Experts: Spy Network within Hezbollah Has Helped Israel Assassinate Top Membershttps://english.aawsat.com/features/5046028-experts-spy-network-within-hezbollah-has-helped-israel-assassinate-top-members
Experts: Spy Network within Hezbollah Has Helped Israel Assassinate Top Members
This picture released on Wednesday, July 31, 2024 by Hezbollah Military Media shows Fouad Shukur a Hezbollah top commander who was killed by an Israeli airstrike that hit a building on Tuesday, July 30, 2024, in a southern suburb of Beirut, Lebanon. (Hezbollah Military Media vía AP)
Experts: Spy Network within Hezbollah Has Helped Israel Assassinate Top Members
This picture released on Wednesday, July 31, 2024 by Hezbollah Military Media shows Fouad Shukur a Hezbollah top commander who was killed by an Israeli airstrike that hit a building on Tuesday, July 30, 2024, in a southern suburb of Beirut, Lebanon. (Hezbollah Military Media vía AP)
Several questions have been raised about Israel's ability to assassinate top Hezbollah operatives. The latest was the assassination on Tuesday of top commander Fouad Shukur in the party’s stronghold in Beirut’s southern suburbs.
Many people have wondered how Israel has managed to pinpoint Shukur’s exact location at a time when Hezbollah commanders should be exercising extreme caution after Israel vowed to avenge the killing of 12 youths in an attack on Majdal Shams in the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights over the weekend. Hezbollah has denied its involvement in the strike.
Wealth of information
Founder and CEO of the Institute for Near East and Gulf Military Analysis (INEGMA) Riad Kahwaji told Asharq Al-Awsat that several advanced technologies are used in spy operations, such as monitoring mobile phones, face recognition cameras, drones and satellites.
However, this technology is useless to the Israelis without information about members of Hezbollah, such where they live, their telephone number and how they actually look like, he explained.
Informants and spies are on the ground to help in these assassinations, he stressed.
“Assuming that Hezbollah leaders are not using mobile phones, the only way to know that Shukur was in the targeted building was if someone had followed him and informed the Israelis of his location,” he went on to say.
There is no doubt that Israel has greatly infiltrated Hezbollah and knows its security measures, allowing it to have committed this number of assassinations of senior figures, as well as members who are not known to the public, but only to the party, Kahwaji said.
Network of agents
Retired general George Nader agrees with Kahwaji that Hezbollah has been infiltrated by a complex network of spies.
Without this network, how could Israeli drones have possibly targeted a Hezbollah member as soon as he crossed a certain location? he wondered in remarks to Asharq Al-Awsat.
No regular person could possibly know the movement of these commanders and their locations. These networks of agents are inside the party in Lebanon, as well as in Syria and Iran, he stated.
Lax measures
Head of the Middle East Center for Strategic Studies retired Brigadier General Dr. Hisham Jaber noted that there are a number of factors that have led to the success of Israeli assassinations.
Hezbollah has been breached and its agents have infiltrated the party, he told Asharq Al-Awsat.
The Israelis also have data on all the Lebanese people, including members of the resistance [Hezbollah] and its leaders. It boasts advanced technology, satellites and the support of American and European intelligence.
Lax security measures by some members of Hezbollah are also another factor that have led to assassinations, he remarked.
Given the tensions in wake of the Majdal Shams attack, a senior member such as Shukur should not have been at his home or at a place he often frequents, he explained.
Notable assassinations
Israel has succeeded since November in carrying out a number of assassinations against Hezbollah.
In November, it assassinated the son of Hezbollah MP Mohammed Raad and four others, who are members of the al-Radwan unit. They were killed in a drone strike that targeted a house they were in.
On January 2, Israel assassinated leading Hamas member Saleh al-Arouri in a strike in the heart of Hezbollah’s stronghold in Beirut’s southern suburbs. It fired rockets at an apartment where he was meeting with Qassam Brigades field commanders.
Days later, on January 8, Israel succeeded in killing Radwan unit commander Wissam Taweel while he was returning home to a southern Lebanon village. It killed prominent members Taleb Abdullah in June and Mohammed Nasser in July.
July 30: Iraq’s Bloodless Coup That Was Followed by Rivers of Bloodhttps://english.aawsat.com/features/5045238-july-30-iraq%E2%80%99s-bloodless-coup-was-followed-rivers-blood
July 30: Iraq’s Bloodless Coup That Was Followed by Rivers of Blood
Former Iraqi President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr and his deputy Saddam Hussein. (AFP)
It’s unwise to corner Saddam Hussein and force him to accept a partner in governing Iraq. The Baath Party and Saddam himself don't favor partnerships.
The Baath Party, which regained power on July 17, 1968, has a history of significant and costly turning points.
The first major shift came on July 30 that year, enabling the party to consolidate power under President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr, with Saddam as his deputy.
As a journalist, I spoke with some key figures from that time and felt it was important to share their stories with the readers of Asharq Al-Awsat.
The defeat of Arab armies in the 1967 war enraged the Arab public, who blamed their governments for what was termed a “setback” but was really a disaster.
Iraqi President Abdul Rahman Arif, who had succeeded his brother Abdul Salam, appeared weak, with a loose grip on the military and little popular support.
By the spring of 1968, rumors were spreading in closed circles about various factions plotting to seize power. Some expected the country to fall under military control.
The Baath Party leadership was keeping a close watch, fearing a coup. They began planning a return to power, seeking to avenge the 1963 events that led to bloodshed and the ousting of Abdul Salam Arif, whom they had initially helped bring to power.
Salah Omar al-Ali.
The leadership wanted to avoid a violent takeover and carefully considered their strategy.
A key figure was Col. Ibrahim al-Daoud, commander of the 20,000-strong Republican Guard. If al-Daoud resisted, a bloody battle could ensue at the palace gates. There was also the risk that such a conflict might pave the way for a third faction from the military to step in as a savior.
The Baathists decided to approach al-Daoud, hoping to win him over or at least neutralize him. They noted that al-Daoud was heavily influenced by his friend Abdul Razzaq al-Nayef, the deputy director of military intelligence, known for his strong influence and rumored ties to Western intelligence. Al-Daoud was thought to follow al-Nayef’s lead closely.
The complex task required cunning and was entrusted to al-Bakr, known for his military skills and political savvy.
The coup organizers secured the cooperation of officer Saadoun Ghaidan, who commanded a force stationed at the presidential palace, including several tanks.
Al-Bakr met with al-Daoud to reveal the plan to overthrow Arif. He urged him to keep the matter secret, swearing on the Quran that it would not be shared with anyone else, especially al-Nayef. However, al-Daoud quickly informed al-Nayef on July 15.
This leak put the Baath Party leadership in a tough spot. The secret was out, and al-Nayef, a man considered dangerous and rumored to have suspicious ties with Western intelligence, knew their plans. The success or failure of the coup now depended on his actions.
Salah Omar al-Ali, a key figure in the leadership, explained: “On the morning of July 16, we informed the civilian and military groups involved about the final details of their roles.”
“We initially planned to act on July 14, the anniversary of the 1958 revolution that established the republic, but practical issues delayed us.”
“On July 16, we retrieved hidden weapons and military uniforms for disguise. At 8 p.m., we met at al-Bakr’s house in the Ali al-Salih neighborhood on 14 Ramadan Street to finalize our plans, waiting for the operation at 2:30 a.m. Then, the unexpected happened.”
An armored vehicle is seen in front of the presidential palace after the 1968 coup. (Getty Images)
Shocking message
As the Baath Party’s regional leaders were finalizing their plans, there was a knock at the door. Al-Bakr answered and came back with a small note. He announced that it was from al-Nayef. The message read: “I know about your operation. I support you and am ready to help in any way. Trust in God.”
Al-Ali recalled that al-Bakr presented the message to the group, saying: “We need to discuss this and make a decision.”
The note, delivered by a lieutenant serving as al-Nayef’s aide, was shocking.
Although the messenger was a Baathist, his actions didn’t lessen the severity of the situation.
The group grew anxious and confused. Al-Nayef was known to be strong, very intelligent and ambitious, which made him a formidable figure. They considered the risks: if they canceled the operation, al-Nayef might reveal their plans, seeing it as a slight against him.
Canceling could be disastrous for the party, but involving al-Nayef was risky too. It was clear that al-Daoud had not kept his oath, complicating matters.
They ultimately decided to proceed and sent al-Nayef this message: “We intentionally kept you uninformed due to your sensitive position and concern for your safety. We informed Ibrahim al-Daoud to avoid putting you in an awkward position, knowing he would tell you. We are moving forward with the operation, and if successful, you will be Iraq’s Prime Minister, God willing.”
Essentially, they made two decisions: to entice al-Nayef with the prime ministership and to eliminate al-Nayef and al-Daoud as soon as possible. The task of storming the Republican Palace was given to the party’s regional leaders.
Before the operation, they gathered at the home of Abdul Karim al-Nadda, al-Bakr’s brother-in-law, who worked for the railway and lived near the radio station in the Salhiya area.
The emotions were high as the nine leadership members, including al-Bakr and Saddam, met with others, including Hardan al-Tikriti. The total number present was less than twenty. The plan required al-Daoud and Ghaidan to be waiting for them.
Storming the palace
The team put on military uniforms and officer badges. At the planned time, a military truck arrived, and they climbed aboard, while another group took two civilian cars. They reached the palace entrance dressed in their military gear and carrying rifles. Ghaidan was waiting at the tank battalion entrance and opened the gate for them. Several young party members, who had secretly trained to operate tanks, joined them.
They were surprised to find that the tanks around the palace were modern and the trainees had trouble operating them. Fortunately, one young man managed to start a tank and moved from one to another, helping them complete the encirclement of the palace.
They set up their command post at the tank battalion headquarters. Al-Bakr called Abdul Rahman Arif, who was asleep. The two men knew each other well. Surprised, Arif asked, “What’s going on?” Al-Bakr responded: “The revolutionary leadership has taken control of the country.”
“Please surrender to avoid any conflict. We guarantee your safety and that of your family. This is not a personal attack; it’s to prevent further bloodshed under your weak leadership. Surrender now.”
Finding the situation serious, Arif tried contacting division commanders outside Baghdad but got no response. Ten minutes later, al-Bakr called again, insisting Arif surrender. In a final warning, al-Bakr said: “If you don’t surrender, you’ll be responsible for your and your family’s safety.”
To reinforce the message, they fired artillery shells over the palace. Hearing this, Arif realized there was no negotiating and contacted them to arrange his surrender. Arif came out and was taken in a small military vehicle to the tank battalion headquarters.
At the start of the operation, a team was dispatched to arrest Prime Minister Taher Yahya at his home. This move marked the Baath Party’s return to power, achieved without any bloodshed.
Abdul Razzaq al-Nayef and Ibrahim al-Daoud.
Potential threats
When asked about Saddam Hussein’s actions during those crucial hours, al-Ali said: “Saddam acted just like the others; he wore a military uniform and carried a rifle, following the lead of the other party members.”
Despite his many criticisms today, Saddam’s bravery and ruthlessness were clear. At the time, he was not a dominant figure and did not control decisions. He was a loyal party member who followed orders.
After the Baath Party took power, its leaders saw Prime Minister al-Nayef and Defense Minister al-Daoud as potential threats.
Al-Ali, involved in the plot against them, described the situation: “We held a meeting to discuss our decisions, including removing al-Nayef and al-Daoud. Al-Bakr said we had to include al-Nayef because he knew our plan and could have turned against us. We promised him the prime ministership, and he did not betray us.”
“However, I was concerned that removing al-Nayef might be seen as treachery, given the bloody history with the Communists in 1963. I suggested we keep cooperating with him and reassess if his behavior changed. We agreed, and al-Nayef began his role as prime minister.”
A few days later, al-Bakr called an urgent meeting and urged the leadership to quickly remove al-Nayef. He explained that he was rapidly working against the party and had recruited military officers without realizing some were Baathists.
“Act fast before he can undermine us,” al-Bakr warned. “Plan his removal, and I’ll support whatever you decide.”
Officers salute al-Nayef before his ouster.
The next day, we met at the home of Saleh Mahdi Al-Ammash, the Interior Minister, since we feared al-Nayef might trap us if he knew our plans. We decided to remove both al-Nayef and al-Daoud.
We had military units in Jordan. We planned for al-Daoud to inspect them while secretly sending party members to arrest him and send him to Spain. At the same time, we would act against al-Nayef.
On July 30, al-Daoud was captured and sent to Spain. Meanwhile, we targeted al-Nayef. After lunch at the palace, he went to al-Bakr’s office. Saddam and I entered with rifles and demanded his surrender. At first, he resisted but then begged us, citing his family.
We needed to act quickly and discreetly. We told al-Nayef to leave as if nothing had happened and warned him not to signal his guards. He was escorted to a car by Saddam, who warned him not to resist. The car left through a rear gate, and al-Nayef was flown out to Morocco.
