositioning and full withdrawal, along with the earlier pullback of SDF forces, created a new security landscape that ISIS is trying to exploit.
The US withdrawal and repositioning at bases such as Kharab al-Jir and Rmelan caused temporary disruption along control lines.
ISIS’s weekly al-Nabaa newsletter reported a rise in attacks on government checkpoints and positions, using roadside bombs and direct assaults. The group carried out about 22 attacks across Syria in March 2026 alone, targeting military sites and civilians.
Ability to hit high-value targets
An attack on Syria’s 86th Division in Deir al-Zor, and on its positions near the Panorama area at the city’s southern entrance, underscored ISIS’s ability to strike deep inside government-held territory and hit sensitive targets.
The group has fully shifted to guerrilla warfare, deploying small, mobile units across vast desert areas that still offer cover despite heavy US airstrikes.
Its messaging, including a Feb. 5 speech by spokesman Abu Hudhayfah al-Ansari, signals an effort to recast itself as the “only legitimate resistance” to the new order. Content in al-Nabaa shows a shift from monitoring to a broad ideological offensive.
The spokesman declared a “new phase of operations” targeting governance in Damascus, signaling a move from defending desert pockets to a war of attrition in cities. Al-Nabaa has stepped up attacks on the new government, branding it an “updated version of apostasy,” and focusing on Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa, still referred to by his former nom de guerre.
Undermining military credibility
ISIS casts al-Sharaa’s shift from jihadist leader to head of state as a “great betrayal.” It is trying to draw in fighters from Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and other factions frustrated by integration into the “new Syrian army” or by perceived leniency toward former regime officials.
It also questions Syria’s role in the US-led coalition, framing it as a concession.
By escalating attacks since mid-February, ISIS appears intent on undermining the government’s ability to enforce security and stability, while casting doubt on the military effectiveness of newly formed forces. It promotes a narrative that al-Sharaa serves US interests, presenting itself as a more ideologically rigid alternative.
Exploiting fault lines
ISIS is betting on social tensions as Damascus reasserts control over areas once run by autonomous authorities or foreign-backed factions, especially in the northeast and parts of the north.
It taps into tribal concerns over central rule, positioning itself as a fallback or covert ally against perceived abuses. At the same time, the state’s focus on remnants of the former regime and opposition militias on the coast and in Sweida gives ISIS more room to move in the east.
Despite losing territory, ISIS retains the ability to survive through flexibility, continued recruitment and enough funding to sustain operations.
Its strength lies in decentralization. Regional branches now operate with autonomy after the weakening of central leadership following the killing of its fourth “caliph,” Abu al-Hussein al-Husseini al-Hashimi. Cells can recruit and act without waiting for orders.
The group has also rebuilt small support hubs in rugged parts of the Homs desert, some hit by US strikes this year, including raids on Jabal al-Amour near Palmyra, making full clearance difficult.
The United States said it carried out 10 airstrikes between Feb. 3 and 12 on more than 30 targets across Syria, many in Homs province, including the Sukhnah desert and gas field areas, raising fresh concerns after the US withdrawal.
Recruiting a new generation
ISIS is targeting teenagers and young men raised in displacement camps or economic hardship, using encrypted platforms to avoid detection. It also exploits sectarian and political narratives to reinforce a sense of marginalization among Sunni communities.
But it faces mounting pressure. Coordination between Damascus and the international coalition has tightened, limiting ISIS’s ability to exploit divisions. Advances in surveillance and drone technology have also reduced the advantage of desert terrain.
Still, the group is betting on potential economic failure or weak public acceptance of the government in newly retaken areas. It is also trying to destabilize tribal dynamics in Deir al-Zor by exploiting arrests of local figures or disputes over oil resources.
Momentum shifts
A security campaign launched in late February by the Interior Ministry, with army support, shifted the balance on the ground. Operations swept eastern Hama, the central desert, and areas around Aleppo and the coast.
In early March, authorities said they foiled a major attack targeting military sites in Aleppo and dismantled three sleeper cells on the coast and in the Homs countryside, disrupting ISIS’s internal networks and communications.
By mid-March, attacks had dropped to levels not seen since late 2024. Small groups were seen moving to the rural edges of Raqqa and Deir al-Zor to regroup.
Some fighters reportedly sought settlements with authorities amid funding shortages and a lack of basic supplies.
Researcher Zain al-Abidin al-Akeidi said ISIS had previously exploited Arab tribal resentment toward the SDF, but areas still under SDF control are now mostly Kurdish, limiting the group’s reach.
He warned of continued recruitment despite the government's experience in tracking ISIS cells, noting that resolving the al-Hol camp issue and restoring state control east of the Euphrates could weaken ISIS propaganda.
But he said security conditions in the Jazira region remain “very difficult,” citing poor living conditions, weak services and drug trade as factors ISIS exploits.
A Syrian army colonel, Mohammed al-Amer, said “tribal fronts” in eastern Syria have links to ISIS and have mediated with some fighters to leave the group after ideological reviews.
He said some were detained and others monitored, adding, “We use all methods to end ISIS’s presence in Syria, especially through security and intelligence work.”
Harassment over control
ISIS no longer aims to seize territory, but to raise the cost of governing. It retains the ability to harass Damascus, even if at a limited level.
Attacks in late March were largely defensive, targeting small patrols or abandoned positions on desert fringes, reflecting weaker planning capacity and a shift toward symbolic presence.
Lying low
By early April, ISIS appeared to enter a “dormancy” phase, pulling back from frontlines, reorganizing and reassessing. This likely precedes a familiar strategy of hiding and rebuilding after losses, as seen in Iraq in 2007.
Worsening economic conditions could aid recruitment, but Damascus's progress in building a unified army and stabilizing living conditions could undermine the group.
ISIS may have lost its aura of dominance in 2026, but not its will to fight. Its attacks on the president and government reflect recognition of the threat posed by the new state.
A dual test
The drop in ISIS activity reflects a mix of security, military and economic pressures. Campaigns have disrupted its structure, forced a partial withdrawal, and triggered internal reorganization and a shift away from direct attacks.
Small cells remain active along desert edges and at the frontlines between Deir al-Zor and Raqqa, suggesting a temporary phase of regrouping.
Past patterns show ISIS exploits downturns to reposition and capitalize on instability. Regional conditions could help it reopen supply lines or reconnect with affiliates.
The coming months will test whether Syrian forces can hold recent gains, and whether ISIS can endure sustained pressure. It may either fade into a marginal threat or re-emerge through sporadic, targeted attacks to signal its presence without entering open conflict.
Either way, the next phase will be decisive in shaping the security landscape in northern and central Syria and defining the trajectory of the fight between the state and ISIS.
