Aoun’s Visit to Assad Won’t Impact Shiite Duo’s Support for Franjieh’s Bid for Lebanese Presidency

This handout picture released by the Syrian Presidency shows Syrian President Bashar al-Assad (R) welcoming Lebanese former President Michel Aoun (2nd L) in Damascus on June 6, 2023. (Syrian Presidency / AFP)
This handout picture released by the Syrian Presidency shows Syrian President Bashar al-Assad (R) welcoming Lebanese former President Michel Aoun (2nd L) in Damascus on June 6, 2023. (Syrian Presidency / AFP)
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Aoun’s Visit to Assad Won’t Impact Shiite Duo’s Support for Franjieh’s Bid for Lebanese Presidency

This handout picture released by the Syrian Presidency shows Syrian President Bashar al-Assad (R) welcoming Lebanese former President Michel Aoun (2nd L) in Damascus on June 6, 2023. (Syrian Presidency / AFP)
This handout picture released by the Syrian Presidency shows Syrian President Bashar al-Assad (R) welcoming Lebanese former President Michel Aoun (2nd L) in Damascus on June 6, 2023. (Syrian Presidency / AFP)

Lebanese former President Michel Aoun paid a visit to Damascus on Tuesday for talks with President Bashar al-Assad. The timing of the visit is significant given the ongoing presidential vacuum in Lebanon. Aoun had last visited Damascus in 2009. 

Tensions are high in Lebanon over the presidency with Aoun’s son-in-law and head of the Free Patriotic Movement MP Gebran Bassil endorsing the opposition’s presidential candidate, Jiahd Azour. 

Azour would face off against the candidate of the Shiite duo of Hezbollah and Amal, Marada movement leader Suleiman Franjieh, who enjoys close ties with Assad. 

Bassil is opposed to Franjieh’s run. 

Aoun’s visit was only announced by the media after he had crossed the Lebanese-Syrian border. He was accomapnied by former minister Pierre Raffoul. 

Sources have doubted that Aoun’s talks with Assad will achieve a breakthrough in the presidential impasse. 

Informed sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that Hezbollah and Amal are unlikely to back down from supporting Franjieh if Aoun was actually seeking Assad’s mediation with the duo, who are allied with Damascus. 

The duo has made up its mind about nominating Franjieh, they stressed. 

Assad will not pressure Hezbollah or Amal movement leader parliament Speaker Nabih Berri to change their stance, they added. 

The presidency is a strictly Lebanese affairs and the duo’s allies believe that the issue should be tackled by Lebanon alone, without forign interference or dictates, they went on to say. 

Moreover, they noted that Hezbollah’s allies have repeatedly said that they are not interfering in Lebanon’s internal affairs. 

Bassil’s siding with the opposition has deepened his rift with Hezbollah, an ally of the FPM. Relations between them have frayed in recent months over their diverging stances on the presidency and other political issues. 

Hezbollah MPs have said Azour is unlikely to be elected president. The party, Amal and their allies, who back Franjieh, are weighing a number of options if they sense that the balance is starting to tip in Azour’s favor. 

They may resort to boycotting the second round of elections, sources close to the duo told Asharq Al-Awsat. 

Berri had called on parliament to convene on June 14 to elect a president. The elections are held over two rounds, with the candidate who garners two-thirds of the votes of the 128-member legislature moving on to the second round. 

Franjieh has long boasted of his good relations with Damascus. He had previously said he prioritizes Lebanon’s interests above Syria’s, even though he is “strategically” aligned with Damascus. 

Aoun was famously an opponent of Damascus for several years. His stance shifted when Syria withdrew its troops from Lebanon in 2005 and he returned from exile in Paris. 

The shift was crowned by his visit to the Syrian capital in 2009.  

The conflict in Syria would erupt in 2011 and Aoun did not visit Damascus after his election as president in 2016. He restricted his contact with Assad to telephone talks on certain occasions. 



Ceasefire Ends Iran-Israel War, Stakeholders Weigh Costs and Benefits

US President Donald Trump (Reuters)
US President Donald Trump (Reuters)
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Ceasefire Ends Iran-Israel War, Stakeholders Weigh Costs and Benefits

US President Donald Trump (Reuters)
US President Donald Trump (Reuters)

In a stunning development, US President Donald Trump announced a ceasefire that effectively ended the conflict between Iran and Israel.

The announcement came shortly after a carefully calibrated Iranian retaliation targeted a US military base in Qatar, an attack that caused no casualties or material damage.

Trump expressed gratitude to Iran for pre-warning Washington about the strike, framing the gesture as a face-saving move.

The question now gripping regional and international capitals is: What have the United States, Iran, and Israel each gained if the ceasefire holds?

United States

The United States has once again asserted itself as the dominant and decisive power in the Middle East. It delivered a crippling blow to Iran’s nuclear facilities without escalating into full-scale war, thereby undermining the very justification for Israel’s initial strike on Tehran.

Recent events have underscored that Israel cannot engage Iran militarily without close coordination with Washington, nor can it exit such a conflict without a pivotal American role.

The confrontation has also highlighted the unparalleled strength of the US military machine, unmatched by any other power, large or small.

Iran, for its part, clearly showed reluctance to escalate the conflict in a way that could trigger direct, open confrontation with the United States.

Trump himself demonstrated tactical skill by combining military pressure with diplomatic overtures, swiftly moving to invite Iran back to the negotiating table.

Meanwhile, the limited role of Europe and the modest involvement of Russia became apparent, unless aligned with US efforts. China appeared “distant but pragmatic,” despite its broad interests in Iran and a vested concern in keeping the strategically vital Strait of Hormuz open.

Iran

Iran demonstrated that the devastating initial strike it suffered from Israel did not undermine its military or political resolve despite the severity of the attack.

The Tehran regime confirmed that, although Israeli fighter jets controlled Iranian airspace briefly, its missile arsenal remained capable of unleashing scenes of destruction across Israeli cities unseen since the founding of the Jewish state. Iran’s missile forces, it showed, could sustain a costly war of attrition against Israel.

Tehran also succeeded in preventing calls for regime overthrow from becoming a shared objective in a US-Israeli war against it.

Yet, Iran appeared to lack a major ally comparable to the United States or even a lesser power, despite its “strategic” ties with Russia and China.

The confrontation revealed Tehran’s inability to fully leverage its proxy forces in Gaza and Lebanon following the fallout of the “Al-Aqsa flood” escalation.

The exchange of strikes further highlighted Israel’s clear technological superiority and the success of Israeli intelligence in penetrating deep inside Iran itself, raising alarming concerns in Tehran.

Israel

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu can claim credit for persuading the Trump administration to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities, particularly those beyond the reach of the Israeli military.

Israeli forces succeeded in gaining control over distant Iranian airspace within days, a feat Russia has not achieved after three years of war in Ukraine.

Israeli intelligence breakthroughs inside Iran played a crucial role in the conflict, culminating in Israel’s public release of videos it labeled “Mossad-Tehran branch” and drone bases.

Netanyahu can argue that he made a difficult decision to attack Iran and convinced the Israeli public that the fight was existential. He can also remind critics that he expelled Iran from Syria and curtailed Hezbollah’s ability to wage war on Israel.

He may also point to new regional power balances he has imposed - part of his broader ambition to reshape the Middle East - with Israel maintaining the region’s most powerful military force.

However, Netanyahu’s policies risk renewed clashes with many, especially as tensions over Gaza and the “two-state solution” resurface.

Observers say the gains made by the parties at the end of the Iran-Israel conflict remain fragile and could shift depending on how events unfold.

Any calm could enable Israeli opposition forces to reopen debates on Netanyahu’s “wars” and their costs. It might also prompt the Iranian public to question their leadership’s responsibility for the military setbacks and Iran’s regional and global standing.

For now, the spotlight remains firmly on the primary player: Trump.