Abed Rabbo: Arafat Urged Saddam to Withdraw from Kuwait

Saddam Hussein during a meeting with Yasser Arafat in Baghdad in May 1990 (Getty Images)
Saddam Hussein during a meeting with Yasser Arafat in Baghdad in May 1990 (Getty Images)
TT
20

Abed Rabbo: Arafat Urged Saddam to Withdraw from Kuwait

Saddam Hussein during a meeting with Yasser Arafat in Baghdad in May 1990 (Getty Images)
Saddam Hussein during a meeting with Yasser Arafat in Baghdad in May 1990 (Getty Images)

Yasser Abed Rabbo, former Secretary-General of the executive committee of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), played a key role in historic talks between Yasser Arafat and Israeli and US officials.
He also participated in meetings with Saddam Hussein after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. His insights shed light on crucial moments. Here's what he said about missed opportunities in negotiations:
“At Camp David in 2000, doubts arose from the start, particularly about American intentions.”
“President Bill Clinton offered a proposal that gave away over 10% of the West Bank, with unclear terms on Jerusalem’s holy sites. This ambiguity favored Israel.”
“Arafat saw these sites as non-negotiable, fearing any compromise would brand him a traitor.”
“He was determined not to be seen as conceding what past leaders hadn’t. Even regarding the Wailing Wall, he insisted it was also the Buraq Wall in Islam, not solely Jewish.”
“For Arafat, protecting these sites meant preserving his legacy as a national hero,” stressed Abed Rabbo.
US ‘Lost Mediator Role’ at Camp David
“Returning to Camp David, the US’ proposal caused a stir and strong reaction because we hadn’t started negotiations with the Israelis. It seemed biased towards Israel,” revealed Abed Rabbo.
According to the Palestinian politician, Washington “quickly withdrew the proposal the next day to open discussions on all issues, including borders, land, Jerusalem, settlements, and refugees.”
The quick withdrawal raised deep doubts among Palestinians.
“It seemed like the Americans had their own agenda, treating their retreat as a tactical move,” said Abed Rabbo.
“This was the first setback for Palestinian negotiators and Yasser Arafat, questioning the sincerity of the process and reliance on the US,” he added.
“Arafat then insisted on direct talks with Ehud Barak to address all issues before involving committees.”
Abed Rabbo noted that Barak avoided direct talks, preferring meetings with Clinton and US representatives as he seemingly relied on their stance against the Palestinians.
“Despite attending committee meetings, Barak refused to engage until they followed his approach. Meetings with Clinton felt hollow, with discussions often echoing Israeli views. It felt like the US and Israel were coordinating without us,” recalled Abed Rabbo.
“This undermined the US role as a mediator,” he concluded.
Arafat’s Error in the Second Intifada
When asked about Iran backing the Oslo Accords’ downfall through suicide attacks, Abed Rabbo said : “I doubt Iran was involved. Hamas led most suicide operations, with other groups also taking part.”
“Arafat made a mistake, hinting to Hamas that he approved these attacks to pressure Israelis. He didn’t condemn the operations themselves, only attacks on civilians by both sides,” clarified Abed Rabbo.

 

As for Arafat’s influence being a barrier to the growth of Hamas, Abed Rabbo admitted that the Palestinian leader initially cracked down on Hamas.
“As the second intifada unfolded after Yitzhak Rabin’s death and Ariel Sharon’s provocative visit to Al-Aqsa, Arafat saw Hamas’ attacks as pressure tactics on Israelis,” revealed Abed Rabbo.
In summary, Arafat’s stance shifted over time, initially cracking down on Hamas but later seeing attacks as a means to pressure Israelis.
After Rabin’s death, during a transitional phase that included Shimon Peres and Benjamin Netanyahu’s election in 1996, the first meeting with Netanyahu occurred at an Israeli military base at the Erez checkpoint, near the entrance to Gaza.
“I was with Arafat in his first meeting with Netanyahu. Another person was there, but I can't recall who,” said Abed Rabbo.
Netanyahu started that meeting by telling Arafat he opposed the Oslo Accords signed with Peres and Rabin.
“With this new government, those agreements are over. We'll follow a principle of reciprocity: positive steps get positive responses, negative steps get negative ones,” Netanyahu told Arafat, according to Abed Rabbo.
In the meeting, Abed Rabbo asked Netanyahu: “Even if we accept this, which we don't because the Oslo Accord binds both Israel and us, who decides if our actions are positive or negative?”
“We decide,” said Netanyahu.
“Then you're both the opponent and the judge,” replied Abed Rabbo.
“It was clear it wouldn't work. Arafat asked for a private meeting but left feeling Netanyahu wanted to destroy Oslo. Since then, Arafat became more cautious, knowing saving Oslo faces big challenges,” recalled Abed Rabbo.
Saddam Compared Jerusalem’s Lights to Baghdad’s
Asked if Arafat misjudged Iraq’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait, Abed Rabbo said: “Definitely. Arafat opposed the invasion internally but feared losing ties with Saddam. His regional support was weak, especially with Hafez al-Assad’s Syria.”
“He spent years in Tunisian exile. His Jordan ties were tense. Despite good Gulf relations, Arafat hoped for a peaceful resolution, but feared losing ties if Saddam fell.”
“Saddam’s support for the Palestinian liberation movement was significant,” said Abed Rabbo.
“Arafat valued not just the financial aid but also logistical support, ensuring communication between Iraq, the West Bank, and Gaza through Jordan.”
“I was with Arafat when he met Saddam Hussein after the Kuwait invasion. Arafat urged Saddam to withdraw, fearing Iraq's fate.”
Recalling the meeting, Abed Rabbo said: “We met in a modest villa in Baghdad’s Al Zawraa Park. Arafat was open, expressing concern over Iraq's fate.”
“I’ve accounted for everything,” Saddam assured Arafat, standing at the villa’s door, overlooking Baghdad.
“Abu Ammar, I see Jerusalem’s lights as I see Baghdad’s now before me. It signifies Jerusalem’s liberation,” remarked Saddam at the time.
Abed Rabbo was born in Jaffa in 1945 and moved to Lebanon after the Nakba. At fifteen, he joined the Arab Nationalists Movement under Mohsen Ibrahim. He studied economics and political science at the American University in Cairo.
In 1968, he helped establish the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine with George Habash and others. The next year, he co-founded the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine. He later founded the Fida Party in 1990 and stepped down in 2004.
Abed Rabbo met Yasser Arafat during the Battle of Karameh in 1968. They formed a strong bond, allowing him to play a key role in US-PLO dialogue.
He led the Palestinian delegation in talks with the US in 1989 and was active in the Oslo Accords negotiations. He held ministerial positions after Palestinian leaders returned, and he attended many meetings with Israeli and US officials.
From 2005 to 2015, he served as Secretary-General of the PLO’s Executive Committee. He left due to disputes with Mahmoud Abbas. His role allowed him to engage in meetings with Arab and global leaders. He also shared a close friendship with Palestinian poet Mahmoud Darwish.



Netanyahu’s Governing Coalition Is Fracturing. Here’s What It Means for Israel and Gaza

 Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu walks in the Knesset, Israel's parliament, on the day of a vote over a possible expulsion of Ayman Odeh from parliament, in Jerusalem, July 14, 2025. (Reuters)
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu walks in the Knesset, Israel's parliament, on the day of a vote over a possible expulsion of Ayman Odeh from parliament, in Jerusalem, July 14, 2025. (Reuters)
TT
20

Netanyahu’s Governing Coalition Is Fracturing. Here’s What It Means for Israel and Gaza

 Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu walks in the Knesset, Israel's parliament, on the day of a vote over a possible expulsion of Ayman Odeh from parliament, in Jerusalem, July 14, 2025. (Reuters)
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu walks in the Knesset, Israel's parliament, on the day of a vote over a possible expulsion of Ayman Odeh from parliament, in Jerusalem, July 14, 2025. (Reuters)

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government suffered a serious blow on Tuesday when an ultra-Orthodox party announced it was bolting the coalition.

While this doesn’t immediately threaten Netanyahu’s rule, it could set in motion his government’s demise, although that could still be months away. It also could complicate efforts to halt the war in Gaza.

United Torah Judaism's two factions said they were leaving the government because of disagreements over a proposed law that would end broad exemptions for religious students from enlistment into the military.

Military service is compulsory for most Jewish Israelis, and the issue of exemptions has long divided the country. Those rifts have only widened since the start of the war in Gaza as demand for military manpower has grown and hundreds of soldiers have been killed.

The threat to the government “looks more serious than ever,” said Shuki Friedman, vice president of the Jewish People Policy Institute, a Jerusalem think tank.

Netanyahu is on trial for alleged corruption, and critics say he wants to hang on to power so that he can use his office as a bully pulpit to rally supporters and lash out against prosecutors and judges. That makes him all the more vulnerable to the whims of his coalition allies.

Here is a look at Netanyahu's political predicament and some potential scenarios:

The ultra-Orthodox are key partners

Netanyahu, Israel’s longest serving leader, has long relied on the ultra-Orthodox parties to prop up his governments.

Without UTJ, his coalition holds just 61 out of parliament’s 120 seats. That means Netanyahu will be more susceptible to pressure from other elements within his government, especially far-right parties who strongly oppose ending the war in Gaza.

The political shake up isn't likely to completely derail ceasefire talks, but it could complicate how flexible Netanyahu can be in his concessions to Hamas.

A second ultra-Orthodox party is also considering bolting the government over the draft issue. That would give Netanyahu a minority in parliament and make governing almost impossible.

The ultra-Orthodox military exemptions have divided Israel

A decades-old arrangement by Israel’s first prime minister granted hundreds of ultra-Orthodox men exemptions from compulsory Israeli service. Over the years, those exemptions ballooned into the thousands and created deep divisions in Israel.

The ultra-Orthodox say their men are serving the country by studying sacred Jewish texts and preserving centuries’ old tradition. They fear that mandatory enlistment will dilute adherents’ connection to the faith.

But most Jewish Israelis see the exemption as unfair, as well as the generous government stipends granted to many ultra-Orthodox men who study instead of work throughout adulthood. That bitterness has only worsened during nearly two years of war.

The politically powerful ultra-Orthodox parties have long had outsize influence in Israel’s fragmented political system and used that status to extract major concessions for their constituents.

But a court last year ruled Netanyahu’s government must enlist the ultra-Orthodox so long as there is no new law codifying the exemptions.

Netanyahu’s coalition has been trying to find a path forward on a new law. But his base is largely opposed to granting sweeping draft exemptions and a key lawmaker has stood in the way of giving the ultra-Orthodox a law they can get behind, prompting their exit.

The political shake up comes during Gaza ceasefire talks

The resignations don't take effect for 48 hours, so Netanyahu will likely spend the next two days seeking a compromise. But that won't be easy because the Supreme Court has said the old system of exemptions amounts to discrimination against the secular majority.

That does not mean the government will collapse.

Netanyahu's opponents cannot submit a motion to dissolve parliament until the end of the year because of procedural reasons. And with parliament's summer recess beginning later this month, the parties could use that time to find a compromise and return to the government.

Cabinet Minister Miki Zohar, from Netanyahu’s Likud party, said he was hopeful the religious party could be coaxed back to the coalition. “God willing, everything will be fine,” he said. A Likud spokesman did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

Once the departures become official, Netanyahu will have a razor-thin majority. The far-right parties within it could threaten to leave the coalition, further weakening him, if he gives in to too many of Hamas' demands.

Hamas wants a permanent end to the war as part of any ceasefire deal. Netanyahu's hard-line partners are open to a temporary truce, but say the war cannot end until Hamas is destroyed.

If they or any other party leave the coalition, Netanyahu will have a minority government, and that will make it almost impossible to govern and likely lead to its collapse. But he could still find ways to approve a ceasefire deal, including with support from the political opposition.

Israel may be on the path toward early elections

Netanyahu could seek to shore up his coalition by appeasing the far-right and agreeing for now to just a partial, 60-day ceasefire with Hamas, promising his governing partners that he can still resume the war once it expires.

But Netanyahu is balancing those political constraints with pressure from the Trump administration, which is pressing Israel to wrap up the war.

Gayil Talshir, a political scientist at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, said she expects Netanyahu to work during those 60 days to shift the narrative away from the draft exemptions and the war in Gaza, toward something that could potentially give him an electoral boost – like an expansion of US-led normalization deals between Israel and Arab or Muslim countries.

Once the 60-day ceasefire is up, Netanyahu could bend to US pressure to end the war and bring home the remaining hostages in Gaza — a move most Israelis would support.

Elections are currently scheduled for October 2026. But if Netanyahu feels like he has improved his political standing, he may want to call elections before then.