Syria’s New Rulers Overhaul Economy with Firing ‘Ghost Employees’

A government employee works at a government building in Damascus suburbs, Syria January 8, 2025.REUTERS/Khalil Ashawi
A government employee works at a government building in Damascus suburbs, Syria January 8, 2025.REUTERS/Khalil Ashawi
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Syria’s New Rulers Overhaul Economy with Firing ‘Ghost Employees’

A government employee works at a government building in Damascus suburbs, Syria January 8, 2025.REUTERS/Khalil Ashawi
A government employee works at a government building in Damascus suburbs, Syria January 8, 2025.REUTERS/Khalil Ashawi

Syria's new leaders are undertaking a radical overhaul of the country's broken economy, including plans to fire a third of all public sector workers and privatizing state-run companies dominant during half a century of Assad family rule, Reuters reported.
The pace of the declared crackdown on waste and corruption, which has already seen the first layoffs just weeks after opposition fighters toppled Assad on Dec. 8, has triggered protests from government workers, including over fears of a sectarian jobs purge.
Reuters interviewed five ministers in the interim government formed by former opposition group the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). All described the wide scope of plans to shrink the state, including removing numerous "ghost employees" - people who got paid for doing little or nothing during Assad's rule.
Under Assad and his father, Syria was organized as a militarized, state-led economy that favored an inner circle of allies and family members, with members of the family's Alawite sect heavily represented in the public sector.
There is now a major shift to "a competitive free-market economy," Syria's new economy minister, 40-year-old former energy engineer Basil Abdel Hanan, told Reuters. Under transitional president Ahmed al-Sharaa, the government will work on privatizing state-run industrial companies, which Hanan said totaled 107 and were mostly loss making. However, he vowed to keep "strategic" energy and transport assets in public hands. He did not provide names of companies to be sold off. Syria's main industries include oil, cement and steel.
Some state companies appeared to exist solely to embezzle resources and would be closed, Finance Minister Mohammad Abazeed said in an interview.
"We expected corruption, but not to this extent," Abazeed said.
Only 900,000 of 1.3 million people on the government payroll actually come to work, Abazeed said, citing a preliminary review.
"This means there are 400,000 ghost names," Abazeed, an energetic 38-year-old, said in his office. "Removing these will save significant resources."
Mohammad Alskaf, the minister for Administrative Development who oversees public sector headcount, went further, telling Reuters the state would need between 550,000 and 600,000 workers - less than half the current number.
The goal of the reforms, which also aim to simplify the tax system with an amnesty on penalties, was to remove obstacles and encourage investors to return to Syria, Abazeed said.
"So that their factories within the country can serve as a launchpad" for global exports, said Abazeed, previously an economist at the Al-Shamal private university before serving as a treasury official in the opposition stronghold of Idlib in 2023.
IDLIB MODEL
Until sweeping into Damascus in the lightening offensive that ousted Assad, HTS had ruled Idlib as an opposition breakaway province since 2017, attracting investment and the private sector with less red tape and by clamping down on hard-line religious factions.
The new government hopes for a nationwide increase in foreign and domestic investment to generate new jobs as Syria rebuilds from 14 years of conflict, three ministers told Reuters.
However, to replicate the Idlib model, HTS will have to overcome widespread challenges, not least international sanctions that severely impinge on foreign trade.
Maha Katta, a Senior Resilience and Crisis Response Specialist for Arab States at the International Labor Organization, said the economy was currently in no condition to create enough private jobs.
Restructuring the public sector "makes sense," Katta said, but she questioned whether it should be a top priority for a government that needs first to revive the economy.
"I'm not sure if this is really a wise decision," she said.
While acknowledging the interim leaders' imperative to move fast to get a grip on the country, some critics see the scale and pace of the planned changes as overreach.
"They are talking about a transitional process but they are making decisions as if they were a government that was legitimately installed," said Aron Lund, a fellow at Middle East-focused think-tank Century International.
Transitional president al-Sharaa has promised elections, but said they could take four years to organize.
SHOCK ABSORBED
Economy minister Hanan said economic policy would be designed to manage the fallout of rapid market reforms, to avoid the chaos of recession and unemployment that followed 'shock therapy' imposed in the 1990s on post-Soviet nations in Europe.
"The goal is to balance private sector growth with support for the most vulnerable," Hanan said. The government has announced a 400% increase to state salaries, currently around $25 a month, starting February. It is also cushioning the blow of layoffs with severance, or by asking some workers to stay home while needs are assessed.
"To employees who were hired just to receive a salary, we say: please take your salary and stay home, but let us do our job," said Hussein Al-Khatib, Director of Health Facilities at the Ministry of Health. However, discomfort is already visible. Workers showed Reuters lists circulating in the labor and trade ministries that pared Assad-era employment programs for former soldiers who fought on the government's side in the civil war.
One such veteran, Mohammed, told Reuters he had been laid off on Jan. 23 from his data entry job at the labor ministry and given three months paid leave. He said around 80 other former fighters received the same notice, which he shared with Reuters. In response to Reuters questions the labor ministry said that "due to administrative inefficiencies and disguised unemployment" a number of employees had been placed on three-month paid leave to assess their job status, after which their situation will be reviewed.
The plans spurred protests in January in cities including Daraa in southern Syria, where the rebellion against Assad first erupted in 2011, and Latakia on the coast. Such protests were unthinkable under Assad, who responded to rebellion with repression that sparked the civil war.
Employees at the Daraa Health Directorate held placards declaring "No to arbitrary and unjust dismissal" during a demonstration by some two dozen people.
Adham Abu Al-Alaya, who took part, said he feared losing his job. He supported eradicating ghost employment, but denied he or his colleagues were paid for doing nothing. He was hired in 2016 to manage records and settle utility bills.
"My salary helps me manage basic needs, like bread and yoghurt, just to sustain the household," Abu Al-Alaya said, adding that he also works another job to make end meet.
"If this decision goes through, it will increase unemployment across society, which is something we cannot afford," he said.
MILES OF FILES
Finance Minister Abazeed said that since taking over, the former opposition fighters had found monumental corruption and waste, including at Syrian Trading Establishment, a public consumer goods distributor he said received government money for a decade, until a few days before Assad's departure, without ever providing official statements of revenues.
He did not disclose how much money was involved. Reuters could not verify the allegations.
The new government has closed the company, Abazeed said.
For now, the administration has no reliable record of government employees. It is building a database of public sector staff, asking employees to complete an online form. Alskaf, the minister for Administrative Development, said it would take about six months to set up, with a team of 50 people on the job.
Acknowledging the difficulties of the task ahead, Labor Minister Fadi al-Qassem said "renovations are more difficult than new building."
The government also plans to digitize employee records, currently stored in about 60 dusty and neglected rooms containing over a million folders, many tied with string and dating back to the Ottoman era that ended more than a century ago.
To Hiba Baalbaki, 35, a labor ministry digitization specialist, the drive was surprising and encouraging.
Under the previous administration, management shunned her efforts to bring record keeping into the 21st century, including an online platform she had been working on for two years, she said.
"It introduced unwelcome changes and closed avenues for corruption and bribes," she said.



Mohammad Baqer Zolghadr: A Man with Strong Connections at the Heart of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards

Zolghadr speaks in an interview with the Tasnim News Agency, December 2020.
Zolghadr speaks in an interview with the Tasnim News Agency, December 2020.
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Mohammad Baqer Zolghadr: A Man with Strong Connections at the Heart of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards

Zolghadr speaks in an interview with the Tasnim News Agency, December 2020.
Zolghadr speaks in an interview with the Tasnim News Agency, December 2020.

Mohammad Baqer Zolghadr was not an unfamiliar figure when he was appointed on Tuesday as secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council. One week after the killing of Ali Larijani, and amid a war that has thinned the ranks of Iran’s top leadership, authorities turned to a man shaped within one of the deepest layers of the “Islamic Republic’s” power structure.

Mehdi Tabatabaei, the Iranian president’s deputy communications director, said on Tuesday that General Zolghadr had been appointed to replace Larijani. He wrote on X that Iran’s new Supreme Leader Mojtaba Khamenei had approved the decision.

The Supreme National Security Council, formally headed by President Masoud Pezeshkian, coordinates security and foreign policy. It includes senior military, intelligence and government officials, as well as representatives of the Supreme Leader, who has final authority in state affairs.

Zolghadr’s appointment appears to reflect state priorities in a time of crisis. A further decree is expected to name him as the Supreme Leader’s representative on the council, allowing him to vote under the constitution.

Unlike politicians who rise through elections or public platforms, Zolghadr belongs to a different category: a figure who boasts internal networks that predate the state and later embedded themselves within it. He accumulated power within the agencies instead of confronting them. His career resembles less a sequence of administrative posts and more a continuous thread linking some of the most entrenched centers of power in Iran.

His elevation to one of the country’s top security posts is significant not only for the positions he has held, but for the role he has played within the system. A veteran of the Iran-Iraq war, he developed expertise in organization and network-based operations, consolidating his position within the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and later extending his influence through the interior ministry, judiciary and Expediency Council.

The appointment signals a broader logic within Iran’s ruling establishment: in moments of heightened pressure, figures rooted in institutional networks tend to take precedence over those with a public political profile.

Early career

Zolghadr’s career is closely tied to the political environment from which he emerged. He belongs to a generation associated with the “Mansouroun” network, an early group that later produced influential figures within the IRGC, including Mohsen Rezaei, Ali Shamkhani, Gholam Ali Rashid, and Mohammad and Ahmad Forouzandeh.

The significance of this affiliation lies not only in early organizational ties, but in the nature of the group itself: an ideologically driven pre-revolutionary network that repositioned itself within the state through the IRGC.

Zolghadr’s rise was not an individual climb through institutional ranks, but growth within a web of relationships and loyalties embedded at the core of the system. He emerged not simply as a professional military officer, but as part of a generation that viewed security and politics as intertwined domains in safeguarding the regime. This gave him the rare ability to “reposition” himself and retain power as successive government ruled Iran.

War and the ‘Ramadan’ headquarters

After the fall of the Shah, Zolghadr, like other members of Mansouroun, initially operated through revolutionary committees before joining the IRGC. His most defining wartime role was leading the “Ramadan Headquarters,” a key unit during the Iran-Iraq war.

This post was central to his political and security development. The Ramadan Headquarters served as a nucleus for external operations, coordinating cross-border activities with Iraqi Kurdish and Shiite groups opposed to Saddam Hussein and managing operations inside Iraq. It later evolved into what became the Quds Force, the IRGC’s current foreign arm.

There, Zolghadr developed a hallmark approach: operating at the intersection of military, intelligence and political spheres. The role involved not only managing battlefield operations, but also building networks, cultivating allies and leveraging conflict to generate long-term influence.

This model — combining military structure, indirect operations and proxy management — became a defining feature of Iran’s regional strategy. Within this environment, Zolghadr gained a reputation as a manager and strategist rather than a public-facing commander.

Rise within the IRGC

Following the end of the war in the late 1980s, Zolghadr spent 16 years at the top of the IRGC hierarchy: eight years as chief of the joint staff and eight years as deputy commander-in-chief.

These roles emphasized administration, coordination and institutional discipline rather than field command. His influence was rooted not in public charisma but in his position within the IRGC’s internal machinery.

Over time, he became firmly aligned with Iran’s conservative camp. His political role became more visible during the reformist presidency of Mohammad Khatami, when tensions between reformists and hardline institutions intensified.

Reform era

During the late 1990s, Zolghadr was among military figures associated with the conservative bloc within the IRGC. His name was linked to a letter sent by IRGC commanders to President Khatami, widely seen as a signal of military intervention in political affairs at a time of unrest. He was also associated with hardline opposition to the reform movement and the student protests of that period.

This phase highlighted a structural aspect of his career: his political role did not begin after leaving the military, but was embedded within the IRGC itself as it became increasingly politicized during its confrontation with reformists.

Interior Ministry under Ahmadinejad

When Mahmoud Ahmadinejad became president in 2005, Zolghadr was appointed deputy interior minister for security affairs. The position placed him at the heart of internal security, overseeing provincial governors and managing crises, protests and local tensions. It marked a transition from military service to the executive branch, while maintaining a focus on security.

His move illustrated a broader pattern: shifting from protecting the system through force to safeguarding it through security bureaucracy, expanding his network within the state apparatus.

Basij

Zolghadr left the interior ministry in 2007 amid reports of differences with Ahmadinejad, but his departure did not signal a loss of influence. In December of that year, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appointed him deputy chief of staff of the armed forces for Basij affairs, a newly created role.

The Basij, a paramilitary force, plays a key role in ideological mobilization and maintaining the IRGC’s presence in Iranian society. The decree emphasized strengthening and expanding the Basij’s reach, underlining the importance of Zolghadr’s assignment.

Judiciary and expanding influence

In 2010, Zolghadr moved to the judiciary, serving first as deputy for social prevention and crime reduction, and later as strategic deputy to the head of the judiciary until 2020.

The shift did not represent a departure from security work, as Iran’s judiciary operates closely under the authority of the Supreme Leader. Instead, it broadened his influence across another pillar of the state.

In September 2021, he was appointed secretary of the Expediency Council, succeeding Mohsen Rezaei. The role involves overseeing the council’s committees and acting as a link to the highest levels of decision-making.

Zolghadr also has family ties that extend his influence. He is the father-in-law of Kazem Gharibabadi, Iran’s deputy foreign minister for legal and international affairs and a prominent figure in nuclear negotiations.

Gharibabadi previously served as Iran’s ambassador to international organizations in Vienna, including the International Atomic Energy Agency.

From Larijani to Zolghadr

Larijani’s death deprived Iran of a political figure skilled in navigating between power centers. The choice of Zolghadr suggests a shift in priorities.

While Larijani represented balance and negotiation, Zolghadr embodies institutional discipline and internal cohesion. His selection follows speculation over other candidates, including former defense minister Hossein Dehghan, who was ultimately not appointed.

The decision reflects the system’s preference, in wartime conditions, for figures trusted by security networks over those known for political flexibility.

He may not be a prominent public figure, but he represents a type of official often relied upon in times of crisis: a man with internal networks, brought back to the forefront as Iran faces one of its most challenging periods.


Expulsion of Iran Ambassador Tests Diplomacy between Beirut and Tehran

Iranian Ambassador to Syria Mohammad Reza Sheibani, shows his ink-stained finger as he votes in the first round of the Iranian presidential election on June 14, 2013 at the Iranian embassy in the Syrian capital, Damascus. (AFP)
Iranian Ambassador to Syria Mohammad Reza Sheibani, shows his ink-stained finger as he votes in the first round of the Iranian presidential election on June 14, 2013 at the Iranian embassy in the Syrian capital, Damascus. (AFP)
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Expulsion of Iran Ambassador Tests Diplomacy between Beirut and Tehran

Iranian Ambassador to Syria Mohammad Reza Sheibani, shows his ink-stained finger as he votes in the first round of the Iranian presidential election on June 14, 2013 at the Iranian embassy in the Syrian capital, Damascus. (AFP)
Iranian Ambassador to Syria Mohammad Reza Sheibani, shows his ink-stained finger as he votes in the first round of the Iranian presidential election on June 14, 2013 at the Iranian embassy in the Syrian capital, Damascus. (AFP)

Diplomatic relations between Lebanon and Iran have entered a new phase with Beirut’s unprecedented withdrawal on Tuesday of its approval of the accreditation of Tehran’s new ambassador Mohammad Reza Sheibani.

The Foreign Ministry said in a statement that it had summoned the Iranian charge d'affaires in Lebanon and informed him of “the Lebanese state's decision to withdraw approval of the accreditation of the appointed Iranian ambassador, Mohammad Reza Sheibani, and declare him persona non grata, demanding that he leave Lebanese territory no later than next Sunday.”

The ministry said it had also summoned Lebanon's ambassador to Iran “in light of what the Lebanese state described as Tehran's violation of diplomatic norms and established practices between the two countries”, after Beirut accused Iran's Revolutionary Guards of commanding Hezbollah's operations in its war against Israel.

The government has accused Hezbollah of dragging Lebanon to war after it fired rockets at Israel on March 2 in wake of the killing of Iran's supreme leader Ali Khamenei at the beginning of the conflict.

Crisis

After three decades of calm, relations between Lebanon and Iran started to grow strained after the 2024 war between Hezbollah and Israel.

Iranian parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf declared at the time that Tehran was ready to negotiate with Paris about the implementation of United Nations Security Council resolution 1701 in Lebanon, sparking condemnation from Lebanon.

Then Prime Minister Najib Mikati slammed it as flagrant meddling in Lebanon’s sovereign affairs. He informed the foreign minister at the time to summon Iran’s charge d’affaires to file a formal complaint.

Relations became more strained in 2025 after Ambassador Mojtaba Amani’s suitcases were searched at Beirut’s Rafik Hariri International Airport.

Youssef Raggi, who became Lebanon’s foreign minister in 2025, summoned the Iranian ambassador for the first time since the 1990s last year. In April, he summoned Amani after he posted that the “project to disarm Hezbollah is an obvious conspiracy.”

The Lebanese government had issued a decision on the disarmament of Iran-backed Hezbollah last year.

In December, media close to Hezbollah reported that Raggi had suspended procedures on approving the accreditation of the new Iranian ambassador.

Last week, he summoned the charge d’affaires over statements attributed to the Iranian mission in Beirut and Iranian officials over security and military developments in Lebanon.

Ties between Raggi and Iranian officials have been strained for months. Last year he declined an official invitation from his Iranian counterpart Abbas Araqhchi to visit Tehran, suggesting that they meet in a third neutral country.

The withdrawal of accreditation is rare and it effectively means that a country refuses to welcome a diplomatic representative, reflecting deep political disapproval of the concerned country’s behavior.

The withdrawal was the latest Lebanese measure against Iran.

On March 5, the government took a series of steps that reflect a hardening approach towards Tehran. It imposed visas on visiting Iranians that had been suspended since 2011 in an effort to encourage trade and tourism between Beirut and Tehran.

The government also banned any activity by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards in Lebanon. Dozens of Iranians have since been deported from Lebanon.

‘Correcting’ relations

Lebanon had in the early 1990s launched a phase to “correct” relations with Iran after the end of the Lebanese civil war.

Then Foreign Minister Fares Boueiz was responsible for “reorganizing diplomatic work in line with the Vienna Convection”, said Lebanese sources.

During the 1975-90 civil war, Iranian officials would move freely to Lebanon through Syria and meet with Hezbollah officials in Beirut. Lebanese authorities had opposed the behavior.

In previous statements to Asharq Al-Awsat, Boueiz said Iranian delegations would travel to Lebanon through Syria without coordinating with the state.

The situation was later addressed through official diplomatic channels, he added.

The Iranian ambassador at the time was informed of the authorities’ objection and the stance was relayed to then Iranian FM Ali Akbar Velayati, said Boueiz.

Two days later, the Lebanese Foreign Ministry received an approval to “correct relations”, leading to an exchange in official visits and the signing of agreements that “regulated” the ties.


Falih al-Fayadh, a ‘Cunning’ Player Who Survived Saddam and the US

PMF chief Falih al-Fayadh and his chief of staff Abdulaziz al-Muhammadawi. (PMF file photo)
PMF chief Falih al-Fayadh and his chief of staff Abdulaziz al-Muhammadawi. (PMF file photo)
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Falih al-Fayadh, a ‘Cunning’ Player Who Survived Saddam and the US

PMF chief Falih al-Fayadh and his chief of staff Abdulaziz al-Muhammadawi. (PMF file photo)
PMF chief Falih al-Fayadh and his chief of staff Abdulaziz al-Muhammadawi. (PMF file photo)

Despite his “modest and calm” appearance, Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces chief Falih al-Fayadh is widely seen, including by rivals, as a “cunning” operator with a keen ability to seize opportunities and wage “fierce” battles against his opponents, traits that have kept him in power for more than a decade atop the PMF despite deep polarization and intense internal rivalries.

An airstrike on Tuesday, believed to be carried out by the US, targeted a house used by Fayadh in Mosul’s al-Arabi neighborhood. Reuters, citing sources, said he was not at the site at the time.

Who is Fayadh?

Fayadh was born in Baghdad in 1956 and holds a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering from the University of Mosul, obtained in 1977.

He belongs to the Albu Amer (Albu Khamis) tribal leadership, which owns large agricultural lands in the Rashidiya and Tarmiyah areas north of Baghdad.

It is widely believed that this tribal affiliation helped him avoid execution during Baath Party rule.

His family was said to enjoy a degree of favor with former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, who pardoned him during a visit to the family and commuted a death sentence issued in 1980, on charges of belonging to the then-banned Dawa Party, to 20 years in prison.

Fayadh entered politics early after 2003, joining the movement of former Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jaafari. He remained a low-profile figure before moving into the security establishment, first through the National Security advisory and later the PMF.

He was appointed head of the PMF Committee in 2014, ahead of the body’s formal establishment, alongside the “jihad of Sufficiency” fatwa issued by top Shiite cleric Ali al-Sistani to confront ISIS. He was formally confirmed in 2016, when the parliament passed the PMF law.

Fayadh served as national security adviser until he was dismissed in 2018 by then Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi.

In 2020, then Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi reappointed him as PMF chief in full capacity, after he had previously held the post in an acting role.

Firmly in control

Despite internal power struggles, including open opposition from the Asaib Ahl al-Haq faction, and US sanctions imposed on him in 2021 over alleged human rights violations, Fayadh has retained firm control of the PMF.

Sources familiar with his career say he built his security and political clout on close ties with Iran and with slain Revolutionary Guard Corps commander Qassem Soleimani, who was killed in a US airstrike in Baghdad in early 2020.

Leveraging his central role in the PMF, Fayadh has secured financial gains through various partnerships and contracts, the sources said.

His success in mobilizing tribal Sunni forces and consolidating their loyalty has helped him build a political foothold in Sunni provinces, particularly Nineveh and the city of Mosul.

The sources said Fayadh also capitalized on tribal mobilization groups, often aligned with Sunni lawmakers or politicians, who pledged loyalty to him as a figure capable of delivering benefits.

Through a network of alliances and loyalties across Sunni-majority areas, including Nineveh, Fayadh has emerged as a leading political player, with notable representation on the local council.

However, rivals accuse him of dominating most projects and investments in Mosul and of using the PMF to place members of his tribe in sensitive positions within the organization.