Elusive Hamas Leader Deif Masterminded Oct. 7 Attack on Israel 

Palestinians search for bodies and survivors in a site hit by an Israeli bombardment on Khan Younis, southern Gaza Strip, Saturday, July 13, 2024. (AP)
Palestinians search for bodies and survivors in a site hit by an Israeli bombardment on Khan Younis, southern Gaza Strip, Saturday, July 13, 2024. (AP)
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Elusive Hamas Leader Deif Masterminded Oct. 7 Attack on Israel 

Palestinians search for bodies and survivors in a site hit by an Israeli bombardment on Khan Younis, southern Gaza Strip, Saturday, July 13, 2024. (AP)
Palestinians search for bodies and survivors in a site hit by an Israeli bombardment on Khan Younis, southern Gaza Strip, Saturday, July 13, 2024. (AP)

Hamas' military leader Mohammed Deif, one of the masterminds of the Oct. 7, 2023 assault on southern Israel, was an elusive figure who had a long and secretive career in the Palestinian group and had been sought by Israel for decades.

Deif, 58, was finally killed in an Israeli airstrike on July 13, a huge blow to the armed group more than nine months after the Oct. 7 attack triggered Israel's devastating campaign in Gaza.

The Israeli military said on Thursday it had confirmed his death in the airstrike in Gaza's Khan Younis area. Hamas did not immediately respond to a request for comment on the Israeli announcement.

Deif had survived seven previous Israeli assassination attempts, the most recent in 2021. In the months since Oct. 7, he was believed to have been directing military operations from the tunnels and backstreets of Gaza, alongside senior colleagues.

Rising up the Hamas ranks over 30 years, Deif developed the group's network of tunnels and its bomb-making expertise. He had topped Israel's most wanted list for decades, held personally responsible for the deaths of dozens of Israelis in suicide bombings.

Hamas sources said Deif lost an eye and sustained serious injuries in one leg in one of Israel's past attempts to kill him. His survival over the years made him a folk hero for some Palestinians.

He and two other Hamas leaders in Gaza formed a three-man military council that planned the Oct. 7 raid, in which 1,200 people were killed and more than 250 taken hostage, according to Israeli tallies, in the bloodiest attack in Israel's 75-year history.

After the attack, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's government vowed to kill the three - Yahya Sinwar, Hamas' leader in Gaza, Deif, head of the military wing, and Marwan Issa his deputy, who was reported killed by Israel in March.

In an audio tape broadcast as Hamas fired thousands of rockets on Oct. 7, Deif named the raid "Al-Aqsa Flood", signaling the attack was payback for Israeli raids at Jerusalem's Al-Aqsa Mosque.

A source close to Hamas said Deif began planning the operation in May 2021, after a raid on Islam's third holiest site that enraged the Arab and Muslim world.

"It was triggered by scenes and footage of Israel storming Al-Aqsa Mosque during Ramadan, beating worshippers, attacking them, dragging elderly and young men out of the mosque," the source said. "All this fueled and ignited the anger."

At the time, Israel accused Palestinians of trying to incite violence in Jerusalem. Palestinians rejected the allegation.

The storming of the mosque compound, long a flashpoint for violence over matters of sovereignty and religion in Jerusalem, helped set off 11 days of fighting that year between Israel and Hamas.

AL-AQSA RAGE

There are only three images of Deif: one in his 20s, another of him masked, and an image of his shadow, which was used when the audio tape was broadcast on Oct. 7.

Deif, 58, rarely spoke and never appeared in public. So when Hamas' TV channel announced he was about to speak that day, Palestinians knew something significant was afoot.

"Today the rage of Al-Aqsa, the rage of our people and nation is exploding. Our mujahedeen (fighters), today is your day to make this criminal understand that his time has ended," Deif said in the recording.

For Israelis and Western states, the Iran-backed Hamas, which has directed suicide bombings in Israel and fought frequent wars against it, is a terrorist group bent on Israel's destruction.

For Palestinian supporters, Hamas leaders are fighters for liberation from Israeli occupation, keeping their cause alive when international diplomacy has failed them.

The source close to Hamas said the decision to prepare the Oct. 7 attack was taken jointly by Deif, who led Hamas's armed wing, known as al-Qassam Brigades, and Sinwar, but it was clear Deif was the architect.

"There are two brains, but there is one mastermind," the source said, adding that information about the operation was known only to a handful of Hamas leaders.

An Israeli security source said Deif was directly involved in the planning and operational aspects of the attack.

DECEPTION EFFORT

The plan as conceived by Deif involved a prolonged effort at deception. Israel was led to believe that Hamas, an ally of Israel's foe Iran, was not interested in starting a conflict and was focusing instead on economic development in Gaza, where it took power in 2007.

But while Israel began providing economic incentives to Gazan workers, the group's fighters were being trained and drilled, often in plain sight of the Israeli military, the source close to Hamas said.

Speaking in a calm voice, Deif said in his recording that Hamas had repeatedly warned Israel to stop its crimes against Palestinians, to release prisoners and to halt its expropriation of Palestinian land. The group had now decided to "put an end to all this", he said.

More than 39,400 Palestinians have been killed in Israel's military campaign since Oct. 7, Gaza health officials say, and much of the enclave has been reduced to rubble. Israel says it aims to eliminate Hamas.

In May 2024, the International Criminal Court's prosecutor said he had requested arrest warrants for Deif, Sinwar and another Hamas figure over the attack, and for Netanyahu and his defense chief over Israel's response.

Both Israel and Hamas dismissed the ICC accusations and said they objected to the way the announcement of the request on the same day appeared to equate them with each other - though they faced different charges.

Born as Mohammad Masri in 1965 in the Khan Younis Refugee Camp set up after the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, he became known as Mohammed Deif after joining Hamas during the first Intifada, or Palestinian uprising, which began in 1987.

He was arrested by Israel in 1989 and spent about 16 months in detention, a Hamas source said.

Deif had a degree in science from the Islamic University in Gaza, where he studied physics, chemistry and biology. He headed the university's entertainment committee and performed on stage in comedies.

His wife, 7-month-old son, and 3-year-old daughter were killed in an Israeli airstrike in 2014.



How Iranians Are Communicating Through Internet Blackout

 People walk past closed shops at the almost empty traditional main bazaar, in Tehran, Iran, Tuesday, March 10, 2026. (AP)
People walk past closed shops at the almost empty traditional main bazaar, in Tehran, Iran, Tuesday, March 10, 2026. (AP)
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How Iranians Are Communicating Through Internet Blackout

 People walk past closed shops at the almost empty traditional main bazaar, in Tehran, Iran, Tuesday, March 10, 2026. (AP)
People walk past closed shops at the almost empty traditional main bazaar, in Tehran, Iran, Tuesday, March 10, 2026. (AP)

Iran's latest internet blackout has lasted more than 14 days, connectivity monitor Netblocks said Friday.

The nature of the limits on internet activity shows "this is a government-imposed measure" and not the result of damage from US and Israeli airstrikes, Netblocks research chief Isik Mater told AFP.

"It is a deliberate shutdown imposed by the authorities to suppress the flow of information and prevent further dissent," said Raha Bahreini, Iran researcher at Amnesty International.

Here are some of the ways information is still flowing in and out of Iran.

- Shortwave radio -

Amsterdam-based nonprofit Radio Zamaneh began shortwave broadcasts during the January protests, sending a nightly Farsi news program from 11:00 pm Tehran time.

"It's really difficult for the regime to jam shortwave because it's a long-distance broadcast," executive director Rieneke van Santen told AFP.

"People can just listen on a super cheap, small, simple radio... It's one of those typical emergency fall-back solutions."

Declining to specify where the transmitter is located, she said it is "closer to the Netherlands than to Iran" -- although Tehran "can figure it out" if they choose.

- Phone calls -

Many with ties to Iran are still receiving landline phone calls from inside -- "quite surprising" given the internet blackout, said Mahsa Alimardani of global rights organization Witness.

Fearing the authorities listening in, people often avoid speaking directly about political topics, such as the killing of Ali Khamenei, she added.

"It's not possible to communicate about sensitive issues through these brief phone calls," Amnesty's Bahreini said.

The required prepaid international calling cards are expensive and often fail to provide their face value in minutes.

"You buy a phone card for 60 minutes, but in eight minutes, it's out," van Santen said.

"It's really just phone calls from family members saying, after the bombing, we're still alive."

- VPN or other internet services -

Virtual private networks (VPNs) -- widely-used services that encrypt internet traffic -- can't create an internet connection where none is available.

But even at around one percent of typical levels, Iran's connectivity is "still a large figure in absolute terms", Netblocks' Mater said.

Iranians suspected of using VPNs since the war began have received warning text messages claiming to be from the authorities.

Before the war, millions turned to Toronto-based company Psiphon, which creates specialist tools more capable than typical "off-the-shelf" VPNs.

Offering techniques including disguising users' data as different types of internet traffic, Psiphon "is able to evade detection more successfully", data and insights director Keith McManamen told AFP.

With up to six million unique daily users in Iran before the latest internet shutdown, connections have now tumbled to fewer than 100,000.

Few but the most tech-savvy users can reach Psiphon's network for now.

Nevertheless, "the situation is extremely dynamic. We're seeing changes not just day to day, but hour by hour," McManamen said.

A similar service, US-based Lantern, is also widely used in Iran.

- Satellite broadcasts -

Created by US-based nonprofit NetFreedom Pioneers, Toosheh is a "filecasting" technology using home satellite TV equipment to broadcast encrypted data to people in Iran.

Users record from the Toosheh satellite TV channel onto a USB stick plugged into their set-top box, which they can then decrypt using a special app installed on their phone or computer.

From that initial download, the data can be copied and shared across multiple households.

The group estimated around three million active users in Iran across 2025, with "thousands to hundreds of thousands... since the (internet) shutdown in January," the group's director of projects Emilia James told AFP.

From its usual educational repertoire ranging from English lessons to news, content these days includes more on "personal safety and digital security... helping people to stay safe," she added.

Since people are tuning in to a broadcast signal, there is no way for the government to track them, she added.

- Starlink -

Elon Musk-owned satellite internet service Starlink was used during this year's protests to get information out, while the government attempted to jam its signals.

At around $2,000 on Iran's black market, the terminals are expensive and very rare in poorer regions like Balochistan or Kurdistan that have suffered the most government repression, Alimardani said.

Meanwhile, Amnesty has received reports of "raids on houses... arrests of people who had Starlink devices," Bahreini said.

Charges for those caught communicating with the outside world range from prison sentences to the death penalty, she added.

Starlink did not respond to AFP's request for comment on usage in Iran.


How Iranians Are Communicating Through Internet Blackout

 People walk past closed shops at the almost empty traditional main bazaar, in Tehran, Iran, Tuesday, March 10, 2026. (AP)
People walk past closed shops at the almost empty traditional main bazaar, in Tehran, Iran, Tuesday, March 10, 2026. (AP)
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How Iranians Are Communicating Through Internet Blackout

 People walk past closed shops at the almost empty traditional main bazaar, in Tehran, Iran, Tuesday, March 10, 2026. (AP)
People walk past closed shops at the almost empty traditional main bazaar, in Tehran, Iran, Tuesday, March 10, 2026. (AP)

Iran's latest internet blackout has lasted more than 14 days, connectivity monitor Netblocks said Friday.

The nature of the limits on internet activity shows "this is a government-imposed measure" and not the result of damage from US and Israeli airstrikes, Netblocks research chief Isik Mater told AFP.

"It is a deliberate shutdown imposed by the authorities to suppress the flow of information and prevent further dissent," said Raha Bahreini, Iran researcher at Amnesty International.

Here are some of the ways information is still flowing in and out of Iran.

- Shortwave radio -

Amsterdam-based nonprofit Radio Zamaneh began shortwave broadcasts during the January protests, sending a nightly Farsi news program from 11:00 pm Tehran time.

"It's really difficult for the regime to jam shortwave because it's a long-distance broadcast," executive director Rieneke van Santen told AFP.

"People can just listen on a super cheap, small, simple radio... It's one of those typical emergency fall-back solutions."

Declining to specify where the transmitter is located, she said it is "closer to the Netherlands than to Iran" -- although Tehran "can figure it out" if they choose.

- Phone calls -

Many with ties to Iran are still receiving landline phone calls from inside -- "quite surprising" given the internet blackout, said Mahsa Alimardani of global rights organization Witness.

Fearing the authorities listening in, people often avoid speaking directly about political topics, such as the killing of Ali Khamenei, she added.

"It's not possible to communicate about sensitive issues through these brief phone calls," Amnesty's Bahreini said.

The required prepaid international calling cards are expensive and often fail to provide their face value in minutes.

"You buy a phone card for 60 minutes, but in eight minutes, it's out," van Santen said.

"It's really just phone calls from family members saying, after the bombing, we're still alive."

- VPN or other internet services -

Virtual private networks (VPNs) -- widely-used services that encrypt internet traffic -- can't create an internet connection where none is available.

But even at around one percent of typical levels, Iran's connectivity is "still a large figure in absolute terms", Netblocks' Mater said.

Iranians suspected of using VPNs since the war began have received warning text messages claiming to be from the authorities.

Before the war, millions turned to Toronto-based company Psiphon, which creates specialist tools more capable than typical "off-the-shelf" VPNs.

Offering techniques including disguising users' data as different types of internet traffic, Psiphon "is able to evade detection more successfully", data and insights director Keith McManamen told AFP.

With up to six million unique daily users in Iran before the latest internet shutdown, connections have now tumbled to fewer than 100,000.

Few but the most tech-savvy users can reach Psiphon's network for now.

Nevertheless, "the situation is extremely dynamic. We're seeing changes not just day to day, but hour by hour," McManamen said.

A similar service, US-based Lantern, is also widely used in Iran.

- Satellite broadcasts -

Created by US-based nonprofit NetFreedom Pioneers, Toosheh is a "filecasting" technology using home satellite TV equipment to broadcast encrypted data to people in Iran.

Users record from the Toosheh satellite TV channel onto a USB stick plugged into their set-top box, which they can then decrypt using a special app installed on their phone or computer.

From that initial download, the data can be copied and shared across multiple households.

The group estimated around three million active users in Iran across 2025, with "thousands to hundreds of thousands... since the (internet) shutdown in January," the group's director of projects Emilia James told AFP.

From its usual educational repertoire ranging from English lessons to news, content these days includes more on "personal safety and digital security... helping people to stay safe," she added.

Since people are tuning in to a broadcast signal, there is no way for the government to track them, she added.

- Starlink -

Elon Musk-owned satellite internet service Starlink was used during this year's protests to get information out, while the government attempted to jam its signals.

At around $2,000 on Iran's black market, the terminals are expensive and very rare in poorer regions like Balochistan or Kurdistan that have suffered the most government repression, Alimardani said.

Meanwhile, Amnesty has received reports of "raids on houses... arrests of people who had Starlink devices," Bahreini said.

Charges for those caught communicating with the outside world range from prison sentences to the death penalty, she added.

Starlink did not respond to AFP's request for comment on usage in Iran.


Will Ahmadinejad Return to the Political Scene in Iran?

Iranian former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. (AFP)
Iranian former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. (AFP)
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Will Ahmadinejad Return to the Political Scene in Iran?

Iranian former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. (AFP)
Iranian former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. (AFP)

A report by The Atlantic said the strike that hit a region close to Iranian former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s residence in the first days of the war on Iran has returned to the spotlight a still controversial political figure even though he left office for over a decade ago.

On the first day of the Iran war, the assassination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei overshadowed news of a strike near Ahmadinejad’s home, said the report.

“Many who remembered his term in office - marked by Holocaust denial, atom-bomb fetishism, and shoving revolutionary ideology down the throats of a country already weary of it - celebrated his reported assassination,” it added. He was president from 2005 to 2013.

“Among those who have followed Ahmadinejad’s post-presidential career, however, his targeting was more of an enigma. Since leaving office, Ahmadinejad has harshly criticized the Iranian government, and as a result, Iran’s Guardian Council has formally excluded him from running for president,” said the report.

For more than a decade, he has been known more as a regime opponent than as a supporter. “I don’t understand why Israel would want to kill him in the first place,” Meir Javedanfar, who co-wrote a biography of Ahmadinejad, told The Atlantic. “Perhaps to settle scores? It makes no sense.”

Contrary to early reports, Ahmadinejad is alive, his associates revealed, requesting anonymity. “The circumstances of his survival may prove significant as the war drags on. Whatever the intent, Ahmadinejad’s associates say the strike was in effect a jailbreak operation that freed the former president from regime control.”

“Long before the war, the government had posted a small number of bodyguards near Ahmadinejad, nominally to protect a prominent citizen but also to keep tabs on him. The regime has never been sure what to do with him,” said the report.

About a month ago, after the January protests, his freedom of movement was further reduced, his phones confiscated, and the contingent of bodyguards increased from single digits to about 50. The bodyguards were based a few hundred meters from Ahmadinejad’s residence itself, at the entrance to a cul-de-sac in Narmak, in northeast Tehran. They established a checkpoint to monitor the houses and high school on that street.

“A February 28 strike hit not the residence, but the security forces nearby. In the ensuing mayhem, Ahmadinejad and his family evidently escaped their home and went underground. The government believed he had died, and his death was announced by official channels, as well as the reformist daily Sharq.”

“When rumors arose that Ahmadinejad had escaped, regime elements immediately suspected that he had been spirited away to take part in a coup,” said The Atlantic. “Ahmadinejad’s only public statement since the attack has been a brief eulogy for the supreme leader, calculated to show that Ahmadinejad was alive and to dispel speculation that he had declared himself an enemy of the state. His location is unknown to the government.”

In 2018, former Defense Minister Hussein Dehghan likened Ahmadinejad to “the door of the mosque, which can’t be burned or thrown away” without torching the mosque itself.

“Arresting Ahmadinejad could unsettle the regime,” Javedanfar said. “He knows a hell of a lot about it.”

“Ahmadinejad’s fans say that he has popular support, and that any postwar government will want him around to lend that support. If the current regime survives, it will need all the legitimacy it can get. If it does not, the United States might need someone with intimate - if outdated - knowledge of the Iranian state to be involved with what comes next. Ahmadinejad could still be useful,” the report said.