Bin Laden Met Saddam’s Envoy, Linking 9/11 to Iraq Invasion

Saddam Hussein convenes with members of his regime in Iraq. (Getty Images)
Saddam Hussein convenes with members of his regime in Iraq. (Getty Images)
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Bin Laden Met Saddam’s Envoy, Linking 9/11 to Iraq Invasion

Saddam Hussein convenes with members of his regime in Iraq. (Getty Images)
Saddam Hussein convenes with members of his regime in Iraq. (Getty Images)

What’s the most dangerous mission someone could take on? A meeting between Saddam Hussein’s envoy and Osama bin Laden in Sudan. US intelligence under President George W. Bush soon found out about it.

This meeting became a key justification used by Washington to invade Iraq, taking advantage of the post-9/11 atmosphere in the US after al-Qaeda, led by bin Laden, attacked New York and Washington on September 11, 2001.

In truth, there was no reason for bin Laden to influence Saddam Hussein’s future. The two men came from very different worlds. Saddam was the president of a major country in the region, not a faction leader.

He belonged to a secular party, choosing a Christian, Tariq Aziz, as foreign minister—a rare decision in the Middle East. Saddam also wasn’t known for playing along in decisions where he wasn’t in control.

But the decision to meet in Khartoum still cost Saddam, even though the meeting was a failure. A former Iraqi intelligence officer said US forces later seized a document showing that the Iraqi envoy advised against working with bin Laden, advice that was followed.

The 1990s in Sudan were extremely risky. During this time, President Omar al-Bashir’s regime made three major blunders: hosting al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, sheltering international fugitive Carlos the Jackal, and involving Ali Osman Taha, the regime’s second-in-command, in an assassination attempt on Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa.

A rare photo shows Omar al-Bashir and Osama bin Laden in Sudan.

Bin Laden didn’t dwell much on the events in Khartoum in August 1994, when French commandos arrested Carlos and took him to France, where he still sits in prison.

Moreover, the al-Qaeda leader couldn’t foresee Sudan’s regime forcing him out of the country.

The regime, however, had no option but to reduce the risks. Bashir dismissed top security officials and decided to expel the “Arab Afghans.”

One day, Bashir and his deputy informed Hassan al-Turabi that bin Laden’s departure had been arranged. They then visited bin Laden, and a military plane flew him to Afghanistan.

The Taliban then gave bin Laden a safe haven, though Mullah Omar never imagined this would lead to his regime's downfall. In the late 1990s, questions about bin Laden were common when speaking with Sudanese officials.

In an interview, Bashir said that bin Laden came to Sudan after the Afghan war to invest in roads, airports, and agriculture—industries his family had been involved in for a long time.

According to Bashir’s statements, bin Laden didn’t have followers or networks in Sudan, just a small group of close aides who stayed out of the public eye.

But the US had made him a global threat, seeing him everywhere, even after he left Sudan, despite knowing he lived in isolation in a distant country.

While Bashir downplayed it, he had met bin Laden several times during his stay in Khartoum, and it's unlikely he was unaware of the ties between bin Laden and Sudanese security officials.

Sudanese politician Hassan al-Turabi reaffirmed Bashir’s claims of bin Laden having been building roads and airports.

“He wasn’t involved in public or intellectual circles and stayed out of the media. We talked about Afghanistan, and I shared our concerns that after the Soviets left, the fighters would be skilled in destruction but not in building a stable society, much like the French Revolution,” said al-Turabi at the time.

“I told him (bin Laden) Kabul fell before they were ready to establish a Muslim society as they envisioned,” added al-Turabi.

When asked who pushed for Osama bin Laden’s exit from Sudan, he said: “It was the British, acting on behalf of the Americans.”

“Saudi Arabia didn’t apply direct pressure—they’re always polite. Bin Laden felt his presence was straining relations between Sudan and Saudi Arabia, which have very close ties. With about half a million Sudanese working in Saudi Arabia, none were expelled. Bin Laden didn’t want to harm that relationship,” he explained.

Bin Laden returned to Afghanistan, entering a dangerous new phase. Soon after, the Taliban took over and welcomed him. Within two years, bombings at US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania led Washington to blame bin Laden.

Osama bin Laden’s home in Sudan. (Asharq Al-Awsat file)

The accusation was repeated after the attack on the USS Cole in Aden. Bin Laden made statements suggesting he was at war with the US, but no one expected him to bring the fight to American soil on September 11, 2001.

When President Bush justified the Iraq invasion, he listed allegations against Saddam, including weapons of mass destruction, repression, and mass graves.

The most controversial claim was that Saddam’s regime was cooperating with al-Qaeda. However, the US administration did not provide evidence for this claim, and no concrete proof of a connection between Saddam and al-Qaeda was presented.

Curiosity about the contact between Saddam and bin Laden had journalists setting out to find more information.

While answers couldn’t be obtained from Saddam’s opponents or his former colleagues, insights from Iraqi intelligence were available.

Salim al-Jumaili, head of the American Affairs Division in Iraqi intelligence, who was involved in the initial outreach to bin Laden, agreed to talk.

Before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Iraq and Saudi Arabia had a good relationship, marked by a security agreement that limited interference and intelligence activities.

Saddam praised Saudi Arabia and King Fahd for their support during the Iran-Iraq War. According to a former Iraqi official, King Fahd tried hard to resolve the situation and return to negotiations after the invasion, but Saddam had gone too far.

The invasion led to the collapse of the security agreement. As news spread about Iraqi opposition groups contacting Saudi Arabia, Iraqi intelligence suggested canceling the agreement, but Saddam refused.

When reports about these contacts continued, Saddam demanded monthly updates.

Eventually, he believed Saudi Arabia was backing efforts to overthrow him and ordered intelligence to “act strongly to undermine the American military presence in Saudi Arabia.”

“When the president issues such an order, all security agencies must try to fulfill it. At that time, I managed the Syria division and had connections with the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, specifically Adnan Okla’s group,” said al-Jumaili.

“Adnan’s brother, Abdul Malik, told us that the Brotherhood had links with bin Laden and could deliver our message. I met Abdul Malik in Baghdad, and he agreed to help. I gave him a message saying we shared a goal of removing US forces from the region and were open to cooperation. We provided about $10,000 for travel expenses,” he revealed.

“The contact returned after a month or so and reported that bin Laden’s stance was very rigid. Bin Laden said the Iraqi regime was infidel and responsible for the presence of US forces in the region, and he was not interested in meeting or cooperating with us. This was in the early 1990s, before al-Qaeda’s actions escalated to the level of September 11.”

“I also heard from Farouk Hijazi, head of external operations, that bin Laden gave a similar response through another channel,” added al-Jumaili.

Al-Jumaili later discovered that Farouk Hijazi had visited Khartoum and met with bin Laden, arranged by al-Turabi.

“Hijazi informed the president that no cooperation with al-Qaeda took place. This is what Bush referred to when he mentioned the president sending an envoy to bin Laden. Bush likely knew there was no real cooperation but didn't mention it to justify the invasion,” al-Jumaili said.

Hassan al-Turabi. (AFP)

Another source, who requested anonymity, said bin Laden showed some flexibility regarding the Iraqi regime during his meeting with Hijazi.

Bin Laden “requested that if there were to be any cooperation, his camps be set up outside Iraqi control and that he have freedom in choosing targets and timing.”

Saddam, after learning of this, was told by Hijazi that cooperating with bin Laden would be complex and risky. Saddam then decided to end the matter entirely.

The consequences of that risky meeting are clear.

Saddam was executed, and Hijazi, who had fled to Syria, was captured at the Syrian-Iraqi border and also executed. Years later, US forces tracked down and killed bin Laden in Pakistan.

Cities sometimes take dangerous risks beyond their means and end up facing harsh realities.

Khartoum paid the price for harboring wanted figures and was punished before it could address the damage.

Some believe that under Bashir, Khartoum aimed to become a center of anti-Western activity, while al-Turabi wanted it to be a hub for political Islam, like Khomeini’s Iran. Both men pushed Sudan beyond its limits.



What to Know About the US-Iran Peace Deal

A US Air Force F-16 fighter jet patrols the skies above the Middle East as American forces maintain regional presence and vigilance (CENTCOM)
A US Air Force F-16 fighter jet patrols the skies above the Middle East as American forces maintain regional presence and vigilance (CENTCOM)
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What to Know About the US-Iran Peace Deal

A US Air Force F-16 fighter jet patrols the skies above the Middle East as American forces maintain regional presence and vigilance (CENTCOM)
A US Air Force F-16 fighter jet patrols the skies above the Middle East as American forces maintain regional presence and vigilance (CENTCOM)

Washington: The New York Times

The United States and Iran said they were close to reaching a deal toward ending the war that has upended the Middle East for more than three months and disrupted the global economy.

Iran’s foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, has said that an agreement had “never been closer.”

US officials signaled on Friday that a potential framework deal could be signed within days.

According to two Iranian officials and one regional official briefed on the terms of the agreement, Tehran and Washington have agreed to a preliminary deal that would end the fighting, reopen the crucial Strait of Hormuz and lift the US naval blockade on Iranian ports.

Both the US and Iran have sought to frame the emerging deal as a diplomatic victory.

Yet the agreement appears to push many of the thorniest issues to a 60-day negotiation period, including Iran’s nuclear program, about which major differences remain and both sides have so far held firm to longstanding red lines.

A deal would cap a week of diplomatic talks punctuated by airstrikes and Israel’s ongoing campaign in southern Lebanon.

What’s in the deal?

The two Iranian officials and one regional official briefed on the terms of the agreement gave a broad outline of the agreement. The United States has not confirmed these details:
Iran would open the Strait of Hormuz for the passage of ships and the United States would lift the naval blockade on Iran’s ports in the Arabian Gulf.

Iran and the United States would start negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program. The negotiations would last a maximum of 60 days and the war would stop on all fronts, including Lebanon, for that period.

During the 60-day negotiation period, Iran and countries in the region would discuss the future management of the strait.

The two Iranian officials said the next phase of talks would include discussion of the lifting of American sanctions, including on Iran’s oil sales and international banking transactions, in exchange for concessions on the Iranian nuclear program.

Speaking on state television Friday, Araghchi said there would be a two-part agreement to end the war: The first would be the signing of a memorandum of understanding between Tehran and Washington, and the second would be for a lasting peace deal. “The nuclear issue has been left for the second round and a final agreement,” Araghchi said.

Araghchi added that the Strait of Hormuz would reopen as part of the initial agreement between the US and Iran, but the economically vital waterway would not return to its prewar status.

He told Iranian state television that all commercial ships would be guaranteed safe passage, but said Tehran would maintain its control of the passage and would eventually charge a “service fee” for vessels passing through, an arrangement the Trump administration had previously warned against.

Framework for Nuclear Talks

According to US officials and diplomats, there are four major points of negotiation on a nuclear agreement between the United States and Iran:

1. A lengthy suspension of uranium enrichment
The United States has demanded for months that Iran agree to conduct no uranium enrichment for at least 20 years. The Iranians have countered by offering a 10-year halt, but American officials believe Tehran would settle for 15 years.

2. Iran’s current stockpile of enriched uranium is diluted, or “downblended”
The United States would work with the International Atomic Energy Agency, the UN inspection body, to dilute or “downblend” Iran’s stockpile of enriched uranium, according to two US officials familiar with the negotiations. American officials envision an active role in handling the nuclear material. Iranian officials say the United States would serve only as an observer.

Secretary of State Marco Rubio has said repeatedly in recent weeks that any agreement would have to cover all 11 tons of enriched uranium in Iran’s possession, not just the half-ton of near-bomb-grade fuel.

The Iranians have not talked publicly about whether they are willing to give up their entire existing stockpile. But if it was downblended, rather than shipped outside the country, Iran’s leaders could say they still have possession of the fuel.

3. Iran dismantles its nuclear sites
The United States has demanded that Iran dismantle its three major nuclear sites at Natanz, Fordo and Isfahan. The United States struck all three nearly a year ago, severely damaging them.

Iran has discussed dismantling two facilities but insists on leaving one open, in part to demonstrate it has not surrendered what it views as a “right to enrich.” That could prove problematic: Critics of the Obama-era nuclear agreement with Iran focused on its failure to close down Fordo, a deep underground site, which the Iranians later revived to produce near-bomb-grade fuel.

4. Iran agrees to “snap” inspections
The United States wants international inspectors to be able to conduct “snap” inspections, anytime and anyplace inside Iran. It is not clear if the Iranian government will agree. Many of the nuclear sites are inside Revolutionary Guards military bases, where inspectors have frequently been barred at the gates.


Growing Egypt-Russia Partnership Raises Alarm in Israel

The Egyptian prime minister visits the construction site of the El Dabaa Nuclear Power Plant in July 2025. (Egyptian government)
The Egyptian prime minister visits the construction site of the El Dabaa Nuclear Power Plant in July 2025. (Egyptian government)
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Growing Egypt-Russia Partnership Raises Alarm in Israel

The Egyptian prime minister visits the construction site of the El Dabaa Nuclear Power Plant in July 2025. (Egyptian government)
The Egyptian prime minister visits the construction site of the El Dabaa Nuclear Power Plant in July 2025. (Egyptian government)

Egypt’s El Dabaa Nuclear Power Plant has yet to begin operations on the country’s Mediterranean coast, but Israeli media outlets supportive of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have intensified warnings that the project could pave the way for a major Russian nuclear presence in the Middle East.

Those concerns over Egypt’s capabilities, as well as its regional partnerships, which have grown since the outbreak of the Gaza war in 2023, are unlikely to subside, according to experts interviewed by Asharq Al-Awsat.

They said that the rhetoric is tied to Israeli domestic politics, electoral competition and efforts to create new security threats for Israeli voters, while also exerting pressure on Cairo and its partners at a time when Israel is seeking to capitalize on tensions between Washington and Moscow.

Although Egypt’s nuclear program dates back to a 1956 agreement with the Soviet Union, the country’s first nuclear power project effectively began on Nov. 19, 2015, when Egypt and Russia signed an agreement to build the El Dabaa Nuclear Power Plant in the Matrouh governorate on the Mediterranean coast. The project is valued at $30 billion, including a $25 billion Russian loan that Egypt is due to begin repaying in October 2029 over a 35-year period at an annual interest rate of 3%.

The plant, which is designed to generate 4,800 megawatts of electricity, will comprise four nuclear reactors. It is expected to operate for more than 60 years and is projected to supply about 10% of Egypt’s electricity needs once its first reactor comes online, currently expected between late 2027 and mid-2028.

Israeli website Natziv.net recently claimed that El Dabaa is more than an electricity-generation project, describing it as “a potential nuclear foothold for Moscow” in the Middle East. The outlet said Russia’s financing of 85% of the project’s cost - about $25 billion - along with its responsibility for fuel supplies and nuclear waste management for 60 years, could create a “long-term strategic dependence” on Moscow.

The website also warned about plans for a Russian industrial zone near the Suez Canal, describing it as a permanent presence at a key global trade hub and a sign of Cairo’s drift away from the West toward a Russia-China axis within the BRICS group, which Egypt joined in January 2024.

Despite the project’s civilian nature, the outlet claimed that the infrastructure and expertise acquired through El Dabaa could one day provide Egypt with a shorter path toward military nuclear options or fuel enrichment capabilities.

It suggested that any radioactive leak could affect Israel’s coastline and desalination facilities, while closer Egyptian-Russian ties could narrow Israel’s strategic room for maneuver and weaken traditional US influence in the region.

Similar arguments appeared in an analysis published last week by Israel’s Yedioth Ahronoth following Russian President Vladimir Putin’s announcement that the plant’s first reactor could begin operating in 2027.

It described the notion that El Dabaa is solely an energy project as a “grave misreading,” portraying it instead as a slow-moving strategic encirclement effort in which “Israel is not incidental to the picture, but the target.”

Raouf Saad, Egypt’s former ambassador to Russia and a former assistant foreign minister, said the reports should be read within their political context. He added that Netanyahu has sought to disrupt efforts toward regional peace and has repeatedly attempted to provoke Egypt since the Gaza war, without success.

Saad dismissed the Israeli allegations as “naive and transparent” aimed at warning the United States about Russia’s return to the region, saying they reflected the weakness of Netanyahu’s position rather than any genuine security threat.

Retired Major General Samir Farag, a military and strategic analyst, said such reports are part of recurring attempts to manufacture crises and are likely to intensify as Israel approaches elections.

“Netanyahu-aligned media outlets have long tried to convince the Israeli public that Egypt seeks to acquire nuclear capabilities and pursue militarization,” Farag said, describing the claims as an effort to exploit the issue politically and divert attention from Israel’s actions in the region.

While Egypt has not officially responded to the allegations, officials and analysts continued to stress that the peaceful use of nuclear energy is a legitimate right under international law.

They noted that Egypt is fully committed to the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and that the El Dabaa project, like the country’s Inshas Nuclear Center, is subject to comprehensive oversight by the International Atomic Energy Agency.


Trump Faces G7 After Year of Trade Wrath, Diplomatic Bluster

People stand outside the Palais Lumiere ahead of the G7 summit in Evian-les-Bains, France, June 12, 2026. (Reuters)
People stand outside the Palais Lumiere ahead of the G7 summit in Evian-les-Bains, France, June 12, 2026. (Reuters)
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Trump Faces G7 After Year of Trade Wrath, Diplomatic Bluster

People stand outside the Palais Lumiere ahead of the G7 summit in Evian-les-Bains, France, June 12, 2026. (Reuters)
People stand outside the Palais Lumiere ahead of the G7 summit in Evian-les-Bains, France, June 12, 2026. (Reuters)

Little is known about what President Donald Trump's intentions are for the G7 summit in Evian, France next week, except maybe the obvious: the American president will impose his schedule and his mood.

The latter may depend largely on the peace agreement discussions with Iran, which were gathering steam Friday.

"It is not possible to 'manage Trump' the way it has been possible during his first term," Liana Fix, associate fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations, told AFP ahead of the summit that will bring the US face-to-face with France, Germany, Canada, Italy, Japan and the United Kingdom.

All these countries' leaders have been on the receiving end of Trump's trade wrath or diplomatic intimidation -- with the exception of Japan's Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi, who he is very fond of.

Every other leader expected on the shores of Lake Geneva has been the target of attacks, criticism or mockery from the Republican billionaire.

- 'Expect the worst' -

Neither growing unpopularity that could cost Trump control of Congress in November, nor the Supreme Court's annulment of his across-the-board tariffs is likely to soften his bruising stance toward global partners.

European leaders in particular have learned, through the Greenland episode, trade conflicts, and the Iran war, "to hope for the best but to expect the worst," Fix said.

Moreover, the US has informed Europeans of their intentions to significantly reduce the number of planes and warships made available to NATO in Europe, the New York Times reported.

"I don't think you're going to see a weakened president," Jackson James, senior fellow at German Marshall Fund of the US, told AFP.

"I think he's going to go over there and do what he always does, which is just try to bully his way through these very, very complicated issues and try to get the American agenda, as he sees it, fulfilled."

Trump "says he doesn't like these multilateral meetings," but "cannot bear for an assembly of world leaders to meet and he not being there," Victor Cha, an expert for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, said during a press conference.

"So he shows it up at these things and he leaves early," Cha said, as he did during the last G7.

- Versailles -

Still, French president Emmanuel Macron hopes to persuade the impatient American president to stay for a dinner at Versailles on Wednesday evening, playing to the 79-year-old's fascination with monarchy and ornate trappings of luxury.

France has already tried to cater to the American president by changing the dates of the summit so it would not coincide with his 80th birthday and the celebratory mixed martial arts tournament Trump will host at the White House on Sunday.

Some experts also consider it a concession to Washington that South Africa, which was being considered for participation in the G7 summit, will not be participating.

Paris insists, however, that there was no pressure to withdraw the invitation to South Africa -- a nation Trump accuses, without evidence, of broad persecution of its white population.

Several analysts say at least one issue that France has put on the table for discussion may attract Trump's interest: trade relations with China.

- Ukraine -

The balance of power has also shifted somewhat when it comes to Ukraine, where the situation has not fundamentally changed since Trump began his second term.

In 2025 "Europeans just sort of agreed that they had to bend the knee to Trump because of Ukraine" and its need for US military support, but now "we're just in a different dynamic where Ukraine is not as dependent on the United States," said Max Bergmann, a CSIS Europe expert, said at a briefing.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, who probably knows better than anyone how quickly a meeting with Trump can spiral out of control, has been invited to a discussion session in Evian.