Storm Daniel Exposes Fragile Libya Infrastructure, Sparks Damning Criticism of Authorities

Mediterranean storm Daniel caused deadly flooding Sunday in many towns of eastern Libya, but the worst-hit was Derna. (Reuters)
Mediterranean storm Daniel caused deadly flooding Sunday in many towns of eastern Libya, but the worst-hit was Derna. (Reuters)
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Storm Daniel Exposes Fragile Libya Infrastructure, Sparks Damning Criticism of Authorities

Mediterranean storm Daniel caused deadly flooding Sunday in many towns of eastern Libya, but the worst-hit was Derna. (Reuters)
Mediterranean storm Daniel caused deadly flooding Sunday in many towns of eastern Libya, but the worst-hit was Derna. (Reuters)

The devastation left behind by storm Daniel in Libya has underscored the fragility and decay of the infrastructure in the country caused by years of instability since the ouster of longtime ruler Moammar al-Gaddafi in 2011.

Libyans lashed out at the ruling authorities for neglecting the infrastructure, accusing officials of corruption and squandering the country’s oil wealth during their struggle for power.

Mediterranean storm Daniel caused deadly flooding Sunday in many towns of eastern Libya, but the worst-hit was Derna.

Two dams in the mountains above the city collapsed, sending floodwaters roaring down the Wadi Derna river and through the city center, sweeping away entire city blocks and killing at least 5,100 people. Search teams combed streets, wrecked buildings and even the sea Wednesday to look for bodies.

Political analyst Ahmed Almhadoui said the interim Tripoli-based Government of National Unity (GNU) headed by Abdulhamid al-Dbeibah was “primarily responsible for the devastation.”

In remarks to Asharq Al-Awsat, he explained that the GNU had at its disposal oil revenues that previous governments had never managed to amass.

It should have used these funds to rebuild several Libyan cities that were left in ruins by the conflict, he added.

Moreover, he noted that the several audit reports had accused the GNU of financial mismanagement, adding that prior to heading the GNU, Dbeibah was previously in charge of an agency that was tasked with modernizing infrastructure.

Since the storm disaster, the GNU has dispatched technical teams to assess the damage in Derna. They found that 30 kms of road networks and five bridges were destroyed in the storm.

Meanwhile, head of the Belaady Organization for Human Rights Tarik Lamloum criticized the government of Osama Hammad that was named by the east-based parliament. He also blamed previous east-based governments for the tragedy.

He said they were largely responsible for the devastating consequences of the storm.

He told Asharq Al-Awsat that the Hammad government should have taken precautions such as determining the locations that were most at risk from the storm and evacuating them.

When the government met before the storm hit, it should have turned to experts who could have warned it of the risks at hand.

Neighborhoods located in valleys and near the burst dams should have been evacuated, he added, while noting that the majority of the construction there was unregulated.

Furthermore, Lamloum said the fragile infrastructure has been an issue in Libya for years, even when Gaddafi was still in power.

Everyone is responsible for the disaster, he declared, while noting that east-based governments never lacked the necessary funds to improve the infrastructure, rather they mismanaged the situation.

The eastern and western administrations were solely concerned with amassing their military forces, not construction and catering to the needs of the country, he lamented.

Given the instability and mistrust from both sides, the administrations dedicated their efforts to acquiring weapons and recruiting fighters in anticipation of the next round of unrest, he went on to say.

Political analyst Mohammed Mahfoud rejected the exploitation of the human tragedy to make political gains and trade accusations.

He told Asharq Al-Awsat: “We must acknowledge the reality caused by the political division endured by Libya for years.”

The division has weakened the executive authorities, he added, while noting that crises in the country are addressed through reactions and after victims are claimed, instead of tackling their root cause.

He remarked that in spite of Libya’s wealth, a revision of infrastructure has never been carried out and a center for predicting natural disasters has never been set up.



20 Years after Its Landmark Withdrawal from Gaza, Israel is Mired There

Israeli soldiers operate, near the border with Gaza, in Israel, August 13, 2025. REUTERS/Amir Cohen
Israeli soldiers operate, near the border with Gaza, in Israel, August 13, 2025. REUTERS/Amir Cohen
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20 Years after Its Landmark Withdrawal from Gaza, Israel is Mired There

Israeli soldiers operate, near the border with Gaza, in Israel, August 13, 2025. REUTERS/Amir Cohen
Israeli soldiers operate, near the border with Gaza, in Israel, August 13, 2025. REUTERS/Amir Cohen

Twenty years ago, Israel withdrew from the Gaza Strip, dismantling 21 Jewish settlements and pulling out its forces. The Friday anniversary of the start of the landmark disengagement comes as Israel is mired in a nearly 2-year war with Hamas that has devastated the Palestinian territory and means it is likely to keep troops there long into the future.

Israel’s disengagement, which also included removing four settlements in the Israeli-occupied West Bank, was then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s controversial attempt to jump-start negotiations with the Palestinians. But it bitterly divided Israeli society and led to the empowerment of Hamas, with implications that continue to reverberate today.

The emotional images of Jews being ripped from their homes by Israeli soldiers galvanized Israel’s far-right and settler movements. The anger helped them organize and increase their political influence, accounting in part for the rise of hard-line politicians like National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir and Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich.

On Thursday, Smotrich boasted of a settlement expansion plan east of Jerusalem that will “bury” the idea of a future Palestinian state.

For Palestinians, even if they welcomed the disengagement, it didn’t end Israel’s control over their lives.

Soon after, Hamas won elections in 2006, then drove out the Palestinian Authority in a violent takeover. Israel imposed a closure on the territory, controlling entry and exit of goods and people. Though its intensity varied over the years, the closure helped impoverish the population and entrenched a painful separation from Palestinians in the West Bank.

Israel captured the West Bank, east Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip in the 1967 Mideast war. The Palestinians claim all three territories for a future independent state.

A unilateral withdrawal enhanced Hamas' stature Israel couldn’t justify the military or economic cost of maintaining the heavily fortified settlements in Gaza, explained Kobi Michael, a senior researcher at the Misgav Institute and the Institute for National Security Studies think tanks. There were around 8,000 Israeli settlers and 1.5 million Palestinians in Gaza in 2005.

“There was no chance for these settlements to exist or flourish or become meaningful enough to be a strategic anchor,” he said. By contrast, there are more than 500,000 Israeli settlers in the West Bank, most living in developed settlement blocs that have generally received more support from Israeli society, Michael said. Most of the world considers the settlements illegal under international law.

Because Israel withdrew unilaterally, without any coordination with the Palestinian Authority, it enhanced Hamas' stature among Palestinians in Gaza.

“This contributed to Hamas’ win in the elections in 2006, because they leveraged it and introduced it as a very significant achievement,” Michael said. “They saw it as an achievement of the resistance and a justification for the continuation of the armed resistance.”

Footage of the violence between Israeli settlers and Israeli soldiers also created an “open wound” in Israeli society, Michael said.

“I don’t think any government will be able to do something like that in the future,” he said. That limits any flexibility over settlements in the West Bank if negotiations over a two-state solution with the Palestinians ever resume.

“Disengagement will never happen again, this is a price we’re paying as a society, and a price we’re paying politically,” he said.

One of the first settlers longs to return Anita Tucker, now 79, was part of the first nine Jewish families that moved to the Gaza Strip in 1976. She and her husband and their three kids lived in an Israeli army outpost near what is today Deir al-Balah, while the settlement of Netzer Hazoni was constructed.

Originally from Brooklyn, she started a farm growing vegetables in the harsh, tall sand dunes. At first relations were good with their Palestinian neighbors, she said, and they worked hard to build their home and a “beautiful community.” She had two more children, and three chose to stay and raise their families in Netzer Hazoni.

She can still recall the moment, 20 years ago, when 1,000 Israeli soldiers arrived at the gate to the settlement to remove the approximately 400 residents. Some of her neighbors lit their houses on fire in protest.

“Obviously it was a mistake to leave. The lives of the Arabs became much worse, and the lives of the Jews became much, much worse, with rockets and Oct. 7,” she said, referring to the decades of rockets fired from Gaza into Israel and the date in 2023 of the Hamas attack that launched the ongoing war.

Despite the passage of time, her family still is “yearning and longing for their home,” she said. Several of her 10 grandchildren, including some who spent their early childhood in the Gaza settlements, have served in the current war and were near her old house.

“It’s hard to believe, because of all the terrible things that happened that we predicted, but we’re willing to build there again,” said Tucker.

Palestinians doubt Israel will ever fully withdraw from Gaza again After Israel’s withdrawal 20 years ago, many Palestinians described Gaza as an “open-air prison.” They had control on the inside – under a Hamas government that some supported but some saw as heavy-handed and brutal. But ultimately, Israel had a grip around the territory.

Many Palestinians believe Sharon carried out the withdrawal so Israel could focus on cementing its control in the West Bank through settlement building.

Now some believe more direct Israeli occupation is returning to Gaza. After 22 months of war, Israeli troops control more than 75% of Gaza, and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu speaks of maintaining security control long term after the war.

Amjad Shawa, the director of the Palestinian NGO Network, said he doesn’t believe Netanyahu will repeat Sharon’s full withdrawal. Instead, he expects the military to continue controlling large swaths of Gaza through “buffer zones.”

The aim, he said, is to keep Gaza “unlivable in order to change the demographics,” referring to Netanyahu’s plans to encourage Palestinians to leave the territory.

Israel is “is reoccupying the Gaza Strip” to prevent a Palestinian state, said Mostafa Ibrahim, an author based in Gaza City whose home was destroyed in the current war.

Missed opportunities Israeli former Maj. Gen. Dan Harel, who was head of the country's Southern Command during the disengagement, remembers the toll of protecting a few thousand settlers.

There were an average of 10 attacks per day against Israeli settlers and soldiers, including rockets, roadside bombs big enough to destroy a tank, tunnels to attack Israeli soldiers and military positions, and frequent gunfire.

“Bringing a school bus of kids from one place to another required a military escort,” said Harel. “There wasn’t a future. People paint it as how wonderful it was there, but it wasn’t wonderful.”

Harel says the decision to evacuate Israeli settlements from the Gaza Strip was the right one, but that Israel missed crucial opportunities.

Most egregious, he said, was a unilateral withdrawal without obtaining any concessions from the Palestinians in Gaza or the Palestinian Authority.

He also sharply criticized Israel’s policy of containment toward Hamas after disengagement. There were short but destructive conflicts over the years between the two sides, but otherwise the policy gave Hamas “an opportunity to do whatever they wanted.”

“We had such a blind spot with Hamas, we didn’t see them morph from a terror organization into an organized military, with battalions and commanders and infrastructure,” he said.

The Oct. 7 attack, Israel’s largest military intelligence failure to date, was not a result of the disengagement, said Harel. “The main issue is what we did in the 18 years in between.”