'Where's the Gold?': How the Assads Sucked Syria Dry

Mountain lair: a soldier looks into a hidden exit from from Maher al-Assad's private office built into a hilltop overlooking Damascus. Bakr ALKASEM / AFP
Mountain lair: a soldier looks into a hidden exit from from Maher al-Assad's private office built into a hilltop overlooking Damascus. Bakr ALKASEM / AFP
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'Where's the Gold?': How the Assads Sucked Syria Dry

Mountain lair: a soldier looks into a hidden exit from from Maher al-Assad's private office built into a hilltop overlooking Damascus. Bakr ALKASEM / AFP
Mountain lair: a soldier looks into a hidden exit from from Maher al-Assad's private office built into a hilltop overlooking Damascus. Bakr ALKASEM / AFP

From a Bond villain lair in the rugged heights overlooking Damascus, the all-seeing eye of a notorious Syrian military unit gazed down on a city it bled dry.

Many of the bases of the elite Fourth Division formerly run by toppled president Bashar al-Assad's feared younger brother Maher now lie looted.

But papers left strewn behind reveal how the man they called "The Master" and his cronies wallowed in immense wealth while some of their foot soldiers struggled to feed their families and even begged on the streets.

Piles of documents seen by AFP expose a vast economic empire that Maher al-Assad and his network of profiteers built by pillaging a country already impoverished by nearly 14 years of civil war.

Western governments long accused him and his entourage of turning Syria into a narco state, flooding the Middle East with captagon.

But far beyond that $10-billion trade -- whose vast scale was exposed in a 2022 AFP investigation -- papers found in its abandoned posts show the Fourth Division had its fingers in many pies in Syria, an all-consuming "mafia" within the pariah state.

+ It expropriated homes and farms

+ Seized food, cars and electronics to sell on

+ Looted copper and metal from bombed-out buildings

+ Collected "fees" at roadblocks and checkpoints

+ Ran protection rackets, making firms pay for escorts of oil tankers, some from areas controlled by extremists

+ Controlled the tobacco and metal trades

Mountain eyrie

The center of this corrupt web was Maher al-Assad's private offices, hidden in an underground labyrinth of tunnels -- some big enough to drive a truck through -- cut into a mountain above Damascus.

A masked guard took AFP through the tunnels with all the brisk efficiency of a tour guide -- the sauna, the bedroom, what appeared to be cells and various "emergency" exit routes.

But at its heart, down a steep flight of 160 stairs, lay a series of vaults with iron-clad doors.

The guard said he had counted nine vaults behind one sealed-off room.

He said safes had been "broken open" by looters who entered the office just hours after the Assad brothers fled Syria on December 8 when Damascus fell to an offensive, ending the family's five-decade rule.

Maher, 57, did not know of his brother's plans to flee to Russia and escaped separately, taking a helicopter to the Iraqi border, according to a senior Iraqi security official and two other sources. He then made his way to Russia, they said, apparently via Iran.

The chaos of their fall is apparent in the underground complex. Safes and empty Rolex and Cartier watch boxes still lie scattered about, though it is not known if the vaults were emptied before the looters arrived.

"This is Maher al-Assad's main office," the guard said, "which has two floors above the ground but also tunnels containing locked rooms that can't be opened."

In one corridor, a shrink wrap machine -- probably used for bundling cash -- was abandoned next to a huge safe.

Hidden fortune

There was never any shortage of bills to wrap.

One document retrieved from the papers that litter the Fourth Division's Security Bureau farther down the hill show they had ready cash of $80 million, eight million euros and 41 billion Syrian pounds at their fingertips in June. That was a perfectly normal cash float, according to papers going back to 2021.

"This is only a small sample of the wealth that Maher and his associates gathered from their shady business deals," said Carnegie Middle East Centre scholar Kheder Khaddour.

Their real fortune is probably hidden abroad”, he said.

"The Fourth Division was a money-making machine," Khaddour added, preying on a land where the UN says more than 90 percent of the population was living on a little more than $2 a day.

State within a state

Western sanctions to squeeze the Assads and their cronies did little to impede Maher and his men.

Theirs was an "independent state" within the state, said Omar Shaaban, a former Fourth Division colonel who has signed a deal with the new Syrian authorities.

"It had all the means... It had everything," he said.

While the US dollar was officially banned under Assad -- with Syrians not even allowed to utter the word -- Shaaban said many Fourth Division officers grew "wealthy and had safes full of money".

"In dollars," naturally, Shaaban added.

Maher's cronies lived in sprawling villas, shipping luxury cars abroad while beyond their gates the country was mired in poverty and despair.

Weeks after the Assads' fall, desperate people were still combing through Maher's mansion built into a hill in Damascus' Yaafour neighborhood next to the stables where his daughter rode her prize-winning horses.

"I want the gold. Where's the gold?" a man asked AFP as he went through its ransacked rooms. But all that was left were old photographs of Maher, his wife and their three children strewn on the floor.

'The butcher'

Maher was a shadowy, menacing figure in Assad's Syria, branded "the butcher" by the opposition. His Fourth Division was the ousted regime's iron fist, linked to a long list of atrocities.

But while his portrait was hung in all their bases, he was seldom seen in public.

Despite rights groups accusing him of ordering the 2011 massacre of protesters in Daraa -- which helped ignite the civil war -- and the United Nations linking him to the 2005 assassination of ex-Lebanese prime minister Rafic Hariri, he was "the invisible man", one person close to the former ruling family told AFP.

"Few people would tell you that they know him," the source said.

Yet Maher could be generous and good company, according to his sister-in-law Majd al-Jadaan, a longtime opponent of the regime.

"However, when he gets angry, he completely loses control... This is what makes his personality terrifying," she told Al-Arabiya TV.

"He knows how to destroy -- he knows how to kill and then lie to appear innocent," Jadaan told French TV early in the civil war, saying he was as ruthless as his father, Hafez.

Luxury cars

One other name keeps cropping up alongside Maher's when people in Damascus curse the crimes of the Fourth Division.

Ghassan Belal was the head of its powerful Security Bureau. Like his boss, he collected luxury cars and lived in a villa in the Yaafour district. Belal has also left Syria, according to security sources.

Inside his spacious offices in the bureau's headquarters, you can piece together his lavish lifestyle bill by bill from the papers he left, including the cost of running his Cadillac.

Over the summer, Belal shipped two cars, a Lexus and a Mercedes, the $29,000 customs and other expenses charged to a credit card under another name.

A handwritten note showed that despite being sanctioned for human rights abuses, he paid his Netflix subscription using a "friend's foreign credit card".

Another list showed that mostly domestic expenses for his properties, including his main villa -- which has since also been looted -- amounted to $55,000 for just 10 days in August.

That same month, a Fourth Division soldier wrote to Belal begging for help because he was in "a terrible financial situation". Belal gave him 500,000 Syrian pounds -- $33. Another soldier who abandoned his post was caught begging on the street.

The money men

While thousands of the papers were burned as the regime fell, many of the classified documents survived the flames and have tales to tell.

Among prominent names mentioned as paying into Fourth Division funds are sanctioned businessmen Khaled Qaddour, Raif Quwatli and the Katerji brothers, who have been accused of generating hundreds of millions of dollars for Iran's Revolutionary Guard and the Yemeni Houthis through the sale of Iranian oil to Syria and China.

Quwatli operated checkpoints and crossings where goods were often confiscated or "taxed", multiple sources said.

Qaddour -- who was sanctioned by the United States for bankrolling Maher through captagon, cigarette and mobile phone smuggling -- denied having any dealings with him when he tried to have his EU sanctions lifted in 2018.

But the Security Bureau's revenue list showed he paid $6.5 million into its coffers in 2020 alone.

'It was a mafia'

Khaddour said the Security Bureau handled most of the division's financial dealings and issued security cards for people it did business with to ease their movements.

A drug lord told Lebanese investigators in 2021 that he held a Fourth Division security card and that the Security Bureau had agreed to protect another dealer's drug shipment for $2 million, according to a statement seen by AFP.

The US Treasury and several Syrian and Lebanese security figures have also cited Belal and the bureau as key players in the captagon trade.

AFP visited a captagon lab linked to the division in December in a villa in the Dimas area near Lebanon's border, its rooms full of boxes and barrels of the caffeine, ethanol and paracetamol needed to make the drug.

Locals said they were not allowed to approach the villa, with shepherds banned from the surrounding hills.

A former Fourth Division officer who worked for Belal, and who asked not to be named, said the bureau enjoyed "so much immunity, no one could touch a member without Maher's approval."

"It was a mafia, and I knew I was working for a mafia," he added.

'They left people in hunger'

The division's unbridled greed haunted families for decades as a letter written by Adnan Deeb, a graveyard caretaker from Homs, shows.

His plea for the return of his family's seized property was found among hundreds of damp and dirty documents at an abandoned checkpoint near Damascus.

When AFP tracked Deeb down, he told how the Fourth Division confiscated his family's villa, and those of several of their neighbors in the village of Kafraya 10 years ago.

Despite not being allowed near them, Deeb said they still had to pay taxes on the properties, which were used as offices, warehouses and likely a jail.

"The Fourth Division Security Bureau here was a red line that no one dared to come close to," the son of one of the owners told AFP.

They found hundreds of cars, motorcycles and hundreds of gallons of cooking oil in the properties after the regime fell.

"They left people in hunger while everything was available for them," he said.

A woman with 25 family members -- some living in a tent -- repeatedly requested the Fourth Division give her back her home in a document found in another of the villas.

Bashar got his cut

The Fourth Division controlled no part of the Syrian economy more than the metals market, with former colonel Shaaban saying "no one was permitted to move iron" without its approval.

It also had "exclusive" control of copper, he said.

When Assad's forces took control of a Damascus suburb after a fierce battle with the opposition, the Fourth Division swiftly sent its men to pull the copper and iron from destroyed homes, one of its officers recalled.

Fares Shehabi, former head of Syria's Chamber of Industry said a metal plant managed by one of Maher al-Assad's partners monopolized the market, with factories forced to buy exclusively from it.

Many "could no longer operate" under such pressure, Shehabi said.

Maher al-Assad and his "friends" controlled a big share of Syria's economy, he said. But the ultimate beneficiary was always his brother Bashar, he argued. "It was one company. The (presidential) palace was always the reference."

The former Fourth Division officer also insisted a share of profits and seized items always went to the president.

Toxic legacy

While little seems to be left of Fourth Division today other than its ransacked depots and headquarters, Syria expert Lars Hauch, of Conflict Mediation Solutions (CMS), warned its legacy could yet be highly toxic.

"The Fourth Division was a military actor, a security apparatus, an intelligence entity, an economic force, a political power, and a transnational criminal enterprise," he said.

"An institution with a decades-long history, enormous financial capacity and close relations with elites doesn't just vanish," he added.

"While the top-level leadership fled the country, the committed and mostly Alawite core (from which the Assads come)... retreated to the coastal regions," Hauch said.

Syria's new leadership has repeatedly sought to reassure minorities they will not be harmed. But across the country, violence against Alawites has surged.

Hauch said caches of weapons may have been hidden away.

Add to that the division's war chest of "billions of dollars", and "you have what you need for a sustained insurgency... if Syria's transition fails to achieve genuine inclusivity and transitional justice," the analyst warned.



Global Nuclear Arms Control under Pressure in 2026 

Russian Yars ICBMs travel through central Moscow, Russia, May 3, 2025. (AFP)
Russian Yars ICBMs travel through central Moscow, Russia, May 3, 2025. (AFP)
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Global Nuclear Arms Control under Pressure in 2026 

Russian Yars ICBMs travel through central Moscow, Russia, May 3, 2025. (AFP)
Russian Yars ICBMs travel through central Moscow, Russia, May 3, 2025. (AFP)

The fragile global legal framework for nuclear weapons control faces further setbacks in 2026, eroding guardrails to avoid a nuclear crisis.

The first half of the year will see two key events: the US-Russia bilateral treaty, New START, expires on February 5, and in April, New York hosts the Review Conference (RevCon) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) -- the cornerstone of global nuclear security frameworks.

The RevCon, held every four to five years, is meant to keep the NPT alive. But during the last two sessions, the 191 signatory states failed to agree on a final document, and experts expect the same outcome in April.

"I think this is going to be a difficult RevCon," said Alexandra Bell, head of US-based global security nonprofit the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, at a UN-hosted online conference in early December.

"In terms of the current state and near future prospects of nuclear arms control architecture, things are bleak," she added.

Anton Khlopkov, director of Russian think-tank the Center for Energy and Security Studies (CENESS), took an even starker point of view, saying at the same event that "we are at the point of almost complete dismantlement of arms control architecture".

"We should be realistic in the current circumstances. At best, I think we should try to preserve what we have," he said.

- 'Crumbling' safeguards -

From US strikes on Iranian nuclear sites to Russia's test of the new Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile and US President Donald Trump's remarks about possibly resuming nuclear tests -- the international nuclear landscape darkened in 2025.

At the same time, "the arms control architecture is crumbling", Emmanuelle Maitre of France's Foundation for Strategic Research (FRS) told AFP.

A key challenge hinges on a shift in global relations.

Nuclear control had been built over decades around a Moscow-Washington axis, but China's growing power and rapid technological advances have shifted the international playing field, which is simultaneously increasingly strained.

"The growing interlinkage between nuclear and conventional forces and the emergence of disruptive technologies (such as the US Golden Dome defense system and new hypersonic weapons) have transformed traditional nuclear deterrence into a multi-domain concept, especially in a multipolar world," said Peking University's Hua Han.

"This trilateral configuration introduces complexities far beyond the Cold War-era bilateral model. Increasing China-Russia cooperation further complicates deterrence calculations, particularly in the two main theaters of concern: Europe and the Asia-Pacific," she added, according to the minutes of an April event held by Pakistan's Center for International Strategic Studies.

A likely result of the changing landscape is the lapse of New START, which sets weapon limits and includes inspection systems.

"The entire inspection component is no longer functioning, the notifications when a missile is moved, etc, all of that has vanished. What remains is only the voluntary commitment to stay within the limits," said Maitre.

- 'Collective solutions' -

But allowing New START to lapse is "in American interest", according to Robert Peters of the influential Heritage Foundation, reflecting the stance of much of the US strategic community to avoid tying Washington's hands to Moscow alone.

Beijing, which currently has fewer weapons, has so far refused to engage in trilateral disarmament talks.

"China is the fastest growing nuclear power on the planet. It's building 100 new warheads a year and now has more ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) silos than the US has active Minuteman III silos," Peters said at a recent online International Institute for Strategic Studies event.

"New START does nothing to address" that issue, he added.

However, Maitre said, a New START lapse doesn't mean the world should expect serious consequences as early as February 6.

In both Washington and Moscow, "there is a small margin to bring some weapons back into service, but the numbers cannot be very significant. There are bottlenecks" that will slow any buildup, she said.

Nor will the lack of a final document from the RevCon cause "immediate or damaging consequences" to the NPT, she said.

But, she warned, fewer safeguards risks leaving the world without diplomatic tools to resolve tensions.

"The less functional the NPT becomes, the harder it is to forge collective solutions in the event of a crisis."


Iraq's Political Future in Limbo as Factions Vie for Power

FILED - 02 November 2025, Iraq, Najaf: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani delivers a speech during a campaign rally of his Reconstruction and Development Coalition in Najaf, ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held on 11 November 2025. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa
FILED - 02 November 2025, Iraq, Najaf: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani delivers a speech during a campaign rally of his Reconstruction and Development Coalition in Najaf, ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held on 11 November 2025. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa
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Iraq's Political Future in Limbo as Factions Vie for Power

FILED - 02 November 2025, Iraq, Najaf: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani delivers a speech during a campaign rally of his Reconstruction and Development Coalition in Najaf, ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held on 11 November 2025. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa
FILED - 02 November 2025, Iraq, Najaf: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani delivers a speech during a campaign rally of his Reconstruction and Development Coalition in Najaf, ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held on 11 November 2025. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa

Political factions in Iraq have been maneuvering since the parliamentary election more than a month ago to form alliances that will shape the next government.

The November election didn't produce a bloc with a decisive majority, opening the door to a prolonged period of negotiations, said The Associated Press.

The government that eventually emerges will be inheriting a security situation that has stabilized in recent years, but it will also face a fragmented parliament, growing political influence by armed factions, a fragile economy, and often conflicting international and regional pressures, including the future of Iran-backed armed groups.

Uncertain prospects

Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani's party took the largest number of seats in the election. Al-Sudani positioned himself in his first term as a pragmatist focused on improving public services and managed to keep Iraq on the sidelines of regional conflicts.

While his party is nominally part of the Coordination Framework, a coalition of Iran-backed Shiite parties that became the largest parliamentary bloc, observers say it’s unlikely that the Coordination Framework will support al-Sudani’s reelection bid.

“The choice for prime minister has to be someone the Framework believes they can control and doesn't have his own political ambitions,” said Sajad Jiyad, an Iraqi political analyst and fellow at The Century Foundation think tank.

Al-Sudani came to power in 2022 with the backing of the Framework, but Jiyad said that he believes now the coalition “will not give al-Sudani a second term as he has become a powerful competitor.”

The only Iraqi prime minister to serve a second term since 2003 was Nouri al-Maliki, first elected in 2006. His bid for a third term failed after being criticized for monopolizing power and alienating Sunnis and Kurds.

Jiyad said that the Coordination Framework drew a lesson from Maliki “that an ambitious prime minister will seek to consolidate power at the expense of others.”

He said that the figure selected as Iraq's prime minister must generally be seen as acceptable to Iran and the United States — two countries with huge influence over Iraq — and to Iraq’s top Shiite cleric, Grand Ali al-Sistani.

Al-Sudani in a bind

In the election, Shiite alliances and lists — dominated by the Coordination Framework parties — secured 187 seats, Sunni groups 77 seats, Kurdish groups 56 seats, in addition to nine seats reserved for members of minority groups.

The Reconstruction and Development Coalition, led by al-Sudani, dominated in Baghdad, and in several other provinces, winning 46 seats.

Al-Sudani's results, while strong, don't allow him to form a government without the support of a coalition, forcing him to align the Coordination Framework to preserve his political prospects.

Some saw this dynamic at play earlier this month when al-Sudani's government retracted a terror designation that Iraq had imposed on the Lebanese Hezbollah militant group and Yemen’s Houthis— Iran-aligned groups that are allied with Iraqi armed factions — just weeks after imposing the measure, saying it was a mistake.

The Coalition Framework saw its hand strengthened by the absence from the election of the powerful Sadrist movement led by Shiite cleric Muqtada Sadr, which has been boycotting the political system since being unable to form a government after winning the most seats in the 2021 election.

Hamed Al-Sayed, a political activist and official with the National Line Movement, an independent party that boycotted the election, said that Sadr’s absence had a “central impact.”

“It reduced participation in areas that were traditionally within his sphere of influence, such as Baghdad and the southern governorates, leaving an electoral vacuum that was exploited by rival militia groups,” he said, referring to several parties within the Coordination Framework that also have armed wings.

Groups with affiliated armed wings won more than 100 parliamentary seats, the largest showing since 2003.

Other political actors

Sunni forces, meanwhile, sought to reorganize under a new coalition called the National Political Council, aiming to regain influence lost since the 2018 and 2021 elections.

The Kurdish political scene remained dominated by the traditional split between the Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan parties, with ongoing negotiations between the two over the presidency.

By convention, Iraq’s president is always a Kurd, while the more powerful prime minister is Shiite and the parliamentary speaker Sunni.

Parliament is required to elect a speaker within 15 days of the Federal Supreme Court’s ratification of the election result, which occurred on Dec. 14.

The parliament should elect a president within 30 days of its first session, and the prime minister should be appointed within 15 days of the president’s election, with 30 days allotted to form the new government.

Washington steps in

The incoming government will face major economic and political challenges.

They include a high level of public debt — more than 90 trillion Iraqi dinars ($69 billion) — and a state budget that remains reliant on oil for about 90% of revenues, despite attempts to diversify, as well as entrenched corruption.

But perhaps the most delicate question will be the future of the Popular Mobilization Forces, a coalition of militias that formed to fight the ISIS group as it rampaged across Iraq more than a decade ago.

It was formally placed under the control of the Iraqi military in 2016 but in practice still operates with significant autonomy. After the Hamas-led attack in southern Israel on Oct. 7, 2023 sparked the devastating war in Gaza, some armed groups within the PMF launched attacks on US bases in the region in retaliation for Washington’s backing of Israel.

The US has been pushing for Iraq to disarm Iran-backed groups — a difficult proposition, given the political power that many of them hold and Iran’s likely opposition to such a step.

Two senior Iraqi political officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity because they weren't authorized to comment publicly, said that the United States had warned against selecting any candidate for prime minister who controls an armed faction and also cautioned against letting figures associated with militias control key ministries or hold significant security posts.

“The biggest issue will be how to deal with the pro-Iran parties with armed wings, particularly those... which have been designated by the United States as terrorist entities,” Jiyad said.


What Egypt’s Red Lines Mean for Sudan’s War

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)
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What Egypt’s Red Lines Mean for Sudan’s War

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)

In unusually blunt language, and following a visit by Sudan’s Sovereignty Council Chairman and army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan to Cairo, the Egyptian presidency issued a statement on the war in Sudan outlining three points it described as red lines.

It said Egypt would not allow any of them to be crossed or compromised, as they directly affect Egypt’s national security, which it said is inseparable from Sudan’s national security.

The reference to activating the joint defense agreement between the two countries was seen as a signal that Egypt could bring its military, political, and diplomatic weight to bear in support of the Sudanese army.

Joint defense agreement

In March 2021, Egypt signed a military cooperation agreement with Sudan that covers training, border security, and the confrontation of shared threats. That agreement followed a joint defense pact signed in 1976 during the presidencies of Sudan’s Gaafar Nimeiry and Egypt’s Anwar Sadat.

Articles One and Two of the pact stipulate that any attack on one party is considered an attack on the other, and require immediate consultation, including the use of armed force to repel aggression. The agreement also commits both sides to coordinating their defense and military policies on matters related to their national security.

After the fall of Nimeiry’s regime in the 1985 popular uprising, then Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi informed the Egyptian leadership of his desire to cancel the joint defense agreement. Instead, the two sides signed what became known as the Brotherhood Charter in 1987. While it did not explicitly cancel the 1976 agreement, its mechanisms have not been discussed or activated since then.

Regional and international messages

Sudanese journalist Osman Mirghani, editor-in-chief of Al-Tayar newspaper, said the Egyptian statements amounted to regional and international messages linked to recent developments and what he described as serious security threats facing Sudan.

He pointed to the expansion of the Rapid Support Forces in the Darfur and Kordofan regions in a way that threatens shared Sudanese and Egyptian national security, warning of risks of geographic fragmentation that could endanger Sudan’s unity.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Mirghani said Egypt was, for the first time, using direct and tough language and signaling the possibility of intervention under international law in Sudan’s conflict. He said this reflected the level of Egyptian concern over the situation in Sudan.

Mirghani added that the reference to red lines was a message directed at all parties, noting that there are many influential players in Sudan.

The red lines

The first red line cited by Cairo was the preservation of Sudan’s unity and territorial integrity, preventing any tampering with its resources or those of the Sudanese people, and rejecting the secession of any part of the country. Egypt reiterated its categorical refusal to the establishment or recognition of any parallel entities, saying such moves would undermine Sudan’s unity and territorial integrity.

The statement also stressed the need to preserve Sudanese state institutions and prevent any harm to them. Egypt affirmed its full right to take all necessary measures permitted under international law, including activating the joint defense agreement between the two brotherly countries, to ensure these red lines are not crossed.

Timing of the visit

Former Sudanese Foreign Minister Ali Youssef noted the timing of Burhan’s visit to Cairo, stating that it occurred after his trip to Saudi Arabia earlier this week and following a visit by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to the United States.

Youssef said the trip was part of efforts to end the war in Sudan through the Quartet mechanism, which includes Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and the United States.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Youssef said Burhan briefed Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi on the outcomes of his Saudi visit and the latest developments in Sudan.

He stated that the visit did not follow the usual ceremonial protocol and was a result of developments in the war, noting that Egypt’s security is linked to Sudan’s security. He added that Egypt is part of the Quartet, which seeks to end a war that is approaching its third year.

Military implications

Sudanese military expert Al-Muatasim Abdel Qader said activating the joint agreement would imply Egyptian intervention in various forms, including supplying weapons and ammunition or direct military involvement.

He said the provisions of the agreement obligate each army to defend the other, adding that the red lines outlined by the Egyptian presidency represented a significant step and carried major implications for the Sudanese state.

In remarks to Asharq Al-Awsat, Abdel Qader described mutual protection between the two countries as a historically rooted matter, dating back to wars Egypt fought in the last century in which Sudanese armed forces took part.

Rapid Support Forces response

Basha Tabiq, an adviser to the commander of the Rapid Support Forces, said in posts on X that Egypt’s position amounted to blatant interference, bias toward one party, and a colonial mindset that views Sudan as a backyard.

Another source aligned with the RSF said accusations against Egypt of backing the Sudanese army have persisted since the early days of the war. The source pointed to the presence of Egyptian forces at Merowe air base in northern Sudan at the start of the conflict, when several Egyptian soldiers and officers were captured before later being handed over to Cairo.

The source also cited accusations by RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, who said in October 2024 that the Egyptian army had carried out air strikes against his forces and supplied the Sudanese army with drones and training.

He said Hemedti renewed those accusations last June, alleging that Cairo supported the Sudanese army with aircraft flown by Egyptian pilots that bombed areas under his forces’ control, and supplied weapons and aviation fuel. Hemedti described this as a blatant aggression against the Sudanese people.

The source, who requested anonymity, said Egypt has been intervening in the war from the outset and that activating the joint defense agreement would merely formalize an existing reality.

No time to spare

Sudanese ambassador Al-Sadiq al-Maqli said Egypt is working with Saudi Arabia and the international Quartet, in coordination with the United States, to give fresh momentum to efforts on Sudan.

He said Washington is currently using soft power rather than force, which he described as an option deferred until shuttle diplomacy by US President’s senior adviser Massad Boulos is exhausted.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Maqli said the United States fully understands the influence of Saudi Arabia and Egypt and their ability to persuade and soften the stance of Sudan’s government, which has rejected the latest US initiative.

He said Burhan currently has no time to spare, as what is unfolding in Sudan represents the world’s worst humanitarian disaster, according to the international community.

Maqli noted that Egypt, represented by Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty, has been almost fully dedicated to making the Quartet mechanism succeed, given that the continuation of the current situation in Sudan poses a threat to Egypt’s national security.

He described Burhan’s visits to Riyadh and Cairo as short but necessary steps toward accepting the Quartet initiative, saying the Saudi visit marked a qualitative shift in the Sudanese government’s official position.

He added that Sudan’s foreign ministry later expressed Port Sudan’s readiness to cooperate with President Donald Trump, his secretary of state, and Boulos in efforts to achieve peace in Sudan, predicting imminent developments that could lead to a major breakthrough in the crisis.