Hamas Weakened, Not Crushed a Year into War with Israel

People search for survivors and the bodies of victims through the rubble of buildings destroyed during Israeli bombardment, in Khan Younis in the southern Gaza Strip on October 26, 2023, amid the ongoing battles between Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas. (AFP)
People search for survivors and the bodies of victims through the rubble of buildings destroyed during Israeli bombardment, in Khan Younis in the southern Gaza Strip on October 26, 2023, amid the ongoing battles between Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas. (AFP)
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Hamas Weakened, Not Crushed a Year into War with Israel

People search for survivors and the bodies of victims through the rubble of buildings destroyed during Israeli bombardment, in Khan Younis in the southern Gaza Strip on October 26, 2023, amid the ongoing battles between Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas. (AFP)
People search for survivors and the bodies of victims through the rubble of buildings destroyed during Israeli bombardment, in Khan Younis in the southern Gaza Strip on October 26, 2023, amid the ongoing battles between Israel and the Palestinian group Hamas. (AFP)

Israel's military campaign to eradicate Hamas in retaliation for the October 7 attack has weakened it by killing several of its leaders and thousands of fighters, and by reducing swaths of the territory it rules to rubble.

But the Palestinian armed group has not been crushed outright, and a year on from its unprecedented attack on Israel, an end to its hold over Gaza remains elusive.

Hamas sparked the Gaza war by sending hundreds of fighters across the border into Israel on October 7, 2023, to attack communities in the south.

The attack resulted in the deaths of 1,205 people, most of them civilians, according to an AFP tally based on official Israeli figures, which include hostages killed in captivity.

Vowing to crush Hamas and bring the hostages home, Israel launched a military campaign in the Gaza Strip from the land, sea and air.

According to data provided by the health ministry of Hamas-run Gaza, the war has killed more than 41,000 people, the majority civilians. The United Nations has acknowledged these figures to be reliable.

- Dead leader -

In one of the biggest blows to the movement since it was founded in 1987 during the Palestinian intifada uprising, Hamas's leader Ismail Haniyeh was assassinated in Iran on July 31.

Both Hamas and its backer Iran accused Israel of killing Haniyeh, though Israel has not commented.

After Haniyeh's death, Hamas named Yahya Sinwar, whom Israel accuses of masterminding the October 7 attack, as its new leader.

On the Gaza battlefield, Israeli forces have aggressively pursued both Sinwar and Hamas military chief Mohammed Deif, whom Israel says it killed in an air strike.

Hamas says Deif is still alive.

"Commander Mohammed Deif is still giving orders," a source in Hamas's armed wing, the Ezzedine Al-Qassam Brigades, told AFP on condition of anonymity as he was not authorized to speak to media on the matter.

- 'Number one target' -

A senior Hamas official who also asked not to be named described Sinwar, who has not been seen in public since the start of the war, as a "supreme commander" who leads "both the military and political wings" of Hamas.

"A team is dedicated to his security because he is the enemy's number one target," the official said.

In August, Israeli officials reported the dead in Gaza included more than 17,000 Palestinian fighters.

A senior Hamas official acknowledged that "several thousand fighters from the movement and other resistance groups died in combat".

Despite its huge losses, the source in the group's armed wing still gloated over the intelligence and security failure that the October 7 attack was for Israel.

"It claims to know everything but on October 7 the enemy saw nothing," he said.

Israel has its own reading of where Hamas now stands.

In September, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said that Hamas "as a military formation no longer exists".

Bruce Hoffman, a researcher at the Council on Foreign Relations, said that Israel's offensive has dealt a "grievous but not a crushing blow" to Hamas.

- 'Political suicide' -

Hamas has controlled Gaza and run its institutions single-handedly since 2007, after winning a legislative election a year earlier and defeating its Palestinian rivals Fatah in street battles.

Now, most of Gaza's institutions have either been damaged or destroyed.

Israel accuses Hamas of using schools, health facilities and other civilian infrastructure to conduct operations, a claim Hamas denies.

The war has left no part of Gaza safe from bombardment: schools turned into shelters for the displaced have been hit, as have healthcare facilities.

Hundreds of thousands of children have not gone to school in nearly a year, while universities, power plants, water pumping stations and police stations are no longer operational.

By mid-2024, Gaza's economy had been reduced to a "less than one-sixth of its 2022 level," according to a UN report that said it would take "decades to bring Gaza back" to its pre-October 7 state.

The collapse has fueled widespread discontent among Gaza's 2.4 million people, two-thirds of whom were already poor before the war, according to Mukhaimer Abu Saada, a political researcher at Al-Azhar University in Cairo.

"The criticism is harsh," he told AFP.

His colleague Jamal al-Fadi branded the October 7 attack as "political suicide for Hamas", which has now "found itself isolated".

Hamas political bureau member Bassem Naim dismissed the assessment.

"While some may not agree with Hamas's political views, the resistance and its project continue to enjoy widespread support," said Naim, who like several other self-exiled Hamas leaders lives in Qatar.



Three Scenarios for Russia’s Military Presence in Syria

Russian President Vladimir Putin inspecting his troops at Hmeimim Airbase in Latakia on December 12, 2017 (Sputnik/AP)
Russian President Vladimir Putin inspecting his troops at Hmeimim Airbase in Latakia on December 12, 2017 (Sputnik/AP)
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Three Scenarios for Russia’s Military Presence in Syria

Russian President Vladimir Putin inspecting his troops at Hmeimim Airbase in Latakia on December 12, 2017 (Sputnik/AP)
Russian President Vladimir Putin inspecting his troops at Hmeimim Airbase in Latakia on December 12, 2017 (Sputnik/AP)

Russian President Vladimir Putin said on Thursday he would meet former Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, who fled to Russia after his regime fell in Damascus. But what will Putin say to his former ally? And how might their first exchange unfold, given Russia’s role in helping Assad escape on a chaotic night?

The Kremlin, known for staging Putin’s meetings with precision, might opt to limit media coverage this time. Putin could be seen sitting at a small table with Assad, now on asylum

in Moscow, in a soundless scene—one that leaves little room for formal pleasantries.

Why has Putin announced plans to meet Assad? Is it to reprimand him? Many in Russia believe Assad’s stubbornness has hurt Moscow’s efforts, threatened its gains in Syria, and could eventually risk its key military presence there.

As details remain unclear, Russian experts are racing to analyze developments in Syria and outline scenarios for the next phase.

Some Russian experts have painted grim scenarios. A member of the prestigious Russian Council on Foreign and Defense Policy warned of potential risks, including a prolonged conflict with civil war elements, a humanitarian catastrophe with millions of refugees, escalating migration in Europe, and rising tensions among nations like Israel, the US, and Iran.

He also predicted a new wave of international terrorism that could reach far beyond the region.

Other experts echoed this pessimism. One posted an image of a Syrian dissident stepping on a statue of Assad’s father, warning that “this is just the beginning.” Another blamed the crisis on the “Obama curse,” citing the West’s interference, while a third shared a bleak analysis titled, “We Must Pray for Syria.”

So far, Russian media and think tanks have avoided any optimistic outlooks for Syria’s future.

Experts, who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat, believe Moscow may be preparing to handle one of three possible scenarios in Syria.

The first, most favorable for Russia’s interests, involves Moscow reaching an agreement with the new Syrian authorities to maintain its military presence for a limited period.

This could mean replacing the current 49-year agreements with a five-year deal to facilitate a gradual Russian withdrawal. Such an arrangement could help the new leadership in Syria manage Western pressure to cut ties with Moscow.

The second scenario envisions Russia giving up its airbase in Hmeimim while retaining a significant presence in Tartus. This would mirror agreements from 1972, which allowed Russian naval vessels to use the Tartus logistics center in the Mediterranean. This compromise would preserve Russia’s interests while reducing Western pressure on Damascus.

The third scenario involves a full Russian withdrawal from both bases, with Moscow later seeking agreements for shared use of air and sea ports. Such agreements, similar to those Russia has signed with other countries, are less likely to provoke Western opposition.

Regardless of the outcome, the Kremlin has yet to develop a clear strategy for dealing with the emerging situation in Syria.

Key questions remain, including how to curb Iran’s regional influence, manage Türkiye and Israel’s growing roles in Syria, and establish a new regional balance that secures Moscow’s minimum interests.