How Al-Sharaa Led Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham to the People’s Palace

Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham leader Abu Mohammad al-Jolani (Ahmad al-Sharaa’) in Aleppo on December 4, 2024 (Telegram). 
Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham leader Abu Mohammad al-Jolani (Ahmad al-Sharaa’) in Aleppo on December 4, 2024 (Telegram). 
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How Al-Sharaa Led Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham to the People’s Palace

Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham leader Abu Mohammad al-Jolani (Ahmad al-Sharaa’) in Aleppo on December 4, 2024 (Telegram). 
Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham leader Abu Mohammad al-Jolani (Ahmad al-Sharaa’) in Aleppo on December 4, 2024 (Telegram). 

Since the Syrian revolution transitioned into armed conflict—after the regime ruled out negotiations and used excessive force to suppress protests in 2011—the country witnessed a surge in armed factions. These ranged from jihadist Islamist groups to more moderate ones, differing in their levels of extremism and religiosity.

In late 2011, one of the largest factions, Harakat Ahrar al-Sham, was established, blending jihadist and Muslim Brotherhood ideologies with a local agenda. Ahrar al-Sham was the first faction to merge global jihadist thought with local objectives, even preceding Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) in this approach. HTS, originally affiliated with al-Qaeda, upheld global jihadism until its formal split from the organization in July 2016.

Throughout its various transformations and ascents—culminating in the “Deter the Aggression” battle that propelled HTS and its leader Abu Mohammad al-Jolani (Ahmad al-Sharaa’) to power in Syria—the group maintained a precise internal structure, resembling a military academy, as described by a former HTS leader who spoke to Asharq Al-Awsat.

Ahrar al-Sham: The First Hybrid Jihadist Faction

At its peak, Ahrar al-Sham was among Syria’s most ideologically driven and organized factions. Its leaders, such as Hassan Abboud and Abu Yazan al-Shami, held strong charisma and influence within the revolutionary circles, alongside figures like Abdul Qadir al-Saleh, the leader of Liwa al-Tawhid.

This dominance continued until September 9, 2014, when a mysterious explosion targeted Ahrar al-Sham’s Shura Council meeting in Idlib’s Ram Hamdan, killing its leader Abu Abdullah al-Hamawi (Hassan Abboud) and nearly 40 other senior figures. This incident marked the beginning of the faction’s decline. Within a short period, Ahrar al-Sham shrank into a minor faction, fragmented between larger groups such as the Syrian National Army (SNA) and HTS.

The Syrian National Army (SNA) itself was formed on December 30, 2017, comprising 36 armed factions, including the Sham Front, Jaysh al-Islam, Faylaq al-Majd, and Sultan Shah Division, which was predominantly Turkmen.

Liwa al-Tawhid: A Brief Yet Powerful Force

Another major faction that enjoyed significant strength and popularity—more than Jabhat al-Nusra (HTS’s predecessor) at one point—was Liwa al-Tawhid, established on July 21, 2012. This group brought together various local battalions primarily operating in northern Aleppo’s countryside.

At its height, Liwa al-Tawhid was the largest opposition formation, embodying a “moderate Islamist” trend that blended Salafism, the Muslim Brotherhood’s ideology, and nationalist rhetoric. It was one of the few factions that initially attracted a diverse spectrum of fighters, from moderate jihadists to nationalists.

The group fought on multiple fronts, including a notable battle against Hezbollah in Qusayr (2013). However, after its leader Abdul Qadir al-Saleh was killed in an airstrike on November 18, 2013, Liwa al-Tawhid quickly disintegrated, with its members dispersing among various factions based on their ideological leanings.

Jaysh al-Islam: A dominant power in Damascus’ suburbs among the most prominent factions that played a key role in the war was Jaysh al-Islam, headquartered in Douma (Eastern Ghouta, Damascus countryside). The group established control over most opposition-held areas surrounding Damascus, including Eastern Ghouta, Qalamoun, and even neighborhoods inside the capital such as Qaboun, Barzeh, and Jobar—reaching as far as Abbasid Square, one of Damascus’ key landmarks.

Jaysh al-Islam was a declared Salafi-jihadist group, which, by 2013, had amassed over 25,000 fighters. It possessed medium and heavy weaponry, including tanks, armored vehicles, and short- to mid-range missiles—as showcased in its 2015 military parade, where 1,700 fighters graduated.

Despite its Salafi-jihadist ideology, Jaysh al-Islam engaged in fierce battles against Jabhat al-Nusra (HTS’s predecessor), Faylaq al-Rahman (an ally of Nusra), and even ISIS. These internal conflicts weakened the group, yet it maintained cohesion until its leader, Zahran Alloush, was assassinated in a suspected Russian airstrike on December 26, 2015.

Like many other factions that collapsed after losing their leaders, Jaysh al-Islam failed to maintain its influence, despite receiving external support. It ultimately lost its territories, especially compared to HTS, which proved more resilient.

How HTS Survived Where Others Failed

Many factions, including Ahrar al-Sham, Jaysh al-Islam, and Liwa al-Tawhid, once outnumbered HTS (then Jabhat al-Nusra) and enjoyed greater material, media, and popular support. However, Nusra was designated a terrorist organization early on, leading to its international isolation. While this seemed like a disadvantage, it allowed HTS to consolidate power away from external interference.

Over time, as other factions splintered due to leadership losses, internal strife, and external pressure, HTS remained intact, strategically evolving. This resilience and adaptability—under Abu Mohammad al-Jolani’s leadership—ultimately positioned HTS as the dominant force, culminating in its rise to power in Syria’s new political landscape.

While most leaders of the armed opposition factions—such as Ahrar al-Sham, Jaysh al-Islam, and Liwa al-Tawhid—were preoccupied with competing for power in areas outside the control of Bashar al-Assad’s forces, Abu Mohammad al-Jolani (Ahmad al-Sharaa’) operated quietly and behind the scenes. He remained out of the public eye until 2016, when he announced his split from al-Qaeda, after which he once again withdrew from the spotlight.

Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), formerly known as Jabhat al-Nusra, was formed through both voluntary and forced alliances among several militant factions, including Jabhat Ansar al-Din, Nour al-Din al-Zenki Movement, Jaysh al-Sunna, and Liwa al-Haqq. It also absorbed a wide range of smaller al-Qaeda-linked factions, such as the Caucasus Emirate, the Turkistan Islamic Party, Jaysh al-Izza, and Jaysh al-Nasr. Like other militant groups, HTS underwent major transformations, splits, and internal shifts. However, what set it apart was its ability to adapt ideologically in response to local, regional, and international realities.

Unlike other factions that were forced into mergers for survival—such as Ahrar al-Sham, which combined with Nour al-Din al-Zenki under the name “Syrian Liberation Front”—HTS managed to maintain its organizational independence. In fact, rather than dissolving into other groups, it continued to absorb smaller al-Qaeda-affiliated factions, including Jabhat Ansar al-Din and Jaysh al-Nasr. As time passed, HTS grew stronger. By early 2019, after intense battles against Ahrar al-Sham, Nour al-Din al-Zenki, and other factions, it secured full control over Idlib Province, along with large parts of Aleppo, Hama, and Latakia.

Sami Mohammad, a former religious and military leader within HTS, explained that the most important factor behind the group’s survival was its independent decision-making, the charisma of Ahmad al-Sharaa’ (Jolani), and the strong discipline within its ranks. He emphasized the personal trust that Jolani built with both his commanders and fighters, noting that Jolani knew all his field commanders, even the lower-ranking ones, and met with them regularly. This personal involvement strengthened his position within the organization and fostered loyalty, unlike other factions that suffered from chaos and disorganized leadership.

Mohammad described HTS as a “true military academy,” in contrast to most Syrian opposition factions, which were structured around local or tribal affiliations. HTS, he explained, had a clear organizational hierarchy and centralized decision-making, ensuring strategic consistency.

Mohammad Ibrahim, also known as Abu Yahya al-Shami, a former military commander in an Islamist faction, noted that the key to HTS’s rise was its relative independence and its ability to break established political boundaries. He explained that most armed factions were directly tied to foreign states, forcing them to adhere to external agendas, whereas HTS was not directly controlled by any state. This allowed it more freedom to act in its own interests, even if that meant eliminating rival factions. He also pointed out that HTS’s designation as a terrorist organization worked in its favor, as it prevented major countries from openly engaging with it like they did with other factions. This, in turn, gave HTS greater flexibility in its decision-making, allowing it to maneuver more effectively and eliminate competitors.

Yahya emphasized that Jolani always pursued his own faction’s interests ruthlessly, unlike other rebel groups that often compromised or sought partial solutions. He argued that while Jolani fought with extreme determination and always aimed to win, many other factions settled for half-measures.

A leaked audio recording of Hassan al-Daghim, a former moral guidance officer in the Syrian National Army, further supports this view. In the recording, Daghim states that Jolani is a pragmatic leader who will sacrifice anything or anyone to achieve power. Abu Yahya concluded that Jolani’s practical experience came from Syria itself, as he was not originally this skilled. However, his ambition, ability to capitalize on victories, and lessons learned Abu from the mistakes of both ISIS and Nusra contributed to his success.

HTS’s dominance was not only due to military strategy but was also aided by religious legitimacy. Several influential clerics and political figures played a key role in legitimizing Jolani’s rule through religious rhetoric. Among them were Zaid al-Atar (Abu Aisha), a former HTS political liaison who later became Foreign Minister under the name Asaad al-Shaibani, and Abu Ahmad Hudud (Anas Khattab), a former security chief who is now head of HTS intelligence. These figures helped consolidate Jolani’s leadership, ensuring that HTS eliminated all potential challengers, leaving only its own government—the “Salvation Government”—as the ruling authority.

Ultimately, HTS’s tactical flexibility, military discipline, and ruthless pragmatism allowed it to outlast and surpass all other opposition factions. Unlike groups that were either fragmented by infighting or constrained by foreign backers, HTS retained control over its own fate. With the fall of the previous regime, it successfully transitioned from an opposition faction to the dominant force in post-war Syria, with its leadership now firmly established in Damascus.

Victory... A Shared Triumph

Alaa al-Din Ayoub, known as “Farouq Abu Bakr,” a former commander in the Free Syrian Army who led negotiations for the withdrawal of opposition factions from Aleppo in 2016, reflected on the past conflicts with Jabhat al-Nusra—later known as Fatah al-Sham and eventually Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). “We had our differences regarding how they dealt with the Free Syrian Army factions,” he said, “but we cannot deny that they were the most organized and well-trained among us. HTS focused on structuring its ranks and training its fighters, yet the recent victory cannot be attributed solely to them.”

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Ayoub emphasized that the success in repelling aggression resulted from multiple factors, both external and internal. International power struggles and geopolitical conflicts played a role, but so did the resilience of tens of thousands of fighters across revolutionary factions. However, he acknowledged that HTS stood out for its ability to seize opportunities better than others.

“We all remember the phase before HTS took control of Idlib and the battles it fought against other factions,” he continued. “In my opinion, the main reason it succeeded where others failed was the fragmentation of the opposition factions and their inability to present a unified, cohesive model.”

Fragmented Alliances

Regarding political formations, particularly the Syrian National Coalition—the political wing of the armed opposition that was tasked with negotiations before the fall of the regime—Ayoub pointed out that its creation was backed by Türkiye and other regional powers. As a result, most of its members and factions were beholden to the interests of the states that helped establish it.

Reflecting on the Syrian revolution’s fourteen-year history, Ayoub noted the emergence of various influential leaders with religious, grassroots, and revolutionary backgrounds. Figures like Zahran Alloush, Abdel Qader Saleh (leader of Liwa al-Tawhid), and Hassan Abboud (leader of Ahrar al-Sham) along with Abu Yazan al-Shami left a significant mark. Others, such as Jamal Maarouf, who led the Syria Revolutionaries Front before being eliminated by HTS in 2014, were eventually removed from the scene—either through assassination or political marginalization.

“In contrast,” Ayoub concluded, “Jolani was the luckiest of them all. After a period of hiding, he not only survived but ultimately prevailed. His past experience in Iraq, along with his security and military acumen, were key factors in his rise to power.”

 

 

 



Global Nuclear Arms Control under Pressure in 2026 

Russian Yars ICBMs travel through central Moscow, Russia, May 3, 2025. (AFP)
Russian Yars ICBMs travel through central Moscow, Russia, May 3, 2025. (AFP)
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Global Nuclear Arms Control under Pressure in 2026 

Russian Yars ICBMs travel through central Moscow, Russia, May 3, 2025. (AFP)
Russian Yars ICBMs travel through central Moscow, Russia, May 3, 2025. (AFP)

The fragile global legal framework for nuclear weapons control faces further setbacks in 2026, eroding guardrails to avoid a nuclear crisis.

The first half of the year will see two key events: the US-Russia bilateral treaty, New START, expires on February 5, and in April, New York hosts the Review Conference (RevCon) of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) -- the cornerstone of global nuclear security frameworks.

The RevCon, held every four to five years, is meant to keep the NPT alive. But during the last two sessions, the 191 signatory states failed to agree on a final document, and experts expect the same outcome in April.

"I think this is going to be a difficult RevCon," said Alexandra Bell, head of US-based global security nonprofit the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, at a UN-hosted online conference in early December.

"In terms of the current state and near future prospects of nuclear arms control architecture, things are bleak," she added.

Anton Khlopkov, director of Russian think-tank the Center for Energy and Security Studies (CENESS), took an even starker point of view, saying at the same event that "we are at the point of almost complete dismantlement of arms control architecture".

"We should be realistic in the current circumstances. At best, I think we should try to preserve what we have," he said.

- 'Crumbling' safeguards -

From US strikes on Iranian nuclear sites to Russia's test of the new Burevestnik nuclear-powered cruise missile and US President Donald Trump's remarks about possibly resuming nuclear tests -- the international nuclear landscape darkened in 2025.

At the same time, "the arms control architecture is crumbling", Emmanuelle Maitre of France's Foundation for Strategic Research (FRS) told AFP.

A key challenge hinges on a shift in global relations.

Nuclear control had been built over decades around a Moscow-Washington axis, but China's growing power and rapid technological advances have shifted the international playing field, which is simultaneously increasingly strained.

"The growing interlinkage between nuclear and conventional forces and the emergence of disruptive technologies (such as the US Golden Dome defense system and new hypersonic weapons) have transformed traditional nuclear deterrence into a multi-domain concept, especially in a multipolar world," said Peking University's Hua Han.

"This trilateral configuration introduces complexities far beyond the Cold War-era bilateral model. Increasing China-Russia cooperation further complicates deterrence calculations, particularly in the two main theaters of concern: Europe and the Asia-Pacific," she added, according to the minutes of an April event held by Pakistan's Center for International Strategic Studies.

A likely result of the changing landscape is the lapse of New START, which sets weapon limits and includes inspection systems.

"The entire inspection component is no longer functioning, the notifications when a missile is moved, etc, all of that has vanished. What remains is only the voluntary commitment to stay within the limits," said Maitre.

- 'Collective solutions' -

But allowing New START to lapse is "in American interest", according to Robert Peters of the influential Heritage Foundation, reflecting the stance of much of the US strategic community to avoid tying Washington's hands to Moscow alone.

Beijing, which currently has fewer weapons, has so far refused to engage in trilateral disarmament talks.

"China is the fastest growing nuclear power on the planet. It's building 100 new warheads a year and now has more ICBM (intercontinental ballistic missile) silos than the US has active Minuteman III silos," Peters said at a recent online International Institute for Strategic Studies event.

"New START does nothing to address" that issue, he added.

However, Maitre said, a New START lapse doesn't mean the world should expect serious consequences as early as February 6.

In both Washington and Moscow, "there is a small margin to bring some weapons back into service, but the numbers cannot be very significant. There are bottlenecks" that will slow any buildup, she said.

Nor will the lack of a final document from the RevCon cause "immediate or damaging consequences" to the NPT, she said.

But, she warned, fewer safeguards risks leaving the world without diplomatic tools to resolve tensions.

"The less functional the NPT becomes, the harder it is to forge collective solutions in the event of a crisis."


Iraq's Political Future in Limbo as Factions Vie for Power

FILED - 02 November 2025, Iraq, Najaf: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani delivers a speech during a campaign rally of his Reconstruction and Development Coalition in Najaf, ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held on 11 November 2025. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa
FILED - 02 November 2025, Iraq, Najaf: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani delivers a speech during a campaign rally of his Reconstruction and Development Coalition in Najaf, ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held on 11 November 2025. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa
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Iraq's Political Future in Limbo as Factions Vie for Power

FILED - 02 November 2025, Iraq, Najaf: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani delivers a speech during a campaign rally of his Reconstruction and Development Coalition in Najaf, ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held on 11 November 2025. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa
FILED - 02 November 2025, Iraq, Najaf: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia' al-Sudani delivers a speech during a campaign rally of his Reconstruction and Development Coalition in Najaf, ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections, scheduled to be held on 11 November 2025. Photo: Ameer Al-Mohammedawi/dpa

Political factions in Iraq have been maneuvering since the parliamentary election more than a month ago to form alliances that will shape the next government.

The November election didn't produce a bloc with a decisive majority, opening the door to a prolonged period of negotiations, said The Associated Press.

The government that eventually emerges will be inheriting a security situation that has stabilized in recent years, but it will also face a fragmented parliament, growing political influence by armed factions, a fragile economy, and often conflicting international and regional pressures, including the future of Iran-backed armed groups.

Uncertain prospects

Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani's party took the largest number of seats in the election. Al-Sudani positioned himself in his first term as a pragmatist focused on improving public services and managed to keep Iraq on the sidelines of regional conflicts.

While his party is nominally part of the Coordination Framework, a coalition of Iran-backed Shiite parties that became the largest parliamentary bloc, observers say it’s unlikely that the Coordination Framework will support al-Sudani’s reelection bid.

“The choice for prime minister has to be someone the Framework believes they can control and doesn't have his own political ambitions,” said Sajad Jiyad, an Iraqi political analyst and fellow at The Century Foundation think tank.

Al-Sudani came to power in 2022 with the backing of the Framework, but Jiyad said that he believes now the coalition “will not give al-Sudani a second term as he has become a powerful competitor.”

The only Iraqi prime minister to serve a second term since 2003 was Nouri al-Maliki, first elected in 2006. His bid for a third term failed after being criticized for monopolizing power and alienating Sunnis and Kurds.

Jiyad said that the Coordination Framework drew a lesson from Maliki “that an ambitious prime minister will seek to consolidate power at the expense of others.”

He said that the figure selected as Iraq's prime minister must generally be seen as acceptable to Iran and the United States — two countries with huge influence over Iraq — and to Iraq’s top Shiite cleric, Grand Ali al-Sistani.

Al-Sudani in a bind

In the election, Shiite alliances and lists — dominated by the Coordination Framework parties — secured 187 seats, Sunni groups 77 seats, Kurdish groups 56 seats, in addition to nine seats reserved for members of minority groups.

The Reconstruction and Development Coalition, led by al-Sudani, dominated in Baghdad, and in several other provinces, winning 46 seats.

Al-Sudani's results, while strong, don't allow him to form a government without the support of a coalition, forcing him to align the Coordination Framework to preserve his political prospects.

Some saw this dynamic at play earlier this month when al-Sudani's government retracted a terror designation that Iraq had imposed on the Lebanese Hezbollah militant group and Yemen’s Houthis— Iran-aligned groups that are allied with Iraqi armed factions — just weeks after imposing the measure, saying it was a mistake.

The Coalition Framework saw its hand strengthened by the absence from the election of the powerful Sadrist movement led by Shiite cleric Muqtada Sadr, which has been boycotting the political system since being unable to form a government after winning the most seats in the 2021 election.

Hamed Al-Sayed, a political activist and official with the National Line Movement, an independent party that boycotted the election, said that Sadr’s absence had a “central impact.”

“It reduced participation in areas that were traditionally within his sphere of influence, such as Baghdad and the southern governorates, leaving an electoral vacuum that was exploited by rival militia groups,” he said, referring to several parties within the Coordination Framework that also have armed wings.

Groups with affiliated armed wings won more than 100 parliamentary seats, the largest showing since 2003.

Other political actors

Sunni forces, meanwhile, sought to reorganize under a new coalition called the National Political Council, aiming to regain influence lost since the 2018 and 2021 elections.

The Kurdish political scene remained dominated by the traditional split between the Kurdistan Democratic Party and Patriotic Union of Kurdistan parties, with ongoing negotiations between the two over the presidency.

By convention, Iraq’s president is always a Kurd, while the more powerful prime minister is Shiite and the parliamentary speaker Sunni.

Parliament is required to elect a speaker within 15 days of the Federal Supreme Court’s ratification of the election result, which occurred on Dec. 14.

The parliament should elect a president within 30 days of its first session, and the prime minister should be appointed within 15 days of the president’s election, with 30 days allotted to form the new government.

Washington steps in

The incoming government will face major economic and political challenges.

They include a high level of public debt — more than 90 trillion Iraqi dinars ($69 billion) — and a state budget that remains reliant on oil for about 90% of revenues, despite attempts to diversify, as well as entrenched corruption.

But perhaps the most delicate question will be the future of the Popular Mobilization Forces, a coalition of militias that formed to fight the ISIS group as it rampaged across Iraq more than a decade ago.

It was formally placed under the control of the Iraqi military in 2016 but in practice still operates with significant autonomy. After the Hamas-led attack in southern Israel on Oct. 7, 2023 sparked the devastating war in Gaza, some armed groups within the PMF launched attacks on US bases in the region in retaliation for Washington’s backing of Israel.

The US has been pushing for Iraq to disarm Iran-backed groups — a difficult proposition, given the political power that many of them hold and Iran’s likely opposition to such a step.

Two senior Iraqi political officials, who spoke on condition of anonymity because they weren't authorized to comment publicly, said that the United States had warned against selecting any candidate for prime minister who controls an armed faction and also cautioned against letting figures associated with militias control key ministries or hold significant security posts.

“The biggest issue will be how to deal with the pro-Iran parties with armed wings, particularly those... which have been designated by the United States as terrorist entities,” Jiyad said.


What Egypt’s Red Lines Mean for Sudan’s War

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)
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What Egypt’s Red Lines Mean for Sudan’s War

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi holds talks with Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan in Cairo on Thursday (Egyptian Presidency)

In unusually blunt language, and following a visit by Sudan’s Sovereignty Council Chairman and army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan to Cairo, the Egyptian presidency issued a statement on the war in Sudan outlining three points it described as red lines.

It said Egypt would not allow any of them to be crossed or compromised, as they directly affect Egypt’s national security, which it said is inseparable from Sudan’s national security.

The reference to activating the joint defense agreement between the two countries was seen as a signal that Egypt could bring its military, political, and diplomatic weight to bear in support of the Sudanese army.

Joint defense agreement

In March 2021, Egypt signed a military cooperation agreement with Sudan that covers training, border security, and the confrontation of shared threats. That agreement followed a joint defense pact signed in 1976 during the presidencies of Sudan’s Gaafar Nimeiry and Egypt’s Anwar Sadat.

Articles One and Two of the pact stipulate that any attack on one party is considered an attack on the other, and require immediate consultation, including the use of armed force to repel aggression. The agreement also commits both sides to coordinating their defense and military policies on matters related to their national security.

After the fall of Nimeiry’s regime in the 1985 popular uprising, then Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi informed the Egyptian leadership of his desire to cancel the joint defense agreement. Instead, the two sides signed what became known as the Brotherhood Charter in 1987. While it did not explicitly cancel the 1976 agreement, its mechanisms have not been discussed or activated since then.

Regional and international messages

Sudanese journalist Osman Mirghani, editor-in-chief of Al-Tayar newspaper, said the Egyptian statements amounted to regional and international messages linked to recent developments and what he described as serious security threats facing Sudan.

He pointed to the expansion of the Rapid Support Forces in the Darfur and Kordofan regions in a way that threatens shared Sudanese and Egyptian national security, warning of risks of geographic fragmentation that could endanger Sudan’s unity.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Mirghani said Egypt was, for the first time, using direct and tough language and signaling the possibility of intervention under international law in Sudan’s conflict. He said this reflected the level of Egyptian concern over the situation in Sudan.

Mirghani added that the reference to red lines was a message directed at all parties, noting that there are many influential players in Sudan.

The red lines

The first red line cited by Cairo was the preservation of Sudan’s unity and territorial integrity, preventing any tampering with its resources or those of the Sudanese people, and rejecting the secession of any part of the country. Egypt reiterated its categorical refusal to the establishment or recognition of any parallel entities, saying such moves would undermine Sudan’s unity and territorial integrity.

The statement also stressed the need to preserve Sudanese state institutions and prevent any harm to them. Egypt affirmed its full right to take all necessary measures permitted under international law, including activating the joint defense agreement between the two brotherly countries, to ensure these red lines are not crossed.

Timing of the visit

Former Sudanese Foreign Minister Ali Youssef noted the timing of Burhan’s visit to Cairo, stating that it occurred after his trip to Saudi Arabia earlier this week and following a visit by Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman to the United States.

Youssef said the trip was part of efforts to end the war in Sudan through the Quartet mechanism, which includes Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and the United States.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Youssef said Burhan briefed Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi on the outcomes of his Saudi visit and the latest developments in Sudan.

He stated that the visit did not follow the usual ceremonial protocol and was a result of developments in the war, noting that Egypt’s security is linked to Sudan’s security. He added that Egypt is part of the Quartet, which seeks to end a war that is approaching its third year.

Military implications

Sudanese military expert Al-Muatasim Abdel Qader said activating the joint agreement would imply Egyptian intervention in various forms, including supplying weapons and ammunition or direct military involvement.

He said the provisions of the agreement obligate each army to defend the other, adding that the red lines outlined by the Egyptian presidency represented a significant step and carried major implications for the Sudanese state.

In remarks to Asharq Al-Awsat, Abdel Qader described mutual protection between the two countries as a historically rooted matter, dating back to wars Egypt fought in the last century in which Sudanese armed forces took part.

Rapid Support Forces response

Basha Tabiq, an adviser to the commander of the Rapid Support Forces, said in posts on X that Egypt’s position amounted to blatant interference, bias toward one party, and a colonial mindset that views Sudan as a backyard.

Another source aligned with the RSF said accusations against Egypt of backing the Sudanese army have persisted since the early days of the war. The source pointed to the presence of Egyptian forces at Merowe air base in northern Sudan at the start of the conflict, when several Egyptian soldiers and officers were captured before later being handed over to Cairo.

The source also cited accusations by RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, who said in October 2024 that the Egyptian army had carried out air strikes against his forces and supplied the Sudanese army with drones and training.

He said Hemedti renewed those accusations last June, alleging that Cairo supported the Sudanese army with aircraft flown by Egyptian pilots that bombed areas under his forces’ control, and supplied weapons and aviation fuel. Hemedti described this as a blatant aggression against the Sudanese people.

The source, who requested anonymity, said Egypt has been intervening in the war from the outset and that activating the joint defense agreement would merely formalize an existing reality.

No time to spare

Sudanese ambassador Al-Sadiq al-Maqli said Egypt is working with Saudi Arabia and the international Quartet, in coordination with the United States, to give fresh momentum to efforts on Sudan.

He said Washington is currently using soft power rather than force, which he described as an option deferred until shuttle diplomacy by US President’s senior adviser Massad Boulos is exhausted.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Maqli said the United States fully understands the influence of Saudi Arabia and Egypt and their ability to persuade and soften the stance of Sudan’s government, which has rejected the latest US initiative.

He said Burhan currently has no time to spare, as what is unfolding in Sudan represents the world’s worst humanitarian disaster, according to the international community.

Maqli noted that Egypt, represented by Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty, has been almost fully dedicated to making the Quartet mechanism succeed, given that the continuation of the current situation in Sudan poses a threat to Egypt’s national security.

He described Burhan’s visits to Riyadh and Cairo as short but necessary steps toward accepting the Quartet initiative, saying the Saudi visit marked a qualitative shift in the Sudanese government’s official position.

He added that Sudan’s foreign ministry later expressed Port Sudan’s readiness to cooperate with President Donald Trump, his secretary of state, and Boulos in efforts to achieve peace in Sudan, predicting imminent developments that could lead to a major breakthrough in the crisis.