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In Gaza, Keeping the Internet on Can Cost Lives but Also Save Them

Displaced Palestinians make their way as they flee the eastern part of Khan Younis following an Israeli army evacuation order, amid the Israel-Hamas conflict, in Khan Younis in the southern Gaza Strip August 8, 2024. (Reuters)
Displaced Palestinians make their way as they flee the eastern part of Khan Younis following an Israeli army evacuation order, amid the Israel-Hamas conflict, in Khan Younis in the southern Gaza Strip August 8, 2024. (Reuters)
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In Gaza, Keeping the Internet on Can Cost Lives but Also Save Them

Displaced Palestinians make their way as they flee the eastern part of Khan Younis following an Israeli army evacuation order, amid the Israel-Hamas conflict, in Khan Younis in the southern Gaza Strip August 8, 2024. (Reuters)
Displaced Palestinians make their way as they flee the eastern part of Khan Younis following an Israeli army evacuation order, amid the Israel-Hamas conflict, in Khan Younis in the southern Gaza Strip August 8, 2024. (Reuters)

Forced to flee his home yet again as war raged across the Gaza Strip, Khalil Salim was desperate to get his family to safety but how could he be sure he wasn’t leading them deeper into danger?

He needed up-to-date information and so he went online and checked out the official social media accounts of the Israeli army and other online sources.

"We would take instructions from the internet. We couldn't assess the internal fighting ... so we would follow the news and channels and look at Facebook and see what people wrote," Salim said.

But when he could not get a signal or a connection, he was left in the dark, with no sure way of plotting a safe route.

"What was pitiful is that (the Israeli army) would put instructions on their Facebook and we wouldn't even have internet. It would be very difficult for us to find out that there were instructions to do this and not that. Sometimes we would spend two days, sometimes a week, without internet."

In the rubble of Gaza, it can be difficult and dangerous to get online but tech activists and Palestinian engineers are making sure the enclave does not go totally dark, securing a precious digital lifeline for thousands of people.

Preserving this connection comes at a price and the risks can be deadly for desperate users clambering to high ground to get a signal or engineers travelling to dangerous areas to repair damaged cables or telecoms towers.

In May, an Israeli strike hit a gathering of people outside a Gaza City shop that provides an internet signal for customers, killing at least three people and wounding more than 20, medics said.

Salim knows all too well what drove those people to that shop.

"Internet is life; without the internet, (life) has no meaning, it is like a prison," the IT engineer and pharmacist told the Thomson Reuters Foundation by phone from Al-Mawasi, an area on the western outskirts of Khan Younis where he now lives with his family after fleeing the border city of Rafah.

THE GIFT OF ACCESS

Israel launched its offensive on Gaza after fighters from the Hamas Islamist militant group attacked southern Israel on Oct. 7, killing 1,200 people and capturing 253 hostages, according to Israeli tallies.

Israel responded by assaulting the coastal enclave, vowing to annihilate the group. Almost 40,000 people have since been killed in Israeli strikes, according to Gaza’s health authorities, with thousands more bodies feared buried under the rubble.

Gaza's economy and infrastructure have been devastated by months of relentless bombing and conflict. Houses, roads, schools, and hospitals have been obliterated and around 70% of the infrastructure needed for communication and technology has been damaged or destroyed.

Tech entrepreneurs outside Gaza are using electronic SIMs, or eSIMs, to help strengthen Gaza's frayed digital lifeline.

An eSIM gives users the option of activating a mobile network's cellular data plan without actually having a physical SIM card. They can be activated using a QR code, allowing users to connect in roaming mode to a foreign network.

For example, Gaza Online, a volunteer group, provides free eSIMs to families to help them stay connected to each other. The group relies on in-kind donations of eSIM activation codes and matches them with families in Gaza through WhatsApp.

Early in the war, an eSIM allowed Salim to oversee the evacuation of his daughter, who was wounded in an Israeli bombing in October, to Egypt and then Tunisia. He was also able to advise doctors on her care.

Nadine Hassan, Gaza Online's chief operating officer who is based in Jordan, said her group’s work is becoming "more challenging every day" with funding a particular issue.

The group has been finding it increasingly difficult to buy eSIMs online as vendors keep closing down their accounts, saying they violated terms of service by buying in bulk.

Activating an eSIM requires a relatively new smartphone model and updated software, Hassan said, a tall order for people in Gaza who are preoccupied with securing access to food and clean water.

Another hurdle, and something of a mystery, is the fact that most of the eSIMs only seem to work at night.

"We have no idea why and we can't find an explanation for it," she said.

ENGINEERS RISK LIVES

Even before the war, telecoms services in Gaza were fragile; a World Bank report from earlier this year said the enclave was the only place in the world that still relied on "obsolete" 2G technology and had no mobile broadband coverage.

By February, the enclave's largest telecoms provider, Paltel, had reported more than 10 total collapses in service provision since Oct. 7. Even when its network has been partly working, it has struggled to maintain service in many areas because of the fighting.

Despite the ongoing battles between Israeli forces and Hamas militants, telecoms engineers have been working to restore services, with reports of several being killed while trying to fix damaged infrastructure.

Speaking to the Thomson Reuters Foundation in March, Hani Alami, who heads East Jerusalem-based internet service provider Coolnet, said one of his teams working in the center of Gaza was hit in February during a suspected Israeli attack, with two engineers killed and one injured.

Alami said he had coordinated his team's movements with the Israeli army before they headed out.

"They gave us the green light to move from the first point and while the vehicle was moving on its track, they bombed the vehicle," he said.

Asked about the alleged incident, the Israeli army said in a statement to the Thomson Reuters Foundation that it "follows international law and takes feasible precautions to mitigate civilian harm."

Some activists have called on Israel to observe a digital ceasefire as the war drags on.

In an article for the Thomson Reuters Foundation, Brett Solomon, former executive director of Internet advocacy watchdog Access Now, said "digital ceasefires must be annexed to traditional ceasefire agreements, encompassing everything from connectivity to censorship."

For now, as he tries to rebuild his life in a half-built house close to the sea, Salim feels more isolated than ever. He can no longer use his eSIM as he is too far from Israeli telecoms towers, he said.

Instead, he must make do with local providers who charge exorbitant fees to go online. It can also take up to a month to get the necessary approvals to get an Internet connection.

That's just too long for people who might have to flee the bombs and bullets again as the conflict waxes and wanes.

Salim would like to get his IT business up and running again so that he can provide for his family. But with no internet, there can be no work.

"If they see you cannot even do a meeting, they become convinced that you cannot do the job."

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ISIS in Syria Eyes Revival by Exploiting Jihadist Disillusionment

ISIS members in Syria (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights)
ISIS members in Syria (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights)
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ISIS in Syria Eyes Revival by Exploiting Jihadist Disillusionment

ISIS members in Syria (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights)
ISIS members in Syria (Syrian Observatory for Human Rights)

Despite losing its last stronghold in Baghouz near the Iraqi border in Syria’s Deir al-Zor province in March 2019, the ISIS group has continued to pose a serious threat to Syria’s security and stability through its mobile sleeper cells operating across the vast Syrian desert.

With the collapse of the Syrian regime in December 2024, the group is widely expected to recalibrate its strategies and adapt to the shifting security landscape.

Neither the military campaigns waged by the former government with Russian air support nor the operations carried out by the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have succeeded in fully dismantling the group or eliminating its threat. US policy, which focused on preventing the group’s resurgence in urban areas, achieved limited success—weakening ISIS militarily and eliminating many of its top and mid-tier leaders.

However, the group continues to pose a residual threat and may exploit Syria’s fragile security environment, particularly with a US withdrawal on the horizon.

ISIS issued a rare video statement on April 20, 2025, threatening Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa and warning him against joining the US-led international coalition against terrorism.

The video, one of the group’s most prominent public threats in recent months, came after Washington formally requested that the newly formed Syrian government take part in efforts to combat ISIS and its affiliates.

Since the collapse of the Assad regime on December 8, 2024, ISIS has intensified its propaganda against Syria’s new leadership, with a noticeable uptick in incitement campaigns published in its weekly newsletter Al-Naba, monitored by Asharq Al-Awsat.

The militant group has launched scathing attacks on al-Sharaa and his administration, accusing the new government of betraying Syria by seeking stronger ties with Arab states and the international community.

ISIS has branded these diplomatic overtures a “betrayal of Syrian sacrifices” and a departure from the principle of “Sharia governance,” a slogan once championed by al-Sharaa himself during his leadership of the former al-Qaeda affiliate, Jabhat al-Nusra.

Blow after blow

Despite the escalating rhetoric, ISIS’s military activity on the ground—particularly in the Syrian desert—has dwindled significantly in recent months, raising questions about the group’s evolving strategy.

Since December, ISIS has suffered a string of security setbacks. Just three days after the regime's fall, Syria’s new government announced the foiling of a planned attack on the Sayyida Zainab shrine near Damascus and the arrest of an ISIS cell.

On December 16, US Central Command carried out airstrikes that killed 12 ISIS fighters. Three days later, another senior ISIS leader was eliminated in Deir al-Zor, reportedly in coordination with the new authorities.

A US strike on December 23 targeted an ISIS weapons truck, while in January 2025, a joint operation with the SDF led to the capture of a key attack cell leader. On February 16, Syrian security forces arrested Abu al-Harith al-Iraqi, suspected of planning attacks inside Damascus.

Observers believe the group’s recent silence may reflect a shift in strategy—minimizing its public footprint to reduce security pressure while regrouping quietly in rural towns and urban fringes, away from government surveillance.

Tactical shift

Over the years, ISIS has refined its guerrilla tactics, relying on swift, nighttime raids carried out by small mobile units of three to five fighters who quickly retreat to avoid detection. This hit-and-run approach has allowed the group to maintain an operational presence without the need for fixed command centers—frustrating counterterrorism efforts for more than a decade.

Now, analysts say, the group appears to be focusing on stealth and survival rather than visibility, potentially laying the groundwork for a long-term resurgence amid Syria’s fragile and shifting security environment.

In areas controlled by the US-backed SDF, ISIS has adopted a different operational model—one that capitalizes on tribal tensions and local grievances.

Tribal sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that several recent attacks targeting SDF forces were carried out by local tribesmen who are not formally affiliated with ISIS, but whose actions align with the group’s tactics of stealth and evasion.

These loosely coordinated assaults have made it more difficult to identify the true perpetrators, giving isolated acts of violence a veneer of organized insurgency. Analysts say this dynamic has created fertile ground for ISIS to expand its presence, using tribal discontent with the SDF as a cover to rebuild its influence.

Idlib’s experience and a comprehensive strategy

A senior Syrian security official, speaking on condition of anonymity, told Asharq Al-Awsat that past experience dismantling ISIS cells in Idlib has bolstered the new government's confidence in confronting the group.

“We know ISIS well—we’ve dealt with them in Idlib and succeeded in dismantling their networks, even at times when the group was stronger financially and militarily, and we were far weaker than we are today,” the official said. “Now, we are more prepared and more experienced.”

The Syrian security official also said the country’s new government is implementing a “comprehensive security strategy” aimed at preventing a resurgence of ISIS, which continues to pose a threat despite its territorial defeat.

The strategy includes rebuilding and coordinating intelligence agencies to detect sleeper cells, strengthening border control in cooperation with neighboring countries, countering extremist propaganda through public awareness campaigns and online monitoring, and dismantling supportive environments by improving basic services, fighting corruption, and expanding local development programs, the official told Asharq Al-Awsat.

The official warned that ISIS may increasingly resort to targeted attacks on prominent civilian or security figures using small explosive devices or selective assassinations.

“Inside cities, the group could activate sleeper cells to carry out such attacks and may use unregulated or informal neighborhoods as temporary hideouts,” they said, adding that such tactics present added challenges for security forces.

Targeting the new administration

Orabi Orabi, a researcher at the Dimensions Center for Strategic Studies, said ISIS is currently in a phase of “exhaustion and attrition,” seeking to establish small cells capable of disrupting security without aiming to hold territory as it did in the past.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Orabi noted that the group is facing severe shortages in manpower and funding, as well as growing regional pressure due to improved security cooperation between Syria and Iraq.

“Still,” he added, “ISIS may attempt to exploit frustration among fighters from other armed factions—especially those with jihadist backgrounds—who feel alienated by the Syrian government’s rhetoric, which has shifted away from Islamist narratives.”

Additionally, ISIS is stepping up its propaganda campaign against Syria’s transitional government, accusing it of betraying the blood of Syrians and capitalizing on lingering grievances such as delays in transitional justice, political exclusion, and perceived marginalization.

“The group is relying increasingly on inciteful rhetoric to undermine the credibility of the new administration,” Orabi told Asharq Al-Awsat, noting that ISIS disseminates its messaging through Telegram channels and covert media networks.

Social media campaigns—circulated by anonymous accounts and sympathetic groups—have also taken aim at al-Sharaa on a personal level. These include attacks on his public image, attire, and the polished persona he seeks to project as the face of Syria’s new era. Particular focus has been placed on his recent appearance with his wife during a diplomatic visit to Antalya.

Fragile transition amid internal and regional tensions

The interim government faces steep challenges in stabilizing the country both economically and in terms of security. Syria remains fractured, with tensions rising in the northeast with Kurdish-led SDF forces, lingering influence from remnants of the former regime in coastal areas, and a strained relationship with parts of the Druze community.

At the same time, the government is seeking to build international and Arab legitimacy. The United States has yet to formally recognize the new leadership, and most international sanctions remain in place. President al-Sharaa’s invitation to the upcoming Arab League summit in Baghdad reportedly came only after prolonged diplomatic negotiations.

In this environment, analysts warn that ISIS is poised to exploit the prevailing instability and security vacuum—particularly in remote desert regions where the government lacks the manpower to maintain control.

Persistent sectarian violence and unresolved local rivalries continue to offer fertile ground for extremist recruitment. Delays in transitional justice—especially in holding accountable those responsible for atrocities under the Assad regime—have further deepened public frustration.

ISIS, in turn, is attempting to present itself as an alternative force for retribution. In recent weeks, the group’s affiliated websites and propaganda outlets have increasingly framed its mission as one of justice for the victims of past abuses—seeking to fill the void left by the state’s slow-moving reforms.

Concerns are mounting that ISIS could attempt to rebuild its ranks not only through recruitment, but also by orchestrating the release of thousands of its imprisoned fighters and leaders—many of whom remain in detention under the Kurdish-led SDF, amid ongoing disputes over their fate.

This threat underscores one of the most pressing and complex challenges facing Syria’s new transitional government: the need to confront ISIS while managing competing demands of state-building, national unity, and economic recovery.

Analysts say the government must strike a delicate balance between asserting control over all Syrian territory, easing societal divisions, and weakening the ideological influence that allows ISIS to survive. That includes cutting off its financial lifelines, curbing recruitment, and deradicalizing communities that once served as the group’s support base—an effort that mirrors the transformation seen in groups like Hayat Tahrir al-Sham.

Experts warn this cannot be achieved in isolation. It requires close coordination with regional and international partners to enhance intelligence sharing, freeze the group’s assets, and support stabilization efforts across the country. Without that, the resurgence of ISIS could become a defining test of Syria’s fragile transition.