Three Conditions for Israeli War on Lebanon, Last One is Political

Lebanese army soldiers inspect the wreckage of a car after an Israeli airstrike targeted the village of Bourj el-Moulouk, approximately 18 kilometers from the city of Nabatieh, last week (AFP)
Lebanese army soldiers inspect the wreckage of a car after an Israeli airstrike targeted the village of Bourj el-Moulouk, approximately 18 kilometers from the city of Nabatieh, last week (AFP)
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Three Conditions for Israeli War on Lebanon, Last One is Political

Lebanese army soldiers inspect the wreckage of a car after an Israeli airstrike targeted the village of Bourj el-Moulouk, approximately 18 kilometers from the city of Nabatieh, last week (AFP)
Lebanese army soldiers inspect the wreckage of a car after an Israeli airstrike targeted the village of Bourj el-Moulouk, approximately 18 kilometers from the city of Nabatieh, last week (AFP)

Before Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu ended his recent visit to Washington, he announced to the US Congress that his government aims to neutralize the security threats posed by the Lebanon-based Hezbollah on Israel’s northern front.

The Israeli Public Broadcasting Corporation reported that the Israeli army has informed the political leadership that preparations for a large-scale ground maneuver are complete, and a strong aerial operation in Lebanon is planned before the maneuver.

Opinions differ on the scope and timing of this maneuver, but there is agreement that Tel Aviv is pressing forward with plans for a major attack on Lebanon unless Hezbollah withdraws from south of the Litani River.

Military expert Brig. Gen. Khalil Helou commented that “three new military units have moved to the northern front and are on alert for a significant military operation.”

He explained that these units need training to work together and coordinate on the front lines.

“When the Israeli army announces a maneuver, it might just be an exercise, but it could also be a prelude to a surprise military attack, leading to a major ground operation,” added Helou.

Helou reminded that “since the end of the 2006 war, Israel has been preparing for a new and extended conflict with Hezbollah, which requires three main components: logistical, military, and political readiness.”

“Our biggest concern is that Israel has achieved political readiness following Netanyahu’s visit to Washington,” cautioned Helou.

Before announcing the maneuver, the commander of the northern front visited the Lebanon border, emphasizing that the airstrike on Yemen’s Hodeidah port was a clear message to Iran and Hezbollah about the reach of the Israeli Air Force.

Helou noted that Israel “is determined to push Hezbollah away from the northern border at any cost, including military action, as Netanyahu outlined in his speech to the US Congress.”

He highlighted that “while ground units are preparing, the Israeli Air Force plays a crucial role in the conflict.”

This announcement follows a large-scale exercise conducted by the Israeli army on May 28, which tested the readiness of its forces for a full-scale war on the northern front.

The Israeli Public Broadcasting Corporation stated that the exercise was carried out unexpectedly to enhance the army's preparedness for various scenarios with Lebanon.

Dr. Sami Nader, Director of the Levant Institute for Strategic Affairs, explained that the new maneuver is part of “pressure on Lebanon, especially as it coincides with Netanyahu’s visit to the US and meetings with top American officials from both parties.”

Nader told Asharq Al-Awsat that “Tel Aviv is determined to remove the threat on the northern front, whether through diplomatic efforts or military action, while Hezbollah insists on maintaining the situation as it was before the October 6, 2023, Al-Aqsa Flood operation.”

“It appears that the Israeli army is moving towards implementing Netanyahu’s threats, despite reported disagreements between him and the military leadership,” said Nader.

Despite efforts by the US and other major powers to prevent new conflicts, particularly with Lebanon, Nader stressed that Israel “is determined to change the rules of engagement, especially after Hezbollah's recent unveiling of significant aerial capabilities that threaten Israel’s security, though these capabilities are not comparable to Tel Aviv’s extensive military assets.”



Türkiye and Russia Engage in Delicate Maneuvers over Syria after Assad’s Downfall

Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, and Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan shake hands as they pose for photos during a meeting on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, on July 3, 2024. (Sergey Guneyev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP, File)
Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, and Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan shake hands as they pose for photos during a meeting on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, on July 3, 2024. (Sergey Guneyev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP, File)
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Türkiye and Russia Engage in Delicate Maneuvers over Syria after Assad’s Downfall

Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, and Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan shake hands as they pose for photos during a meeting on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, on July 3, 2024. (Sergey Guneyev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP, File)
Russian President Vladimir Putin, right, and Turkish President Recep Tayyib Erdogan shake hands as they pose for photos during a meeting on the sidelines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit in Astana, Kazakhstan, on July 3, 2024. (Sergey Guneyev, Sputnik, Kremlin Pool Photo via AP, File)

The rapid downfall of Syrian leader Bashar Assad has touched off a new round of delicate geopolitical maneuvering between Russia's Vladimir Putin and Türkiye’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
With the dust still settling from the stunning events in Damascus, the outcome for now seems to be favoring Ankara, which backed the victorious opposition factions, while Moscow suffered a bruising blow to its international clout.
“In the game of Czars vs. Sultans, this is Sultans 1 and Czars 0,” said Soner Cagaptay, director of the Turkish Research Program at the Washington Institute. “Far from being allies, Türkiye and Russia are competitors. And in this case, Türkiye has outsmarted Russia.”
The Assad regime’s demise opens another chapter in the complex relationship between Putin and Erdogan, with wide-ranging implications not just for Syria but also for Ukraine and the two leaders' ties with Washington.
Russia and Türkiye share economic and security interests — along with an intense rivalry. The personal relationship between Putin and Erdogan often sees them both praising each other, even as they jockey for political and economic gains.
“There are currently only two leaders left in the world -- there is me and there is Vladimir Putin,” Erdogan said recently, reflecting the respect for the Kremlin leader. Putin, in turn, has often praises Erdogan’s political prowess.
Conflicts and deals Russia and Türkiye backed opposing sides in Syria’s civil war that started in 2011, putting them on a collision course. Tensions spiraled when a Turkish fighter jet shot down a Russian warplane near the Türkiye-Syria border in November 2015, soon after Moscow launched its air campaign to support Assad.
The Kremlin responded with sweeping economic sanctions that halted Turkish imports, drove Turkish companies from the lucrative Russian market and cut the flow of Russian tourists to Türkiye’s resorts.
Faced with massive economic damage, Erdogan apologized months later. Soon after, Putin staunchly supported him when he faced an attempted military coup in July 2016, helping to warm ties quickly.
In 2018, Moscow and Ankara negotiated a ceasefire and de-escalation deal for the opposition-held Idlib province in northwestern Syria on the border with Türkiye and sought to anchor the often-violated agreement with follow-up deals in the next few years.
But even as they cooperated on Syria, Moscow and Ankara also vied for influence in Libya, where Russia supported forces loyal to military commander Khalifa Hifter while Türkiye backed his Tripoli-based foes. Türkiye also aggressively sought to increase its leverage in the former Soviet Central Asian nations competing with Russia and China.
In 2020, Moscow backed off when Türkiye’s ally Azerbaijan routed ethnic Armenian forces in the fighting over the breakaway region of Karabakh. Even though Armenia hosted a Russian military base, the Kremlin has engaged in a delicate balancing act, seeking to maintain warm ties with both Azerbaijan and Türkiye.
While their political interests often clashed, economic ties boomed, with Russia boosting natural gas exports to Türkiye via a Black Sea pipeline; by building Türkiye’s first nuclear plant; and by providing the NATO member with advanced air defense systems — to Washington’s dismay.
Relations amid the war in Ukraine
Ties with Türkiye grew even more important for Putin after he invaded Ukraine in 2022, Europe’s largest conflict since World War II.
The West responded with economic sanctions that barred Russia from most Western markets, restricted its access to international financial system, shut transport routes and halted exports of key technologies. Türkiye, which didn’t join the sanctions, has emerged as Russia’s key gateway to global markets, strengthening Erdogan’s hand in negotiations with Putin.
While Türkiye backed Ukraine’s territorial integrity and supplied Kyiv with weapons, Erdogan echoed Putin in accusing the US and NATO of fomenting the conflict. Putin has praised Erdogan for offering to mediate a settlement.
In March 2022, Türkiye hosted Russia-Ukraine peace talks in Istanbul that soon collapsed, with both Putin and Erdogan blaming the West for their failure.
Later that year, Ankara pooled efforts with the United Nations to broker a deal that opened the door for Ukrainian grain exports from its Black Sea ports, an agreement that helped drive down global food prices before falling apart the following year.
Türkiye’s balancing act in Ukraine is driven by its dependence on the vast Russian market, supplies of natural gas and a flow of tourists.
Russia’s focus on Ukraine has eroded its clout in regions where Türkiye and other players have tried to take advantage of Moscow's withering influence.
In September 2023, Azerbaijan reclaimed control over all of Karabakh in an one-day blitz while Russian regional peacekeepers stood back. That hurt Russia’s ties with Armenia, which has shifted increasingly toward the West.
Moscow's new look at Syria
Focused on Ukraine, Russia had few resources left for Syria at a time when Hezbollah similarly pulled back its fighters amid the war with Israel and Iranian support for Assad also weakened.
Russia tried to sponsor talks on normalizing relations between Türkiye and Syria, but Assad stonewalled them, refusing any compromise.
Assad’s intransigence helped trigger the Türkiye-backed opposition’s offensive in November. The underfunded and demoralized Syrian army quickly crumbled, allowing the opposition to sweep across the country and capture Damascus.
Even as it has offered asylum to Assad and his family, Russia has reached out to Syria's new leaders, seeking to ensure security for its troops still there and extend leases on its naval and air bases.
At his annual news conference Thursday, Putin said Russia offered Syria's new leaders to use the bases for humanitarian aid deliveries and suggested Moscow could offer other incentives.
While Assad's demise dealt a heavy blow to Russia, some believe Moscow could navigate the rapidly changing environment to retain at least some clout.
“Syria’s opposition forces well understand that the country’s future is uncertain,” said Nikolay Kozhanov, a consulting fellow with Chathan House’s Russia and Eurasia program, in a commentary. “They want Russia, if not as a friend, then a neutral party.”
He noted that “Moscow’s main goal will be to maintain at least a minimal level of influence through a military presence, for example, at its existing bases, or through contacts with other regional players, such as Türkiye.”
Cagaptay observed that while Türkiye would like to see an end to Russia’s military presence in Syria, Ankara’s position will depend on how relations evolve with Washington.
“If we see a reset in US-Turkish ties where Türkiye thinks it can comfortably lean on the U.S. against Russia, I can see Erdogan adopting a kind of more boisterous tone vis a vis Putin,” he said.
But if the US maintains its alliance with the Kurds and stands against Türkiye’s effort to push back on Kurdish fighters in northeastern Syria, “Ankara may decide that it needs to continue to play all sides as it has been doing for about a decade now,” Cagaptay said.
Putin noted Russia understands Türkiye’s motives in securing its borders, but he also warned that the Kurds could offer strong resistance if attacked.
Emre Ersen, a Russia expert at Istanbul’s Marmara University, also noted that while Assad’s fall will diminish Moscow’s influence, “the relationship between Türkiye and Russia will not be devastated by the events in Syria.”
“Obviously, they still need to reach out to each other regarding the crisis in Ukraine, but also because they have very significant economic relations,” Ersen said, adding that Erdogan could be expected to seek more concessions from Russia on energy and trade issues.