Guardian: US’s Extensive Weapons Stockpile in Israel Falls Under Scrutiny

Israeli army cannon fires shells near the border with Gaza (AFP)
Israeli army cannon fires shells near the border with Gaza (AFP)
TT
20

Guardian: US’s Extensive Weapons Stockpile in Israel Falls Under Scrutiny

Israeli army cannon fires shells near the border with Gaza (AFP)
Israeli army cannon fires shells near the border with Gaza (AFP)

Their precise location is classified, but somewhere in Israel there are multiple closely guarded warehouses that contain billions of dollars’ worth of weapons owned by the US government.

The stockpile was first established in the 1980s to rapidly supply US forces for any future Middle East conflicts. However, over time, Israel has been permitted in certain situations to draw from its extensive supplies, The Guardian revealed in its reported.

Long shrouded in secrecy, the warehouses are part of an extensive but previously little-known stockpile now facing scrutiny as pressure mounts on the Biden administration over its support for Israel’s bombardment of Gaza.

Israel now appears to be receiving munitions from the stockpile in significant quantities for use in its war on Gaza, yet there has been little transparency about transfers from the arsenal.

In interviews with the Guardian, multiple former US officials familiar with American security assistance to Israel have described how the stockpile enables expedited arms transfers to the Israeli army It can also shield movements of US weapons from public and congressional oversight, they said.

“Officially it’s US equipment for US use,” a former senior Pentagon official said, “but on the other hand, in an emergency, who’s to say we’re not going to give them the keys to the warehouses?”

Since the emergency of war, Israel has dropped tens of thousands of bombs in Gaza, and it has been open about its demand for large amounts of US-supplied munitions.

There are widely held concerns that Israel’s bombing of Gaza has been indiscriminate. And with close to 20,000 people dead in Gaza, according to local authorities, the US is facing questions about the quantities and categories of bombs it is providing to Israel and the proportion being made available through the secretive pre-positioned stockpile.

In Washington, lawmakers have raised concerns about proposals by the White House that would relax rules on the kinds of weapons placed in the stockpile, waive spending caps on its replenishment and give the Pentagon greater flexibility to make transfers from the arsenal, the report read.

Josh Paul, who recently resigned from the state department in protest at Washington’s continued lethal assistance for Israel, said the proposed changes to the stockpile were part of a drive by the Biden administration to find new ways to supply Israel.

After Hamas attack in October, he said, there was a press from the White House "to say essentially we need to figure out every possible [legal] authority that we could give Israel that would get it weapons as fast as possible.”

The full contents of the pre-positioned stockpile – known as the War Reserve Stocks for Allies-Israel (WRSA-I) – are not publicly disclosed, though former officials say the Pentagon provides Congress with an annual breakdown of what it holds.

The report may be classified, but earlier this year an unusually candid description of the stockpile’s contents emerged when a former US military chief recalled in an op-ed touring the WRSA-I warehouse.

“The current stockpile is full of so-called dumb munitions [those without sophisticated guidance systems],” he said, including “thousands of ‘iron bombs’ that are simply dropped from aircraft so gravity can do its work”.

In 2020, this abundance of dumb munitions in the stockpile was highlighted by a pro-Israel thinktank, the Jewish Institute for National Security of America, which complained that WRSA-I had become “obsolete” because of its high levels of unguided bombs and shortage of precision-guided munitions (PGMs).

In its latest aerial bombardment of Gaza, however, Israel has relied heavily on these lower-accuracy unguided munitions, which weapons experts say has undercut claims by the Israeli army that it is trying to minimize civilian casualties.

The army and Israel’s defense ministry did not respond to requests for comment.



Who Remains from the Symbols of October 7?

Palestinians celebrate atop an Israeli tank on the separation barrier near Khan Younis on October 7, 2023 (AP). 
Palestinians celebrate atop an Israeli tank on the separation barrier near Khan Younis on October 7, 2023 (AP). 
TT
20

Who Remains from the Symbols of October 7?

Palestinians celebrate atop an Israeli tank on the separation barrier near Khan Younis on October 7, 2023 (AP). 
Palestinians celebrate atop an Israeli tank on the separation barrier near Khan Younis on October 7, 2023 (AP). 

On October 7, 2023, Hamas-affiliated media accounts posted a video showing several of the group’s prominent leaders outside Gaza falling into a “prostration of thanks” as they watched on television the start of the unprecedented assault on Israel -- what Hamas called “Operation Al-Aqsa Flood.”

The video, recorded in a spacious office, appeared to show Hamas’s top brass monitoring an event they clearly anticipated. Figures like Ismail Haniyeh, then head of the political bureau; his deputy, Saleh al-Arouri; and senior leaders Khaled Meshaal and Khalil al-Hayya were all seen in the footage. At the time, the scene fueled speculation about whether the political leadership had prior knowledge or direct involvement in planning the attack.

Yet, according to Hamas sources who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat, many of those in the video were unaware of the operation’s exact timing or scope. They knew the Qassam Brigades, Hamas’s military wing, were preparing a preemptive strike in response to Israeli plans for a limited military campaign -- but the leaders abroad had not been briefed on the final execution.

The sources revealed that the video was filmed in Hamas’s office in Türkiye, where leaders were preparing to travel to Iraq, part of a broader diplomatic initiative. The delegation, which had recently visited Lebanon, was set to engage with other Arab and Islamic countries, including Iran, Kuwait, and Oman, in an effort to widen Hamas’s political footprint. This diplomatic offensive was seen by some in the Palestinian Authority as an attempt to position Hamas as an alternative to the PA and the PLO --an accusation the group denied.

However, without the knowledge of most of the political wing, Hamas’s military leadership in Gaza had a different agenda -one that was kept tightly guarded and may have contributed to the operation’s initial success. In the early hours of the attack, leaders outside Gaza scrambled to contact counterparts in the Strip, asking, “What’s happening?” Some of those asked reportedly responded with confusion or claimed ignorance.

Only a small inner circle knew the full scope of the plan, and even among Gaza-based leadership, not all were informed. Some received instructions before the attack to leave their homes and relocate to secure areas.

As Israel’s war on Gaza enters its twentieth month and continues to target Hamas leaders, the question now is: who remains from the core of October 7, and who truly knew what?

While most of Hamas’s political leadership was excluded from operational details, some senior figures had given strategic backing to the idea of a preemptive strike. Khaled Meshaal, Mousa Abu Marzouk, and Mahmoud al-Zahar were among those who supported military action to derail reported Israeli assassination plans targeting Hamas figures.

The name most closely linked to the attack remains Yahya Sinwar, who headed Hamas in Gaza at the time. Though not the originator of the idea, he was the operation’s chief engineer and maintained strict control over its planning. He handpicked those who were fully briefed and sanctioned the final plan.

Following the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran in July 2024, Sinwar was elevated to head of the political bureau -- a symbolic challenge to Israel. But just months later, in October 2024, Sinwar was killed in a surprise clash in Tel al-Sultan, western Rafah, alongside members of his inner circle.

Haniyeh, for his part, had been focused on expanding Hamas’s diplomatic reach. He had only a vague idea about the October 7 operation, believing it would be limited. He was assassinated in Tehran as well, in the same month as his successor.

Khalil al-Hayya, now leading the political bureau and negotiations, was better informed than many of his peers but not to the extent of the military planners. Ruhi Mushtaha, one of the few civilians aware of the operation’s breadth and timing, was killed in July 2024, as was Saleh al-Arouri, who was targeted earlier that year in Lebanon.

Nizar Awadallah, who left Gaza shortly before the attack, remains active in back-channel negotiations and is considered a hardline figure inside Hamas. Though largely behind the scenes, he was reportedly better informed than most on the political level.

On the military front, few names carry as much weight as Mohammed Deif, long-time commander of the Qassam Brigades. Deif, who survived numerous Israeli assassination attempts over the years, was finally killed in July 2024. Mohammed Sinwar, Yahya’s younger brother, was considered the true mastermind of the operation and played a central role in its planning and execution. He too was killed in a targeted strike in Khan Younis, alongside his brother.

Other key figures, like Marwan Issa, who had long served as Deif’s deputy, died in March 2024 after being sidelined by illness. Several brigade commanders who oversaw preparations and joint drills with other factions, including the Islamic Jihad, were also eliminated. Only one high-ranking commander, Ezzedine al-Haddad of Gaza City, is believed to still be alive. Known as “The Fox” for his ability to evade Israeli intelligence, he continues to operate underground.