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For Over a Century: Saudi Success in Hajj Management

Hajj pilgrims’ camps at the beginning of the Saudi era (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Hajj pilgrims’ camps at the beginning of the Saudi era (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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For Over a Century: Saudi Success in Hajj Management

Hajj pilgrims’ camps at the beginning of the Saudi era (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Hajj pilgrims’ camps at the beginning of the Saudi era (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Saudi Arabia’s connection with Hajj is a long-standing tradition marked by significant achievements. This journey began with the first pilgrimage under the reign of the Kingdom’s founder, King Abdulaziz, soon after he entered Makkah in December 1924.
While Hajj is a great honor for Saudi Arabia, it also comes with immense responsibility.
King Abdulaziz Calls on Muslims to Join Hajj
King Abdulaziz has invited Muslims from around the world to join the Hajj pilgrimage. He promised to ensure their comfort, security, and rights.
Due to ongoing unrest in Jeddah at the time, pilgrims were directed to travel to the holy city of Makkah through the ports of Rabigh, Al Lith, and Al Qunfudhah.
In his message, King Abdulaziz said: “We warmly welcome pilgrims from all Muslim nations. We are committed to their comfort and safety, and we will facilitate their journey to Makkah from Rabigh, Al Lith, or Al Qunfudhah. Our forces have secured these areas, and we will take all necessary measures to ensure the pilgrims’ comfort.”
King Abdulaziz Welcomes Charitable Initiatives
King Abdulaziz announced that all previous barriers to charitable and economic projects have been removed. He invited everyone to undertake such efforts, assuring that the gates of Hijaz are open and the local government is ready to provide full support and facilities for these initiatives.
Challenges of Hajj Before Saudi Rule
On February 25, 1925, Sultan Abdulaziz bin Abdul Rahman Al Saud issued a call to Muslims, inviting them to perform Hajj. This was before he was declared King of Hijaz. How did he organize the first Hajj season, and what conditions did pilgrims face? Security was a major concern, along with disease, mistreatment by local authorities, and lack of services.
British documents reveal a lack of clear policies. One document notes the anger of Bengali Muslims due to the poor treatment of their pilgrims in the 1924 Hajj season. Another document states that Indian Muslims found the arrangements in Makkah very poor.
Maj. Gen. Ibrahim Rifaat Pasha, who performed Hajj in 1901 and 1908, documented his experiences.
In 1901, he noted, “The ruler of Makkah imposed a tax for the railway, charging each pilgrim one riyal. Pilgrims who refused to pay were detained in Makkah for seven days after Hajj.”
“Some Moroccan pilgrims complained to the governor about being detained. The governor sent a representative, but the pilgrims were beaten by the ruler’s guards and returned empty-handed. A rightful complaint was met with harsh humiliation,” added Pasha.
Pasha also warned that if this injustice continues, people will avoid Hajj, which would harm the Arab economy and Islam.
“Hajj connects Muslims worldwide. Without it, Muslims would be easy prey for colonizers,” he cautioned.
He described the chaos as pilgrims left Makkah, “Pilgrims were stopped to pay another tax of one riyal per camel. The congestion was severe, with harsh enforcement by guards. People fell, bones broke, and luggage was lost or damaged.”
“The sounds of women wailing, children crying, and men arguing filled the air. There was no police to maintain order. This chaos was due to poor tax collection. The government could have appointed more collectors and scheduled departures by caravan to ensure a calm and safe journey for the pilgrims,” concluded Pasha.
King Abdulaziz Acts to Secure Pilgrims
King Abdulaziz faced various challenges and waited several years before annexing Hijaz. Despite having a clear path forward, he avoided actions that might provoke foreign intervention.
He pursued a patient approach, issuing statements and communications to clarify his position regarding the Hijaz government’s treatment of pilgrims, which justified his eventual annexation decision.
However, he delayed due to recognizing the significant difficulties in Hijaz needing comprehensive solutions.
While annexing Hijaz was pivotal for his unification efforts, King Abdulaziz’s primary aim was to protect the holy sites, ensure safe access, establish peace, and address injustices faced by pilgrims.
His vision prioritized swiftly providing essential services and enforcing justice based on Islamic principles. Despite resource constraints, wartime conditions, the siege of Jeddah, and international criticism, King Abdulaziz felt deeply responsible for fulfilling this mission.
Inaugurating the First Hajj Season under Saudi Rule
King Abdulaziz successfully oversaw the inaugural Hajj season during his reign, a milestone achieved through divine guidance, clear vision, and meticulous planning aimed at ensuring security, justice, and enhanced services.
This responsibility was immense, but King Abdulaziz fully grasped its importance, closely monitored its execution, and personally supervised the details. The successful management of the Hajj pilgrimage in the early years of the Saudi state underscored his effective leadership.
Security
After declaring the restoration of security in the Hijaz shortly after entering Makkah, King Abdulaziz moved quickly to enforce order. He warned of severe punishments for anyone endangering security, especially during the Hajj pilgrimage.
He deployed patrols to hunt down criminals targeting pilgrims, ensuring their swift justice. Tribal leaders were cautioned against disrupting pilgrim caravans and held responsible for crimes in their territories. This firm stance deterred further criminal activity.
Health and Municipal Services
Upon arriving in Makkah, King Abdulaziz swiftly appointed his personal physician, Dr. Mahmoud Hamdi Hamouda, to oversee public health.
He took immediate steps to organize health services and educate the public through articles in the early editions of “Um Al-Qura” newspaper. Addressing prevalent diseases and epidemics became a top priority after ensuring security.
Key initiatives included verifying causes of death and issuing weekly statistical reports.
Before the Hajj season, proactive health measures were implemented to prevent diseases, proposing suitable medical teams with a strong focus on prevention.
Several hospitals and health centers were prepared to operate during Hajj. Food and beverage sales, bakery cleanliness, and health guidelines for barbers were monitored closely, with strict penalties for violations.
The cleansing of holy sites and preparation of sacrificial areas were also part of the comprehensive preparations.
Post-Hajj, a health report confirmed the absence of epidemic diseases and a decrease in mortality rates compared to previous years, accompanied by several recommendations.
Water and Food
King Abdulaziz prioritized the maintenance of Ayn Zubaydah’s water channels, ensuring it remained clear to prevent pilgrim thirst, a lesson learned from past Hajj seasons.
Early in Dhu al-Qi’dah, the operation of a water pump was announced to transport water to Mina, with efforts to fill reservoirs ensuring water availability for pilgrims. The King entrusted his advisor, Hafiz Wahba, to oversee these operations, inspecting pumping machinery and reservoirs in Mina and Arafat and reporting back.
Before the Hajj season, efforts to clean and sterilize water channels, reservoirs, and public basins in Mina were completed.
King Abdulaziz also took proactive measures to secure food supplies from various regions, opening markets and ensuring staples like dates, meat, ghee, honey, wheat, barley, corn, and sesame were available from Najd, Asir, Jazan, and Taif.
He appointed Abdullah Al-Fadl to procure goods early from Aden and India, resulting in several ships arriving before Hajj carrying flour, sugar, barley, and kerosene. Caravans of camels also delivered provisions.
Announcements regarding food availability, price monitoring, and weekly price lists were made, with actions taken against monopolistic traders. Some companies advertised affordable food options, ensuring accessibility for all pilgrims.

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Features

From UNIFIL to Verification Committees... Will Int’l Force in Lebanon Have Expanded Powers?

UN peacekeepers (UNIFIL) vehicles drive in the Lebanese village of Wazzani near the border with Israel, southern Lebanon, July 6, 2023. (Reuters)
UN peacekeepers (UNIFIL) vehicles drive in the Lebanese village of Wazzani near the border with Israel, southern Lebanon, July 6, 2023. (Reuters)
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From UNIFIL to Verification Committees... Will Int’l Force in Lebanon Have Expanded Powers?

UN peacekeepers (UNIFIL) vehicles drive in the Lebanese village of Wazzani near the border with Israel, southern Lebanon, July 6, 2023. (Reuters)
UN peacekeepers (UNIFIL) vehicles drive in the Lebanese village of Wazzani near the border with Israel, southern Lebanon, July 6, 2023. (Reuters)

With UNIFIL’s departure now all but certain, the question is no longer whether the UN force will remain in southern Lebanon, but who will replace it, and with what powers.

A European-led force and verification committees are under discussion, potentially expanding the international role from monitoring UN Security Council resolution 1701 to verifying exclusive state control over weapons south of the Litani River.

European-led force

Abbas Daher, director of the Center for Media Foresight, told Asharq Al-Awsat that a decision not to renew the UN Interim Force in Lebanon’s (UNIFIL) mandate was now “virtually certain,” despite recent attempts involving Italy to revive efforts for an extension.

“However, President Joseph Aoun’s visit to Italy and the current visit by Lebanese army Commander Gen. Rodolphe Haykal to continue discussions on implementation have effectively opened debate over the force that could succeed UNIFIL, whether in the form of verification committees or a force with a predominantly European composition,” Daher said.

“Discussions are now underway, and European countries, led by Italy, France and Spain, and perhaps Germany, are considering establishing a primarily European force to continue the mission,” he added.

“Efforts are also being made to gain international support for this arrangement.”

As for the verification committees, Daher said there was a proposal for the United States to play a role, particularly in verifying that weapons were under the state’s exclusive control and monitoring implementation. Discussions with Washington remain open, he added.

Italian proposal

Separately, local media reported having reviewed a four-page Italian proposal for the post-UNIFIL phase. The plan calls for a smaller, but more effective international presence focused on supporting the Lebanese army, protecting civilians and backing the mechanism monitoring the ceasefire.

The force could play a role in the disarmament measures, conditional on political approval.

Force’s mission

The debate over the force’s composition is closely tied to questions about its jurisdiction, mission and powers.

Asked how the new force would differ from UNIFIL, Daher said: “UNIFIL’s duties were defined by an international mandate and resolution 1701.”

“Lebanon will insist on replicating the experience or substance of the resolution in defining the nature of its work. The question, however, is whether that will succeed or whether amendments will be imposed, because Washington, under Israeli pressure, wants any committee to have greater executive powers.”

Retired Brig. Gen. Fadi Daoud agreed that the most important issue in the next phase was not limited to which party would replace UNIFIL. Rather, he said, it concerned a change in the nature of the international mission itself and the potential redefinition of the relationship between the new force and the Lebanese army.

“The process of ending UNIFIL’s mission has effectively become a reality, despite Lebanese efforts to secure an extension,” Daoud told Asharq Al-Awsat.

“The central question has therefore become: Who will replace it? The alternative arrangement will be the one that receives US approval,” he added.

“We are moving from peacekeeping forces to verification committees — from a mission linked to resolution 1701 to a different mechanism suited to a post-1701 phase, at least in the form in which we have known it over the past years.”

“Lebanon has no problem with any mechanism for verifying exclusive state control over weapons south of the Litani because it is committed to this issue,” Daher said.

“But the fundamental question is whether Israel will withdraw or remain an occupying force. If verification committees carry out their work, the army reaches certain areas and confirms that they are free of weapons, will Israel uphold its end of the arrangement and withdraw?”

“There must be a clear framework for an Israeli withdrawal, just as there is a clear framework for ensuring exclusive state control over weapons in the south.”

Powers of the verification committees

From a military perspective, Daoud said the scope of the committees’ powers lay at the heart of the debate. The distinction between verifying that the army had completed its mission and helping oversee its implementation could determine whether any new arrangement was viable.

“Will the verification committees’ role be limited to confirming that the Lebanese army has completed the task required of it, or will they take part in overseeing how it is carried out? There is a very significant difference between the two,” he stressed.

“For example, if information is received about a weapons depot at a particular location and the Lebanese army raids the site, will the committee merely receive a report confirming that the mission was completed and verify its outcome? Or will it accompany the military force and monitor the search on the ground using personnel, cameras and communications equipment?” he added.

“This is not a technical detail. It could be the most dangerous issue in any new arrangement because the Lebanese army cannot easily accept a foreign party or an entity outside its military chain of command exercising such close oversight over how it performs its duties or directing it during search operations,” he continued.

“An international body can verify that a mission has been carried out and confirm its results. But moving toward direct supervision of its implementation could create serious and sensitive problems,” Daoud said.

Features

Gaza’s Diabetes Patients Face a War Without Respite

Palestinian child Al-Baraa Abdel Aal, who has diabetes, was forced to use expired medication in Gaza (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Palestinian child Al-Baraa Abdel Aal, who has diabetes, was forced to use expired medication in Gaza (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Gaza’s Diabetes Patients Face a War Without Respite

Palestinian child Al-Baraa Abdel Aal, who has diabetes, was forced to use expired medication in Gaza (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Palestinian child Al-Baraa Abdel Aal, who has diabetes, was forced to use expired medication in Gaza (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Diabetes patients in the Gaza Strip are fighting two battles without respite - the fallout from an Israeli offensive that began nearly three years ago despite a ceasefire announced almost a year ago, and a daily struggle to secure medication as Israel tightens restrictions on the entry of drugs and other medical supplies, despite appeals from UN and health organizations.

The war has forced people with chronic illnesses to use expired medication as access to safe treatment has dwindled.

Habib Abu Daqqa, 11, who was diagnosed with diabetes a year before the war, has spent more than three months at Nasser Medical Complex after falling into a coma following an injection of expired diabetes medication.

His mother, Maysaa Abu Daqqa, who also has diabetes, told Asharq Al-Awsat that her son has become severely distressed and needs regular, safe treatment before he can leave the hospital.

She resorted to the expired injection because of his condition, despite warnings from some doctors, while others had told her it could still be used. He subsequently developed diabetic ketoacidosis and was admitted to intensive care.

Before the war, she recalled, both had reliable access to medication and appropriate food and followed regular treatment and dietary plans. She attributed their deteriorating health partly to the period of famine in Gaza.

In 2024, the Palestinian Health Ministry estimated that around 350,000 people with chronic illnesses in Gaza lacked necessary healthcare, including about 71,000 diabetes patients, 225,000 people with hypertension and 45,000 with cardiovascular disease.

Al-Baraa Abdel Aal, 14, who has Type 1 diabetes, also required intensive care after medication shortages forced him to take expired drugs.

“Before the war, I had access to all kinds of medication, especially insulin,” Abdel Aal told Asharq Al-Awsat. Suitable food was also readily available.

“I spent eight days in intensive care. I saw death,” he recalled, adding that expired medication and substitutes left him severely fatigued.

Wafaa Washah, 36, a Jabalia refugee camp resident displaced to Khan Younis who has had diabetes for 13 years, explained that economic hardship and her husband’s unemployment had deprived her of suitable food and even clean drinking water.

She recounted that she nearly slipped into a coma several times after using expired medication because no alternatives were available. During the famine, shortages of food, particularly flour, left her suffering frequent dizziness and fever.

Farah Lafi, 19, noted that the crisis extends beyond insulin to glucose test strips needed for frequent blood-sugar monitoring. She estimated that expired medications retain only about 30% of their effectiveness, undermining patients’ daily activity and ability to function.

Ibrahim Dhair, a diabetes consultant at hospitals in southern Gaza, described diabetes patients as among those hardest hit by severe drug shortages. Much of the available medication is expired and can lead to complications including diabetic ketoacidosis and admission to intensive care.

Even when insulin is available, proper refrigeration poses another problem, he explained. Many residents live in tents without basic services, while extreme heat can spoil medicines that must be stored at specific temperatures.

Dhair added that doctors sometimes issue guidance on how to manage available medicines, but with stocks continuing to run out, he described the current situation as a crisis beyond the healthcare system’s capacity to handle.

Features

From Wells to Budget: Where Does Libya’s Oil Money Go?

Tugboat Al-Hani begins operations at Zueitina port (National Oil Corporation)
Tugboat Al-Hani begins operations at Zueitina port (National Oil Corporation)
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From Wells to Budget: Where Does Libya’s Oil Money Go?

Tugboat Al-Hani begins operations at Zueitina port (National Oil Corporation)
Tugboat Al-Hani begins operations at Zueitina port (National Oil Corporation)

Libya depends on oil for nearly 98% of its income. Yet a central question persists: How are those revenues collected and spent in a country divided between rival governments? And why do Libyans complain of poverty when their country holds Africa’s largest oil reserves and produces and exports about 1.4 million barrels a day?

The process starts with the National Oil Corporation, which collects proceeds from crude oil and gas sales in US dollars and deposits them in accounts at the Libyan Foreign Bank. The money is then transferred to the Central Bank of Libya's accounts in Tripoli, recorded as state budget sovereign revenue, and converted into Libyan dinars.

The dollar trades at 6.36 dinars at the official rate, compared with 9.12 on the parallel market.

The Finance Ministry in Tripoli then issues spending authorizations under approved financial arrangements, after which the central bank releases funds to ministries and other state bodies through the main budget chapters.

Libya’s oil export revenues have swung sharply in recent years, ranging between $18 billion and $22 billion. They rose to about $18 billion in the first half of this year, nearly double the level in the same period last year, according to the Economy Ministry in the interim Government of National Unity.

Libyan oil expert Mohamed al-Shahati attributed the increase during that period to the war involving Iran.

Where is the breakdown?

Economists say Libya’s dependence on oil as its near-exclusive source of income lies at the heart of the crisis.

Ayoub al-Farsi, an economics professor at the University of Benghazi, said Libya showed how excessive reliance on natural resources could turn into a complex financial crisis when combined with political fragmentation and a lack of economic diversification.

“The Libyan economy is a clear example of how excessive dependence on natural resources can become a complex financial crisis,” he said, adding that political fragmentation and the absence of diversification had created conditions that directly affected people’s lives.

Al-Farsi, a member of the Central Bank of Libya’s Monetary Policy Committee, said the economy was built around a rentier-state model that depended almost entirely on oil exports to fund the treasury and provide foreign currency.

That dependence, he told Asharq Al-Awsat, had created deep structural distortions.

Agriculture and industry had been marginalized, the state bureaucracy had expanded to absorb workers into unproductive public-sector jobs, and the country had grown heavily dependent on imports for most consumer goods, he said.

Industrial activity remains limited, largely confined to the private sector and small-scale production. Critics also point to a market dominated by a small number of traders and importers, helping imported goods crowd out local production.

At protests across Libyan cities, the question is often the same: Where is the oil money going? Why are people struggling in an energy-producing country?

Al-Shahati said part of the answer lies in the difference between the value of the oil Libya produces and the amount that actually reaches the state treasury.

“Not every barrel produced in Libya is converted directly into a dollar entering the public treasury, because foreign partners have a share,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Foreign companies have become production partners under various contractual arrangements, he said.

He also pointed to a stark contradiction: Libya produces oil, yet depends heavily on imports of gasoline, diesel, and other petroleum products to meet domestic demand.

That means a growing share of the country’s resources is converted into foreign currency to pay for fuel imports.

Al-Shahati said another problem was the lack of a regularly published, unified, and easy-to-read account that answers basic questions, such as: What was the total value of the oil produced? How much went to foreign partners? How much was exported for the state? How much went to the domestic market? And how much net revenue was actually available for public spending?

“The figures in circulation provide parts of the picture,” he said, “but they do not always show the full flow of revenues from the wellhead to the state’s public accounts.”

Libya’s oil fields are concentrated mainly in the eastern Sirte Basin, which holds about 82% of its oil reserves, as well as in the Murzuq Basin in the southwest and offshore areas along the coast.

Fuel and power crises

Those weaknesses in the oil revenue chain are unfolding as Libya grapples with a severe electricity crisis.

The country has suffered several “blackouts” in recent days, with some areas going without electricity for more than 17 hours a day.

Researcher Ezzedine Mokhtar sees the power cuts as one part of a wider pattern of recurring financial failures, including fuel shortages.

He blamed the hardship facing many Libyans on “corruption” and “unlimited spending” by two rival governments competing for power in the country’s east and west.

He also cited “oil smuggling through Arkenu, whose revenues go to specific individuals rather than the state treasury.”

Mokhtar said Libya’s subsidy system was another core problem, with more than 60% of the country’s budget going to fuel subsidies.

He called on the Tripoli government to phase out those subsidies gradually and to draw up a national plan to develop the workforce.

“We have no industrial skills in anything,” he said. “We import everything — yogurt, dairy products, fruit, vegetables, frozen fish, and even underwear. Everything comes from abroad.”

Libya ranks 10th globally in proven oil reserves, with about 48.3 billion barrels, according to Worldometer.

The UN Panel of Experts said in its latest report on Libya, covering October 2024 to February 2026, that Arkenu had moved at least $3 billion in oil revenues to bank accounts outside Libya between January 2024 and November 2025.

According to the report, Arkenu was established in 2023 as a private company and is indirectly controlled by Saddam Haftar, deputy commander-in-chief of the Libyan National Army. It faces accusations of “oil smuggling.”

Reuters previously investigated the company and concluded, based on shipping documents, London Stock Exchange Group data, and information from Kpler, that some oil revenues were being diverted away from the Central Bank of Libya.

How are revenues distributed?

Oil revenues are distributed across the four main chapters of the state budget, according to experts and economists.

Chapter One, salaries and wages, takes the largest share. It covers public-sector employees across eastern, western, and southern Libya through the unified national identification number system.

Chapter Two covers operating expenses for ministries and public institutions.

Chapter Three covers subsidies, including fuel, water, and electricity.

Chapter Four covers development and projects, including infrastructure, as well as allocations to the National Oil Corporation to sustain and increase production.

Al-Shahati said 26% of oil revenues went toward importing fuel products, equivalent to about $7 billion if crude traded at $70 a barrel.

This year, he said, the figure could rise to between $8 billion and $9 billion because oil prices had climbed above $85 a barrel and the gap between crude prices and diesel and gasoline prices had widened amid shortages.

He also pointed to higher domestic consumption driven by economic growth and a rise in smuggling.

A second problem, al-Shahati said, is the absence of an approved national budget, which would make it possible to determine how spending should be allocated among population groups and regions.

“What is clear is that the main cities control most spending,” he said.

He also pointed to “a large and obvious imbalance” in salaries across Libya’s three regions, job grades, and types of employment.

Those gaps, he said, risk widening financial divisions between social groups.

Even an agreement to unify development spending did not appear to be properly implemented because there were no clear standards and no comprehensive budget.

“There are no criteria for distributing oil revenues,” al-Shahati said. “The distribution process is random and unsustainable.”

Libya fell to 177th out of 182 countries in the 2025 Corruption Perceptions Index, from 173rd out of 180 countries in 2024, reflecting worsening corruption and no tangible improvement over the past two years.

Pressure on the local economy

A report by UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres on Libya highlighted deep structural strains in the economy, driven by high public spending, near-total dependence on oil and gas revenues, and mounting pressure from food, fuel, and electricity prices.

The report, submitted to the UN Security Council on Aug. 17, covers the period from April 1 to July 28.

Citing the International Monetary Fund, it said Libya’s fiscal deficit reached 30% of gross domestic product last year, while public debt climbed to 146% of GDP.

Inflation also rose into double digits, eroding purchasing power.

The UN report noted unjustified increases in fuel consumption by military and security agencies and the energy sector, as well as repeated double purchasing.

The cost of institutional division

Libya’s political and institutional split and the presence of multiple authorities have made the economic crisis worse, al-Farsi said.

The distortions, he said, were no longer merely structural.

They had created parallel public finances and pushed consumer spending higher to meet the demands of rival authorities, sending salaries and subsidies to unprecedented levels.

Repeated shutdowns of oil fields in previous years, combined with lower actual revenues, pushed financial authorities toward deficit financing and higher public debt, al-Farsi said.

That flooded the market with money without a corresponding rise in domestic production.

Oil revenues reached $21.9 billion in 2025, according to the National Oil Corporation, up from $18.6 billion in 2024, an increase of 15%.

Al-Farsi said the deterioration in public finances had left monetary authorities in a difficult position and forced them into emergency measures to protect reserves and contain the deficit.

The result, he said, was a weaker national currency, liquidity shortages and a collapse in confidence.

Development tools had also been paralyzed.

“Monetary policy shifted from an instrument for stimulating growth and investment into a tool for managing daily crises,” he said.

Why has the crisis not been solved?

Economists point to several reasons.

Al-Shahati put “corruption spreading on an unprecedented scale” near the top of the list.

“Corruption is no longer confined to the margins,” he said. “It has come to dominate the core of public finances in key sectors, obstructing any attempt at reform.”

He also blamed the absence of an institutional vision following the breakdown of middle management, which had once linked fiscal and monetary policy to economic realities and provided unified political backing.

Policies, he said, had become detached from the economy and lost their ability to restore balance.

Conventional reforms that had worked elsewhere would not work in Libya, al-Shahati said, because the country lacked a central political authority capable of building an institutional vision and curbing corruption that had spread through both the state and private sector.

Al-Farsi said Libya could not escape its fiscal and monetary crisis without addressing the roots of the problem.

That meant unifying the management of public finances, curbing government spending, and launching genuine structural reforms that would gradually shift Libya from consuming oil rents to building a diversified economy.

Mokhtar also called on the Tripoli government to develop a strategic plan to make better use of human resources and support small and medium-sized industries.

For him, breaking Libya’s dependence on oil revenues is part of the way out.

Masoud Suleiman, chairman of Libya’s National Oil Corporation, said in media remarks last week that the country needed between $30 billion and $40 billion in investment to develop untapped oil and gas resources.

The corporation, he said, aims to raise production to 2 million barrels a day by 2030.