Netanyahu-Trump Meeting Reveals Unexpected Gaps on Key Issues

 President Donald Trump, left, shakes hands with Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as he leaves the West Wing of the White House, Monday, April 7, 2025, in Washington. (AP)
President Donald Trump, left, shakes hands with Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as he leaves the West Wing of the White House, Monday, April 7, 2025, in Washington. (AP)
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Netanyahu-Trump Meeting Reveals Unexpected Gaps on Key Issues

 President Donald Trump, left, shakes hands with Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as he leaves the West Wing of the White House, Monday, April 7, 2025, in Washington. (AP)
President Donald Trump, left, shakes hands with Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as he leaves the West Wing of the White House, Monday, April 7, 2025, in Washington. (AP)

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu traveled to Washington this week for a hastily organized White House visit bringing a long list of concerns: Iran's nuclear program. President Donald Trump's tariffs. The surging influence of rival Türkiye in Syria. And the 18-month war in Gaza.

Netanyahu appeared to leave Monday's meeting largely empty-handed — a stark contrast with his triumphant visit two months ago. During an hourlong Oval Office appearance, Trump appeared to slap down, contradict or complicate each of Netanyahu's policy prerogatives.

On Tuesday, Netanyahu declared the meeting a success, calling it a “very good visit” and claiming successes on all fronts. But privately, the Israeli delegation felt it was a tough meeting, according to a person familiar with the matter who spoke on condition of anonymity in line with regulations.

Netanyahu “didn't hear exactly what he wanted to hear, so he returns back home with very little,” said Nadav Eyal, a commentator with the Yediot Ahronot daily, who added that the visit was still friendly, despite the disagreements.

Netanyahu's second pilgrimage to Washington under Trump's second term was organized at short notice and billed as an attempt to address the new US tariff regime. But it came at a pivotal time in Middle East geopolitics. Israel restarted the war in Gaza last month, ending a Trump-endorsed ceasefire, and tensions with Iran are rising over its nuclear program.

Netanyahu and his allies were thrilled with Trump's return to office given his strong support for Israel during his first term. This time around, Trump has not only nominated pro-Israel figures for key administration positions, he has abandoned the Biden administration's criticism of Israel's conduct in Gaza and the West Bank, and of Netanyahu's steps to weaken Israeli courts.

Monday's meeting showed that while Trump remains sympathetic to Israel, Netanyahu's relationship with the president during his second term is more complicated and unpredictable than he may have expected.

Here is a look at where Trump and Netanyahu appear to have diverged.

Netanyahu has long pushed for military pressure against Iran

With Netanyahu's strong encouragement, Trump in 2018 unilaterally withdrew the United States from the agreement between world powers and Iran over its nuclear program. That deal, negotiated by the Obama administration, put curbs on Iran's nuclear program. It was denigrated by Netanyahu because he said it did not go far enough to contain Iran or address Iran's support for regional militant groups.

Netanyahu has long maintained that military pressure was the best way to prevent Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons. Israel struck Iran last year in the countries' first direct conflict ever. But it did not target Iran's nuclear facilities, something Israel would likely need US military assistance to do in order to strike targets buried deep underground.

Trump has suggested, including on Monday, that the US could take military action if Iran doesn't agree to negotiate. But his announcement Monday that talks would take place between the US and Iran this weekend flew in the face of Netanyahu's hawkish views.

Netanyahu gave a tepid endorsement, noting that both leaders agree that Iran cannot develop a nuclear weapon. He said he would favor a diplomatic agreement similar to Libya's deal in 2003 to destroy its nuclear facilities and allow inspectors unfettered access. However, it is not clear if Trump will set such strict conditions.

Eyal said the announcement with Netanyahu by Trump's side was meant to show the transparency between the countries' leadership.

Netanyahu hoped for tariff relief and appeared to be rebuffed

A day before Trump's so-called Liberation Day unleashed global tariffs on the world last week, Israel preemptively announced that it would eliminate all levies on US goods. But that didn't spare Israeli products from being slapped with a 17% tariff by its largest trading partner.

Netanyahu was summoned to Washington ostensibly to make Israel's case against the levy. He was the first international leader to do so, in an encounter that may have set the stage for how other world leaders approach the tariffs.

While Trump repeatedly praised the Israeli leader, he did not appear to budge on Israel's share of the burden. Asked if he might change his mind, he said “maybe not.” He cited the billions of dollars the US gives Israel in military assistance each year — money that is seen as the bedrock of the US-Israel relationship and an insurance policy for US interests in the region.

“We give Israel $4 billion a year. That's a lot,” he said, as though to suggest Israel was already getting enough from the US, and congratulated Netanyahu on that achievement.

Netanyahu was told to be reasonable on Türkiye

Since the fall of the Assad dynasty in Syria late last year, Israel and Türkiye have been competing in the country over their separate interests there. Israel fears that Syria's new leadership will pose a new threat along its border. It has since taken over a buffer zone in Syrian territory and said it will remain there indefinitely until new security arrangements are made.

Türkiye has emerged as a key player in Syria, prompting concerns in Israel over the possibility of Türkiye expanding its military presence inside the country. Netanyahu said Tuesday that Turkish bases in Syria would be a “danger to Israel.”

Once strong regional partners, ties between Israel and Türkiye have long been frosty and deteriorated further over the war in Gaza. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been an outspoken critic of the war, prompting angry reactions from Israeli officials.

Netanyahu sought to hear support from his stalwart ally Trump on a country Israel perceives as increasingly hostile. Instead, Trump lavished praise on Erdogan for “taking over Syria,” positioned himself as a possible mediator between the countries and urged Netanyahu to be “reasonable” in his dealings with the country.

“Israel is not provided with a blank check here,” said Udi Sommer, an expert on US-Israel relations at Tel Aviv University. “There's no unconditional love here. It is contingent. It is contingent on Israel behaving a certain way.”

Trump wants the war in Gaza to end

While both addressed the ongoing war in Gaza and the Israeli hostages who remain held there, the topic appeared to take a backseat to other issues.

Netanyahu spoke of the hostages' plight and an emerging deal to free them, as well as the need to end the “evil tyranny of Hamas.” Trump sympathized with the hostages and made another pitch for his plan to “own” Gaza and remove its Palestinian population, a once fringe idea in Israeli discourse that has now found acceptance among mainstream politicians, including Netanyahu.

However, there were signs of differences on the horizon.

Netanyahu broke the ceasefire last month and has been under major pressure from his governing allies to keep up the fighting until Hamas is crushed. He has appeared to be in no rush to end the war or bring home the remaining hostages.

Trump, however, made it clear that he'd like to see the hostages freed and for the war to end. “And I think the war will stop at some point that won't be in the too distant future,” he said.



From Haftar to Dbeibah: The Map of Control and Influence in Libya

Haftar visits a military manufacturing facility (Libyan National Army) 
Haftar visits a military manufacturing facility (Libyan National Army) 
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From Haftar to Dbeibah: The Map of Control and Influence in Libya

Haftar visits a military manufacturing facility (Libyan National Army) 
Haftar visits a military manufacturing facility (Libyan National Army) 

Libya, once held together under the iron grip of Muammar Gaddafi, exploded into chaos after his ouster in 2011. Fourteen years later, the country remains fractured, yet a new map of military, political, and territorial control has emerged. It reflects not stability but shifting alliances, entrenched divisions, and the tug-of-war between rival powers vying for supremacy, from Khalifa Haftar in the east to Abdul Hamid Dbeibah in the west.

In 2014, General Khalifa Haftar, a former Gaddafi-era officer, launched a campaign to rebuild Libya’s disbanded army. As Tripoli and other western cities welcomed Islamist factions and extremist militias, Haftar began consolidating forces under a new banner -the Libyan National Army. Backed by the eastern-based House of Representatives, he was formally appointed commander-in-chief in 2015 by Speaker Aguila Saleh and was promoted to Field Marshal the following year.

Haftar’s supporters, such as Khaled Al-Turjuman, view this effort as a revival of the national military. What began as a force of just over 300 personnel has reportedly grown to more than 120,000 officers and soldiers. A recent military parade in Benghazi put this strength on full display, showcasing a broad arsenal of advanced weaponry. Haftar took the opportunity to issue a warning to rivals: “In the critical moment, the army will have the final word.”

Haftar’s influence extends beyond eastern Libya. His forces have consolidated control from Benghazi through Sirte and Jufra in the center, down to the southern borders with Sudan, Chad, Niger, and Algeria. One of the most strategically vital areas under his command is the oil crescent along the northeastern coast, encompassing Ras Lanuf, Sidra, Brega, and Zueitina, essential hubs for Libya’s oil exports.

Since 2019, Haftar has shifted his focus further south, targeting key cities such as Sabha, Brak al-Shati, and Ubari, and extending his reach to the far southwest in Ghat. He also controls southeastern border areas like Kufra, Al-Jawf, Al-Uwaynat, and the Tibesti Mountains near Chad. This southern push, some analysts argue, is part of a calculated strategy to project power beyond the traditional east-west divide. While Tripoli remains home to key sovereign institutions such as the Central Bank and National Oil Corporation, Haftar’s growing territorial grip has led critics to accuse him of attempting to militarize the state.

Military analyst Adel Abdul Kafi notes that most of Libya’s southern borders are now under Haftar’s effective control. He also points to a US-backed initiative involving joint forces from the east and west to secure Libya’s frontiers and coastlines.

Control over Libya’s energy resources remains a central pillar of Haftar’s power. Beyond the oil ports along the coast, he oversees several major oilfields in the south. The Sharara field in Ubari, producing approximately 315,000 barrels per day, and the El Feel (Elephant) field, with around 70,000 barrels daily, are among the most significant. Though these fields are managed by the National Oil Corporation headquartered in Tripoli, protection on the ground often comes from a patchwork of facility guards and local militias -- some loyal to Haftar, others to Dbeibah, and some switching sides as needed.

Haftar commands a network of military bases that support his campaigns in the east, center, and south. These include the Jufra Airbase, used as a launchpad during his failed 2019 offensive on Tripoli; Al-Khadim (also known as Al-Kharouba), where drone operations have been reported; Al-Abrag and Gamal Abdel Nasser airbases in the east; the Tamanhent base near Sabha; and Brak Al-Shati, which secures critical southern supply lines. Another strategic base, Ma’tan al-Sarra near Kufra, is rumored to host Russian forces, giving Moscow a potential gateway to the African Sahel.

Haftar’s military strength is matched by political clout. Though the eastern-based government of Osama Hammad is not internationally recognized, it operates with Haftar’s backing and funds development projects through the Libya Development and Reconstruction Fund, headed by Qassem Haftar, the commander’s son. Despite their expired mandates, the House of Representatives and the High Council of State continue to pass legislation and negotiate over the formation of a new government—deepening Libya’s institutional deadlock.

The Presidential Council, headed by Mohamed al-Menfi, was established under the 2020 Geneva agreement and holds formal international legitimacy. However, its actual power is limited. Though it is nominally the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, internal divisions and political agreements strip it of much of its authority. Even in the west, where it is based, the Council is overshadowed by the Government of National Unity under Abdul Hamid Dbeibah.

Dbeibah’s legitimacy has come under increasing scrutiny, especially after violent clashes erupted in Tripoli in May, sparked by the killing of militia leader Abdul Ghani Al-Kikli (Ghneiwa). These confrontations exposed the fragility of the security landscape in the capital and significantly weakened Dbeibah’s position. Though his term officially ended after being appointed in early 2021, he refuses to step down without elections, leaning on continued international support.

Despite controlling public spending and state institutions, Dbeibah’s grip on security is largely dependent on a volatile network of militias. Previously aligned with powerful groups like the Stability Support Apparatus and the Special Deterrence Force, Dbeibah has since fallen out with many of these factions. Following Ghneiwa’s death, he disbanded the SSA and entered into open conflict with Abdul Rauf Kara’s Deterrence Force, escalating tensions across Tripoli.

Today, Dbeibah relies primarily on the 444th Combat Brigade, led by Major General Mahmoud Hamza, who also heads Military Intelligence in western Libya. He is supported by the Joint Operations Force in Misrata and other militia groups, including Battalion 55 under Muammar Al-Dawi. These forces benefit from extensive support from Türkiye, which provides Bayraktar TB2 drones, limited radar systems, and military training facilities under prior agreements signed with former Prime Minister Fayez al-Sarraj.

Western Libya’s military infrastructure includes several important bases. Al-Watiya Airbase, southwest of Tripoli near the Tunisian border, is vital for control over the western region. Mitiga Airbase in Tripoli, currently controlled by the Deterrence Force, serves as a civilian and military airport. Abu Sitta Naval Base in Tripoli functions as the headquarters of the General Staff, with strong Turkish naval ties. Misrata Airbase, among the country’s most fortified, hosts Turkish personnel and hardware. Other key sites include Yarmouk Camp in Tripoli -- now reportedly housing Syrian mercenaries --April 7 Camp in Bab Ben Ghashir, and the Khums Naval Base near the city of Khums.

Tripoli remains the nerve center of Libya’s institutional framework, hosting the Unity Government, the Presidential Council, the High Council of State, the Central Bank, and the National Oil Corporation. Yet, control over western Libya’s border regions with Tunisia, Algeria, and Niger remains tenuous. In areas like Ubari, Ghat, and Murzuq -home to Tuareg and Tebu communities - authority shifts frequently among competing forces.

The frontline between the rival eastern and western coalitions lies just west of Sirte. Haftar’s forces control the city, while Dbeibah’s militias are stationed in its outskirts, near Misrata. Buwairat al-Husun marks the main demarcation line. Periodic troop mobilizations and skirmishes in the area fuel ongoing fears of a new confrontation.