US Stance on Iran Protests Balances Threats, Caution

Crowds of Iranian protesters gather in Taleghani Square in Karaj, west of Tehran. (Telegram)
Crowds of Iranian protesters gather in Taleghani Square in Karaj, west of Tehran. (Telegram)
TT

US Stance on Iran Protests Balances Threats, Caution

Crowds of Iranian protesters gather in Taleghani Square in Karaj, west of Tehran. (Telegram)
Crowds of Iranian protesters gather in Taleghani Square in Karaj, west of Tehran. (Telegram)

It may still be premature to say Iran’s ruling system is nearing collapse. Yet the unrest that has gripped the country in recent weeks has pushed Tehran into its most severe internal crisis in years.

Protests triggered by economic freefall and the collapse of the national currency have rapidly spread across regions and social classes, shedding their purely economic character and evolving into a direct challenge to the foundations of the political system.

As strikes have expanded, particularly in the bazaar and the oil sector, popular anger has deepened into a political crisis with existential stakes.

At the heart of these developments, the United States factor stands out as one of the most sensitive and influential elements, not only because of the long history of conflict between Washington and Tehran, but also due to the unprecedented tone adopted by US President Donald Trump, and the political and media reaction within Congress, which has reflected a calibrated division over how to approach the Iranian crisis.

From the early days of the escalating protests, Trump opted to depart from traditional diplomatic language. In a series of interviews and statements, he said he was following events in Iran “very closely,” expressing his belief that the country was “on the verge of collapse.”

More significant than his assessment, however, were his public warnings to the Iranian leadership against continuing to suppress protesters.

Trump spoke bluntly of live fire against unarmed demonstrators, arrests, and executions, describing the situation as “brutal behavior,” and stressing that he had informed Tehran that any bloody escalation would be met with “very severe strikes” from the United States.

This language amounts to an attempt at political and psychological deterrence rather than a declaration of an imminent military plan.

It pressures Iran’s leadership and sends a message of moral support to protesters, while simultaneously preserving ambiguity over the nature of any potential US action.

Vice President JD Vance expressed a similar stance, writing on X that Washington supports anyone exercising their right to peaceful protest, noting that Iran’s system suffers from deep problems.

He reiterated Trump’s call for “real negotiations” over the nuclear program, while leaving future steps to the president’s judgment.

Despite Trump’s clear support for the protests, his administration has so far avoided going further on the question of “the day after.”

This hesitation has been evident in its position on Reza Pahlavi, the son of Iran’s late shah, whose name has resurfaced as a figure of the exiled opposition.

While Trump described him as “a nice person,” he stopped short of holding an official meeting, saying it was still too early to determine who could genuinely represent the will of the Iranian people.

This caution reflects US awareness of the sensitivity of the Iranian scene, in light of past experiences in the region, from Iraq to Libya, where early bets on political alternatives led to disastrous outcomes.

Any overt US backing of a specific opposition figure could also give the Iranian authorities grounds to reinforce their narrative of a “foreign conspiracy,” a line already invoked by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and state media.

Alongside political rhetoric, the economic card occupies a central place in US calculations.

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has described Iran’s economy as on the edge of collapse, pointing to high inflation and a sharp erosion in living standards due to sanctions and mismanagement.

These remarks were not merely technical assessments, but a political message that Washington sees the economic crisis as a pressure point that could accelerate the erosion of the system’s ability to endure.

The economy is not only the spark that ignited the protests, but also one of the keys to their future. Continued strikes, particularly in the oil sector, threaten the main artery of state revenues, compounding pressure and narrowing room for maneuver.

In this context, Washington appears convinced that time is working against Tehran and that allowing the crisis to play out internally may be more effective than any direct intervention.

Another factor closely watched by US decision-makers is the international stance, notably the silence of Russia and China.

These two countries, which have provided Iran with political and economic cover in recent years, appear unwilling or unable to intervene to rescue the system from its internal crisis.

Their silence gives Washington a wider scope to escalate its rhetoric without fear of a major international confrontation.

At the same time, the US administration is keen to avoid appearing as the driver of regime change in Iran. Its declared support remains confined to an ethical and humanitarian framework, protecting protesters and preventing massacres, rather than shaping an alternative system.

This approach seeks to strike a balance between exploiting an adversary’s weakness and avoiding a slide into chaos.

The US response has not been limited to the White House, extending into Congress, where positions have reflected a disciplined division of opinion. The House Foreign Affairs Committee attacked the Iranian system in a post on X, describing it as a dictator that has stood for decades on the bodies of Iranians demanding change.

Within the Republican camp, alignment behind Trump has been clear.

Senator Lindsey Graham wrote that the president was “absolutely right,” that he “stands with the Iranian people against tyranny,” and called to “make Iran great again.”

Senator Ted Cruz said the protests had exposed the system’s “fatally weakened” status and that Iranians were “not chanting for cosmetic reforms, but for an end to clerical rule.”

Democrats, by contrast, expressed solidarity with protesters in a more cautious tone.

Senator Chris Murphy said Iranians deserve their future in their own hands, not through American bombs, warning that military intervention could undermine the movement.

Bernie Sanders said the United States should stand with human rights, not repeat the mistakes of forcibly changing regimes.

In the House, Representative Yassamin Ansari sparked further debate by voicing support for the Iranian people while warning against empowering the Mujahideen-e-Khalq, which she described as “an extremist group lacking legitimacy.”

Republican lawmakers such as Claudia Tenney and Mario Diaz-Balart adopted a harsher tone, calling for clear support for Iranians, “who are bravely demanding freedom, dignity, and basic human rights.”

This divergence reflects a complex US picture. Republicans see the Iranian moment as an opportunity to validate Trump’s pressure and deterrence strategy, while Democrats fear that verbal support could slide into ill-considered entanglement.

Yet both sides converge on a core point: holding Iran’s system responsible for violence and economic collapse and viewing current events as an unprecedented challenge to its legitimacy.

This relative alignment grants Trump room to maneuver domestically without imposing consensus on intervention.

Washington, as reflected in White House rhetoric and congressional debate, prefers at this stage to watch the fractures within Iran deepen, while keeping all options on the table and awaiting what happens on the streets.



A Look at the UK’s Royal Navy, Which Has Faced Jibe After Jibe from Trump and Hegseth

Indonesian soldiers stand guard as Royal Navy offshore patrol vessel HMS Spey is docked at Tanjung Priok Port during a port visit in Jakarta, Indonesia, Wednesday, Jan. 15, 2025. (AP Photo/Tatan Syuflana, File)
Indonesian soldiers stand guard as Royal Navy offshore patrol vessel HMS Spey is docked at Tanjung Priok Port during a port visit in Jakarta, Indonesia, Wednesday, Jan. 15, 2025. (AP Photo/Tatan Syuflana, File)
TT

A Look at the UK’s Royal Navy, Which Has Faced Jibe After Jibe from Trump and Hegseth

Indonesian soldiers stand guard as Royal Navy offshore patrol vessel HMS Spey is docked at Tanjung Priok Port during a port visit in Jakarta, Indonesia, Wednesday, Jan. 15, 2025. (AP Photo/Tatan Syuflana, File)
Indonesian soldiers stand guard as Royal Navy offshore patrol vessel HMS Spey is docked at Tanjung Priok Port during a port visit in Jakarta, Indonesia, Wednesday, Jan. 15, 2025. (AP Photo/Tatan Syuflana, File)

US President Donald Trump and his Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth have been damning of the UK's naval capabilities. Their jibes may have stung in a country with a long and proud maritime history, but they do carry some substance.

The UK has been at the forefront of Trump’s ire since the onset of the Iran war on Feb. 28, when British Prime Minister Keir Starmer refused to grant the US military access to British bases.

Though that decision has been partly reversed with the decision to permit the US to use the bases, including that of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, for so-called defensive purposes, Trump is adamant he was let down. He has repeatedly lashed out at Starmer and branded the Royal Navy’s two aircraft carriers as “toys.”

“You don’t even have a navy,” he told Britain's Daily Telegraph in comments published Wednesday. "You’re too old and had aircraft carriers that didn’t work.”

Hegseth, meanwhile, said sarcastically that the “big, bad Royal Navy” should get involved in making the Strait of Hormuz safe for commercial shipping.

For numerous reasons, the Royal Navy is not as big and bad as it used to be when Britannia ruled the waves. But it's not as feeble as Trump and Hegseth imply and is largely similar with the French navy, which it is often compared with.

“On the negative side, there is a grain of truth, with the Royal Navy being smaller than it has been in hundreds of years,” said professor Kevin Rowlands, editor of the Royal United Services Institute Journal. “On the positive side, the Royal Navy would say that it’s entering its first period of growth since World War II, with more ships set to be built than in decades.”

Capabilities and preparedness

It’s not that long ago that Britain could muster a task force of 127 ships, including two aircraft carriers, to sail to the south Atlantic after Argentina’s invasion of the Falkland Islands. That 1982 campaign, which then-US President Ronald Reagan was lukewarm about, marked the final hurrah of Britain’s naval pedigree.

Nothing on that scale, or even remotely, could be accomplished now. Since World War II, Britain’s combat-ready fleet has declined substantially, much of it linked to changing military and technological advances and the end of empire. But not all.

The number of vessels in the Royal Navy fleet, including aircraft carriers, destroyers frigates and submarines has fallen from 166 in 1975 to 66 in 2025, according to The Associated Press' analysis of figures from the Ministry of Defense and the House of Commons Library.

Though the Royal Navy has two aircraft carriers at its command, there was a seven-year period in the 2010s when it had none. And the number of destroyers has halved to six while the frigate fleet has been slashed from 60 to just 11.

Diminished state

The Royal Navy faced criticism for the time it took to send the HMS Dragon destroyer to the Middle East after the war with Iran broke out. Though naval officials worked night and day to get it shipshape for a different mission than the one it was readying for, to many it symbolized the extent to which Britain’s military has been gutted since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989.

For much of the Cold War, Britain was spending between 4% and 8% of its annual national income on its military. After the Cold War, that proportion steadily dropped to a low of 1.9% of GDP in 2018, fuel to Trump's fire.

Like other countries, Britain, largely under the Labour governments of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, sought to use the so-called “peace dividend” following the collapse of the Soviet Union to divert money earmarked for defense to other priorities, such as health and education.

And the austerity measures imposed by the Conservative-led government in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2008-9 prevented any pickup in defense spending despite the clear signs of a resurgent Russia, especially after its annexation of Crimea and parts of eastern Ukraine.

No quick fix

In the wake of Russia's full-blown invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and with another Middle East war underway, there's a growing understanding across the political divide that the cuts have gone too far.

Following the Ukraine invasion, the Conservatives started to turn the military spending tide around. Since the Labour Party returned to power in 2024, Starmer is seeking to ramp up British defense spending, partly at the cost of cutting the country's long-vaunted aid spending.

Starmer has promised to raise UK defense spending to 2.5% of gross domestic product by 2027, and the updated goal is now for it to rise to 3.5% of GDP by 2035, as part of a NATO agreement pushed by Trump. That, in plain terms, will mean tens of billions pounds more being spent — a lot more kit for the armed forces.

The pressure is on for the government to speed that schedule up. But with the public finances further imperiled by the economic consequences of the Iran war, it's not clear where any additional money will come.

The jibes will likely keep coming even though the critiques are unfair and far from the truth, said RUSI's Rowlands, who was a captain in the Royal Navy.

“We are dealing with an administration that doesn’t do nuance,” he said.


Back to Israeli Occupation of South Lebanon?

Smoke rises from explosions during Israeli military operations in the Lebanese village of Taybeh on April 1, 2026. (AFP)
Smoke rises from explosions during Israeli military operations in the Lebanese village of Taybeh on April 1, 2026. (AFP)
TT

Back to Israeli Occupation of South Lebanon?

Smoke rises from explosions during Israeli military operations in the Lebanese village of Taybeh on April 1, 2026. (AFP)
Smoke rises from explosions during Israeli military operations in the Lebanese village of Taybeh on April 1, 2026. (AFP)

A month into Israel's war against Hezbollah, invading Israeli troops are gradually advancing in south Lebanon, raising fears for the area's fate following the last Israeli occupation that lasted nearly two decades.

Since war erupted last month, Israeli officials have said Israel intends to establish a "security zone" inside Lebanon.

More recently, Defense Minister Israel Katz said the military "will establish itself in a security zone inside Lebanon ... and will maintain security control over the entire area up to the Litani" river, around 30 kilometers (20 miles) from the border.

What is happening on the ground and how far could Israel go?

- What's happening in south Lebanon? -

The Israeli military previously issued unprecedented evacuation orders for swathes of the country's south, where Iran-backed Hezbollah holds sway.

An Israeli military source told AFP that four army divisions are currently deployed across the country's northern border.

A Western military source in south Lebanon said "the Israelis are advancing one axis at a time" and destroying border villages as they go.

The source told AFP on condition of anonymity that Israeli forces had taken the strategic town of Khiam, located along the eastern stretch of the shared border.

Hezbollah, which drew Lebanon into the Middle East war last month with rocket fire towards Israel, has been claiming repeated attacks on Israeli troops in south Lebanon, where Israel's military says 10 soldiers have been killed in combat.

The Iran-backed group is not halting Israeli troops' advance "but is seeking symbolic victories such as the destruction of Merkava tanks", the Western military source said.

David Wood, senior Lebanon analyst at the International Crisis Group, told AFP that as Israel pushes further inside Lebanon, "it is entering a style of warfare that might actually suit Hezbollah better, in this sort of guerrilla hit-and-run style of fighting".

Lebanon's army has announced troop "repositioning and redeployment" in parts of the south where Israel is advancing.

A Lebanese military source said Israeli soldiers have advanced up to 10 kilometers (six miles) in some places, and Lebanon's army, which has limited means, fears it will be targeted or encircled.

Israeli fire has killed one on-duty Lebanese soldier.

United Nations peacekeepers deployed in south Lebanon have been powerless to stop the fighting, with three of their troops also killed.

- What does Israel want? -

Katz has said Israel would control south Lebanon up to the Litani, and vowed that hundreds of thousands of south Lebanon residents will not return until northern Israel's security is guaranteed.

Lebanese Defense Minister Michel Menassa this week denounced "a clear intention to impose a new occupation of Lebanese territory".

UN aid chief Tom Fletcher has warned that south Lebanon could become another occupied territory in the Middle East.

But Eyal Zisser, a Lebanon expert at Tel Aviv University, cautioned against taking Katz's announcements at face value.

"He's good at making statements, but you always have to check first of all if it is in full agreement" with what Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu says, he told AFP's Jerusalem bureau.

Netanyahu has ordered troops to "further expand" a so-called security zone in south Lebanon "to definitively neutralize the threat of invasion (by Hezbollah) and to keep anti-tank missile fire away from the border".

Military analyst and retired Lebanese army general Khalil Helou told AFP that Hezbollah has "recruited people from southern towns" for decades, giving the group "local power" that Israel fears could be further exploited if southerners return.

- New occupation? -

Israel has previously tried to create a buffer zone in southern Lebanon.

Following a first invasion in 1978, Israeli troops returned four years later, entering Lebanon all the way to Beirut to drive out Palestinian fighters.

Hezbollah was born in response to the 1982 invasion.

Israel withdrew gradually but kept an area up to 20 kilometers deep inside Lebanese territory until 2000, when it pulled out under persistent pressure from Hezbollah.

Lebanese are increasingly concerned about a return to a similar scenario.

In its last war with Hezbollah and even after a November 2024 ceasefire, Israeli troops damaged or destroyed swathes of border villages and towns through strikes, controlled demolitions and the wrecking of agricultural areas.

Zisser said Israel maintaining control of the area south of the Litani was technically feasible.

"But you need to make a decision and you need to decide how to do it, (whether) to occupy the entire territory and establish yourself there" or not, he said.

Wood meanwhile cautioned that an occupation would create "new security threats" for Israel.

"If Israel denies people the right to return to their ancestral homes, then armed resistance groups will emerge or will continue to take up this struggle," he said.


Al-Tanf Crossing Opens Iraqi Energy Lifeline to Counter Hormuz Disruption

Iraqi fuel tankers heading to enter Syrian territory (Syrian General Authority for Land and Sea Ports)
Iraqi fuel tankers heading to enter Syrian territory (Syrian General Authority for Land and Sea Ports)
TT

Al-Tanf Crossing Opens Iraqi Energy Lifeline to Counter Hormuz Disruption

Iraqi fuel tankers heading to enter Syrian territory (Syrian General Authority for Land and Sea Ports)
Iraqi fuel tankers heading to enter Syrian territory (Syrian General Authority for Land and Sea Ports)

In a step reflecting a strategic shift in regional energy routes, Baghdad has officially begun exporting crude oil via Syria, in an effort to bypass the paralysis that has affected traditional maritime trade corridors. The move, which Damascus described as a return to its role as a “transit compass” and a vital platform for global energy, comes amid sweeping geopolitical shifts in the region that are imposing a new economic reality based on overland integration between the two countries.

The first convoys of Iraqi fuel tankers set off through the Al-Tanf–Al-Waleed border crossing, heading toward the Baniyas refinery on Syria’s Mediterranean coast, marking the effective launch of a new phase of economic cooperation. The Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA) reported that the cargo of 299 fuel tankers will later be loaded for export.

The Al-Tanf crossing had been closed since 2015, when ISIS took control of it. In 2016, US-backed forces established a military base in Al-Tanf. Syrian forces took control of the base last month, paving the way for the crossing to reopen.

"Transit Compass"

With the first convoys entering Syrian territory through the Al-Tanf–Al-Waleed crossing en route to Baniyas, Syrian Energy Minister Mohammed Al-Bashir wrote on X: “From the Syrian-Iraqi border to the maritime carriers in Baniyas... Syria is returning as a transit compass and a strategic export platform for global energy.” He said the step “enhances national interests and advances Arab economic integration toward broader horizons.”

The General Authority for Land and Sea Ports said the move represents “an important milestone in developing economic cooperation between the two countries by activating trade and energy routes, enhancing opportunities for economic integration, and supporting trade flows in the coming phase,” stressing its readiness to provide all necessary facilitation and ensure efficient procedures.

Mazen Alloush, director of public relations at the authority, announced Tuesday via Facebook the reopening of the Al-Tanf–Al-Waleed crossing, confirming the entry of the first Iraqi oil tanker convoys toward the Baniyas terminal.

In parallel, a delegation from the authority conducted a field tour to assess readiness at the Al-Yarubiyah–Rabia crossing ahead of plans to resume operations in early May, while also reviewing the status of the Semalka–Fishkhabour crossing as part of procedures to integrate it into the authority’s operational system. Passenger traffic has resumed at the Al-Bukamal–Al-Qaim crossing.

Alongside the reopening of Al-Waleed, Syrian government efforts are focused on activating Al-Yarubiyah–Rabia in early May and completing procedures at Semalka–Fishkhabour to strengthen the broader cross-border connectivity network.

For his part, the Iraqi subdistrict head of Al-Waleed, Mujahid Mardhi Al-Dulaimi, told the Iraqi News Agency (INA) that the crossing has entered a trial reopening phase with crude oil tankers beginning to move between Iraq and Syria. He said more than 150 tankers are currently waiting to enter Syrian territory, expecting daily traffic to reach at least 500 tankers.

Oil cooperation between Syria and Iraq has the backing of President Donald Trump’s administration. US Special Envoy to Syria Tom Barrack said last week at the Atlantic Council that Syria could be “the solution” to the energy crisis stemming from the situation in the Strait of Hormuz, highlighting the potential development of pipeline networks, including from Iraq.

Iraqi fuel tankers heading to enter Syrian territory (Syrian General Authority for Land and Sea Ports)

"Syria a Vital Option"

The move gains added significance amid escalating regional tensions and intensifying confrontation between the United States and Israel on one side and Iran on the other, which has resulted in direct threats to navigation in the Strait of Hormuz, through which about 20 percent of global energy supplies pass.

In this context, economic expert Dr. Fadi Ayash said Iraq, as a major oil producer, has found in Syria a vital and available option to sustain export flows, especially given the difficulty of secure maritime exports. He said the current direction aims to raise tanker traffic to between 500 and 700 per day at a minimum.

Amid drone attacks and shelling targeting the Syrian side of the border since the outbreak of the unprecedented regional war- including a drone strike last Saturday launched from Iraq on the Al-Tanf base in southeastern Syria, questions arise about the sustainability of keeping crossings open and continuing Iraqi oil exports through Syrian territory under these security conditions.

Ayash said: “There is no doubt that Iraq is among the Gulf countries most affected by the current war, given that it is a major oil producer and exporter heavily dependent on export revenues. It therefore had to look for alternatives to sustain exports, and Syria was a viable option. However, sustainability depends on balancing financial and oil needs- especially with continued disruption in the Strait of Hormuz- against on-the-ground security challenges in active conflict zones.”

Iraq is seeking to increase exports through Syria to between 600 and 700 trucks per day, making it a vital and mutually agreed option. According to Ayash, this represents “a practical application of spatial economics as a temporary solution to sustain exports, allowing time and resources to revive the pipeline linking Iraq and Syria to the Baniyas oil terminal on the Mediterranean. Pipeline exports are more efficient, less costly, and more secure, particularly as border areas are subject to intermittent security tensions and shelling, posing direct risks to trucks and crews.”

Iraq had reduced oil production by about 80 percent, to 800,000 barrels, due to shipping difficulties.

Operations Despite Risks

Despite the risks, initial convoys have begun moving, indicating an effort to proceed despite regional conditions. Ayash said continuation depends primarily on the ability of security forces in both countries to secure tanker routes, as well as the availability of financial, technical, and logistical resources needed to rehabilitate pipelines and pumping stations in both Iraq and Syria.

Economic Returns for Syria

According to current estimates and agreements under implementation, exporting Iraqi oil through Syrian territory is expected to generate direct and indirect financial and technical benefits for Syria. Transit fees alone could reach between $150 million and $200 million annually if operations run at high capacity.

The Syrian treasury would also benefit from port fees, storage and unloading charges, and road service revenues for trucks. Operating between 600 and 700 trucks daily would drive significant spending on fuel, maintenance, and road fees, stimulating economic activity along transit routes.

Ayash added that the arrangement could allow Syria to obtain shares of oil or derivatives at preferential prices or as part of transit compensation, easing its energy import bill. These revenues, he said, are vital under current conditions, contributing to economic recovery and foreign currency inflows, although final returns depend on export volumes and border security stability, which remains essential for sustaining exports through the Syrian route.