Elusive Hamas Leader Deif Masterminded Oct. 7 Attack on Israel 

Palestinians search for bodies and survivors in a site hit by an Israeli bombardment on Khan Younis, southern Gaza Strip, Saturday, July 13, 2024. (AP)
Palestinians search for bodies and survivors in a site hit by an Israeli bombardment on Khan Younis, southern Gaza Strip, Saturday, July 13, 2024. (AP)
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Elusive Hamas Leader Deif Masterminded Oct. 7 Attack on Israel 

Palestinians search for bodies and survivors in a site hit by an Israeli bombardment on Khan Younis, southern Gaza Strip, Saturday, July 13, 2024. (AP)
Palestinians search for bodies and survivors in a site hit by an Israeli bombardment on Khan Younis, southern Gaza Strip, Saturday, July 13, 2024. (AP)

Hamas' military leader Mohammed Deif, one of the masterminds of the Oct. 7, 2023 assault on southern Israel, was an elusive figure who had a long and secretive career in the Palestinian group and had been sought by Israel for decades.

Deif, 58, was finally killed in an Israeli airstrike on July 13, a huge blow to the armed group more than nine months after the Oct. 7 attack triggered Israel's devastating campaign in Gaza.

The Israeli military said on Thursday it had confirmed his death in the airstrike in Gaza's Khan Younis area. Hamas did not immediately respond to a request for comment on the Israeli announcement.

Deif had survived seven previous Israeli assassination attempts, the most recent in 2021. In the months since Oct. 7, he was believed to have been directing military operations from the tunnels and backstreets of Gaza, alongside senior colleagues.

Rising up the Hamas ranks over 30 years, Deif developed the group's network of tunnels and its bomb-making expertise. He had topped Israel's most wanted list for decades, held personally responsible for the deaths of dozens of Israelis in suicide bombings.

Hamas sources said Deif lost an eye and sustained serious injuries in one leg in one of Israel's past attempts to kill him. His survival over the years made him a folk hero for some Palestinians.

He and two other Hamas leaders in Gaza formed a three-man military council that planned the Oct. 7 raid, in which 1,200 people were killed and more than 250 taken hostage, according to Israeli tallies, in the bloodiest attack in Israel's 75-year history.

After the attack, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's government vowed to kill the three - Yahya Sinwar, Hamas' leader in Gaza, Deif, head of the military wing, and Marwan Issa his deputy, who was reported killed by Israel in March.

In an audio tape broadcast as Hamas fired thousands of rockets on Oct. 7, Deif named the raid "Al-Aqsa Flood", signaling the attack was payback for Israeli raids at Jerusalem's Al-Aqsa Mosque.

A source close to Hamas said Deif began planning the operation in May 2021, after a raid on Islam's third holiest site that enraged the Arab and Muslim world.

"It was triggered by scenes and footage of Israel storming Al-Aqsa Mosque during Ramadan, beating worshippers, attacking them, dragging elderly and young men out of the mosque," the source said. "All this fueled and ignited the anger."

At the time, Israel accused Palestinians of trying to incite violence in Jerusalem. Palestinians rejected the allegation.

The storming of the mosque compound, long a flashpoint for violence over matters of sovereignty and religion in Jerusalem, helped set off 11 days of fighting that year between Israel and Hamas.

AL-AQSA RAGE

There are only three images of Deif: one in his 20s, another of him masked, and an image of his shadow, which was used when the audio tape was broadcast on Oct. 7.

Deif, 58, rarely spoke and never appeared in public. So when Hamas' TV channel announced he was about to speak that day, Palestinians knew something significant was afoot.

"Today the rage of Al-Aqsa, the rage of our people and nation is exploding. Our mujahedeen (fighters), today is your day to make this criminal understand that his time has ended," Deif said in the recording.

For Israelis and Western states, the Iran-backed Hamas, which has directed suicide bombings in Israel and fought frequent wars against it, is a terrorist group bent on Israel's destruction.

For Palestinian supporters, Hamas leaders are fighters for liberation from Israeli occupation, keeping their cause alive when international diplomacy has failed them.

The source close to Hamas said the decision to prepare the Oct. 7 attack was taken jointly by Deif, who led Hamas's armed wing, known as al-Qassam Brigades, and Sinwar, but it was clear Deif was the architect.

"There are two brains, but there is one mastermind," the source said, adding that information about the operation was known only to a handful of Hamas leaders.

An Israeli security source said Deif was directly involved in the planning and operational aspects of the attack.

DECEPTION EFFORT

The plan as conceived by Deif involved a prolonged effort at deception. Israel was led to believe that Hamas, an ally of Israel's foe Iran, was not interested in starting a conflict and was focusing instead on economic development in Gaza, where it took power in 2007.

But while Israel began providing economic incentives to Gazan workers, the group's fighters were being trained and drilled, often in plain sight of the Israeli military, the source close to Hamas said.

Speaking in a calm voice, Deif said in his recording that Hamas had repeatedly warned Israel to stop its crimes against Palestinians, to release prisoners and to halt its expropriation of Palestinian land. The group had now decided to "put an end to all this", he said.

More than 39,400 Palestinians have been killed in Israel's military campaign since Oct. 7, Gaza health officials say, and much of the enclave has been reduced to rubble. Israel says it aims to eliminate Hamas.

In May 2024, the International Criminal Court's prosecutor said he had requested arrest warrants for Deif, Sinwar and another Hamas figure over the attack, and for Netanyahu and his defense chief over Israel's response.

Both Israel and Hamas dismissed the ICC accusations and said they objected to the way the announcement of the request on the same day appeared to equate them with each other - though they faced different charges.

Born as Mohammad Masri in 1965 in the Khan Younis Refugee Camp set up after the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, he became known as Mohammed Deif after joining Hamas during the first Intifada, or Palestinian uprising, which began in 1987.

He was arrested by Israel in 1989 and spent about 16 months in detention, a Hamas source said.

Deif had a degree in science from the Islamic University in Gaza, where he studied physics, chemistry and biology. He headed the university's entertainment committee and performed on stage in comedies.

His wife, 7-month-old son, and 3-year-old daughter were killed in an Israeli airstrike in 2014.



Rare Precedents for Lebanon-Israel Talks

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio (C), alongside US State Department Counselor Michael Needham (2L) and US Ambassador to Lebanon Michel Issa (2R), speaks during a meeting with Lebanon's Ambassador to the US Nada Hamadeh Moawad (out of frame) and Israeli Ambassador to the US Yechiel Leiter (out of frame) at the State Department in Washington, DC, on April 14, 2026. (AFP)
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio (C), alongside US State Department Counselor Michael Needham (2L) and US Ambassador to Lebanon Michel Issa (2R), speaks during a meeting with Lebanon's Ambassador to the US Nada Hamadeh Moawad (out of frame) and Israeli Ambassador to the US Yechiel Leiter (out of frame) at the State Department in Washington, DC, on April 14, 2026. (AFP)
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Rare Precedents for Lebanon-Israel Talks

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio (C), alongside US State Department Counselor Michael Needham (2L) and US Ambassador to Lebanon Michel Issa (2R), speaks during a meeting with Lebanon's Ambassador to the US Nada Hamadeh Moawad (out of frame) and Israeli Ambassador to the US Yechiel Leiter (out of frame) at the State Department in Washington, DC, on April 14, 2026. (AFP)
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio (C), alongside US State Department Counselor Michael Needham (2L) and US Ambassador to Lebanon Michel Issa (2R), speaks during a meeting with Lebanon's Ambassador to the US Nada Hamadeh Moawad (out of frame) and Israeli Ambassador to the US Yechiel Leiter (out of frame) at the State Department in Washington, DC, on April 14, 2026. (AFP)

There are few precedents for the direct talks between Lebanese and Israeli officials that began in Washington on Tuesday.

- 1949, Fragile armistice -

The first Arab-Israeli war began on May 15, 1948, the day after the declaration of the establishment of the State of Israel.

Five countries -- Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon and Iraq -- had rejected a UN plan adopted in November 1947 to partition Palestine into Jewish and Arab states and went to war against the new state.

In 1949, Israel and neighboring countries signed armistice agreements, but they collapsed with the start of the 1967 Arab-Israeli War.

- 1983, Unimplemented agreement -

Israel invaded Lebanon on June 6, 1982, in an operation it dubbed "Peace for Galilee" that was initially aimed at expelling Palestinian fighters, but which resulted in a nearly 18-year Israeli occupation.

On May 17, 1983, Lebanon and Israel signed an agreement on the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon after four-and-a-half months of direct talks with US participation.

The deal was scrapped less than a year later, in March 1984, under pressure from Syria and its allies in Lebanon.

- 1991-93, Washington talks -

A series of bilateral negotiations between Israel and Syria, Lebanon, and a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation was launched in late 1991, following the Madrid conference on Middle East peace.

Ten rounds of bilateral talks were held in Washington over 20 months until 1993, but failed to produce results.

- 2022, Maritime border deal -

After years of US mediation, Lebanon and Israel reached an agreement on October 27, 2022, which demarcated their maritime border and set the terms for sharing offshore gas resources in the eastern Mediterranean.

There was no direct contact between the two sides, with the deal formalized through separate exchanges of letters with the United States.

- 2024, Fragile ceasefire -

A November 2024 ceasefire sought to end more than a year of fresh hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah, but Israeli forces kept up strikes in Lebanon, saying they aimed to prevent Hezbollah from rebuilding its capabilities.

In December 2025, civilian officials for the first time joined Lebanese and Israeli military representatives in ceasefire-monitoring meetings in southern Lebanon, led by the US and also involving France and the United Nations peacekeeping force.

The talks marked the first direct discussions between the two sides in decades.


What Does a ‘Blockade of the Blockade’ in the Strait of Hormuz Mean?

Ships and a boat in the Strait of Hormuz on April 12, 2026 (Reuters)
Ships and a boat in the Strait of Hormuz on April 12, 2026 (Reuters)
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What Does a ‘Blockade of the Blockade’ in the Strait of Hormuz Mean?

Ships and a boat in the Strait of Hormuz on April 12, 2026 (Reuters)
Ships and a boat in the Strait of Hormuz on April 12, 2026 (Reuters)

When Iran moved to close the Strait of Hormuz, it did not physically seal the waterway — for example, by fully mining it. Instead, it barred ships and oil tankers belonging to Gulf littoral states, as well as vessels from countries it considers adversaries, chiefly the United States and Israel, from transiting the strait.

At the same time, Tehran allowed its own tankers to pass, maintaining exports of about 1.5 million barrels per day to global markets.

In effect, Iran imposed a selective blockade on the Strait of Hormuz, closing it to much of the world while keeping it open for its own trade.

By contrast, US President Donald Trump’s proposal to impose a naval blockade on the strait and all Iranian ports would amount to a “blockade of the blockade.” Such a move would deny Iran access to the waterway altogether, halting both its oil and non-oil exports and dealing a severe blow to its economy.

Iran’s Gains and Losses

Oil prices surged after traffic through the strait was disrupted, rising from about $75–$80 a barrel before the February conflict to roughly $120–$126 at peak wartime levels.

With exports of around 1.5 million barrels per day, Iran is estimated to have earned an additional $60 million a day from higher prices. However, because about 90 percent of its crude is sold to China at discounted rates, the net additional gain is likely closer to $45 million a day.

These figures reflect incremental revenue. At an assumed average price of $100 a barrel, Iran’s total oil income would reach roughly $150 million a day, or about $4.5 billion a month, revenues that would be cut off under a full naval blockade.

Such a “blockade of the blockade” would likely push oil prices even higher. But its impact would extend beyond Iran. China, which buys the bulk of Iranian crude, would be among the most affected.

According to Pakistani diplomatic sources, Beijing played a key role in persuading Tehran at the last minute to accept a two-week truce announced on April 7 by Donald Trump. Some analysts believe that if China’s energy supplies are threatened, it could again press Iran to make concessions in talks with Washington aimed at ending the conflict.

Rerouting Shipping Traffic

Iran’s restrictions did more than limit access; they reshaped how ships moved through the strait.

Rather than formally altering internationally recognized shipping lanes, Iran imposed operational controls that effectively redirected maritime traffic. Vessels permitted to transit were steered toward routes closer to Iran’s coastline, particularly between Qeshm and Larak islands, instead of the traditional channels running between Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunb islands.

This shift created a de facto controlled corridor near Iranian shores without any formal declaration of new navigation routes.

In many cases, passage became contingent on prior coordination with Iranian authorities, permits, or even transit fees, marking a sharp departure from the previously unrestricted flow of traffic.

Iran has allowed “friendly” or neutral vessels to pass under certain conditions, while blocking those it deems hostile. It has also deployed drones, naval mines and fast attack craft to monitor and, when necessary, intercept ships that fail to comply.

The risks have forced many shipping companies to reroute vessels around the Cape of Good Hope or adopt longer, more secure paths, including routes closer to Iranian-controlled waters.

Before the conflict, roughly 130 to 150 ships transited the Strait of Hormuz each day. During the crisis, that number dropped sharply to about five vessels, or fewer, a day.


Baby Born in Tent on a Beirut Roadside Struggles to Survive, Her Family Displaced by War

Haifa Kenjo, who fled Israeli airstrikes on the southern suburbs of Beirut, holds her 15-day-old daughter Shiman inside the tent she uses as a shelter and where she gave birth to her in Beirut, Sunday, April 12, 2026. (AP Photo/Emilio Morenatti)
Haifa Kenjo, who fled Israeli airstrikes on the southern suburbs of Beirut, holds her 15-day-old daughter Shiman inside the tent she uses as a shelter and where she gave birth to her in Beirut, Sunday, April 12, 2026. (AP Photo/Emilio Morenatti)
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Baby Born in Tent on a Beirut Roadside Struggles to Survive, Her Family Displaced by War

Haifa Kenjo, who fled Israeli airstrikes on the southern suburbs of Beirut, holds her 15-day-old daughter Shiman inside the tent she uses as a shelter and where she gave birth to her in Beirut, Sunday, April 12, 2026. (AP Photo/Emilio Morenatti)
Haifa Kenjo, who fled Israeli airstrikes on the southern suburbs of Beirut, holds her 15-day-old daughter Shiman inside the tent she uses as a shelter and where she gave birth to her in Beirut, Sunday, April 12, 2026. (AP Photo/Emilio Morenatti)

All that newborn Shiman knows of the world is a flimsy tent along Beirut’s waterfront — the stench of mildewed blankets, stings of swarming insects and screams of Israeli warplanes striking the Lebanese capital.

As of Monday, she was 16 days old after being born here in the mud, said her mother, Haifa Kenjo.

Kenjo, 34, was nine months pregnant when Israeli attacks on Beirut’s southern suburbs of Dahiyeh sent her, her husband and their 2-year-old son, Khalid, running for their lives in sandals and pajamas. They had no time to bring anything as explosions shook the house, they said — not clothes, not cash.

They took refuge in a donated tent near downtown Beirut and secured the tarp with rocks as the wind threatened to rip it from the ground.

Of the more than 1 million people uprooted in Lebanon by this latest war between Israel and the Iran-backed Hezbollah, 13,500 are pregnant and more than 1,500 are expected to deliver in the next month, the United Nations’ sexual and reproductive health agency said this week, warning that many struggle to access adequate maternal care.

When life had been normal, Kenjo pictured giving birth at Beirut's main public hospital, where she delivered Khalid. She is originally from Syria, and although she has spent almost half her life in the Lebanese capital and married a Lebanese man, she must pay to access the country’s public hospitals, where Lebanese mothers can give birth for free.

When her water broke and she went into labor on March 28, she called an ambulance and her husband scraped together the $40 admission fee. But the $500 they needed to deliver Shiman at the hospital was buried in the ruins of their home, razed the week before in an Israeli airstrike.

They returned to the tent, called a midwife and prayed.

Umm Ali, the midwife, said she did her best, but the tent was filthy. The rain seeped inside. They washed tiny Shiman with bottled water.

Kenjo had no milk in her breasts to give her child. Infant formula costs more than her husband makes in a day installing water tanks.

She knows her baby is hungry. Volunteers passing out food in the displacement camp gave her just enough formula for the next few days.

Shiman doesn’t cry like a normal infant. She coughs. Her skin is cold and clammy, pockmarked with insect bites.

“She is so precious,” Kenjo said, stroking her baby girl. “But for her we have nothing. We have less than zero.”