Should Lebanon Fear the ‘New Syria’?

People wait with their belongings at the Al-Masnaa crossing as they prepare to return to Syria, on the Lebanese-Syrian border, Lebanon, 11 December 2024. (EPA)
People wait with their belongings at the Al-Masnaa crossing as they prepare to return to Syria, on the Lebanese-Syrian border, Lebanon, 11 December 2024. (EPA)
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Should Lebanon Fear the ‘New Syria’?

People wait with their belongings at the Al-Masnaa crossing as they prepare to return to Syria, on the Lebanese-Syrian border, Lebanon, 11 December 2024. (EPA)
People wait with their belongings at the Al-Masnaa crossing as they prepare to return to Syria, on the Lebanese-Syrian border, Lebanon, 11 December 2024. (EPA)

Celebration may have swept Lebanon over the collapse of President Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria given its decades of brutal hegemony over its smaller neighbor, but some Lebanese officials have warned of imminent dangers should extremists assume rule in Damascus.

Head of the Free Patriotic Movement MP Gebran Bassil spoke of an “existential concern among all segments that fear the Islamist groups that are now in control in Syria.”

He questioned the assurances from the groups, recalling how they had occupied some eastern Lebanese regions in recent years, which could force Lebanon into taking a defensive position.

Bassil and others fear a repeat of the 2014 attacks by ISIS and the Al-Nusra Front against the eastern Lebanese border. The groups had attacked the border town of Arsal, killing soldiers and civilians, and occupying regions across the border with Syria.

Lebanese security agencies have intensified measures along the border to prevent a reoccurrence of such an attack, which seems pressing given the presence of hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees throughout Lebanon.

FPM deputy leader Dr. Naji Hayek stressed that as long as the Syrians “don’t meddle in the affairs of our country, then they are free to choose what they want.”

He told Asharq Al-Awsat: “We wish the Syrian people well and hope the new regime will meet the aspirations of the people, who alone can shape the form of their government.”

“Our one fear is meddling in Lebanon’s affairs,” he added.

He hoped democracy would prevail in Syria, warning against totalitarianism. “We did not agree on the form of the previous regime and hope the new one will be better,” he remarked.

Member of the Strong Republic bloc MP Ghada Ayoub said she was not surprised with Bassil’s comments, saying that the regime in Syria was not the only thing that fell, “but so have the masks of Lebanese officials, including Bassil, who were banking on the survival of this regime.”

Bassil lost an ally in Assad and an integral part of the “Axis of Resistance”, which the FPM struck an understanding with in 2006 that allowed then FPM leader Michel Aoun to become president of Lebanon, she told Asharq Al-Awsat.

The Strong Republic bloc positively views the change in Syria, she stressed, saying the former regime was “hostile to Lebanon for 50 years.”

“It believed that Lebanon should be annexed to Syria and that decisions should be taken from Damascus, not Beirut. We mustn't forget all the wars it waged in Lebanon and against the Lebanese people, as well as the crimes, assassinations and arrests that it carried out,” she went on to say.

“The Assad regime also allowed Syria to become a passage for Iranian militias that meddled with Lebanon’s fate and allowed Iran to seize control of Lebanon,” Ayoub added.

“So, a new phase has started in Syria with the collapse of the regime. We must congratulate the Syrian people on their newfound freedom,” she stressed.

“Lebanon wants to build normal relations with Syria based on respect for each other’s sovereignty, away from Assad’s old slogan of ‘one people in two countries’,” she stated.

Islamist movements and terrorist affairs expert Ahmed al-Ayyoubi said Lebanon has nothing to fear from the “new Syria.”

He told Asharq Al-Awsat that the extremist threat comes from the remaining ISIS cells, which the ousted regime and Iran sought to exploit and that they may exploit against the alliance of revolutionaries in Damascus.

He said that Damascus’ new rulers have obstacles to overcome, but extremism is not one of them.

He stressed the need to always focus on preserving freedoms and building a just civilian state.

Moreover, Ayyoubi explained that Hayat Tahrir al-Sham was not the sole component of the victorious factions in Syria. Rather, they are formed of various diverse groups that will be represented in the expected transitional council.

Furthermore, he noted that Iran has sought to pin the label of terrorism on Sunni groups to present itself and its militias as a leader of an anti-terrorism axis.

The reality is far from the truth, Ayyoubi added, saying that the Assad regime “was harboring the most extremist and terrorist groups, and they are Hezbollah and the Shiite militias that are aligned with Iran.”

On December 6, two days before the ouster of the regime, the armed Syrian factions addressed the Lebanese people to reassure them that they were hoping to establish “diplomatic ties with them that achieve mutual interests.”



Iran's Revolutionary Guards Extend Control over Tehran's Oil Exports

Iranians drive as smog obscures the skyline in Tehran, Iran, 18 December 2024. EPA/ABEDIN TAHERKENAREH
Iranians drive as smog obscures the skyline in Tehran, Iran, 18 December 2024. EPA/ABEDIN TAHERKENAREH
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Iran's Revolutionary Guards Extend Control over Tehran's Oil Exports

Iranians drive as smog obscures the skyline in Tehran, Iran, 18 December 2024. EPA/ABEDIN TAHERKENAREH
Iranians drive as smog obscures the skyline in Tehran, Iran, 18 December 2024. EPA/ABEDIN TAHERKENAREH

Iran's Revolutionary Guards have tightened their grip on the country's oil industry and control up to half the exports that generate most of Tehran's revenue and fund its proxies across the Middle East, according to Western officials, security sources and Iranian insiders.

All aspects of the oil business have come under the growing influence of the Guards, from the shadow fleet of tankers that secretively ship sanctioned crude, to logistics and the front companies selling the oil, mostly to China, according to more than a dozen people interviewed by Reuters.
The extent of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps' (IRGC) control over oil exports has not previously been reported.

Despite tough Western sanctions designed to choke Iran's energy industry, reimposed by former US President Donald Trump in 2018, Iran generates more than $50 billion a year in oil revenue, by far its largest source of foreign currency and its principal connection to the global economy.

Six specialists - Western officials and security experts as well as Iranian and trading sources - said the Guards control up to 50% of Iran's oil exports, a sharp increase from about 20% three years ago. The sources declined to be identified due to the sensitivity of the matter.

Three of the estimates were based on intelligence documents about Iranian shipping while others derived their figures from monitoring shipping activity by tankers and companies linked to the IRGC. Reuters was unable to determine the exact extent of the IRGC's control.

The IRGC's growing domination of the oil industry adds to its influence in all areas of Iran's economy and also makes it harder for Western sanctions to hit home - given the Guards are already designated as a terrorist organization by Washington.

Trump's return to the White House in January, however, could mean tougher enforcement of sanctions on Iran's oil industry. The country's oil minister said Tehran is putting measures in place to deal with any restrictions, without giving details.

As part of their expansion in the industry, the Guards have muscled in on the territory of state institutions such as the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) and its NICO oil trading subsidiary, according to four of the sources.

When sanctions hit Iran's oil exports years ago, the people running NIOC and the wider industry were specialized in oil rather than how to evade sanctions, added Richard Nephew, a former deputy special envoy for Iran at the US State Department.

"The IRGC guys were much, much better at smuggling, just terrible at oil field management, so they began to get a larger control of oil exports," said Nephew, who is now a researcher at Columbia University.
The IRGC, NIOC, NICO and Iran's foreign ministry did not respond to requests for comment.
RISK APPETITE
The IRGC is a powerful political, military and economic force with close ties to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
The Guards exert influence in the Middle East through their overseas operations arm, the Quds Force, by providing money, weapons, technology and training to allies Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, Yemen's Houthis and militias in Iraq.
While Israel has killed a number of senior IRGC commanders over the past year, the oil specialists in its ranks have been able to continue their operations, two Western and two Iranian sources said.
The Iranian government began allotting oil, instead of cash, to the IRGC and Quds Force around 2013, according to Nephew.
The government was under budgetary pressure then because it was struggling to export oil due to Western sanctions imposed over Iran's nuclear program.
The IRGC proved adept at finding ways to sell oil even under sanctions pressure, said Nephew, who was actively involved in tracking Iranian oil activities then.
Iranian oil revenues hit $53 billion in 2023 compared with $54 billion in 2022, $37 billion in 2021 and $16 billion in 2020, according to estimates from the US government's Energy Information Administration.
This year, Tehran's oil output has topped 3.3 million barrels per day, the highest since 2018, according to OPEC figures, despite the Western sanctions.
China is Iran's biggest buyer of oil, with most going to independent refineries, and the IRGC has created front companies to facilitate trade with buyers there, all the sources said.
Oil export revenues are split roughly evenly between the IRGC and NICO, said one source involved in Iranian oil sales to China. The IRGC sells oil at a $1-$2 barrel discount to prices offered by NICO because buyers take a bigger risk buying from the Guards, the person said.
"It depends on a buyer's risk appetite, the higher ones will go for the IRGC, which the US designates as a terrorist group."
Two Western sources estimated that the IRGC offered an even bigger discount, saying it was $5 per barrel on average but could be as much as $8.
The oil is allocated directly by the government to the IRGC and Quds Force. It's then up to them to market and ship the oil - and work out a mechanism for disbursing the revenue, according to the sources and intelligence documents seen by Reuters.
NIOC gets a separate allocation.
CHINESE FRONT
One of the front companies used is China-based Haokun. Operated by former Chinese military officials, it remains an active conduit for IRGC oil sales into China, despite Washington hitting it with sanctions in 2022, two of the sources said.
The US Treasury said China Haokun Energy had bought millions of barrels of oil from the IRGC-Quds Force and was sanctioned for having "materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, the IRGC-QF".
In one oil transaction dated March 16, 2021 involving Haokun and parties including Turkish company Baslam Nakliyat - which is under US sanctions for its trading links to the IRGC - a payment was processed via US bank JP Morgan and Turkish lender Vakif Katilim, according to the intelligence documents.
The transaction took place before the companies were sanctioned. Reuters has no indication JP Morgan or Vakif Katilim were aware of the Iranian connection - highlighting the risks of companies getting inadvertently caught up in the shadow trade.
JP Morgan declined to comment. Vakif Katilim said in a statement: "Our bank performs its activities within the framework of national and international banking rules."
Haokun declined to comment. Baslam did not respond to a request for comment.
'GHOST FLEET'
Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani, who was killed in a US strike in Baghdad in 2020, had set up a clandestine headquarters and inaugurated that year for the unit's oil smuggling activities, initially staffed by former oil minister Rostam Ghasemi, according to the intelligence documents.
Reuters could not determine where all the oil money funneled through the IRGC goes. The IRGC headquarters and day-to-day operations has an annual budget of around $1 billion, according to assessments from two security sources tracking IRGC activities.
They estimated that the IRGC budget for Hezbollah was another $700 million a year.
"Exact figures remain undisclosed, as Hezbollah conceals the funds it receives. However, estimates are that its annual budget is approximately $700 million to $1 billion. Around 70%-80% of this funding comes directly from Iran," Shlomit Wagman, former director general of Israel’s Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing Prohibition Authority, said separately.
Hezbollah did not respond to a request for comment.
The former Secretary General of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, who was killed in an Israeli airstrike, said Iran provided the group's budget, including for salaries and weapons.
Iran's main tanker operator NITC, which previously played a key role in exports, also now provides services to the IRGC.
It executes ship-to-ship transfers of Iranian oil onto vessels operated by the IRGC to ship crude into China, according to sources and ship-tracking data. Such transfers are common practice to help disguise the origin of the oil tankers carry.
NITC did not respond to a request for comment.
In August, Israel's National Bureau for Counter Terror Financing, part of the country's defense ministry, imposed sanctions on 18 tankers it said were involved in transporting oil belonging to the Quds Force.
In October, the US Treasury slapped sanctions on 17 separate tankers it said formed part of Iran's "ghost fleet", outside of NITC vessels. It followed up with sanctions on a further 18 tankers on Dec. 3.