Iran Gives Türkiye Green Light in Iraq without Guarantees 

Asharq Al-Awsat details plan to eliminate the Kurdistan Workers' Party in Iraq

An Iraqi soldier is seen in Sinjar three years after its liberation from ISIS. (AP file photo)
An Iraqi soldier is seen in Sinjar three years after its liberation from ISIS. (AP file photo)
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Iran Gives Türkiye Green Light in Iraq without Guarantees 

An Iraqi soldier is seen in Sinjar three years after its liberation from ISIS. (AP file photo)
An Iraqi soldier is seen in Sinjar three years after its liberation from ISIS. (AP file photo)

The pro-Iran Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) in Iraq has become a partner in a crucial deal between Baghdad and Ankara - with Iran’s blessing - to eliminate the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). Iraqi and Turkish sources said the recent deal goes beyond military operations against the PKK to cover comprehensive arrangements related to the shape of the Middle East after the war in Gaza is over.

A Turkish official told Asharq Al-Awsat that part of “Ankara’s plan” was to prepare for changes that will happen after the war and its determination to have “zero security problems in the region, especially in Iraq.” The “blood fraternity” between the PKK and Shiite factions in the town of Sinjar may however prove to be an obstacle in Türkiye's new plan.

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan spoke last week of an understanding reached between his country and “an official institution funded by the Iraqi state” over Sinjar.

It seems Türkiye is throwing its major political and military weight in Iraq and is seeking broader relations to end the chronic tensions along its southern border. Internal balances in Baghdad and the PKK’s rising power in Sinjar could undermine the plan.

Iraqi sources agreed that the “comprehensive Turkish activity” is part of the post-war arrangements for the region, and this demands the “elimination of sources of tension.”

What happened?

On March 13, Turkish FM Fidan met with his Iraqi counterpart Fuad Hussein in Baghdad. Security officials, including PMF leader Faleh al-Fayyad and National Security Adviser Qasim al-Araji were present at the meeting.

A government statement said Iraq deems the presence of the PKK on its territory as a “violation of the constitution.” Türkiye praised the statement, speaking of forming a 40-km deep buffer zone to eliminate the PKK, which it deems as terrorist. The zone would stretch from the Sulaymaniyah region, pass through Sinjar and reach the Syrian border.

That night, Turkish Defense Minister Yasar Guler did not return to Ankara with Fidan. He stayed behind and spent the night at the Iraqi border at the headquarters of Turkish forces deployed in Hakkari.

Türkiye’s zero hour

According to two sources in Baghdad and Erbil, Ankara has for years been receiving Iraqi complaints that it has been “too patient” in its fight against the PKK that ultimately has not been successful. It has repeatedly been asked what is holding it back from launching a “final military operation to rid everyone of this headache.” It seems it has finally been convinced to take decisive action.

Iraqi sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that before Fidan traveled to Baghdad, Iraq was informed of the Turkish plan, including Iran’s blessing of the new situation regarding the PKK.

“Everything, including zero hour, was ready” when the official consultations began, revealed another Iraqi source. He described the plan as “unprecedented” between the countries, adding that the PMF will be involved in some regions to provide support.

It remains unclear why Iran has agreed to eliminating the PKK in Iraq, especially since the party’s activity has since 2016 been connected to pro-Iran factions along Tehran’s strategic route that stretches to Damascus and Beirut.

The Iraqi sources said the agreement includes Turkish mediation with the Americans on easing tensions with Tehran in Iraq and securing a greater Iranian role in regional trade with Turkish guarantees. It also includes securing Iran’s assistance to Baghdad in overcoming crises, such as the export of oil and the “flawed” situation in the Kurdistan Region and Kirkuk.

Comprehensive changes

An Iraqi diplomat said the political aspects of the deal prepare for the “comprehensive changes that are expected to happen after the war in Gaza is over.” A Turkish aide had confirmed to Asharq Al-Awsat that Ankara had prepared a file about the post-war situation that covers countries in the region.

Speaking on condition of anonymity, the Turkish official said the Turkish foreign ministry and security agencies had drafted a plan some five months ago, covering Ankara’s options in the post-war phase and how to deal with the expected changes. “Iraq and Syria are part of this picture,” he revealed.

Former Nineveh Governor, Sunni politician Atheel al-Nujayfi told Asharq Al-Awsat: “All countries in the region are aware that the battle in Gaza has a post-war phase. Changes will be made to the strategies of major powers in the region.”

These changes demand preemptive steps that either prepare for a greater role in the future or prevent any plans that could affect the national security of these countries. He said Türkiye is very active in making strategic calculations to develop its interests.

However, a Turkish diplomatic source denied that the Turkish military operations in Iraq are directly tied to the situation in Gaza. He predicted that the operations may kick off in June.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is expected to travel to Baghdad in April. He is set to sign an agreement for the establishment of a joint operations command center and a buffer zone, “which will effectively mean we have reached zero hour,” said Turkish sources.

An Iraqi official from the pro-Iran Coordination Framework said Ankara wants to turn the PKK’s zones of influence into a “zone of secure partnership” with Iraq and Iran. The Turks have shown “clear keenness for the concerned regional players in this file to reach the post-war phase with zero tensions.”

This may explain why Türkiye is throwing such weight in Iraq. “Türkiye needs to prevent the ball of fire from rolling towards it amid such instability in the region,” said al-Nujayfi. This is why it is urging Iraq and Syria to “carry out direct and strong measures with it to prevent the PKK from turning into a greater crisis.”

Meanwhile, Iraqi sources said Tehran has given its blessing to the Turks to act in Iraq. An Iraqi politician said this was reflected with the notable presence of the PMF at the official consultations that took place between the two countries. The possibility of an armed confrontation taking place against the PKK in Sinjar remains unresolved, revealed the sources.

Türkiye’s military plan calls for a broad military operation in mountainous regions in the Kurdistan Region, while Baghdad provides intelligence support, maps and information and monitors the border.

Sulaymaniyah and Sinjar, however, lie on the outskirts of the Turkish buffer zone and intersect with Iranian interests, demanding that Ankara take different political and security arrangements over them.

A Kurdish source told Asharq Al-Awsat that the Turks were trying to neutralize the PKK in Sulaymaniyah by forging a new relationship with Bafel Talabani, head of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), including exploring opportunities for partnership with him and resolving differences with the Kurdistan Democratic Party in Erbil.

Al-Nujayfi said it would be difficult for the leaderships of the PUK, including Talabani, to put themselves in a confrontation with agreements reached between major countries in the region. So, there can be no doubt that the agreements were blessed by Iran and approved by Iraq, Türkiye and the official authority in Kurdistan.

Sinjar hurdle

The situation in Sinjar, however, remains an obstacle in the regional plans. The situation there will be handled by the PMF, according to the Turkish agreement.

Al-Nujayfi told Asharq Al-Awsat that the Shiite factions’ influence is limited to Sinjar and doesn’t extend to the rest of the Kurdish regions.

The situation in Sinjar is different, however. Located on the Turkish-Syrian border, its population is predominantly Yazidi and it boasts several armed groups. Even the Iraqi army acts like one of the factions there, said a local official in the town.

He compared Sinjar to Beirut during the Lebanese civil war where frontlines are at a close distance from one another and armed groups that represent regional and local interests are always on alert.

An alliance has grown over the years between the PMF and PKK and they formed a “blood fraternity” during the battles against the ISIS extremist group, said a member of a Shiite faction.

It remains unclear how the PMF will neutralize PKK fighters after the recent years of partnership on the ground.

Information about the nature of this alliance has varied. Two leading members of Shiite factions told Asharq Al-Awsat that the PMF provides safe locations for PKK leaderships in Sinjar, Nineveh and other regions in return for logistic and military services.

Three sources on the ground, including the leader of a powerful faction in Baghdad, said the situation goes “much more beyond this because the decision to form an alliance between the PMF and PKK was taken by Iran.”

“The PKK is very powerful. All the Iraqi security agencies don’t have an accurate imagining of the power of the party and its weapons,” they revealed, adding that the Iraqi military, during the term of former Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi, twice confronted the PKK in Sinjar and it came out defeated both times.

Moreover, they claimed that the PKK had set up a network of tunnels in Sinjar, especially the mountainous regions. Local journalists told Asharq Al-Awsat that they had previously spotted trucks transporting diggers from Sinjar to the areas where the tunnels are located.

Locals in Sinjar and members of Shiite factions did not answer question from Asharq Al-Awsat about the tunnels.

Expert force

A prominent politician from Nineveh described the PKK as an “expert force in deployment, mobilization and consolidating control, so it would be difficult to predict how the PMF can eliminate the party or help Türkiye neutralize it.”

Al-Nujayfi said the PKK will become a problem for Iraq that will weigh on local affairs so it will need Türkiye’s help in tackling this “internal crisis.” The PKK will eventually realize that “it is nothing more than a pawn and negotiations card. When it no longer serves a role, everyone will cooperate to eliminate it,” he added.

The question remains: How will the PMF neutralize the PKK fighters?

Former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki said in a recent television interview that there was a need to “confront the PKK gunmen as long as they were harming the people of Sinjar.” He added, however, that he doesn’t know how the cooperation with Türkiye against this party will take place, referring to whether the fighters will be expelled or contained.

A Shiite politician said: “The Iranian green light is not decisive.” Speaking on condition of anonymity, he added that Tehran stands before a “good deal with Türkiye, but it won’t sign a blank check and jeopardize its armed influence in Iraq.”

“Iran is observing and everything may change according to how developments unfold. All we know now is that a limited settlement is in place in Sinjar,” he remarked.

Other sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that the PMF would deploy local PKK members among Shiite factions, ending the visible presence of the party. Such a move would guarantee total control over Sinjar at the expense of Kurdish forces that are loyal to the Kurdistan Democratic Party.

What does this mean? The PMF will view the Turkish agreement as a way to strengthen its influence in a strategic area to Iraq, Iran and Türkiye. In theory, the military operation will lead to the expulsion of the PKK fighters to the mountainous regions of Kurdistan. It will also merge the Turkish buffer zone with the Iranian zone where Iranian factions are deployed near Syria. Political and diplomatic aides in Baghdad said everything should go according to plan “unless Tehran comes up with an unexpected card at a decisive moment.”



How the US Could Take Over Greenland and the Potential Challenges

05 February 2025, Greenland, Nuuk: Greenlandic flags fly in front of the Inatsisartut parliament in the capital Nuuk. (dpa)
05 February 2025, Greenland, Nuuk: Greenlandic flags fly in front of the Inatsisartut parliament in the capital Nuuk. (dpa)
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How the US Could Take Over Greenland and the Potential Challenges

05 February 2025, Greenland, Nuuk: Greenlandic flags fly in front of the Inatsisartut parliament in the capital Nuuk. (dpa)
05 February 2025, Greenland, Nuuk: Greenlandic flags fly in front of the Inatsisartut parliament in the capital Nuuk. (dpa)

US President Donald Trump wants to own Greenland. He has repeatedly said the United States must take control of the strategically located and mineral-rich island, which is a semiautonomous region that's part of NATO ally Denmark.

Officials from Denmark, Greenland and the United States met Thursday in Washington and will meet again next week to discuss a renewed push by the White House, which is considering a range of options, including using military force, to acquire the island.

Trump said Friday he is going to do “something on Greenland, whether they like it or not.”

If it's not done “the easy way, we're going to do it the hard way," he said without elaborating what that could entail. In an interview Thursday, he told The New York Times that he wants to own Greenland because “ownership gives you things and elements that you can’t get from just signing a document.”

Danish Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen has warned that an American takeover of Greenland would mark the end of NATO, and Greenlanders say they don't want to become part of the US.

This is a look at some of the ways the US could take control of Greenland and the potential challenges.

Military action could alter global relations

Trump and his officials have indicated they want to control Greenland to enhance American security and explore business and mining deals. But Imran Bayoumi, an associate director at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, said the sudden focus on Greenland is also the result of decades of neglect by several US presidents towards Washington's position in the Arctic.

The current fixation is partly down to “the realization we need to increase our presence in the Arctic, and we don’t yet have the right strategy or vision to do so,” he said.

If the US took control of Greenland by force, it would plunge NATO into a crisis, possibly an existential one.

While Greenland is the largest island in the world, it has a population of around 57,000 and doesn't have its own military. Defense is provided by Denmark, whose military is dwarfed by that of the US.

It's unclear how the remaining members of NATO would respond if the US decided to forcibly take control of the island or if they would come to Denmark's aid.

“If the United States chooses to attack another NATO country militarily, then everything stops,” Frederiksen has said.

Trump said he needs control of the island to guarantee American security, citing the threat from Russian and Chinese ships in the region, but “it's not true” said Lin Mortensgaard, an expert on the international politics of the Arctic at the Danish Institute for International Studies, or DIIS.

While there are probably Russian submarines — as there are across the Arctic region — there are no surface vessels, Mortensgaard said. China has research vessels in the Central Arctic Ocean, and while the Chinese and Russian militaries have done joint military exercises in the Arctic, they have taken place closer to Alaska, she said.

Bayoumi, of the Atlantic Council, said he doubted Trump would take control of Greenland by force because it’s unpopular with both Democratic and Republican lawmakers, and would likely “fundamentally alter” US relationships with allies worldwide.

The US already has access to Greenland under a 1951 defense agreement, and Denmark and Greenland would be “quite happy” to accommodate a beefed-up American military presence, Mortensgaard said.

For that reason, “blowing up the NATO alliance” for something Trump has already, doesn’t make sense, said Ulrik Pram Gad, an expert on Greenland at DIIS.

Bilateral agreements may assist effort

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio told a select group of US lawmakers this week that it was the Republican administration’s intention to eventually purchase Greenland, as opposed to using military force. Danish and Greenlandic officials have previously said the island isn't for sale.

It's not clear how much buying the island could cost, or if the US would be buying it from Denmark or Greenland.

Washington also could boost its military presence in Greenland “through cooperation and diplomacy,” without taking it over, Bayoumi said.

One option could be for the US to get a veto over security decisions made by the Greenlandic government, as it has in islands in the Pacific Ocean, Gad said.

Palau, Micronesia and the Marshall Islands have a Compact of Free Association, or COFA, with the US.

That would give Washington the right to operate military bases and make decisions about the islands’ security in exchange for US security guarantees and around $7 billion of yearly economic assistance, according to the Congressional Research Service.

It's not clear how much that would improve upon Washington's current security strategy. The US already operates the remote Pituffik Space Base in northwestern Greenland and can bring as many troops as it wants under existing agreements.

Influence operations expected to fail

Greenlandic politician Aaja Chemnitz told The Associated Press that Greenlanders want more rights, including independence, but don't want to become part of the US.

Gad suggested influence operations to persuade Greenlanders to join the US would likely fail. He said that is because the community on the island is small and the language is “inaccessible.”

Danish Foreign Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen summoned the top US official in Denmark in August to complain that “foreign actors” were seeking to influence the country’s future. Danish media reported that at least three people with connections to Trump carried out covert influence operations in Greenland.

Even if the US managed to take control of Greenland, it would likely come with a large bill, Gad said. That’s because Greenlanders currently have Danish citizenship and access to the Danish welfare system, including free health care and schooling.

To match that, “Trump would have to build a welfare state for Greenlanders that he doesn’t want for his own citizens,” Gad said.

Disagreement unlikely to be resolved

Since 1945, the American military presence in Greenland has decreased from thousands of soldiers over 17 bases and installations to 200 at the remote Pituffik Space Base in the northwest of the island, Rasmussen said last year. The base supports missile warning, missile defense and space surveillance operations for the US and NATO.

US Vice President JD Vance told Fox News on Thursday that Denmark has neglected its missile defense obligations in Greenland, but Mortensgaard said that it makes “little sense to criticize Denmark,” because the main reason why the US operates the Pituffik base in the north of the island is to provide early detection of missiles.

The best outcome for Denmark would be to update the defense agreement, which allows the US to have a military presence on the island and have Trump sign it with a “gold-plated signature,” Gad said.

But he suggested that's unlikely because Greenland is “handy” to the US president.

When Trump wants to change the news agenda — including distracting from domestic political problems — “he can just say the word ‘Greenland’ and this starts all over again,” Gad said.


US Stance on Iran Protests Balances Threats, Caution

Crowds of Iranian protesters gather in Taleghani Square in Karaj, west of Tehran. (Telegram)
Crowds of Iranian protesters gather in Taleghani Square in Karaj, west of Tehran. (Telegram)
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US Stance on Iran Protests Balances Threats, Caution

Crowds of Iranian protesters gather in Taleghani Square in Karaj, west of Tehran. (Telegram)
Crowds of Iranian protesters gather in Taleghani Square in Karaj, west of Tehran. (Telegram)

It may still be premature to say Iran’s ruling system is nearing collapse. Yet the unrest that has gripped the country in recent weeks has pushed Tehran into its most severe internal crisis in years.

Protests triggered by economic freefall and the collapse of the national currency have rapidly spread across regions and social classes, shedding their purely economic character and evolving into a direct challenge to the foundations of the political system.

As strikes have expanded, particularly in the bazaar and the oil sector, popular anger has deepened into a political crisis with existential stakes.

At the heart of these developments, the United States factor stands out as one of the most sensitive and influential elements, not only because of the long history of conflict between Washington and Tehran, but also due to the unprecedented tone adopted by US President Donald Trump, and the political and media reaction within Congress, which has reflected a calibrated division over how to approach the Iranian crisis.

From the early days of the escalating protests, Trump opted to depart from traditional diplomatic language. In a series of interviews and statements, he said he was following events in Iran “very closely,” expressing his belief that the country was “on the verge of collapse.”

More significant than his assessment, however, were his public warnings to the Iranian leadership against continuing to suppress protesters.

Trump spoke bluntly of live fire against unarmed demonstrators, arrests, and executions, describing the situation as “brutal behavior,” and stressing that he had informed Tehran that any bloody escalation would be met with “very severe strikes” from the United States.

This language amounts to an attempt at political and psychological deterrence rather than a declaration of an imminent military plan.

It pressures Iran’s leadership and sends a message of moral support to protesters, while simultaneously preserving ambiguity over the nature of any potential US action.

Vice President JD Vance expressed a similar stance, writing on X that Washington supports anyone exercising their right to peaceful protest, noting that Iran’s system suffers from deep problems.

He reiterated Trump’s call for “real negotiations” over the nuclear program, while leaving future steps to the president’s judgment.

Despite Trump’s clear support for the protests, his administration has so far avoided going further on the question of “the day after.”

This hesitation has been evident in its position on Reza Pahlavi, the son of Iran’s late shah, whose name has resurfaced as a figure of the exiled opposition.

While Trump described him as “a nice person,” he stopped short of holding an official meeting, saying it was still too early to determine who could genuinely represent the will of the Iranian people.

This caution reflects US awareness of the sensitivity of the Iranian scene, in light of past experiences in the region, from Iraq to Libya, where early bets on political alternatives led to disastrous outcomes.

Any overt US backing of a specific opposition figure could also give the Iranian authorities grounds to reinforce their narrative of a “foreign conspiracy,” a line already invoked by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and state media.

Alongside political rhetoric, the economic card occupies a central place in US calculations.

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has described Iran’s economy as on the edge of collapse, pointing to high inflation and a sharp erosion in living standards due to sanctions and mismanagement.

These remarks were not merely technical assessments, but a political message that Washington sees the economic crisis as a pressure point that could accelerate the erosion of the system’s ability to endure.

The economy is not only the spark that ignited the protests, but also one of the keys to their future. Continued strikes, particularly in the oil sector, threaten the main artery of state revenues, compounding pressure and narrowing room for maneuver.

In this context, Washington appears convinced that time is working against Tehran and that allowing the crisis to play out internally may be more effective than any direct intervention.

Another factor closely watched by US decision-makers is the international stance, notably the silence of Russia and China.

These two countries, which have provided Iran with political and economic cover in recent years, appear unwilling or unable to intervene to rescue the system from its internal crisis.

Their silence gives Washington a wider scope to escalate its rhetoric without fear of a major international confrontation.

At the same time, the US administration is keen to avoid appearing as the driver of regime change in Iran. Its declared support remains confined to an ethical and humanitarian framework, protecting protesters and preventing massacres, rather than shaping an alternative system.

This approach seeks to strike a balance between exploiting an adversary’s weakness and avoiding a slide into chaos.

The US response has not been limited to the White House, extending into Congress, where positions have reflected a disciplined division of opinion. The House Foreign Affairs Committee attacked the Iranian system in a post on X, describing it as a dictator that has stood for decades on the bodies of Iranians demanding change.

Within the Republican camp, alignment behind Trump has been clear.

Senator Lindsey Graham wrote that the president was “absolutely right,” that he “stands with the Iranian people against tyranny,” and called to “make Iran great again.”

Senator Ted Cruz said the protests had exposed the system’s “fatally weakened” status and that Iranians were “not chanting for cosmetic reforms, but for an end to clerical rule.”

Democrats, by contrast, expressed solidarity with protesters in a more cautious tone.

Senator Chris Murphy said Iranians deserve their future in their own hands, not through American bombs, warning that military intervention could undermine the movement.

Bernie Sanders said the United States should stand with human rights, not repeat the mistakes of forcibly changing regimes.

In the House, Representative Yassamin Ansari sparked further debate by voicing support for the Iranian people while warning against empowering the Mujahideen-e-Khalq, which she described as “an extremist group lacking legitimacy.”

Republican lawmakers such as Claudia Tenney and Mario Diaz-Balart adopted a harsher tone, calling for clear support for Iranians, “who are bravely demanding freedom, dignity, and basic human rights.”

This divergence reflects a complex US picture. Republicans see the Iranian moment as an opportunity to validate Trump’s pressure and deterrence strategy, while Democrats fear that verbal support could slide into ill-considered entanglement.

Yet both sides converge on a core point: holding Iran’s system responsible for violence and economic collapse and viewing current events as an unprecedented challenge to its legitimacy.

This relative alignment grants Trump room to maneuver domestically without imposing consensus on intervention.

Washington, as reflected in White House rhetoric and congressional debate, prefers at this stage to watch the fractures within Iran deepen, while keeping all options on the table and awaiting what happens on the streets.


A Timeline of How the Protests in Iran Unfolded and Grew

A general view from a street in Tehran, Iran, 08 January 2026. (EPA)
A general view from a street in Tehran, Iran, 08 January 2026. (EPA)
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A Timeline of How the Protests in Iran Unfolded and Grew

A general view from a street in Tehran, Iran, 08 January 2026. (EPA)
A general view from a street in Tehran, Iran, 08 January 2026. (EPA)

Demonstrations broke out in Iran on Dec. 28 and have spread nationwide as protesters vent their increasing discontent over the country's faltering economy and the collapse of its currency.

Dozens of people have been killed and thousands arrested as the daily protests have grown and the government seeks to contain them.

While the initial focus had been on issues like spikes in the prices of food staples and the country's staggering annual inflation rate, protesters have now begun chanting anti-government statements as well.

Here is how the protests developed:

Dec. 28: Protests break out in two major markets in downtown Tehran, after the Iranian rial plunged to 1.42 million to the US dollar, a new record low, compounding inflationary pressure and pushing up the prices of food and other daily necessities. The government had raised prices for nationally subsidized gasoline in early December, increasing discontent.

Dec. 29: Central Bank head Mohammad Reza Farzin resigns as the protests in Tehran spread to other cities. Police fire tear gas to disperse protesters in the capital.

Dec. 30: As protests spread to include more cities, as well as several university campuses, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian meets with a group of business leaders to listen to their demands and pledges his administration will “not spare any effort for solving problems” with the economy.

Dec. 31: Iran appoints Abdolnasser Hemmati as the country's new central bank governor. Officials in southern Iran say that protests in the city of Fasa turned violent after crowds broke into the governor's office and injured police officers.

Jan. 1: The protests' first fatalities are officially reported, with authorities saying at least seven people have been killed. The most intense violence appears to be in Azna, a city in Iran’s Lorestan province, where videos posted online purport to show objects in the street ablaze and gunfire echoing as people shouted: “Shameless! Shameless!”

The semiofficial Fars news agency reports three people were killed. Other protesters are reported killed in Bakhtiari and Isfahan provinces while a 21-year-old volunteer in the paramilitary Revolutionary Guard’s Basij force was killed in Lorestan.

Jan. 2: US President Donald Trump raises the stakes, writing on his Truth Social platform that if Iran “violently kills peaceful protesters,” the United States “will come to their rescue.” The warning, only months after American forces bombed Iranian nuclear sites, includes the assertion, without elaboration, that: “We are locked and loaded and ready to go.”

Protests, meantime, expand to reach more than 100 locations in 22 of Iran's 31 provinces, according to the US-based Human Rights Activists News Agency.

Jan. 3: Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei says “rioters must be put in their place,” in what is seen as a green light for security forces to begin more aggressively putting down the demonstrations. Protests expand to more than 170 locations in 25 provinces, with at least 15 people killed and 580 arrested, HRANA reports.

Jan. 6: Protesters conduct a sit-in at Tehran's Grand Bazaar until security forces disperse them using tear gas. The death toll rises to 36, including two members of Iranian security forces, according to HRANA. Demonstrations have reached over 280 locations in 27 of Iran’s 31 provinces.

Jan. 8 to 9: Following a call from Iran's exiled crown prince, a mass of people shout from their windows and take to the streets in an overnight protest. The government responds by blocking the internet and international telephone calls, in a bid to cut off the country of 85 million from outside influence. HRANA says violence around the demonstrations has killed at least 42 people while more than 2,270 others have been detained.