Multiple Failures, Multiple Investigations: Unraveling the Attempted Assassination of Donald Trump

 Republican presidential candidate former President Donald Trump appears during the Republican National Convention Monday, July 15, 2024, in Milwaukee. (AP)
Republican presidential candidate former President Donald Trump appears during the Republican National Convention Monday, July 15, 2024, in Milwaukee. (AP)
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Multiple Failures, Multiple Investigations: Unraveling the Attempted Assassination of Donald Trump

 Republican presidential candidate former President Donald Trump appears during the Republican National Convention Monday, July 15, 2024, in Milwaukee. (AP)
Republican presidential candidate former President Donald Trump appears during the Republican National Convention Monday, July 15, 2024, in Milwaukee. (AP)

The young man was pacing around the edges of the Donald Trump campaign rally, shouldering a big backpack and peering into the lens of a rangefinder toward the rooftops behind the stage where the former president would stand.

His behavior was so odd, so unlike that of the other rallygoers, that local law enforcement took notice, radioed their concerns and snapped a photo. But then he vanished.

The image was circulated by officers stationed outside the security perimeter on that hot, sunny Saturday afternoon. But the man didn't appear again until witnesses saw him climbing up the side of a squat manufacturing building that was within 135 meters (157 yards) from the stage.

That's where he opened fire, six minutes after Trump began speaking, in an attempt to assassinate the presumptive GOP presidential nominee. The gunman killed one rallygoer and seriously wounded two others. Trump suffered an ear injury but was not seriously hurt, appearing just days later at the Republican National Convention in Milwaukee with a small bandage over the wound.

Now come the questions, and there are plenty. Multiple investigations have been launched, both into the crime itself and how law enforcement allowed it to happen. It's becoming increasingly clear this was a complicated failure involving multiple missteps and at least nine local and federal law enforcement divisions that were supposed to be working together. Law enforcement has also warned of the potential for copycat attacks and more violence.

This story is based on interviews with eight law enforcement officials, some of whom spoke to The Associated Press on condition of anonymity to discuss the investigations into the attempt on Trump's life.

A view of downtown Butler three days after the shooting by 20-year-old Thomas Matthew Crooks, named by the FBI as the "subject involved" in the attempted assassination of former US President Donald Trump, in Butler, Pennsylvania, US July 16, 2024. (Reuters)

Multiple agencies work together to secure events

The Secret Service always partners with local law enforcement when a president, political candidate or other high-level official comes to town, and Saturday's rally was no different. An advance team comes early to scope out the scene and identify potential areas of concern. They order vehicles moved. They set up barriers. They block off roads.

In some larger cities, one or two local agencies may work alongside the federal teams. In more rural areas, one local agency won't have enough manpower so multiple agencies are often involved. On Saturday, the show of force included members of at least six different agencies, including two sheriff's offices, local police, state police and multiple teams within the Secret Service, plus fire and emergency rescue officials. Within those agencies are individual divisions that have different duties.

In theory, more manpower is better. But it can often create communication problems, and it's unclear how the information about Thomas Matthew Crooks was transmitted. For instance, it's not clear how widely his photo was circulated or whether everyone was equally aware of the potential threat.

All the extra officers can be a drain on resources, leaving agencies stretched thin. The Secret Service at any given time is protecting the president, candidates and others, plus running point on major national security events. It's the same for local police, who told the Secret Service they didn't have enough people to station officers outside the building all day.

The Secret Service controls the area inside the perimeter, after people pass through metal detectors. Local law enforcement is supposed to handle outside the perimeter.

A home believed to be connected to the shooter in the assassination attempt of Republican presidential candidate former President Donald Trump, Tuesday, July 16, 2024, in Bethel Park, Pa. (AP)

Reports of someone on the roof

The shooter, later identified as Thomas Matthew Crooks, disappeared from the crowds of Trump supporters decked out in red, white and blue. The stream of supporters entering through the metal detectors was slowing. Trump was getting ready to go on.

The rooftop from which Crooks fired is in a complex of buildings that form AGR International Inc., a supplier of automation equipment for the glass and plastic packaging industry. The building was closed for the day, except to law enforcement.

Crooks was spotted again when members of a local SWAT team, stationed inside the building complex, noticed him walking around and looking at the roof. One officer took a photo of Crooks and radioed to others to be on the lookout for a suspicious person looking through a rangefinder — a small device resembling binoculars that hunters to measure distance from a target.

Not long after, witnesses reported seeing him scaling the squat building closest to the stage. He then set up his AR-style rifle and lay on the rooftop, a detonator in his pocket to set off crude explosive devices that were stashed in his car parked nearby.

Outside, a local officer climbed up to the roof to investigate. The gunman turned and pointed his rifle at him. The officer did not — or could not — fire a single shot. But Crooks did, firing into the crowd toward the former president and sending panicked spectators ducking for cover as Secret Service agents shielded Trump and pulled him from the stage. Two countersniper teams were stationed on buildings behind Trump, and the team further away from Crooks fired once, killing him.

An unknown person adjusts the window shades inside the home of deceased 20-year-old Thomas Matthew Crooks, named by the FBI as the "subject involved" in the attempted assassination of former President Donald Trump, in Bethel Park, Pennsylvania, US, July 15, 2024. (Reuters)

Many investigations, few answers

“We are speaking of a failure,” Homeland Security Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas told CNN. “We are going to analyze through an independent review how that occurred, why it occurred, and make recommendations and findings to make sure it doesn’t happen again.”

House Oversight Committee Republicans have subpoenaed Secret Service Director Kim Cheatle. House Speaker Mike Johnson said he would set up a task force to investigate, and some Republicans have called on Cheatle to resign. Security has been stepped up for Trump and President Joe Biden, and independent presidential candidate Robert F. Kennedy Jr. also received a protective detail.

Biden has ordered an independent review of the shooting. The Department of Homeland Security’s inspector general also opened an investigation into the Secret Service’s handling of the shooting.

But it's a big task. There were special agents, presidential protective teams, counterassault and countersniper teams all there that day. There were also roughly 50 firefighters and emergency personnel, plus dozens of officers from the Butler Township police, deputies from Beaver County and Butler County and Pennsylvania State Police troopers.

It will take weeks — if not months — to interview all the officers involved and determine exactly how Crooks was able to pull off the most serious attempt to kill a president or presidential candidate since Ronald Reagan was shot in 1981.

The shooter had prepared for carnage. Investigators found he brought multiple loaded magazines. He also bought 50 rounds on the day of the shooting. The rifle was purchased legally by his father years earlier.

Investigators found a bulletproof vest in his car and another rudimentary explosive device at his home, where over the past few months he had received several packages, including some that had potentially hazardous material. The FBI gained access to Crooks’ cellphone, scoured his computer, home and car, and interviewed more than 100 people so far.

But the investigation has failed to lift the mystery surrounding the biggest question: Why did he do it?



How Hamas Recruited, Trained New Fighters During the War

Military training manuals titled “Anti-Armor Weapons – Northern Brigade” and dated 2023 provide insight into Hamas’ methods for preparing recruits to target Israeli forces (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Military training manuals titled “Anti-Armor Weapons – Northern Brigade” and dated 2023 provide insight into Hamas’ methods for preparing recruits to target Israeli forces (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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How Hamas Recruited, Trained New Fighters During the War

Military training manuals titled “Anti-Armor Weapons – Northern Brigade” and dated 2023 provide insight into Hamas’ methods for preparing recruits to target Israeli forces (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Military training manuals titled “Anti-Armor Weapons – Northern Brigade” and dated 2023 provide insight into Hamas’ methods for preparing recruits to target Israeli forces (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Hamas said it recruited and trained thousands of fighters during the 15-month Gaza war, a claim supported by former US Secretary of State Antony Blinken.

Abu Obaida, spokesman for Hamas’ military wing, the Al-Qassam Brigades, said in July: “We recruited thousands of new fighters, strengthened key capabilities, set up ambushes, and made explosives and rockets.”

The announcement highlights Hamas’ efforts to expand its military strength during the conflict.

In his final address as US Secretary of State on January 14, Blinken confirmed Hamas recruited new fighters during the war.

“Indeed, we assess that Hamas has recruited almost as many new militants as it has lost,” Blinken revealed. “That is a recipe for an enduring insurgency and perpetual war,” he explained.

The statements from US officials and Hamas have raised questions about how the group managed to recruit and train fighters amid the war.

However, military training manuals belonging to Hamas, discovered by an Asharq Al-Awsat correspondent in the rubble of Jabalia camp in northern Gaza, provided partial insight into the group’s methods for preparing its fighters.

The Jabalia refugee camp was the site of a highly intense Israeli military operation that lasted around 100 days. According to Israeli army statements, the operation resulted in the deaths of dozens of Israeli officers and soldiers.

Hamas, however, has remained silent about its own losses during the battles, leaving questions about the full scale of casualties in the prolonged fighting.

Military training manuals titled “Anti-Armor Weapons – Northern Brigade” and dated 2023 provide insight into Hamas’ methods for preparing recruits to target Israeli forces.

The documents include instructions on using light weapons, guided rockets, and other munitions, aiming to train new fighters for operations against Israeli troops.

The manuals detail shooting techniques, effective firing ranges, and guidelines for targeting Israeli armored vehicles, particularly weaknesses in Merkava tanks to maximize damage and ensure destruction.

They also explain the use of various projectiles, including RBG rockets, PG-7V, F-7, BG-7M, Yassin rockets, tandem warheads, and both Chinese and Russian munitions, as well as the TBG rocket system.

According to Hamas sources speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, such manuals have long been part of Al-Qassam Brigades’ military training.

Recruits have been trained practically at military sites using these guides. The sources added that the manuals found in Jabalia, where clashes took place, were intended to help fighters, particularly new recruits, deal with the Israeli assault.

Hamas sources said the training manuals significantly aided fighters in battles across Gaza, particularly in the north, which faced the heaviest and most extensive Israeli assaults.

“The military capabilities were being eroded,” the sources said.

“However, field commanders quickly addressed this by recruiting new fighters and finding alternatives to manage the battle effectively,” they added.

The sources noted that many fighters recruited during the Gaza war had undergone only basic, fast-track training before being sent to the battlefield. After losing many experienced fighters, the group relied on trainees and loyalists with minimal preparation.

“These new recruits fought alongside seasoned fighters,” the sources said. “They received basic instructions and were taught to use advanced weapons like guided rockets but were mostly skilled with light arms like Kalashnikov rifles.”

Despite limited training, the recruits played a vital role in the conflict.

Sources acknowledged that new recruits had limited field experience and faced challenges but found urban and guerrilla warfare easier. Most of these fighters were involved in battles in northern Gaza, especially in Jabalia and Beit Lahia, while a smaller group fought in Beit Hanoun and took part in operations that killed Israeli soldiers.

Hamas emphasized its recruitment abilities during the first hostage exchange after last Sunday’s ceasefire. Al-Qassam Brigades members made a public appearance in Gaza City, which is in northern Gaza.

Hamas reportedly used a “deception” tactic, sending out vehicles resembling those used to transport hostages while also deploying decoy vehicles from different areas.

They also instructed their members to gather in Saraya Square to distract from the vehicle carrying female prisoners.

The exact number of new recruits remains unclear, though they have been called “2024 recruits” after a statement by Abu Obaida. Israeli media estimates the number at around 4,000 fighters, with some accusing Mohammad Sinwar, brother of the late Yahya Sinwar, of leading the recruitment.

Blinken criticized Israel’s approach in Gaza, saying Hamas can’t be defeated by military means alone. He stressed the need for a political solution to prevent the group’s return.

The Wall Street Journal reported that Mohammad Sinwar is focused on rebuilding the group's military strength.

Hamas’ recruitment during the war and its continued resistance have made it a tough challenge for Israel, which has had to return to areas it thought were cleared of militants, only to face renewed fighting.

Before the war, Hamas’ Al-Qassam Brigades had about 30,000 fighters in 24 battalions.

Blinken noted that Hamas had replaced the fighters it lost during the conflict and that militants in northern Gaza continue to regroup after Israeli military operations, showing the ongoing challenge for Israel without a political solution.