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Mohammed Deif: Al-Qassam Brigades Leader, Phantom who Survived Multiple Close Calls

A presumed image of Mohammed Deif released by Israel last year
A presumed image of Mohammed Deif released by Israel last year
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Mohammed Deif: Al-Qassam Brigades Leader, Phantom who Survived Multiple Close Calls

A presumed image of Mohammed Deif released by Israel last year
A presumed image of Mohammed Deif released by Israel last year

Before the current war in Gaza, Mohammed Deif, leader of Hamas’ military wing, the Al-Qassam Brigades, was known only to his family and a few within Hamas.

His true appearance remained a mystery until Israel released his image late last year, marking it as the fourth depiction. Previous images ranged from a young man to a masked figure and a silhouette.

The latest shows him calmly alongside someone with gray hair, a light beard, and one eye.

Deif maintained a high level of secrecy in all his movements. Even when his mother passed away in January 2011, it was unclear if he attended her funeral.

There were rumors he did, unrecognized, while others claimed he never attended due to security concerns. Some even suggested he disguised himself as an elderly man to bid his mother farewell before disappearing.

Deif appears not to use modern technology and is not fond of making public appearances. Rarely does he release voice messages, such as when he announced the start of new battles with Israel, including the Oct.7 Al-Aqsa Flood attacks.

Even during the current war, Israel’s pursuit of Deif in every corner of Gaza has proven elusive until now, with the targeting in Khan Younis marking the first revealed attempt after over nine months of conflict.

In fact, Israel has sought Deif since the mid-1990s. Shimon Peres, then Prime Minister in 1996, requested Palestinian President Yasser Arafat to arrest him, only for Arafat to express surprise at the name, seemingly unaware of him.

Peres later admitted discovering Arafat protected, hid, and lied about him.

Profile Overview

Real Name: Mohammad Diab Ibrahim Al-Masri, known as Deif. Born in 1965 to a Palestinian refugee family from Al-Qubeiba, settled in Khan Younis refugee camp, southern Gaza.

Deif grew up in poverty, briefly leaving school to help support his family by working with his father in textiles and later starting a small poultry farm. He also worked as a driver before becoming a target of Israeli pursuit.

Known for his friendly demeanor and interest in theater, Deif joined Hamas in late 1987 through mosque connections. He completed his studies at the Islamic University of Gaza in 1988, earning a Bachelor’s degree in Science.

Arrested by Israel in 1989 without trial, he spent 16 months in prison accused of involvement in Hamas’ military wing. Upon release, he co-founded the Al-Qassam Brigades and played a significant role in operations against Israel throughout the 1990s.

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Three Scenarios for Russia’s Military Presence in Syria

Russian President Vladimir Putin inspecting his troops at Hmeimim Airbase in Latakia on December 12, 2017 (Sputnik/AP)
Russian President Vladimir Putin inspecting his troops at Hmeimim Airbase in Latakia on December 12, 2017 (Sputnik/AP)
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Three Scenarios for Russia’s Military Presence in Syria

Russian President Vladimir Putin inspecting his troops at Hmeimim Airbase in Latakia on December 12, 2017 (Sputnik/AP)
Russian President Vladimir Putin inspecting his troops at Hmeimim Airbase in Latakia on December 12, 2017 (Sputnik/AP)

Russian President Vladimir Putin said on Thursday he would meet former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, who fled to Russia after his regime fell in Damascus. But what will Putin say to his former ally? And how might their first exchange unfold, given Russia’s role in helping Assad escape on a chaotic night?

The Kremlin, known for staging Putin’s meetings with precision, might opt to limit media coverage this time. Putin could be seen sitting at a small table with Assad, now on asylum

in Moscow, in a soundless scene—one that leaves little room for formal pleasantries.

Why has Putin announced plans to meet Assad? Is it to reprimand him? Many in Russia believe Assad’s stubbornness has hurt Moscow’s efforts, threatened its gains in Syria, and could eventually risk its key military presence there.

As details remain unclear, Russian experts are racing to analyze developments in Syria and outline scenarios for the next phase.

Some Russian experts have painted grim scenarios. A member of the prestigious Russian Council on Foreign and Defense Policy warned of potential risks, including a prolonged conflict with civil war elements, a humanitarian catastrophe with millions of refugees, escalating migration in Europe, and rising tensions among nations like Israel, the US, and Iran.

He also predicted a new wave of international terrorism that could reach far beyond the region.

Other experts echoed this pessimism. One posted an image of a Syrian dissident stepping on a statue of Assad’s father, warning that “this is just the beginning.” Another blamed the crisis on the “Obama curse,” citing the West’s interference, while a third shared a bleak analysis titled, “We Must Pray for Syria.”

So far, Russian media and think tanks have avoided any optimistic outlooks for Syria’s future.

Experts, who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat, believe Moscow may be preparing to handle one of three possible scenarios in Syria.

The first, most favorable for Russia’s interests, involves Moscow reaching an agreement with the new Syrian authorities to maintain its military presence for a limited period.

This could mean replacing the current 49-year agreements with a five-year deal to facilitate a gradual Russian withdrawal. Such an arrangement could help the new leadership in Syria manage Western pressure to cut ties with Moscow.

The second scenario envisions Russia giving up its airbase in Hmeimim while retaining a significant presence in Tartus. This would mirror agreements from 1972, which allowed Russian naval vessels to use the Tartus logistics center in the Mediterranean. This compromise would preserve Russia’s interests while reducing Western pressure on Damascus.

The third scenario involves a full Russian withdrawal from both bases, with Moscow later seeking agreements for shared use of air and sea ports. Such agreements, similar to those Russia has signed with other countries, are less likely to provoke Western opposition.

Regardless of the outcome, the Kremlin has yet to develop a clear strategy for dealing with the emerging situation in Syria.

Key questions remain, including how to curb Iran’s regional influence, manage Türkiye and Israel’s growing roles in Syria, and establish a new regional balance that secures Moscow’s minimum interests.