Bin Laden Met Saddam’s Envoy, Linking 9/11 to Iraq Invasion

Saddam Hussein convenes with members of his regime in Iraq. (Getty Images)
Saddam Hussein convenes with members of his regime in Iraq. (Getty Images)
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Bin Laden Met Saddam’s Envoy, Linking 9/11 to Iraq Invasion

Saddam Hussein convenes with members of his regime in Iraq. (Getty Images)
Saddam Hussein convenes with members of his regime in Iraq. (Getty Images)

What’s the most dangerous mission someone could take on? A meeting between Saddam Hussein’s envoy and Osama bin Laden in Sudan. US intelligence under President George W. Bush soon found out about it.

This meeting became a key justification used by Washington to invade Iraq, taking advantage of the post-9/11 atmosphere in the US after al-Qaeda, led by bin Laden, attacked New York and Washington on September 11, 2001.

In truth, there was no reason for bin Laden to influence Saddam Hussein’s future. The two men came from very different worlds. Saddam was the president of a major country in the region, not a faction leader.

He belonged to a secular party, choosing a Christian, Tariq Aziz, as foreign minister—a rare decision in the Middle East. Saddam also wasn’t known for playing along in decisions where he wasn’t in control.

But the decision to meet in Khartoum still cost Saddam, even though the meeting was a failure. A former Iraqi intelligence officer said US forces later seized a document showing that the Iraqi envoy advised against working with bin Laden, advice that was followed.

The 1990s in Sudan were extremely risky. During this time, President Omar al-Bashir’s regime made three major blunders: hosting al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, sheltering international fugitive Carlos the Jackal, and involving Ali Osman Taha, the regime’s second-in-command, in an assassination attempt on Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa.

A rare photo shows Omar al-Bashir and Osama bin Laden in Sudan.

Bin Laden didn’t dwell much on the events in Khartoum in August 1994, when French commandos arrested Carlos and took him to France, where he still sits in prison.

Moreover, the al-Qaeda leader couldn’t foresee Sudan’s regime forcing him out of the country.

The regime, however, had no option but to reduce the risks. Bashir dismissed top security officials and decided to expel the “Arab Afghans.”

One day, Bashir and his deputy informed Hassan al-Turabi that bin Laden’s departure had been arranged. They then visited bin Laden, and a military plane flew him to Afghanistan.

The Taliban then gave bin Laden a safe haven, though Mullah Omar never imagined this would lead to his regime's downfall. In the late 1990s, questions about bin Laden were common when speaking with Sudanese officials.

In an interview, Bashir said that bin Laden came to Sudan after the Afghan war to invest in roads, airports, and agriculture—industries his family had been involved in for a long time.

According to Bashir’s statements, bin Laden didn’t have followers or networks in Sudan, just a small group of close aides who stayed out of the public eye.

But the US had made him a global threat, seeing him everywhere, even after he left Sudan, despite knowing he lived in isolation in a distant country.

While Bashir downplayed it, he had met bin Laden several times during his stay in Khartoum, and it's unlikely he was unaware of the ties between bin Laden and Sudanese security officials.

Sudanese politician Hassan al-Turabi reaffirmed Bashir’s claims of bin Laden having been building roads and airports.

“He wasn’t involved in public or intellectual circles and stayed out of the media. We talked about Afghanistan, and I shared our concerns that after the Soviets left, the fighters would be skilled in destruction but not in building a stable society, much like the French Revolution,” said al-Turabi at the time.

“I told him (bin Laden) Kabul fell before they were ready to establish a Muslim society as they envisioned,” added al-Turabi.

When asked who pushed for Osama bin Laden’s exit from Sudan, he said: “It was the British, acting on behalf of the Americans.”

“Saudi Arabia didn’t apply direct pressure—they’re always polite. Bin Laden felt his presence was straining relations between Sudan and Saudi Arabia, which have very close ties. With about half a million Sudanese working in Saudi Arabia, none were expelled. Bin Laden didn’t want to harm that relationship,” he explained.

Bin Laden returned to Afghanistan, entering a dangerous new phase. Soon after, the Taliban took over and welcomed him. Within two years, bombings at US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania led Washington to blame bin Laden.

Osama bin Laden’s home in Sudan. (Asharq Al-Awsat file)

The accusation was repeated after the attack on the USS Cole in Aden. Bin Laden made statements suggesting he was at war with the US, but no one expected him to bring the fight to American soil on September 11, 2001.

When President Bush justified the Iraq invasion, he listed allegations against Saddam, including weapons of mass destruction, repression, and mass graves.

The most controversial claim was that Saddam’s regime was cooperating with al-Qaeda. However, the US administration did not provide evidence for this claim, and no concrete proof of a connection between Saddam and al-Qaeda was presented.

Curiosity about the contact between Saddam and bin Laden had journalists setting out to find more information.

While answers couldn’t be obtained from Saddam’s opponents or his former colleagues, insights from Iraqi intelligence were available.

Salim al-Jumaili, head of the American Affairs Division in Iraqi intelligence, who was involved in the initial outreach to bin Laden, agreed to talk.

Before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Iraq and Saudi Arabia had a good relationship, marked by a security agreement that limited interference and intelligence activities.

Saddam praised Saudi Arabia and King Fahd for their support during the Iran-Iraq War. According to a former Iraqi official, King Fahd tried hard to resolve the situation and return to negotiations after the invasion, but Saddam had gone too far.

The invasion led to the collapse of the security agreement. As news spread about Iraqi opposition groups contacting Saudi Arabia, Iraqi intelligence suggested canceling the agreement, but Saddam refused.

When reports about these contacts continued, Saddam demanded monthly updates.

Eventually, he believed Saudi Arabia was backing efforts to overthrow him and ordered intelligence to “act strongly to undermine the American military presence in Saudi Arabia.”

“When the president issues such an order, all security agencies must try to fulfill it. At that time, I managed the Syria division and had connections with the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, specifically Adnan Okla’s group,” said al-Jumaili.

“Adnan’s brother, Abdul Malik, told us that the Brotherhood had links with bin Laden and could deliver our message. I met Abdul Malik in Baghdad, and he agreed to help. I gave him a message saying we shared a goal of removing US forces from the region and were open to cooperation. We provided about $10,000 for travel expenses,” he revealed.

“The contact returned after a month or so and reported that bin Laden’s stance was very rigid. Bin Laden said the Iraqi regime was infidel and responsible for the presence of US forces in the region, and he was not interested in meeting or cooperating with us. This was in the early 1990s, before al-Qaeda’s actions escalated to the level of September 11.”

“I also heard from Farouk Hijazi, head of external operations, that bin Laden gave a similar response through another channel,” added al-Jumaili.

Al-Jumaili later discovered that Farouk Hijazi had visited Khartoum and met with bin Laden, arranged by al-Turabi.

“Hijazi informed the president that no cooperation with al-Qaeda took place. This is what Bush referred to when he mentioned the president sending an envoy to bin Laden. Bush likely knew there was no real cooperation but didn't mention it to justify the invasion,” al-Jumaili said.

Hassan al-Turabi. (AFP)

Another source, who requested anonymity, said bin Laden showed some flexibility regarding the Iraqi regime during his meeting with Hijazi.

Bin Laden “requested that if there were to be any cooperation, his camps be set up outside Iraqi control and that he have freedom in choosing targets and timing.”

Saddam, after learning of this, was told by Hijazi that cooperating with bin Laden would be complex and risky. Saddam then decided to end the matter entirely.

The consequences of that risky meeting are clear.

Saddam was executed, and Hijazi, who had fled to Syria, was captured at the Syrian-Iraqi border and also executed. Years later, US forces tracked down and killed bin Laden in Pakistan.

Cities sometimes take dangerous risks beyond their means and end up facing harsh realities.

Khartoum paid the price for harboring wanted figures and was punished before it could address the damage.

Some believe that under Bashir, Khartoum aimed to become a center of anti-Western activity, while al-Turabi wanted it to be a hub for political Islam, like Khomeini’s Iran. Both men pushed Sudan beyond its limits.



Arab Gulf in 25 Years: Prosperity in a Region on Fire

Saudi Arabia launched its Vision 2030 in 2016. (AP)
Saudi Arabia launched its Vision 2030 in 2016. (AP)
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Arab Gulf in 25 Years: Prosperity in a Region on Fire

Saudi Arabia launched its Vision 2030 in 2016. (AP)
Saudi Arabia launched its Vision 2030 in 2016. (AP)

Dr. Ibrahim Al-Othaimin*

I like to refer to Henry Kissinger in summing up the reality experienced in the region over the past quarter century. In his book, “World Order: Reflections on the Character of Nations and the Course of History”, the former US secretary of state said “the Middle East is caught in a confrontation akin to—but broader than—Europe’s pre-Westphalian wars of religion. Domestic and international conflicts reinforce each other. Political, sectarian, tribal, territorial, ideological, and traditional national-interest disputes merge.”

The wars, he added, were caused by the collapse of the state and their transformation into fertile ground for terrorism and weapons smuggling. The collapse will subsequently lead to the breakup of the regional and world orders.

The Arab region witnessed unprecedented developments in the past 25 years that have altered its features and impacted the structure of its regional order. The Arab Gulf countries were at the heart of these developments. Despite the regional and international threats, they managed to maintain their internal stability and consolidate their pivotal role in achieving regional balance, underscoring their position as the cornerstone of security and stability in the region.

The September 11, 2001, attacks changed the shape of the world. (Reuters file)

First wars of the 21st Century

The September 11, 2001, attacks marked the beginning of the first wars of the 21st Century that would go on to change global security equations. They would also lead to massive pressure on the region by the terrorist al-Qaeda organization. The developments were a real turning point in global counter-terrorism efforts.

Saudi Arabia and the Gulf were victims of a series of terrorist attacks in the past decades that targeted their security and stability. The worst of the attacks targeted a refinery in the city of Yanbu. It was carried out by Mustafa al-Ansari, an al-Qaeda member who had taken part in fighting in Afghanistan and Somalia. Another attack targeted Halliburton offices in the city of Khobar.

The Gulf countries responded to these challenges by taking firm counter-terrorism measures and launching efforts to dry their sources of funding. In 2002, the Gulf Cooperation Council countries approved a joint security strategy to combat terrorism.

In 2004, Gulf countries signed a counter-terrorism agreement during a meeting of interior ministers in Kuwait. The agreements established a legal framework for GCC efforts to bolster coordination between their members. In 2006, they set up a permanent security committee tasked with combating terror. The committee meets regularly to address terrorism-related issues and to bolster joint security cooperation.

The 2003 US invasion of Iraq was one the landmark moments in the war on terror. It forever changed the shape of the region, paving the way for a new chapter of unrest. The toppling of Saddam Hussein’s regime led to security vacuum that gave way for sectarian divisions and increased Iran’s influence, creating instability in the region.

Even though the Gulf countries opposed the invasion and stressed the need to respect international laws, they found themselves having to confront its fallout. On the political level, they expressed their concern over Iran’s growing influences and intensified their efforts to back Iraq’s unity, stability, sovereignty and independence. They supported the political process that was led by the UN, including holding legislative elections and the ratification of a new constitution.

On the security level, the Gulf countries sought to bolster their defense capabilities, intensify intelligence cooperation and boost security partnerships with the US to counter Iran's influence.

A US soldier covers a Saddam Hussein statue with an American flag in Baghdad on April 5, 2003. (AFP)

Major collapses

The region was soon swept by the 2011 so-called “Arab Spring” protests. The Gulf was again put to the test of maintaining its internal security and stability amid the major collapses of regimes and rulers across the region, starting with Tunisia, then Egypt, Libya, Syria and Yemen.

These developments led to the collapse of political systems and the fragmentation of the countries’ social and political structures. Chaos reigned, leading to unrest and protests, which were fertile ground for the emergence of terrorist groups and foreign meddling that seek their interests at the expense of regional stability.

The Gulf countries feared that these changes would lead to the spread of so-called political Islamist ideology in the Arab world. They approached the “Arab Spring” from a deep strategic view and with total awareness of the challenges at hand. This allowed them to take calculated steps that preserved their internal stability and regional roles. The countries also worked on consolidating internal unity and listened to the demands of the people to ensure that stability is maintained.

On the regional level, the Gulf contained the impact of the crises through supporting allied countries that were affected by the unrest. They also intervened directly in some countries, such as Yemen and Bahrain, to preserve stability and avert the spread of chaos.

After more than a decade since the “Arab Spring” developments, their impact is still very much felt to this day in several countries in the region. Throughout, the Gulf countries managed to maintain their stability and present themselves as a regional force that can help in confronting chaos and unrest.

The crises in Gaza and Lebanon have topped the concerns of Gulf countries. (SPA)

COVID-19

No sooner had the region caught its breath after the unrest than it was confronted by the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. The world was faced with an unprecedented threat that helped reshape health and economic priorities and left a lasting impact on various levels.

The Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia, handled the crisis with extraordinary skill. From the very first moment the virus emerged, the Kingdom took firm measures and offered healthcare to everyone without exception. It provided free treatment, expanded its healthcare sector and rapidly launched vaccination campaigns that were commended by international organizations.

Despite the pandemic’s impact on the global economy and oil prices, the Gulf countries’ preemptive long-term plans and strategies, which called for easing reliance on oil, such as Saudi Arabia’s Vision 2030, allowed them to weather the storm. The Gulf countries showed vigilant leadership and an exceptional ability to adapt during the pandemic, allowing them to protect their people and preserve their economic and social stability.

Prosperity amid regional tumult

The region is now confronted with a new wave of escalation, especially amid the war on Gaza and the possibility that the conflict may spread in the Middle East. It also has to contend with the fallout of the collapse of Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria.

Amid these changes, the Gulf countries have again proven their ability to adapt by presenting effective diplomatic initiatives and deepening international coordination with the aim of consolidating stability in the region.

The Palestinian-Israeli conflict and the war on Gaza remain a top priority. The Gulf countries have repeatedly called for ending the conflict. They have backed international and regional efforts to reach a peaceful resolution based on the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative and implementing the two-state solution.

In Lebanon, as tensions rise with Hezbollah, the Gulf countries have continued to support efforts that would bolster Lebanon’s sovereignty and stability through international coordination aimed at the implementation of UN Security Council resolution 1701.

The Gulf region is also preparing to deal with post-Assad Syria, hoping to help in the country’s reconstruction to establish it as a stable state that shuns Iranian meddling. The goal demands critical coordination with regional and international partners to ensure that stability is restored to Damascus and the entire region.

*Dr. Al-Othaimin is a researcher in foreign relations.