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Iran Gives Türkiye Green Light in Iraq without Guarantees 

Asharq Al-Awsat details plan to eliminate the Kurdistan Workers' Party in Iraq

An Iraqi soldier is seen in Sinjar three years after its liberation from ISIS. (AP file photo)
An Iraqi soldier is seen in Sinjar three years after its liberation from ISIS. (AP file photo)
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Iran Gives Türkiye Green Light in Iraq without Guarantees 

An Iraqi soldier is seen in Sinjar three years after its liberation from ISIS. (AP file photo)
An Iraqi soldier is seen in Sinjar three years after its liberation from ISIS. (AP file photo)

The pro-Iran Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) in Iraq has become a partner in a crucial deal between Baghdad and Ankara - with Iran’s blessing - to eliminate the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). Iraqi and Turkish sources said the recent deal goes beyond military operations against the PKK to cover comprehensive arrangements related to the shape of the Middle East after the war in Gaza is over.

A Turkish official told Asharq Al-Awsat that part of “Ankara’s plan” was to prepare for changes that will happen after the war and its determination to have “zero security problems in the region, especially in Iraq.” The “blood fraternity” between the PKK and Shiite factions in the town of Sinjar may however prove to be an obstacle in Türkiye's new plan.

Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan spoke last week of an understanding reached between his country and “an official institution funded by the Iraqi state” over Sinjar.

It seems Türkiye is throwing its major political and military weight in Iraq and is seeking broader relations to end the chronic tensions along its southern border. Internal balances in Baghdad and the PKK’s rising power in Sinjar could undermine the plan.

Iraqi sources agreed that the “comprehensive Turkish activity” is part of the post-war arrangements for the region, and this demands the “elimination of sources of tension.”

What happened?

On March 13, Turkish FM Fidan met with his Iraqi counterpart Fuad Hussein in Baghdad. Security officials, including PMF leader Faleh al-Fayyad and National Security Adviser Qasim al-Araji were present at the meeting.

A government statement said Iraq deems the presence of the PKK on its territory as a “violation of the constitution.” Türkiye praised the statement, speaking of forming a 40-km deep buffer zone to eliminate the PKK, which it deems as terrorist. The zone would stretch from the Sulaymaniyah region, pass through Sinjar and reach the Syrian border.

That night, Turkish Defense Minister Yasar Guler did not return to Ankara with Fidan. He stayed behind and spent the night at the Iraqi border at the headquarters of Turkish forces deployed in Hakkari.

Türkiye’s zero hour

According to two sources in Baghdad and Erbil, Ankara has for years been receiving Iraqi complaints that it has been “too patient” in its fight against the PKK that ultimately has not been successful. It has repeatedly been asked what is holding it back from launching a “final military operation to rid everyone of this headache.” It seems it has finally been convinced to take decisive action.

Iraqi sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that before Fidan traveled to Baghdad, Iraq was informed of the Turkish plan, including Iran’s blessing of the new situation regarding the PKK.

“Everything, including zero hour, was ready” when the official consultations began, revealed another Iraqi source. He described the plan as “unprecedented” between the countries, adding that the PMF will be involved in some regions to provide support.

It remains unclear why Iran has agreed to eliminating the PKK in Iraq, especially since the party’s activity has since 2016 been connected to pro-Iran factions along Tehran’s strategic route that stretches to Damascus and Beirut.

The Iraqi sources said the agreement includes Turkish mediation with the Americans on easing tensions with Tehran in Iraq and securing a greater Iranian role in regional trade with Turkish guarantees. It also includes securing Iran’s assistance to Baghdad in overcoming crises, such as the export of oil and the “flawed” situation in the Kurdistan Region and Kirkuk.

Comprehensive changes

An Iraqi diplomat said the political aspects of the deal prepare for the “comprehensive changes that are expected to happen after the war in Gaza is over.” A Turkish aide had confirmed to Asharq Al-Awsat that Ankara had prepared a file about the post-war situation that covers countries in the region.

Speaking on condition of anonymity, the Turkish official said the Turkish foreign ministry and security agencies had drafted a plan some five months ago, covering Ankara’s options in the post-war phase and how to deal with the expected changes. “Iraq and Syria are part of this picture,” he revealed.

Former Nineveh Governor, Sunni politician Atheel al-Nujayfi told Asharq Al-Awsat: “All countries in the region are aware that the battle in Gaza has a post-war phase. Changes will be made to the strategies of major powers in the region.”

These changes demand preemptive steps that either prepare for a greater role in the future or prevent any plans that could affect the national security of these countries. He said Türkiye is very active in making strategic calculations to develop its interests.

However, a Turkish diplomatic source denied that the Turkish military operations in Iraq are directly tied to the situation in Gaza. He predicted that the operations may kick off in June.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is expected to travel to Baghdad in April. He is set to sign an agreement for the establishment of a joint operations command center and a buffer zone, “which will effectively mean we have reached zero hour,” said Turkish sources.

An Iraqi official from the pro-Iran Coordination Framework said Ankara wants to turn the PKK’s zones of influence into a “zone of secure partnership” with Iraq and Iran. The Turks have shown “clear keenness for the concerned regional players in this file to reach the post-war phase with zero tensions.”

This may explain why Türkiye is throwing such weight in Iraq. “Türkiye needs to prevent the ball of fire from rolling towards it amid such instability in the region,” said al-Nujayfi. This is why it is urging Iraq and Syria to “carry out direct and strong measures with it to prevent the PKK from turning into a greater crisis.”

Meanwhile, Iraqi sources said Tehran has given its blessing to the Turks to act in Iraq. An Iraqi politician said this was reflected with the notable presence of the PMF at the official consultations that took place between the two countries. The possibility of an armed confrontation taking place against the PKK in Sinjar remains unresolved, revealed the sources.

Türkiye’s military plan calls for a broad military operation in mountainous regions in the Kurdistan Region, while Baghdad provides intelligence support, maps and information and monitors the border.

Sulaymaniyah and Sinjar, however, lie on the outskirts of the Turkish buffer zone and intersect with Iranian interests, demanding that Ankara take different political and security arrangements over them.

A Kurdish source told Asharq Al-Awsat that the Turks were trying to neutralize the PKK in Sulaymaniyah by forging a new relationship with Bafel Talabani, head of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), including exploring opportunities for partnership with him and resolving differences with the Kurdistan Democratic Party in Erbil.

Al-Nujayfi said it would be difficult for the leaderships of the PUK, including Talabani, to put themselves in a confrontation with agreements reached between major countries in the region. So, there can be no doubt that the agreements were blessed by Iran and approved by Iraq, Türkiye and the official authority in Kurdistan.

Sinjar hurdle

The situation in Sinjar, however, remains an obstacle in the regional plans. The situation there will be handled by the PMF, according to the Turkish agreement.

Al-Nujayfi told Asharq Al-Awsat that the Shiite factions’ influence is limited to Sinjar and doesn’t extend to the rest of the Kurdish regions.

The situation in Sinjar is different, however. Located on the Turkish-Syrian border, its population is predominantly Yazidi and it boasts several armed groups. Even the Iraqi army acts like one of the factions there, said a local official in the town.

He compared Sinjar to Beirut during the Lebanese civil war where frontlines are at a close distance from one another and armed groups that represent regional and local interests are always on alert.

An alliance has grown over the years between the PMF and PKK and they formed a “blood fraternity” during the battles against the ISIS extremist group, said a member of a Shiite faction.

It remains unclear how the PMF will neutralize PKK fighters after the recent years of partnership on the ground.

Information about the nature of this alliance has varied. Two leading members of Shiite factions told Asharq Al-Awsat that the PMF provides safe locations for PKK leaderships in Sinjar, Nineveh and other regions in return for logistic and military services.

Three sources on the ground, including the leader of a powerful faction in Baghdad, said the situation goes “much more beyond this because the decision to form an alliance between the PMF and PKK was taken by Iran.”

“The PKK is very powerful. All the Iraqi security agencies don’t have an accurate imagining of the power of the party and its weapons,” they revealed, adding that the Iraqi military, during the term of former Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi, twice confronted the PKK in Sinjar and it came out defeated both times.

Moreover, they claimed that the PKK had set up a network of tunnels in Sinjar, especially the mountainous regions. Local journalists told Asharq Al-Awsat that they had previously spotted trucks transporting diggers from Sinjar to the areas where the tunnels are located.

Locals in Sinjar and members of Shiite factions did not answer question from Asharq Al-Awsat about the tunnels.

Expert force

A prominent politician from Nineveh described the PKK as an “expert force in deployment, mobilization and consolidating control, so it would be difficult to predict how the PMF can eliminate the party or help Türkiye neutralize it.”

Al-Nujayfi said the PKK will become a problem for Iraq that will weigh on local affairs so it will need Türkiye’s help in tackling this “internal crisis.” The PKK will eventually realize that “it is nothing more than a pawn and negotiations card. When it no longer serves a role, everyone will cooperate to eliminate it,” he added.

The question remains: How will the PMF neutralize the PKK fighters?

Former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki said in a recent television interview that there was a need to “confront the PKK gunmen as long as they were harming the people of Sinjar.” He added, however, that he doesn’t know how the cooperation with Türkiye against this party will take place, referring to whether the fighters will be expelled or contained.

A Shiite politician said: “The Iranian green light is not decisive.” Speaking on condition of anonymity, he added that Tehran stands before a “good deal with Türkiye, but it won’t sign a blank check and jeopardize its armed influence in Iraq.”

“Iran is observing and everything may change according to how developments unfold. All we know now is that a limited settlement is in place in Sinjar,” he remarked.

Other sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that the PMF would deploy local PKK members among Shiite factions, ending the visible presence of the party. Such a move would guarantee total control over Sinjar at the expense of Kurdish forces that are loyal to the Kurdistan Democratic Party.

What does this mean? The PMF will view the Turkish agreement as a way to strengthen its influence in a strategic area to Iraq, Iran and Türkiye. In theory, the military operation will lead to the expulsion of the PKK fighters to the mountainous regions of Kurdistan. It will also merge the Turkish buffer zone with the Iranian zone where Iranian factions are deployed near Syria. Political and diplomatic aides in Baghdad said everything should go according to plan “unless Tehran comes up with an unexpected card at a decisive moment.”

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Gemayel to Asharq Al-Awsat: Khaddam was Assad’s Stick to Apply Pressure

Relations between Gemayel and Khaddam were highly tense (Getty)
Relations between Gemayel and Khaddam were highly tense (Getty)
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Gemayel to Asharq Al-Awsat: Khaddam was Assad’s Stick to Apply Pressure

Relations between Gemayel and Khaddam were highly tense (Getty)
Relations between Gemayel and Khaddam were highly tense (Getty)

Late Syrian President Hafez al-Assad was a masterful negotiator, fiercely protective of his image and reputation. He was known for exhausting his guests with lengthy detours into history before addressing the substance of any talks.

Assad had an exceptional ability to restrain his anger, circling around an issue before striking again — often with calculated patience.

He avoided coarse language, allowing resentments to speak for themselves, but he never forgave those he believed had tried to derail his vision. Among them, according to accounts, were Yasser Arafat, Kamal Jumblatt, Bashir Gemayel, Amine Gemayel, and Samir Geagea.

In dealing with rivals and pressuring opponents, Assad often relied on a trusted enforcer: Abdel Halim Khaddam, his long-time foreign minister and later vice president. In the second part of his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, former Lebanese President Amine Gemayel said Khaddam was Assad’s “stick,” used to assert control.

Many Lebanese politicians believed Khaddam’s bluntness was not personal, but rather a reflection of an official mandate from his mentor.

Assad rarely issued direct threats. Instead, he preferred subtle intimidation — as when he told Gemayel that his aides had once suggested blowing up President Anwar Sadat’s plane to prevent him from reaching Jerusalem.

Khaddam, the late Syrian strongman’s long-serving envoy, was known for humiliating both allies and foes who dared defy Damascus’ directives. His tactics were often unsettling — deliberately designed to leave visitors unnerved and pliant by the time they reached Assad’s office.

In a conversation in Paris during his retirement, Khaddam defended his hardline methods, saying they were not meant to insult but to prevent potentially dangerous confrontations. “The aim was to avoid escalation that could lead to security agencies taking over, which might have resulted in worse outcomes,” he said.

In the same meeting, Khaddam accused former Lebanese President Amine Gemayel of obstructing a political solution in Lebanon, calling him “hesitant and suspicious.”

He also acknowledged Assad was caught off guard when the Tripartite Agreement collapsed. The Syrian leader, Khaddam said, had not believed anyone in Lebanon would openly defy Syria — or the other Lebanese factions who had signed the accord.

“President Assad had many cards to play. President Sarkis had none,” recalled former Lebanese Foreign Minister Fouad Boutros, reflecting on the stark imbalance between Syria and Lebanon during Elias Sarkis’s presidency.

Assad, he said, had the power to topple or paralyze the Lebanese government before Sarkis even returned to Beirut. “Sarkis had no leverage over Assad,” Boutros noted. “But while Sarkis often showed flexibility, he would stand firm when asked to compromise Lebanon’s core principles.”

Boutros, who played a key role in Lebanon’s diplomacy during the civil war, said he had to exercise utmost restraint to keep Khaddam — Syria’s often abrasive envoy — from derailing talks with personal attacks or inflammatory language.

The dynamic, he suggested, was not unique to Sarkis. It also echoed the later, uneasy relationship between Gemayel and Assad.

Gemayel recalled a cold and confrontational relationship with Khaddam, describing him as “the stick and the poison” used by Assad to pressure Beirut into submission.

“There was no warmth between us from the beginning,” Gemayel told Asharq Al-Awsat.

“Khaddam used underhanded tactics to undermine the presidency and sow division within my team. While President Assad treated me with respect and politeness, he needed someone to apply pressure — and that was Khaddam,” he added.

Gemayel said Khaddam was behind all the pressure campaigns Syria waged against him — all with Assad’s full knowledge. “Assad played the courteous statesman. Khaddam handled the dirty work. Syria wanted me to sign agreements harmful to Lebanon’s interests, and Khaddam was the one tasked with forcing my hand.”

Despite Khaddam’s harsh demeanor, Gemayel said he never allowed him to overstep.

“I kept him in check. He didn’t dare cross the line with me. We were once in a meeting with President Assad, and Khaddam had been spreading ridiculous rumors beforehand. When he spoke up, I turned to Assad and said: ‘Mr. President, we have a problem with Khaddam. Please ask him to stop acting like a spy when dealing with us.’”

Khaddam, Gemayel said, tried to intimidate many Lebanese politicians — but not him.

“He was rude, even insolent to the point of absurdity. But he knew that if he said anything out of line with me, I would respond immediately.”

Assad’s Subtle Control and the Language of Minorities

Assad understood early on the fragility of Lebanon’s sectarian makeup. To him, the country was a meeting place for minorities — one that always needed an external patron to manage its wars and truces. He allowed for limited victories, but never total defeat, ensuring that no side could do without Syria’s oversight.

Assad sought to rule Syria indefinitely, with Lebanon as a backyard extension of his regime. Yet unlike his brother Rifaat, he avoided openly sectarian rhetoric or calls for partition. Rifaat, according to Gemayel, once suggested dividing both Syria and Lebanon along sectarian lines during a conversation with Lebanese leaders Walid Jumblatt and Marwan Hamadeh.

When asked whether he ever felt his dialogue with Assad was, at its core, a conversation between an Alawite and a Maronite, Gemayel replied: “No — that was Rifaat’s language. He used to say minorities must come together and show solidarity. But that narrative was never pushed by President Assad or his inner circle. It was always tailored to serve their own agenda.”

Assad’s political strategy was built on gathering leverage — and minority groups were central to that plan. His ties with Lebanon’s Druze community, and his clash with Druze leader Kamal Jumblatt, fit squarely within this framework. Assad relied on Syria’s own Druze population, as well as the Christian minority, to tighten his grip on the country’s diverse communities and align them under the banner of his regime.

“Assad had a firm hold on the minorities,” Gemayel said, adding that “he brought them all together to make them part of the Syrian system.”

Tensions between Syria’s Alawite leadership and the country’s Sunni majority were well known, Gemayel added, particularly through the candid rhetoric of Assad’s brother, Rifaat.

“Rifaat was open about the hostility between Alawites and Sunnis,” Gemayel said. “In his conversations with us, it was clear. But with President Assad, there was no visible sign of that. What lay beneath the surface, only God knows — but in our dealings with him, we never felt it.”

Gemayel Dismisses Reports of a Syria-Lebanon Confederation Proposal

Asked about longstanding claims that former Lebanese President Camille Chamoun had once proposed a confederation between Lebanon and Syria to Hafez al-Assad, Gemayel was quick to reject the idea.

“That’s absolutely not true,” he said. “President Chamoun would never have made such a proposal. A lot of things were said at the time. There were even reports that US envoy Dean Brown had suggested relocating Lebanon’s Christians to California — all of it nonsense, poetic talk with no grounding in reality.”

Gemayel also addressed one of the most controversial moments in US diplomacy during Lebanon’s 1988 presidential crisis: the phrase reportedly used by US envoy Richard Murphy — “Mikhael Daher or chaos.”

Daher, a Christian MP close to Damascus, had been floated as the only candidate acceptable to both Syria and the United States.

But Washington later distanced itself from the deal. The episode, Gemayel said, underscored a period in which American pressure aligned more with Syrian — and by extension, Israeli — interests, leaving Lebanon’s sovereignty hanging in the balance.

Gemayel confirmed that US envoy Richard Murphy did indeed issue the stark ultimatum in 1988. The phrase, which became emblematic of foreign interference in Lebanon’s presidential crisis, reflected what Gemayel described as Washington’s unwillingness to confront Damascus — despite acknowledging its destabilizing role in Lebanon.

“Yes, Murphy said it,” Gemayel affirmed to Asharq Al-Awsat.

“The Americans had a problem — they wanted Syria, and they didn’t. They knew Syria was playing a destructive role in Lebanon, but they didn’t want to challenge it. They kept trying to find common ground with Syria, not with us.”

According to Gemayel, the US saw Daher — a respected Christian parliamentarian close to Damascus — as a palatable compromise. “They thought Daher was a respectable figure who might be acceptable to the Lebanese, so they went along with Syria’s choice,” he said.

Washington, he added, had consistently prioritized pragmatism over principle in Lebanon, often aligning with whichever side could deliver results — even if it came at Beirut’s expense.

“It was the same with the May 17 Agreement with Israel,” Gemayel said, referring to the short-lived 1983 accord.

“The US couldn't pressure Israel, so Lebanon had to pay. And they couldn’t pressure Syria either — Syria was stubborn, had resources, and they didn’t want a confrontation. So they kept trying to sell us solutions that weren’t in Lebanon’s interest.”

“The Americans were always looking for the quickest deal,” he added. “They wanted to please both Syria and Israel. With Syria, it was clear — they didn’t want to upset Assad, because they knew who held the real power in Lebanon.”

Gemayel said that while he personally held the reins in decision-making and negotiations with Syria during his time in office, several close advisers and intermediaries played essential roles in laying the groundwork for dialogue with Damascus.

“The relationship and final decisions were in my hands,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

“I was the one doing the actual negotiating. But when it came to preparation, the late Jean Obeid played a very valuable role. He was intelligent, committed to Lebanon’s interests, and had close ties with the Syrians. He couldn’t get everything done, but he managed to ease certain issues,” said Gemayel.

Gemayel also credited Eli Salem, another aide, for navigating delicate talks with Syrian officials — particularly with Khaddam.

“Salem had a knack for getting through on specific points,” Gemayel said. “He had good chemistry with Khaddam, and that helped, especially since Khaddam and I didn’t get along.”

One figure who unexpectedly played a constructive role, according to Gemayel, was Brigadier General Jamil al-Sayyed, then an intelligence officer stationed in Lebanon’s eastern Bekaa Valley.

“You may be surprised,” he said, “but Jamil al-Sayyed was very helpful. Whenever I was heading to Damascus, I would stop in the Bekaa to meet him. He gave me very precise insights into what was happening at the Syrian presidential palace and the broader picture in Damascus. He was well-informed, sincere, and provided intelligence that wasn’t widely available — information that truly benefited Lebanon.”

Asked whether Syria was uneasy about the role of veteran journalist and diplomat Ghassan Tueni in his administration, Gemayel said the Syrians had little affection for him.

“There was never any warmth toward Ghassan,” he said. “He came with me to Syria just once, and it was clear there was tension. Whenever he was present, things got heated. Ghassan and Khaddam were like a ping-pong match — constantly hitting the ball back and forth.”

The friction, Gemayel explained, stemmed in large part from Tueni’s association with An-Nahar, the Beirut daily he helped lead, which often published sharp criticism of Syria.

“Syria never appreciated An-Nahar,” Gemayel said. “Even if Ghassan tried to distance himself from specific articles, the content was out there for everyone to see — and the Syrians didn’t forget it.”