Washington and Tehran in Iraq... Impossible Enmity or Possible Friendship?

A photo published by the Iraqi Prime Minister’s Media Office shows Al-Sudani meeting with senior officials in the Iraqi Armed Forces and the International Coalition. (AFP)
A photo published by the Iraqi Prime Minister’s Media Office shows Al-Sudani meeting with senior officials in the Iraqi Armed Forces and the International Coalition. (AFP)
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Washington and Tehran in Iraq... Impossible Enmity or Possible Friendship?

A photo published by the Iraqi Prime Minister’s Media Office shows Al-Sudani meeting with senior officials in the Iraqi Armed Forces and the International Coalition. (AFP)
A photo published by the Iraqi Prime Minister’s Media Office shows Al-Sudani meeting with senior officials in the Iraqi Armed Forces and the International Coalition. (AFP)

For the first time in two months, a change was observed in the Iraqi political discourse towards both Iran and the United States.
Although both Tehran and Washington have been comfortable for years in making Iraq an arena for settling their scores, the Iraqi perspective, whether for balancing the relationship between the two parties or the way it deals with the independence of its political decision, differed with the change of governments that succeeded after 2003.

The positions of the powers, blocs, parties, components, and subsequently the armed factions that are often described as loyal to Iran, vary ebb and flow in terms of the nature of the relationship with both Iran and the United States, and often extend towards the Arab Gulf region first and the rest of the Arab countries that are relatively close to Iraq, such as Syria, Jordan, and Egypt.
After the arrival of Prime Minister Mohammed Shia Al-Sudani to office in October 2022, the Iraqi political discourse regarding Iran and America changed relatively.
Al-Sudani tried to insert the term “productive diplomacy” in the context of Iraq’s relations with its external regional and international environment.
Although Sudani’s approach goes towards activating the economic, development and investment dimension between Iraq and countries of the world, the relationship between Tehran and Washington during the past two decades was not based on this consideration.
Iraq’s dealings with these two powers remained based on a rule of playing on the paradox of impossible hostility for both of them and possible friendship, but from the perspective of the country’s sovereignty.
Both Tehran and Washington violated what Sudani tried to establish since he assumed office until the Gaza War, as both capitals chose their preferred arena to settle their scores on.
During his meeting on Tuesday with the Turkish Defense Minister, Sudani said that the security of Iraq and Turkiye are “interconnected, as is the case with the security of neighboring countries.”
In another meeting with the Secretary of the Iranian National Security Council, Ali Akbar Ahmadian, Sudani stressed that Iraq “rejects any unilateral actions undertaken by any country in contravention of international principles that are based on mutual respect for sovereignty.”
The official Iraqi discourse has begun to escalate in its rejection of these practices, which reflects efforts to consolidate the country’s sovereignty despite the difficulties that stand in the way, including the strength of Iran’s influence inside Iraq and the weakness of Baghdad’s opinion within American institutions.

 



Iran Scrambles to Swiftly Build Ties with Syria’s New Rulers

A handout photo made available by the Iranian presidential office shows Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian (R) and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi (L) during the opening session of the Organization of Eight Developing Countries (D-8) summit in Cairo, Egypt, 19 December 2024. (EPA/Handout)
A handout photo made available by the Iranian presidential office shows Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian (R) and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi (L) during the opening session of the Organization of Eight Developing Countries (D-8) summit in Cairo, Egypt, 19 December 2024. (EPA/Handout)
TT

Iran Scrambles to Swiftly Build Ties with Syria’s New Rulers

A handout photo made available by the Iranian presidential office shows Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian (R) and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi (L) during the opening session of the Organization of Eight Developing Countries (D-8) summit in Cairo, Egypt, 19 December 2024. (EPA/Handout)
A handout photo made available by the Iranian presidential office shows Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian (R) and Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi (L) during the opening session of the Organization of Eight Developing Countries (D-8) summit in Cairo, Egypt, 19 December 2024. (EPA/Handout)

The Iranian government is scrambling to restore some of its influence in Syria as it still reels from the shock ouster of its close ally President Bashar al-Assad on December 8.

The Iranian president, Masoud Pezeshkian, is already facing multiple domestic and international crises, including an economy in shambles and continued tensions over its nuclear program. But it is the sudden loss of influence in Syria after the fall of Assad to opposition groups that is exercising Iranian officials most, reported The Guardian on Friday.

“In the short term they want to salvage some influence with the opposition in Damascus. Iranian diplomats insist they were not wedded to Assad, and were disillusioned with his refusal to compromise,” it said.

Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi said in an interview this week: “We had long ago reached the conclusion that the continuation of governance in Syria would face a fundamental challenge. Government officials were expected to show flexibility towards allowing the opposition to participate in power, but this did not happen.”

He added: “Tehran always had direct contacts with the Syrian opposition delegation. Since 2011, we have been suggesting to Syria the need to begin political talks with those opposition groups that were not affiliated with terrorism.”

At the same time, Iran’s foreign ministry spokesperson insisted it only entered Syria in 2012 at Assad’s request to help defeat ISIS, continued The Guardian. “Our presence was advisory and we were never in Syria to defend a specific group or individual. What was important to us was helping to preserve the territorial integrity and stability of Syria,” he said.

Such explanations have not cut much ice in Damascus. Iran remains one of the few countries criticized by Ahmed al-Sharaa, the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) leader.

Short honeymoon

Many Iranian officials are claiming the current victory lap being enjoyed by Türkiye in Syria may be brief as Ankara’s interests will start to diverge from the government led by the HTS.

Senior cleric Naser Makarem Shirazi said: “We must follow the Syrian issue with hope and know that this situation will not continue, because the current rulers of Syria will not remain united with each other”.

The conservative Javan newspaper predicted that “the current honeymoon period in Syria will end due to the diversity of groups, economic problems, the lack of security and diversity of actors.”.

Officially Iran blames the US and Israel for Assad’s collapse, but resentment at Ankara’s role is rife, ironically echoing Donald Trump’s claim that Syria has been the victim of an unfriendly takeover by Türkiye.

In his speech responding to Assad’s downfall supreme leader Ali Khamenei said a neighboring state of Syria played a clear role” in shaping events and “continues to do so now”. The Fars news agency published a poster showing the HTS leader in league with Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Benjamin Netanyahu and Joe Biden.

Iran’s Strategic Council on Foreign Relations questioned whether HTS would remain allies with Türkiye for long. It said: “Although Türkiye is only one of the main winners of Bashar al-Assad’s fall from power in the short term, Ankara can never bring a government aligned with itself to power in Syria. Even if HTS attempts to form a stable government in Syria, which is impossible, in the medium term, it will become a major threat to Türkiye, which shares an 830-kilometer border with Syria.”

Reliance on Türkiye

Former Iranian President Hassan Rouhani predicted a bleak future for Syria and Türkiye. “In recent weeks, all of Syria’s military power has been destroyed by Israel, and unfortunately, the militants and Türkiye did not respond appropriately to Israel. It will take years to rebuild the Syrian army and armed forces.”

Mohsen Baharvand, a former Iranian ambassador to the UK, suggested the Damascus government may find itself overly reliant on Türkiye. “If the central government of Syria tries to consolidate its authority and sovereignty through military intervention and assistance from foreign countries – including Türkiye – Syria, or key parts of it, will be occupied by Türkiye, and Türkiye will enter a quagmire from which it will incur heavy human and economic costs.”

He predicted tensions between Türkiye and the HTS in particular about how to handle the Syrian Kurdish demand in north-east Syria for a form of autonomy. The Turkish-funded Syrian National Army is reportedly ready to mount an offensive against the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces in Kobani, a Kurdish-majority Syrian town on the northern border with Türkiye.

Türkiye’s Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said on Wednesday that if the issue were addressed “properly” Ankara would not seek a military intervention. “There is a new administration in Damascus now. I think this is primarily their concern now,” Fidan said.

More broadly, the Syrian reverse is forcing Iran to accelerate a rethink of its foreign policy. The review centers on whether the weakening of its so-called Axis of Resistance – comprising allied groups in the region – requires Iran to become a nuclear weapon state, or instead strengthen Iran by building better relations in the region.

For years, Iran’s rulers have been saying that “defending Iran must begin from outside its borders.” This hugely costly strategy is largely obsolete, and how Iran explains its Syria reverse will be critical to deciding what replaces that strategy.