US Stance on Iran Protests Balances Threats, Caution

Crowds of Iranian protesters gather in Taleghani Square in Karaj, west of Tehran. (Telegram)
Crowds of Iranian protesters gather in Taleghani Square in Karaj, west of Tehran. (Telegram)
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US Stance on Iran Protests Balances Threats, Caution

Crowds of Iranian protesters gather in Taleghani Square in Karaj, west of Tehran. (Telegram)
Crowds of Iranian protesters gather in Taleghani Square in Karaj, west of Tehran. (Telegram)

It may still be premature to say Iran’s ruling system is nearing collapse. Yet the unrest that has gripped the country in recent weeks has pushed Tehran into its most severe internal crisis in years.

Protests triggered by economic freefall and the collapse of the national currency have rapidly spread across regions and social classes, shedding their purely economic character and evolving into a direct challenge to the foundations of the political system.

As strikes have expanded, particularly in the bazaar and the oil sector, popular anger has deepened into a political crisis with existential stakes.

At the heart of these developments, the United States factor stands out as one of the most sensitive and influential elements, not only because of the long history of conflict between Washington and Tehran, but also due to the unprecedented tone adopted by US President Donald Trump, and the political and media reaction within Congress, which has reflected a calibrated division over how to approach the Iranian crisis.

From the early days of the escalating protests, Trump opted to depart from traditional diplomatic language. In a series of interviews and statements, he said he was following events in Iran “very closely,” expressing his belief that the country was “on the verge of collapse.”

More significant than his assessment, however, were his public warnings to the Iranian leadership against continuing to suppress protesters.

Trump spoke bluntly of live fire against unarmed demonstrators, arrests, and executions, describing the situation as “brutal behavior,” and stressing that he had informed Tehran that any bloody escalation would be met with “very severe strikes” from the United States.

This language amounts to an attempt at political and psychological deterrence rather than a declaration of an imminent military plan.

It pressures Iran’s leadership and sends a message of moral support to protesters, while simultaneously preserving ambiguity over the nature of any potential US action.

Vice President JD Vance expressed a similar stance, writing on X that Washington supports anyone exercising their right to peaceful protest, noting that Iran’s system suffers from deep problems.

He reiterated Trump’s call for “real negotiations” over the nuclear program, while leaving future steps to the president’s judgment.

Despite Trump’s clear support for the protests, his administration has so far avoided going further on the question of “the day after.”

This hesitation has been evident in its position on Reza Pahlavi, the son of Iran’s late shah, whose name has resurfaced as a figure of the exiled opposition.

While Trump described him as “a nice person,” he stopped short of holding an official meeting, saying it was still too early to determine who could genuinely represent the will of the Iranian people.

This caution reflects US awareness of the sensitivity of the Iranian scene, in light of past experiences in the region, from Iraq to Libya, where early bets on political alternatives led to disastrous outcomes.

Any overt US backing of a specific opposition figure could also give the Iranian authorities grounds to reinforce their narrative of a “foreign conspiracy,” a line already invoked by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and state media.

Alongside political rhetoric, the economic card occupies a central place in US calculations.

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has described Iran’s economy as on the edge of collapse, pointing to high inflation and a sharp erosion in living standards due to sanctions and mismanagement.

These remarks were not merely technical assessments, but a political message that Washington sees the economic crisis as a pressure point that could accelerate the erosion of the system’s ability to endure.

The economy is not only the spark that ignited the protests, but also one of the keys to their future. Continued strikes, particularly in the oil sector, threaten the main artery of state revenues, compounding pressure and narrowing room for maneuver.

In this context, Washington appears convinced that time is working against Tehran and that allowing the crisis to play out internally may be more effective than any direct intervention.

Another factor closely watched by US decision-makers is the international stance, notably the silence of Russia and China.

These two countries, which have provided Iran with political and economic cover in recent years, appear unwilling or unable to intervene to rescue the system from its internal crisis.

Their silence gives Washington a wider scope to escalate its rhetoric without fear of a major international confrontation.

At the same time, the US administration is keen to avoid appearing as the driver of regime change in Iran. Its declared support remains confined to an ethical and humanitarian framework, protecting protesters and preventing massacres, rather than shaping an alternative system.

This approach seeks to strike a balance between exploiting an adversary’s weakness and avoiding a slide into chaos.

The US response has not been limited to the White House, extending into Congress, where positions have reflected a disciplined division of opinion. The House Foreign Affairs Committee attacked the Iranian system in a post on X, describing it as a dictator that has stood for decades on the bodies of Iranians demanding change.

Within the Republican camp, alignment behind Trump has been clear.

Senator Lindsey Graham wrote that the president was “absolutely right,” that he “stands with the Iranian people against tyranny,” and called to “make Iran great again.”

Senator Ted Cruz said the protests had exposed the system’s “fatally weakened” status and that Iranians were “not chanting for cosmetic reforms, but for an end to clerical rule.”

Democrats, by contrast, expressed solidarity with protesters in a more cautious tone.

Senator Chris Murphy said Iranians deserve their future in their own hands, not through American bombs, warning that military intervention could undermine the movement.

Bernie Sanders said the United States should stand with human rights, not repeat the mistakes of forcibly changing regimes.

In the House, Representative Yassamin Ansari sparked further debate by voicing support for the Iranian people while warning against empowering the Mujahideen-e-Khalq, which she described as “an extremist group lacking legitimacy.”

Republican lawmakers such as Claudia Tenney and Mario Diaz-Balart adopted a harsher tone, calling for clear support for Iranians, “who are bravely demanding freedom, dignity, and basic human rights.”

This divergence reflects a complex US picture. Republicans see the Iranian moment as an opportunity to validate Trump’s pressure and deterrence strategy, while Democrats fear that verbal support could slide into ill-considered entanglement.

Yet both sides converge on a core point: holding Iran’s system responsible for violence and economic collapse and viewing current events as an unprecedented challenge to its legitimacy.

This relative alignment grants Trump room to maneuver domestically without imposing consensus on intervention.

Washington, as reflected in White House rhetoric and congressional debate, prefers at this stage to watch the fractures within Iran deepen, while keeping all options on the table and awaiting what happens on the streets.



Why is North Korea Ramping Up Criticism of Japan?

News coverage showing file footage of a North Korean missile launch is seen on a screen at Seoul Station in Seoul on August 12, 2026. (Photo by GREG BAKER / AFP)
News coverage showing file footage of a North Korean missile launch is seen on a screen at Seoul Station in Seoul on August 12, 2026. (Photo by GREG BAKER / AFP)
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Why is North Korea Ramping Up Criticism of Japan?

News coverage showing file footage of a North Korean missile launch is seen on a screen at Seoul Station in Seoul on August 12, 2026. (Photo by GREG BAKER / AFP)
News coverage showing file footage of a North Korean missile launch is seen on a screen at Seoul Station in Seoul on August 12, 2026. (Photo by GREG BAKER / AFP)

North Korea has stepped up a campaign of rhetoric against Japan's military ‌buildup and its security ties with the United States and South Korea, saying they threaten regional stability. The criticism in more than a dozen state media attacks since early July has coincided with an unusual silence over the North's own missile launches, raising questions about Pyongyang's broader strategic messaging, according to Reuters.

WHY IS NORTH KOREA TALKING MORE ABOUT JAPAN?

North Korean statements have targeted Japan's acquisition of counter-strike capabilities, testing of a US-made Tomahawk cruise missile, rising defense spending and Tokyo's annual defense white paper.

Last week, Kim Yo Jong, the influential sister of leader Kim Jong Un, warned of "additional military options" in response to what she described as Japan's transformation into a military power. On Tuesday, a KCNA commentary described Japan's 2026 defense white paper as a "re-invasion-minded" document aimed at justifying military expansion.

The latest broadside came on Friday, when North Korea criticized annual US-South Korean Ulchi Freedom Shield military drills and accused US-Japan-South Korea military cooperation of evolving into a "nuclear alliance". Washington and Seoul say the drills are defensive.

Another KCNA commentary accused Washington of pursuing a strategy that lowers the threshold for nuclear weapons use and cited US extended deterrence commitments to South Korea and Japan.

HOW HAS ‌JAPAN CHANGED ITS ‌DEFENCE STANCE?

Japan in 2022 announced plans to double defense spending to 2% of GDP to ‌counter ⁠growing security threats ⁠from China, Russia and North Korea.

A major part of that expansion includes spending on long-range missiles such as the US-made Tomahawk, which can strike targets more than 1,000 km (621 miles) away. Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s government is expected this year to revise Japan’s national security strategy, a move some analysts will likely lead to further increases in defense spending, including on drones and arms production.

IS THIS REALLY ABOUT JAPAN?

Analysts say Japan is only part of the story.

Park Won-gon, a professor at Seoul's Ewha Womans University, said the primary goal is to frame Northeast Asia as a contest between rival camps.

"The biggest objective is to create a US-South Korea-Japan versus North Korea-China-Russia framework," Park said.

He said Pyongyang wants stronger backing ⁠from Beijing and Moscow to cement its escape from diplomatic isolation and to bolster arguments that its ‌nuclear arsenal is necessary.

South Korea's Unification Ministry expressed a similar view on Thursday after ‌North Korean First Vice Foreign Minister Jang Kum-chol criticized Seoul's plans to acquire nuclear-powered submarines and accused South Korea, the United States and Japan of ‌preparing a "second AUKUS" in Northeast Asia. The ministry said North Korea appears to view South Korea's submarine plans, Japan's evolving security posture ‌and trilateral military cooperation as threats to the regional balance of power, as it increasingly aligns itself with China and Russia. Kyungnam University professor of North Korean studies Lim Eul-chul said North Korea's messaging increasingly mirrors China's concerns about Japan's military expansion.

WHY IS NORTH KOREA STAYING SILENT ABOUT ITS MISSILE TESTS?

The heightened rhetoric has coincided with unusual silence on North Korea's recent missile launches, which were condemned by South Korea, Japan and the United States.

Despite conducting ‌ballistic missile tests last week and again this week, state media has yet to report either, departing from its usual pattern of publicizing tests within a day.

Analysts say the launches may ⁠have involved upgrades to existing missile ⁠systems rather than new weapons, reducing their propaganda value. Shin Jong-woo of the Korea Defense and Security Forum said the tests may have involved improved short-range ballistic missiles developed with Russian technical assistance and potentially destined for Russia.

Kim Yong-hyun, a professor at Dongguk University, said North Korea may be avoiding publicity if launches are connected to prospective military exports.

WHAT DOES RUSSIA HAVE TO DO WITH IT?

North Korea's growing military cooperation with Russia has become a central factor in assessments of its weapons programs. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy has repeatedly said Russia continues to use North Korean missiles against Ukraine and has accused Pyongyang of providing Moscow with missiles, ammunition and a further promise of troops for the war effort.

Analysts say battlefield feedback and Russian assistance may have helped North Korea improve the accuracy and performance of some missile systems.

Shin said recent launches could have been tests of upgraded variants before deployment or export.

WHAT IS NORTH KOREA TRYING TO ACHIEVE?

Analysts say North Korea is seeking to cast the region in terms of competing blocs, with Pyongyang, Beijing and Moscow on one side and Washington, Seoul and Tokyo on the other.

Portraying US-South Korea-Japan cooperation as an increasingly threatening military and nuclear alliance helps Pyongyang justify its weapons programs, bolster Chinese and Russian backing and argue that its nuclear arsenal is a necessary response to a worsening security environment, they say.


Mazen Al-Sudairi Brings Financial Expertise as Saudi Market Expands Globally

Mazen bin Turki Al-Sudairi (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Mazen bin Turki Al-Sudairi (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Mazen Al-Sudairi Brings Financial Expertise as Saudi Market Expands Globally

Mazen bin Turki Al-Sudairi (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Mazen bin Turki Al-Sudairi (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Mazen bin Turki Al-Sudairi will lead the board of Saudi Arabia’s Capital Market Authority after a royal order appointed him chairman with the rank of minister, as the kingdom’s capital market rapidly expands, deepens its offerings, strengthens ties with global markets and seeks to attract more foreign investment.

Al-Sudairi brings a career rooted in financial markets and investment before moving into government and policymaking, combining technical expertise in market analysis with institutional experience inside government.

His appointment comes as Saudi Arabia’s capital market enters a new phase of growth focused on greater depth and openness, a broader investor base and a stronger presence in global markets, alongside the economic and investment transformation under Saudi Vision 2030.

The royal order appointed Al-Sudairi chairman of the Capital Market Authority’s board with the rank of minister, succeeding Mohammed El-Kuwaiz. He takes charge of the market regulator as the financial sector assumes an increasingly important role in financing economic growth and attracting domestic and international capital.

Since 2024, Al-Sudairi has served as an adviser at the General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers at an excellent grade, adding a government dimension to his background in finance and investment. The role broadened his experience from analyzing markets and investments to working in an environment closely connected to policymaking and decision-making.

He holds a master’s degree in finance from HEC Paris in France and a bachelor’s degree in industrial engineering from King Saud University, an academic background combining financial knowledge with the analytical and quantitative training associated with engineering.

Al-Sudairi has extensive experience in financial services and capital markets. He served as head of research at Al Rajhi Capital, where he monitored company and sector performance and analyzed economic and financial developments and their impact on investor decisions.

He also headed sell-side research at Al-Istithmar Capital, adding experience in managing investment research and responding to market developments and investor needs during a period of rapid regulatory and investment change in the Saudi market.

Earlier, Al-Sudairi worked as an analyst covering the energy and petrochemicals sectors at Samba Capital, two of the most influential sectors in the Saudi economy and capital market. The role gave him direct experience analyzing companies and industries exposed to energy markets, global developments, commodity prices and economic cycles.

His career also took him outside Saudi Arabia, where he worked in equity research at Bank Degroof in Belgium. The experience added an international dimension to his background and gave him practical exposure to market and company analysis in a European financial environment.

Al-Sudairi is a recognized name in financial research and market analysis, having built experience across Saudi and international financial and investment institutions. His roles have been closely tied to assessing markets, analyzing companies and sectors, and evaluating investment opportunities.

His career spans financial and economic analysis, investment research and government work. After years of leading research functions at Saudi financial institutions and analyzing equities and sectors, his move into government added experience in institutional work and policymaking.

Al-Sudairi takes the helm of the Capital Market Authority’s board as the market becomes increasingly important as a channel for financing companies and projects, supporting private-sector growth, expanding savings and investment options, and connecting the Saudi economy more closely with global capital flows.


From War Amnesty to Prison Amnesty... What Has Changed in Lebanon in 35 Years?

A general view of parliament building in Beirut, Lebanon, March 24, 2026. (Reuters)
A general view of parliament building in Beirut, Lebanon, March 24, 2026. (Reuters)
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From War Amnesty to Prison Amnesty... What Has Changed in Lebanon in 35 Years?

A general view of parliament building in Beirut, Lebanon, March 24, 2026. (Reuters)
A general view of parliament building in Beirut, Lebanon, March 24, 2026. (Reuters)

The Lebanese parliament's landmark approval of an amnesty law on Wednesday, 35 years after the 1991 amnesty, has revived debate on the different circumstances that prompted Lebanon to resort to amnesty twice.

While the first was enacted to turn the page on the 1975-90 civil war and kick off a new political chapter in the country, the 2026 law came to address the conditions of detainees and convicts, prolonged detentions, and the prison crisis, amid political considerations that led to parliament to ratify it.

‘Public oblivion’

Former Minister of Social Affairs Rashid Derbas brought the discussion back to the philosophy of amnesty itself, telling Asharq Al-Awsat that "the general amnesty issued in 1991 came following the civil war, in hopes of closing a chapter and entering a new era."

He explained that "the philosophy of general amnesty is fundamentally based on establishing public oblivion, meaning closing a page of the past and opening a new one."

Commenting on the current amnesty law, Derbas wondered: "Is it reasonable for a person to remain all this long time without a trial? Is it reasonable for certain accusations and cases to drag on to this extent? It was necessary to address this issue,” but unfortunately, it fell victim to political wrangling for years.

Former Justice Minister Ibrahim Najjar drew a legal and political distinction between the two experiences, telling Asharq Al-Awsat that "there is a very big difference between the law of August 26, 1991, and the law of August 12, 2026."

He explained that "from a political standpoint, the 1991 general amnesty law aimed to turn the page on the war and conclude all prosecutions associated with it. This is evidenced by the fact that it broadly covered crimes committed before March 28, 1991, specifically war-related crimes of a political nature, with some specific exceptions."

Najjar added that "the 1991 law therefore had a political, reconciliatory character, meaning it aimed to restore the smooth functioning of coexistence, which was its primary political goal."

As for the new legislation, he placed it in a different framework, stating that "the 2026 law has specific political dimensions in Lebanon and Syria, in addition to being related to prison conditions and the high number of detainees and convicts."

Najjar stressed that "the law issued on Wednesday is not a general amnesty for crimes committed before a specific date, because it targets specific categories and cases. It is closer to a socio-penal law concerned with addressing the conditions of detainees and convicts through an exceptional reduction of certain sentences."

He pointed out that "the 2026 law excluded many crimes and felonies, including the killing of military personnel, crimes referred to the Judicial Council, premeditated murder, money laundering, financial crimes, and drug felonies."

"This Lebanese law has clear Syrian dimensions, and it has also benefited some Lebanese who had sought refuge in Israel," he added.

Lebanese lawmakers attend a parliamentary session to discuss a proposed general amnesty law, the abolition of the death penalty and the salaries of retired members of Lebanon's security forces in Beirut, Lebanon, 11 August 2026. (EPA)

Political settlement

Former MP and Minister Butros Harb interpreted the current law from an angle that combines politics and humanitarian considerations.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Harb stated: "In part, the current amnesty is a political settlement more than a purely judicial move, even though it includes a humanitarian aspect that cannot be ignored."

At the same time, he stressed that addressing the conditions of prisoners should not lead to "overlooking the rights of the Lebanese Army and its victims, particularly in cases related to those who engaged in clashes with it."

He explained that "there is a humanitarian aspect that must be taken into account, because the Lebanese judiciary was influenced at certain stages and did not exercise its powers with the required speed, whether in terms of settling cases or issuing verdicts."

He noted that "there are individuals who spent long periods in prison that, in some cases, exceeded the sentence that could have been issued against them had they been tried within normal timeframes."

This "demands a humanitarian and legal solution to the problem," he remarked.

However, he noted that the amnesty file "has also unfortunately turned into a subject of sectarian debates, especially regarding the cases of Islamists who fought the army."

Harb criticized the double standards related to the army in the ongoing debate. "Some of those who today declare their concern for the army were, unfortunately, among the forces that helped inflict major losses on it, whether during the Lebanese civil war or in the clashes the country witnessed in later years."

The issue must not turn into fodder for political debates at the expense of the army or the rights of its victims, he urged.

‘Fundamentally different’

He said the 1991 and current amnesty are "fundamentally different."

He explained that the 1991 amnesty happened during "exceptional political circumstances that followed the Taif Agreement" and the end of the civil war.

"At that time, Lebanon was emerging from a long war, and it was necessary to turn the page on that chapter and enter a new era allowing the rebuilding of the state. Therefore, the amnesty was part of a broader national political settlement."

"Today, however, the problem is different even if it has a political aspect because it is primarily linked to a judicial and humanitarian failure that must be addressed," Harb stressed.

"The issue required a solution because it is unacceptable for individuals to remain in prison for years due to delayed trials or the failure to settle their cases," he said.