From the PKK’s Mountain Ascent to Laying Down Arms

Abdullah Ocalan in 1992 (File Photo/AFP)
Abdullah Ocalan in 1992 (File Photo/AFP)
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From the PKK’s Mountain Ascent to Laying Down Arms

Abdullah Ocalan in 1992 (File Photo/AFP)
Abdullah Ocalan in 1992 (File Photo/AFP)

Nestled in the tri-border region between Iraq, Türkiye, and Iran, the Qandil Mountains have long been shrouded in myth. Difficult to reach due to geography and security, the legends surrounding them gradually took on the weight of truth—especially after Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) fighters established their base there in the early 1990s.

Now, the group is dismantling its structures and laying down arms, following a call by its jailed leader Abdullah Ocalan, who has been imprisoned on Türkiye’s Imrali Island since 1999.

After more than six weeks of attempts to reach PKK insiders in Ankara, Erbil, Sulaimaniyah, Berlin, London, Qamishli and Baghdad, this investigative report evolved from tracing the past and future of the Kurdish “revolutionary” group into a window onto a broader political standoff—one where neither side appears ready to offer trust or guarantees for lasting peace in a region scarred by decades of conflict.

Verifying the real story of Qandil proved one of the most complex challenges of this investigation. Contradictory narratives persist—between what the PKK presents as partial truth, and what is propagated by Turkish authorities or rival Kurdish factions. But despite the scarcity of independent sources, eyewitnesses and individuals close to the Qandil story helped piece together the clearest picture yet of what is unfolding under the shadow of those mountains.

When the late Iraqi President Jalal Talabani met his Turkish counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdogan in March 2008 to discuss the fate of the PKK, the conversation took a sharp turn.

“I am Recep Tayyip Erdogan, not a prophet,” the Turkish leader said, according to Kamran Qaradaghi, a close adviser to Talabani who was present during the meeting.

At the time, Qaradaghi had stepped down as chief of staff at the Iraqi presidency but joined Talabani on the visit to Ankara at the president’s request “to make use of his ties with the Turks,” as Qaradaghi recalls.

Talabani had sought clear answers from Erdogan about the PKK, which Ankara considers a terrorist group. The question he posed was blunt: “Mr. Erdogan, if thousands of fighters come down from Qandil Mountain and we send them into Türkiye, where would they go — to prison, or to their homes?”

According to Qaradaghi, Talabani never got a straight answer.

Qaradaghi recalled the shift in Talabani’s tone as Erdogan refused to give a clear answer about whether PKK militants laying down arms would face prison or freedom.

Realizing he had hit a wall, Talabani changed tactics.

“Are you a good Muslim, Mr. Erdogan?” he asked.

“Of course,” Erdogan replied without hesitation.

“And do you follow the example of the Prophet Muhammad?” Talabani continued.

“No true Muslim would not,” Erdogan responded, now looking slightly perplexed.

Then came Talabani’s clincher: “So why don’t you do what the Prophet did, as the Qur’an says: ‘Enter in peace, secure and safe’?”

Erdogan shot back: “I am Recep Tayyip Erdogan, not the Prophet Muhammad.”

The 2008 meeting between Erdogan and Talabani ended without a breakthrough. Back then, PKK fighters holed up in the Qandil Mountains—where the borders of Iraq, Türkiye

and Iran converge—were already growing disillusioned after three failed ceasefire attempts with the Turkish state.

Seventeen years later, on February 27, 2025, jailed Kurdish leader Abdullah Ocalan issued a dramatic call: he urged the PKK, which he founded, to lay down arms, end its armed struggle with Ankara and dissolve the group altogether.

But many of those interviewed by Asharq Al-Awsat for this report—revisiting key moments in the decades-old Kurdish-Turkish conflict—say the process is likely to be long and fraught with uncertainty.

Even the most hardline among them, including self-described Stalinists, admit the world, and particularly the Middle East, is undergoing unprecedented change.

The physical distance between Ankara and the Qandil Mountains is around 1,000 miles. But the political gap between Erdogan and the PKK’s mountain leadership may be even wider.

PKK cadres believe the ball is now in Erdogan’s court. Yet the Turkish president, known for absorbing high expectations, appears to be playing for time—signaling he wants more before offering a definitive response.

And history suggests the wait could stretch even further. It has before.

This time, Ocalan appears serious about disarmament. The jailed Kurdish leader, once a Marxist revolutionary, has shifted ideologically—embracing the decentralist philosophy of Murray Bookchin—and is said to have been worn down by years of isolation.

“He’s a political actor who learns, adapts and evolves,” said one source familiar with his thinking.

Erdogan, by contrast, is seen as seeking a major victory—“but on his own terms,” according to multiple figures with knowledge of the PKK file in Ankara and Qandil, both supporters and critics.

Black Box

The Qandil Mountains have long been wrapped in myth. With access restricted by both security concerns and forbidding geography, folklore often fills the void left by the lack of verifiable facts. Among the most persistent claims: that PKK fighters recruit children and abduct young men and women into their ranks.

PKK supporters dismiss such accusations as part of a “propaganda war deeply rooted in Turkish state policy.” But security and political officials in both Erbil and Ankara insist the allegations are credible.

Mohammed Arsan, a Kurdish writer sympathetic to the PKK, claims intelligence agencies have worked hard to craft a narrative aimed at discrediting the group. “This is an orchestrated campaign,” he said.

The PKK first arrived in the mountains in 1991, according to Qaradaghi, who joined the Kurdish revolution in the mid-1970s and later observed the rugged Qandil range up close.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, he said the group capitalized on the chaos following the First Gulf War and the Kurdish uprising against Saddam Hussein’s regime.

“But the real expansion came after 1992,” Qaradaghi said, “when fighters slipped through Iranian territory and crossed the Turkish border, eventually establishing themselves in Qandil.”

Kurdish fighters quickly realized they had secured a rare strategic position in the Qandil Mountains — a natural fortress.

“It’s a harsh, fortified terrain, nearly impossible for ground forces to penetrate,” said Qaradaghi, a longtime observer of the region.

Reaching the area from the nearby town of Raniya, northeast of Sulaimaniya, requires crossing seven mountain peaks on foot, he added — a journey that highlights the natural defenses the group came to rely on.

Much like traditional Leninist parties, the PKK initially structured itself around a rigid ideological core, guided by Ocalan from his prison cell on Imrali Island, where he has been held since 1999.

Over time, however, the group evolved.

“The structure became more flexible,” said Kamal Jumani, a Kurdish journalist based in Europe who specializes in PKK affairs and has visited Qandil multiple times.

“The PKK began as a Marxist-Leninist organization but gradually developed its own independent ideology—democratic confederalism,” he said.

Qandil, he added, serves as the party’s de facto headquarters—“the place where its political and military strategies are shaped and executed.”

At the top of the PKK is the Executive Council of the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK), an umbrella organization that encompasses the PKK and its sister parties in Türkiye, Syria, Iraq, and Iran, according to Jumani.

The KCK oversees strategic decision-making and political coordination across these branches. In line with the PKK’s gender equality principles, it operates under a co-leadership model, headed jointly by Cemil Bayik and Bese Hozat.

On the military front, the People’s Defense Forces (HPG) serve as the PKK’s armed wing. The unit was led for years by veteran commander Murat Karayilan, while Bahoz Erdal has played a prominent historical role. In addition to military operations, the HPG also implements key decisions—from diplomacy to local governance—in areas under the party’s influence.

Over time, the PKK’s decision-making process has shifted, shaped by Ocalan’s ideological vision of democratic confederalism. “The party is now run collectively from Qandil,” Jumani said.

Qandil: A Regional Watchtower

Nearly five decades after first trekking through Qandil in 1974, Qaradaghi still recalls the mountain range as a kind of “paradise” for eco-tourism—a land of rare birds, wild abundance, and untapped mineral wealth nestled within the offshoots of the Zagros Mountains.

Back then, he climbed seven peaks on foot from the town of Raniya, northeast of Sulaimaniya, to reach the remote terrain. “It’s a rugged, fortified region,” Qaradaghi told Asharq Al-Awsat. “It was hard to reach—and easy to hold.”

Qandil lies at the heart of what was once known as “Greater Kurdistan.”

Historically, it served as a borderland between the Ottoman Empire and Persia’s Badfars province. Today, it functions as a regional watchtower, perched at the intersection of Iraq, Türkiye and Iran.

With the arrival of PKK fighters in the early 1990s, Qandil was transformed. What began as a guerrilla outpost grew into a self-contained enclave—complete with a command hierarchy and sprawling infrastructure.

The group established schools to teach the ideology of Ocalan, along with medical depots, training camps, political offices, and media hubs. There are courts, prisons, and facilities to prepare operatives for missions abroad.

According to PKK sympathizer Arsan, the group built at least seven cemeteries in Qandil, the oldest two within the mountains and the rest scattered between Zab and the broader Zagros range. He estimates that more than 1,000 PKK fighters are buried there.

Today, around 5,000 militants remain in the mountains, although the International Crisis Group places the number closer to 7,000.

Demographically, Qandil’s fighters reflect the broader Kurdish diaspora, drawing members from Türkiye, Iraq, Iran and Syria. A Kurdish intelligence officer in Erbil said this diversity influences internal dynamics.

“Iranian and Syrian recruits tend to focus on their own countries’ issues, unlike the more hardline Turkish and Iraqi cadres,” the officer said.

But a senior PKK official rejected that view. “The PKK’s decisions are made pragmatically,” he said. “They depend on region, country, political context, and the party’s interest. We adapt to where we operate.”

Around Qandil, many describe the range as the capital of a fully formed partisan society—home to partizans, a term used for members of resistance and guerrilla movements.

‘Mountain law’: Inside the PKK’s Strict Code of Armed Struggle

Qandil has become more than just a stronghold — it is a fortress for partizans governed by the unwritten rules of armed struggle.

“Everything runs according to guerrilla warfare discipline,” said Jabar al-Qadir, a Kurdish researcher from Kirkuk. “Movements like these rely on guerrilla tactics, especially in rugged terrain.”

Former affiliates familiar with life inside Qandil described it as a world ruled by rigid systems — “like living in a real-life version of Squid Game,” one said, requesting anonymity.

“Every mistake has consequences. Every act of betrayal leads to punishment. The solitary cells were rarely empty.”

The PKK’s internal discipline is enforced through what is often referred to as “mountain law,” a strict code that governs behavior, loyalty, and dissent.

In a 2007 interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, Osman Ocalan — brother of the PKK founder— revealed he had been imprisoned for three years within Qandil, including three months in solitary confinement, after proposing reforms to the party’s structure.

Osman was later publicly denounced by PKK military commander Duran Kalkan, a Turkish national, who called him “defeatist” in a statement to the pro-PKK Firat news agency.

Strict regulations govern nearly every aspect of life in the mountains. Romantic relationships, sexual activity, and even marriage are banned. According to the PKK’s internal doctrine, emotional attachment is seen as a distraction from revolutionary struggle and a threat to collective discipline.

“There’s an official manual,” one source said. “Love is treated as a weakness that undermines the cause.”

The Syrian front: Erdal’s Shadow over the Kurdish Fight against ISIS

On the Syrian front, Mazloum Abdi — commander of the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) — is widely seen as a protégé of Bahoz Erdal, one of the PKK’s most prominent military leaders.

Abdi, a Syrian Kurd, came under Erdal’s wing in his early twenties, according to a PKK source in Qandil. “He left the PKK and returned to Syria in September 2014, when ISIS began attacking Kurdish towns and villages,” the source said.

But the enduring connection between the two men has fueled speculation — and contradictions — about Erdal’s influence over Kurdish affairs in Syria. Some believe he played a pivotal role in empowering the Democratic Union Party (PYD), the PKK’s Syrian affiliate, since its founding in 2003.

Kurdish activists inside and outside the PKK sphere say Erdal often falls into contradictions when assessing the situation in Syria.

Just five months after Syria’s uprising began in 2011, Erdal declared that “Bashar al-Assad and his supporters have lost all legitimacy.”

That statement came at a time when Syrian Kurds were rising up in force, galvanized by the assassination of prominent Kurdish opposition figure Mashaal Tammo in October 2011.

In the months that followed, forces loyal to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad pulled out of Kurdish towns and villages in the country’s north, leaving a power vacuum.

Stepping in were units affiliated with the PYD, which swiftly moved to establish what it called “administrative entities” — a framework that became the backbone of Kurdish self-rule in Syria.

The PYD, often described as the Syrian sibling of the PKK, is ideologically aligned with Qandil through the umbrella of the KCK, the transnational network that links Kurdish movements in Türkiye, Syria, Iraq and Iran.

A Kurdish intelligence officer familiar with the PKK file says the Assad regime’s withdrawal from Kurdish areas in northern Syria was not a retreat, but part of a tacit deal.

“Handing over those areas to the PYD was a calculated move,” he said. “In return, the party stayed neutral during the Syrian uprising and distanced itself from other Kurdish factions.”

At the start of the 2011 revolution, Syrian Kurds were eager to rise up. Under Assad’s rule, many lived without basic civil rights.

Even simple acts—such as holding a Kurdish wedding with traditional dabkeh dancing—required prior approval from state security. Newborns couldn’t be given Kurdish names; the state would assign Arabic ones instead.

In a previous interview, Erdal claimed he did not return to Syria after the uprising—except briefly in 2014 for “family reasons.” But that year also marked the rise of the People’s Protection Units (YPG), the PYD’s armed wing, which later formed the backbone of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).

Erdal’s role in Syria has remained deliberately ambiguous. He is believed to have been instrumental in shaping the PKK’s military strategy and establishing its combat units. Some reports even claim he helped form covert armed groups such as the Kurdistan Freedom Hawks (TAK), which carried out suicide car bombings in Türkiye over the past two decades.

A PKK source in Qandil denies any connection. “That theory is impossible,” he said. “The Hawks see the PKK as not radical enough to respond to Türkiye’s attacks or to break Ocalan out of prison.”

Ocalan, often referred to as “Apo”—meaning “uncle” in Kurdish and Turkish—remains the symbolic leader of the broader Kurdish movement.

Iran

Iran was not part of the picture when the PKK was founded. It began as a Marxist movement fighting for a “Greater Kurdistan,” then shifted to demands for “autonomy,” and now champions a “democratic confederation.” But its path into the regional equation began not through Tehran, but Damascus.

Following Türkiye’s 1980 military coup led by General Kenan Evren, PKK fighters fled to Syria and Lebanon. There, they quickly became part of the region’s anti-imperialist bloc. Ironically, PKK founder Ocalan lived in the same apartment building as Türkiye’s military attaché in Damascus, according to late Syrian Vice President Abdel Halim Khaddam, who told a Turkish TV station in 2011: “No one would have imagined he was living there.”

The PKK’s early ties to Iran were not direct but routed through Hafez al-Assad’s Syria, which hosted Ocalan and allowed the group to run training camps near Lebanon’s Beqaa Valley.

In 1992, a year after Iraq’s Kurds rose up against Saddam Hussein, the United States and its allies enforced the so-called “Line 36” no-fly zone to protect Kurdish areas in northern Iraq. But tensions among the Kurds themselves remained.

The two main Kurdish parties in Iraq—the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) led by Jalal Talabani and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) headed by Masoud Barzani—joined forces to fight the PKK in the Qandil mountains. “Some 2,000 PKK fighters surrendered,” said Qaradaghi.

“They were brought down from the mountains and Talabani sent them to Zaleh,” a region in western Iran near the Iraqi-Kurdish border.

Sensing an opportunity, Iran moved quickly. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) offered the wounded fighters food, medicine, and training. Once recovered, Qaradaghi said, they were routed back to Qandil through a path that looped around the Turkish-Iraqi-Iranian triangle—back to the same mountains Talabani had emptied.

But Iranian support came with strings attached. Tehran expected the PKK’s Iranian offshoot, PJAK, to refrain from carrying out attacks inside Iran.

Was Talabani wrong to choose Zaleh as a haven for the defeated PKK fighters? Qaradaghi argues the late president’s decision was strategic. Talabani had initially planned to house them in a heavily fortified military base between Sulaymaniyah and Dukan, “but he feared Turkish airstrikes. So he opted for Zaleh,” which Turkish jets would avoid striking for fear of violating Iranian airspace.

PKK and Iran: A Shadowy Alliance

The PKK’s relationship with Iran is cloaked in secrecy, shaped by an intricate web of people, places and overlapping interests. Over the years, Turkish and Kurdish media outlets such as Darka Mazi—meaning “Path of Hope” in Kurdish—have circulated claims that Tehran struck a deal with the PKK as early as 1986.

Independent journalistic sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that no formal agreement exists, but rather a series of tactical understandings over the years, benefiting both sides.

For Iran, the PKK represents a double-edged sword: a destabilizing nationalist movement with potential to stir unrest among Iran’s own Kurdish population, yet also a strategic buffer against Turkish ambitions in the tri-border region linking Iran, Iraq and Türkiye.

“There’s no written agreement,” said Kurdish analyst Jabbar Qadir. “But the two sides share positions that have led to a kind of quiet coordination.” Iran, he added, has offered logistical concessions that avoid provoking Ankara, while the PKK has largely refrained from causing trouble on Iranian soil—even though it established an Iranian offshoot, PJAK, whose mandate includes countering the influence of the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran.

Qadir situates the PKK’s role within what is now referred to as the “Axis of Resistance,” a term Iran uses to describe its regional alliance. Still, he insists the group has not become an Iranian proxy. “The PKK has its own financial means and procures its weapons independently. It’s not reliant on Iranian funding like Tehran’s other militias.”

Tensions flared in 2010 and 2011 when PJAK stepped up its attacks on Iranian forces, prompting heavy retaliation. But the eruption of Syria’s civil war in 2011 created new priorities. Both sides needed to conserve strength and focus on their respective agendas in Syria, leading to a quiet de-escalation pact.

By late 2015, the PKK’s standing within the Axis of Resistance had shifted dramatically amid the battles against ISIS. A senior Shi’ite commander in an Iran-backed faction said Iranian officials were struck by the PKK’s discipline and combat effectiveness.

“They viewed the PKK fighters as more organized, committed and fierce than others—almost on par with Hezbollah,” he said. “Their fierce battles to liberate Sinjar from ISIS even impressed the US-led coalition, which began coordinating with them.”

As ISIS spread deeper into Iraq, Qassem Soleimani—the powerful IRGC commander—coordinated PKK operations within a broad network of militias stretching from Iraq’s Popular Mobilisation Forces to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Kurdish fighters were deployed along critical supply corridors linking Iran to Lebanon’s Beqaa Valley.

The most sensitive stretch lies along the horizontal axis between Qandil, Sinjar and northeastern Syria. Sources familiar with the matter say the PKK capitalised on its central role in Sinjar’s liberation and its alliance with local Yazidi groups. Together, they formed an armed force known as the Sinjar Protection Units, or YBS.

The Final Act: How Ocalan’s Vision Shifted After Decades in Isolation

Few expected it. When the PKK announced its 12th Congress would be held on May 5–7, 2025, it marked a stunning departure from the group’s long-standing secrecy. What would once have been a covert meeting of a handful of cadres turned into a historic public gathering of hundreds of party leaders.

“The world is changing, and the PKK had to listen—even if reluctantly,” said Deniz Caner, a Turkish researcher close to the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP).

But how did Ocalan, the party’s jailed leader, arrive at this moment—more than four decades after launching an armed struggle? Qadir, who met Ocalan in Damascus in the mid-1990s “at the height of his leadership,” believes that over 25 years in prison forced a deep rethinking. “He came to see his party’s model as rooted in Cold War logic,” Qadir said, referencing Öcalan’s latest message to supporters.

Caner, who has closely tracked the group’s ideological evolution, described the PKK’s transformation as cyclical: “The party sheds its skin every 20 years. It has already undergone two major transitions, and this is the third—shaped by the Iran-Iraq war, the fall of Saddam Hussein, the rise of Iraqi Kurdistan, the Arab Spring, the emergence of ISIS, and the Syrian revolution.”

Shwan Taha, a former Kurdish MP and academic who served in Iraq’s federal parliament from 2006 to 2010, said Ocalan’s change of heart also reflected shifts in modern warfare. “He came to realize that the mountains of Qandil stand no chance in an age of technological warfare,” he said. Taha added that Ocalan was also likely influenced by the Beirut suburb “Pager Operation,” after which Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah was assassinated.

“Dissolving the party,” Taha said, “could ultimately save the Kurds from disappearing forever.”

Other factors also played a role in Ocalan’s apparent pivot. According to Qaradaghi, two key developments shaped his decision: “First, the deep isolation of his detention in İmralı prison. And second, that this peace overture came not from Erdogan, as in the past, but from Devlet Bahceli”—leader of Türkiye’s far-right Nationalist Movement Party.

It appears Ocalan is not the only one undergoing a shift—or being compelled to. On the other side, Erdogan may also need a new dynamic to secure a constitutional change that would allow him to seek a third presidential term. That would require forging broader, more agile alliances—an unlikely feat without a sweeping, multi-party deal.

Such a deal would need to satisfy nationalists seeking cultural and economic reforms, and Kurds demanding a greater political role—many of whom increasingly lean toward opposition parties.

Still, Caner disagrees with the theory that Erdogan is simply maneuvering for internal gains. “Erdogan isn’t chasing victory just to offset domestic crises,” she said.

Lowering the Qandil Flag

PKK officials have offered shifting explanations for their disarmament. Over time, their rhetoric moved from giving up arms to halting war while keeping weapons in reserve—coupled with hardline statements from affiliated parties like Iran’s PJAK.

Yet the greatest operational freedom remains in Syria, where the Kurdish-led SDF is seen by analyst Shwan Taha as “the biggest winner”—the surviving offspring, as he put it, “after the mother was sacrificed.”

From the outset, Qadir predicted that PKK leaders in the Qandil Mountains would prolong the disarmament phase until Türkiye took concrete steps to recognize Kurdish cultural rights.

According to Arsan, Ocalan set clear conditions: constitutional amendments to grant cultural rights, legislation to enable the PKK’s transition into legal politics in Türkiye—and, above all, his own release.

“No fighter will give up their weapon unless those conditions are met,” Arsan said. Some PKK commanders reportedly heard directly from Ocalan that “Erdogan agreed to everything.”

Such hopes, however, may be overly optimistic, says Caner. “Meeting demands like these is unlikely,” she said, adding that “even if a genuine deal emerges, implementation could take years.”

Independent media sources say surprises remain possible. “At most,” one source noted, “Ocalan may be moved to a more suitable house on İmralı Island—under tight security.”

PKK spokesman Zagros Hiwa denied any formal agreement with the Turkish state, written or otherwise. “These are unilateral goodwill gestures aimed at finding a democratic solution to the Kurdish issue,” he said.

The Fate of the Mountain and the Gun

When asked about the future of the Qandil Mountains after a potential PKK withdrawal, Hiwa said: “These historic heights could play a decisive role not just for the Kurdish people, but for the peoples of the Middle East as a whole.”

But Jabbar Qadir warned that both regional governments and the international coalition fear that, if vacated, Qandil could become a haven for extremists. Iran, in particular, “is working to prevent hostile groups from taking root there,” he said.

Ankara, for its part, appears unwilling to jeopardize fragile progress. Iran’s influence in the talks between Ocalan and Erdogan has become largely peripheral.

Caner estimated that about 30% of the PKK’s positions in Qandil lie within Iranian territory, where several of the group’s top leaders are based. Resolving this sensitive piece of the puzzle may require “military intervention inside Iran with US and Israeli backing—an unpredictable scenario,” she said.

At the individual level, options include reintegrating fighters into their home countries—Türkiye, Iraq, Syria, and Iran—or relocating them to a European country willing to take them in. In Türkiye, however, around 50 senior PKK figures are blacklisted from return and will not be included in any reintegration lists.

Throughout this 40-year story, Ocalan has been both its beginning and end. The man who once scattered clandestine pamphlets in Ankara and Istanbul in the mid-1970s—while envisioning a “Greater Kurdistan”—is now scripting the closing act for Qandil.

Asked what the PKK stands to gain from peace, sources repeatedly answered: “The Kurdish fighter is simply tired of war.” But none of this might have happened had Ocalan not decided to lay down the mountain’s guns and embrace the kind of pragmatism he long mastered.

In a final message to this investigation, spokesman Hiwa sounded far from optimistic: “Türkiye will not change its mindset toward the Kurds, and it has done nothing that matches Ocalan’s initiative.”

Hiwa’s tone echoed the bitter history of failed ceasefires and aborted reconciliations. Yet Qaradaghi still hopes to one day return to the seven peaks he visited half a century ago—this time as a tourist.

Others fear they may never hear another word from Ocalan again—his voice silenced on an island in the Sea of Marmara, whose waves have long kept the secrets and sorrows of the Turkish people.



Floods, Drought Raise Questions over Türkiye’s Tigris, Euphrates Leverage

The Ataturk Dam on the Euphrates River sparked a Türkiye -Syria crisis in the 1990s. (Turkish State Hydraulic Works website)
The Ataturk Dam on the Euphrates River sparked a Türkiye -Syria crisis in the 1990s. (Turkish State Hydraulic Works website)
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Floods, Drought Raise Questions over Türkiye’s Tigris, Euphrates Leverage

The Ataturk Dam on the Euphrates River sparked a Türkiye -Syria crisis in the 1990s. (Turkish State Hydraulic Works website)
The Ataturk Dam on the Euphrates River sparked a Türkiye -Syria crisis in the 1990s. (Turkish State Hydraulic Works website)

Floods that swept northern and eastern Syria in early June, along with a rise in the Euphrates River after heavy rain and increased flows from Türkiye, have revived questions about the water crisis in Syria and Iraq, and whether Türkiye is using the Tigris and Euphrates as a political and security pressure card.

The crisis between Türkiye, Iraq and Syria centers on how to share the waters of the two rivers. Türkiye, the upstream state, controls the main tributaries. Its water policies and expanding dam network have sharply reduced flows, worsened drought and pushed water levels to near-catastrophic lows, especially in Iraq, which has faced its worst drought in more than 80 years.

Türkiye says the Tigris and Euphrates are transboundary rivers and that it has the right to manage them under its territorial sovereignty. Iraq and Syria want them classified as international rivers, with fair-sharing rules and international law applied under historic agreements, including the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne and joint cooperation protocols.

Mismanagement or resource depletion?

Türkiye has been accused of using water as leverage against Iraq and Syria for security reasons, mainly linked to the Kurdistan Workers Party, or PKK, and its extensions inside both countries. Those tensions later widened into Turkish air and ground operations in the two neighboring states, leaving a Turkish military presence that has long caused friction, especially between Ankara and Baghdad.

Several issues drive the crisis. The most important is Türkiye’s Southeastern Anatolia Project, designed to develop eastern and southeastern Türkiye. Under the project, Türkiye built major dams and reservoirs, including the Ataturk, Keban and Ilisu dams, to regulate irrigation and generate power. That sharply reduced the water reaching Syria and Iraq, the transit and downstream states.

The impact has been especially severe in Iraq. Water scarcity has battered agriculture, shrunk farmland, damaged the southern marshes listed as a World Heritage site and triggered repeated social and environmental crises.

Lower flows have also hit hydroelectric power generation and drinking water supplies for millions of people. In Syria, drought periods have raised the risks of pollution and disease.

Diplomatic efforts have surfaced from time to time. The countries have reached understandings, joint agreements and bilateral, and sometimes trilateral, memorandums of understanding to secure the minimum vital needs of each state. During severe droughts, Iraq and Syria have also tried to persuade Türkiye to increase flows. Türkiye insists it is a water-poor country and says Iraq’s crisis stems from local mismanagement and poor resource use, not from Turkish dams.

In Mesopotamia, water has rarely been just a natural resource. It has been a foundation of civilization, a source of conflict and, at times, a key to reconstruction and joint development. That was reflected in the Iraq-Türkiye framework agreement on water and development signed in November 2025.

What the Tigris brings together, the Euphrates drives apart

Turkish writer and water affairs researcher Bilgay Duman said the agreement, whose full terms have not been disclosed, marked an important development not only in Ankara-Baghdad relations, but also in redefining how shared resources are managed in the Middle East.

Duman said that after Türkiye, Iraq and Syria emerged as states, regulating the use of resources became a political and legal necessity. It also became a permanent source of dispute. The Euphrates turned into a three-way issue, while the Tigris became central to Turkish-Iraqi relations.

Early attempts were made to agree on water shares. The 1921 Ankara Agreement and the 1946 agreement between Türkiye and Iraq laid technical foundations for cooperation, including data sharing and flood control.

Later came the 1987 Syrian-Turkish agreement, a temporary deal to share Euphrates waters during the five-year filling of the Ataturk Dam reservoir.

Signed on July 17, 1987, the agreement committed Türkiye to provide an annual average of more than 500 cubic meters per second at the Turkish-Syrian border until a final arrangement was reached among the three Euphrates states.

On April 17, 1989, Syria and Iraq signed an agreement setting Iraq’s share at 9.106 billion cubic meters a year through the Syrian border, Syria’s share at 6.627 billion cubic meters and Türkiye’s at 15.700 billion cubic meters.

Syria registered its agreement with Türkiye at the United Nations in 1994 to secure its minimum share, and Iraq’s, of Euphrates waters. But that did not solve the problem.

Water for the PKK

As accusations grew that Türkiye was using water to pressure its neighbors, squeeze Kurds in Syria and push Iraq to act against the PKK and classify it as a terrorist organization, the 1997 UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses set out the principles of no harm and equitable distribution.

It also required states to consider the water, economic and social needs of all riparian countries, as well as the needs of populations dependent on the watercourse and its direct and possible effects.

The convention strengthened Iraq and Syria’s legal position against Türkiye because both countries have large areas along the Tigris and Euphrates. Syria was among the first states to ratify it. Türkiye did not join, saying it harmed its interests and water rights, and voted against its adoption.

Syria, where the Euphrates irrigates more than 640,000 hectares, did not turn to international arbitration to secure its water rights from Türkiye. International law remains inconclusive in such cases, and arbitration requires both sides to agree.

Syrian support for the PKK, and its decision to allow the group’s fighters to use northern Syria as a rear base, pushed Türkiye into a harder position and led Ankara to link that support to the water dispute.

In 1993, Turkish-Syrian talks were held in Ankara to reach a final agreement on water shares. They produced nothing beyond the temporary 1987 arrangement, which was tied only to the filling of Lake Ataturk.

The same period saw Syria and Türkiye sign a joint development agreement on the Orontes River, which rises in Lebanon’s upper Bekaa Valley. Türkiye had been excluded from sharing the river with Syria and Lebanon in 1994. Giving up its share was a small price for greater benefit from the Euphrates.

Only 10% of the Orontes reached Türkiye’s Hatay province, and by then it was polluted and unusable. For decades, residents of the province bordering Syria, historically known as the Sanjak of Alexandretta, saw central government policies as unfair and blamed them for marginalizing the area and depriving it of a natural resource for political, ethnic and religious reasons.

Syrian revolution, Turkish opportunity

After the Syrian uprising against Bashar al-Assad began, Türkiye moved quickly to complete the Sanliurfa water canals project in 2012. The canals allowed water held at the Ataturk Dam to irrigate the border plains with Syria in Harran, Mardin and Ceylanpinar. The Silvan Dam was also filled in 2011. Syria took no countermeasure because Assad’s authorities were busy suppressing the uprising.

Syria’s approach to the water file showed that its main strategy against Türkiye had been to exploit internal security and the PKK threat, a strategy that ended with the Adana Agreement. Other options seemed impossible because of Türkiye’s military strength, external alliances and control of the Euphrates source.

Iraq: Drought and unrest

Iraq, which gets 60% of its water needs from Türkiye, has been the hardest hit by shortages. It faced successive severe crises across its territory, especially after the Ilisu Dam, built on the upper Tigris in Türkiye, began operating in 2020. Other dams on smaller tributaries added to the pressure. Tensions with Türkiye over water reached their peak.

Other environmental issues, including tree-cutting in northern Iraq during a Turkish military campaign against PKK militants, deepened tensions with Ankara. Pressure on the Turkish government produced little beyond a slight delay in filling Ilisu, postponing the problem rather than solving it.

In the summer of 2018, dwindling water resources and pollution caused fish to die in the Euphrates. Water shortages then became a major cause of social unrest across Iraq in the following years, culminating in the worst drought in 80 years in 2025.

The Ilisu Dam reduced Iraq’s share of Tigris waters to nearly 60% because of power generation.

In June 2025, Iraq called for water not to be used as a political pressure card and urged a joint regional vision based on fair distribution of transboundary waters. At the same time, it noted progress in negotiations and in the work of joint committees with Türkiye and Iran.

Despite this, Iraq and Türkiye kept positive relations, which expanded under Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani. The two sides reached understandings on security, the economy, trade, water and energy, while focusing on cooperation over the Development Road project.

Water disputes, also tied to security as in the Syrian case, became a route to cooperation after Iraq’s National Security Council declared the PKK a banned group in 2024.

Development Road runs through politics

On Nov. 2, 2025, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan and Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein signed a document establishing a mechanism to finance projects under a framework agreement for water cooperation. The mechanism implements the water cooperation framework agreement signed in 2024 during Turkish President Tayyip Erdogan’s visit to Iraq.

The agreement set a framework for water projects worth billions of dollars. Turkish companies will build new infrastructure to improve water-use efficiency and storage in Iraq. The projects will be financed from Iraqi oil revenues, in an attempt to turn crude exports into water security.

According to details that have emerged but have not been formally announced by either side, the first projects include water-collection dams and land-reclamation initiatives.

Ankara described the initiative as mutually beneficial for regional stability and economic cooperation.

“We in Türkiye are keen to support Iraq’s security, development and safety, and our support in this regard is absolute,” Fidan said at the signing ceremony.

Hussein said the agreement was needed to protect water security, food production and economic stability. He said Baghdad had long suffered from a weak position because of the absence of formal treaties regulating the use of Tigris and Euphrates waters.

Securing Erdogan’s presidency in 2028?

The agreement stirred doubts and fears among some Iraqi politicians and water experts. Some said it serves Türkiye more than Iraq and supports Erdogan’s effort to remain president after 2028.

Some Iraqi political forces reject the agreements with Türkiye, including those linked to the Development Road project and water cooperation. They say the deals could make Iraq dependent on Türkiye.

Allocating oil revenues to contracts with Turkish companies also raises legal and constitutional questions, along with concerns about corruption, weak transparency and possible obstacles caused by relying on one funding source, oil, which is exposed to global price swings.

Some opponents point to the absence of a final, binding legal framework agreed by both sides that defines the water share Türkiye must release to Iraq from the Tigris and Euphrates.

Although Türkiye and the PKK have begun a process to end the group’s activity, the PKK file and the presence of its members in northern Iraq, in areas beyond Baghdad’s control, could still obstruct implementation of the agreement.

The issue is not limited to Iraq’s domestic situation. It also touches the regional balance, with some parties seeing stronger Iraq-Türkiye ties as a source of pressure. That could turn Iraq into an arena for regional competition and influence struggles.

The Ottoman legacy

Duman said the agreement serves the interests of both Türkiye and Iraq. He said the water problem between the two countries did not emerge in recent decades, but dates back to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, when the Tigris and Euphrates changed from internal rivers inside one political entity into transboundary rivers between independent states.

What marks the current phase in Turkish-Iraqi relations, he said, is the gradual shift from conflict over water shares to managing mutual benefit, and a broader rethinking of transboundary resources as a driver of integration, not a permanent source of tension.

He said the agreement’s most important new feature is the direct link between water and energy. Revenues from oil Türkiye imports from Iraq will finance water projects inside Iraq.

Turkish companies specializing in dams, modern irrigation networks, water treatment and waste reduction will carry them out. That bypasses one of Iraq’s biggest development obstacles, lack of funding, without turning to foreign loans or the conditions of international financial institutions.

In an article on the Turkish platform Fikir Turu, Duman said the model gives Türkiye a new role, not just as a state that controls water sources but as a partner in rebuilding Iraq’s infrastructure. That strengthens Türkiye’s regional influence through economic and development tools rather than hard-power tools.

The model could also expand regionally and become a practical reference for future cooperation with Syria, especially on Euphrates water management, if the right political conditions emerge.

Water diplomacy in the Levant could then shift from a source of fragility and chronic conflict into a platform for trust-building and regional integration, by linking natural resources to economic development rather than reducing them to sovereignty and conflict.

Prominent Turkish transboundary water researcher Dr. Tugba Evrim Maden told Asharq Al-Awsat that shared water resources need joint management based on technological solutions, not conflict or legal disputes.

She said the problems of downstream countries mostly stem from political instability, destroyed infrastructure, poor resource use and waste.

Türkiye is not rich in water

Contrary to common belief, Türkiye is not rich in water resources. It is not water-abundant compared with its region. It lies in a semi-arid climate zone and has less annual water per person than its neighbors, North America and water-rich northern Europe.

In water-rich countries, the annual per capita share of usable water exceeds 10,000 cubic meters. In Türkiye, it is about 1,350 cubic meters, according to Turkish Foreign Ministry data.

If the population reaches 100 million in 2030, Türkiye’s per capita water share is expected to fall to about 1,000 cubic meters. Because Türkiye’s water resources vary by region and season, they cannot meet current and expected needs everywhere. Some areas have abundant water that is not suitable for use, while densely populated industrial areas lack enough water.

Türkiye’s arid and semi-arid regions receive rain for only four or five months a year. That makes water development projects, including dams and reservoirs that store rainwater for year-round use, vital to sustainable social and economic development.

At the same time, Türkiye’s energy consumption is rising because of rapid urbanization and industrialization. Its per capita energy use is only one-sixth of the European Union average. Türkiye has no major oil or natural gas resources, so it is pursuing domestic resources to meet rising energy needs, including renewable, cheap and environmentally friendly hydropower.

The UN Convention to Combat Desertification’s report, “Global Drought Hotspots 2023-2025,” placed Türkiye among critical areas in the drought belt stretching from southern Europe to the Middle East.

The report warned that current trends could push Türkiye into severe water scarcity by 2030, with nearly 80% of its farmland potentially exposed to repeated and severe drought waves over the next decade.

As climate change intensifies, Türkiye is nearing a crisis that threatens its water security. Turkish and international experts say it is approaching the critical threshold of water poverty and could be officially classified as water-poor by 2030 if current conditions continue.

Türkiye’s per capita share of renewable water has fallen from about 1,650 cubic meters at the start of the millennium to below 1,300 cubic meters now, nearing the UN red line of 1,000 cubic meters a year.

The 19% decline in two decades reflects not only a resource crisis, but also an unsustainable consumption pattern and a water management system facing a serious structural challenge, water experts say.

Türkiye suffered severe drought in 2025, marked by scarce rain, record temperatures and dried-up lakes and water bodies. It recorded its hottest December in more than half a century, with rainfall more than 50% below seasonal averages, according to the Turkish State Meteorological Service.

Lack of response

Experts say that despite growing warnings about water poverty, the authorities’ response remains below the scale of the challenge.

Mustafa Chashmaz, a climate professor at Karadeniz Technical University, warned that evaporation caused by rising temperatures has become one of the main drivers of water loss. He said that storing water in broad-surface dams without accounting for climate conditions makes reservoirs more vulnerable to evaporation as heat waves intensify.

He called for urgent technical solutions, including deeper reservoirs less exposed to sunlight, covered basins in sensitive areas, and a ban on the use of freshwater in private swimming pools at coastal resorts, replacing it with treated saltwater.

He also said state institutions are part of the problem because public facilities consume large amounts of water without effective conservation systems or modern saving technologies.

Türkiye faces one of the most complex environmental challenges in its modern history: widening desertification, worsening drought and rising environmental stress. Recent years have brought repeated severe heat waves and forest fires, including about 3,000 fires in the summer of 2025.

Türkiye’s water crisis extends beyond its borders and affects regional water security, especially in Syria and Iraq. Türkiye controls about 90% of Euphrates waters and a large share of Tigris waters.

At the opening of water projects in October 2025, Erdogan said Türkiye was not water-rich, as some believe. Annual average rainfall does not exceed 574 millimeters, he said, far below the global average.

Experts say agriculture consumes 70% to 75% of total water withdrawals, while cities lose 20% to 35% through leaking networks. Dam efficiency is also weakened by evaporation and sediment buildup.

The Turkish government recently announced a program to restore shrinking or dried-up lakes, including Lake Marmara in western Türkiye. It also plans to invest in wastewater recycling plants for irrigation, agriculture and industry, and to build new desalination plants in areas with chronic freshwater shortages, especially western Anatolia and the Mediterranean coast.

Urgent priorities include cutting urban water losses to below 15%, expanding high-efficiency irrigation systems to save up to 30% of agricultural consumption, reducing evaporation by improving reservoir design and expanding underground storage, raising treated-water reuse to 20% of urban demand, adjusting water tariffs, shifting to less water-intensive crops and adopting mandatory drought management plans.


Sudan’s Muslim Brotherhood at a Crossroads

Ali Ahmed Karti, Secretary General of the Sudanese Islamic Movement. (Facebook)
Ali Ahmed Karti, Secretary General of the Sudanese Islamic Movement. (Facebook)
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Sudan’s Muslim Brotherhood at a Crossroads

Ali Ahmed Karti, Secretary General of the Sudanese Islamic Movement. (Facebook)
Ali Ahmed Karti, Secretary General of the Sudanese Islamic Movement. (Facebook)

Sudan is passing through an exceptionally complex phase as the war enters its fourth year and military and political alliances continue to shift at a rapid pace. With factions that have defected from the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) joining the Sudanese Armed Forces, alongside the Joint Forces of Darfur’s armed movements, the Sudan Shield Forces, and formations linked to the Islamist movement, a new balance of power is gradually emerging within the anti-RSF camp.

This evolving landscape reflects a temporary convergence of interests among actors that differ sharply in their backgrounds, objectives, and visions for Sudan’s future. While confronting the RSF remains the primary factor uniting these forces, underlying political and military differences raise serious questions about the durability of their alliance.

Sudan’s history suggests that wartime coalitions do not necessarily evolve into stable partnerships in peacetime. Instead, they often become arenas for new struggles over influence, power, and postwar arrangements. Understanding the emerging balance of forces is therefore crucial to assessing whether cooperation or confrontation will define the next phase.

In recent months, the Sudanese army has become the principal military umbrella under which a range of disparate groups operate.

The Joint Forces drawn from Darfur’s armed movements bring battlefield experience and significant combat capability. The Sudan Shield Forces have emerged as a growing tribal and military force, while former RSF members are seeking to secure a place within the new order.

Necessary alliance

This configuration has created what amounts to an “alliance of necessity.” Its members are united by a common objective — defeating the RSF — but not by a shared political project. Each faction has its own calculations regarding future power-sharing arrangements and influence.

Within this context, a central question concerns the place of Sudan’s Islamist movement in the postwar landscape.

For decades, Islamists constituted one of the most influential forces within the Sudanese state through their political, organizational, and security networks. Today, however, they no longer monopolize the instruments of power.

Many of the groups that have risen during the conflict do not subscribe to the Islamist project. Some also carry a long history of political rivalry with Islamists dating back to the era of the National Salvation regime led by ousted former President Omar al-Bashir.

This has produced a striking paradox: the broader the coalition supporting the army becomes, the smaller the Islamists’ relative weight within it. They are no longer the sole source of political backing, military support, or social mobilization. Instead, they have become one actor among several competing centers of influence, each pursuing its own interests.

Sudanese army soldiers parade in the streets of eastern Sudan's city of Gedaref on August 14, 2025 to mark the 71st anniversary of the formation of the Sudanese army. (AFP)

Mounting pressure

Signs are growing that the Islamist movement is facing increasing political pressure, both domestically and internationally.

Retired Maj. Gen. Abdel-Hadi Abdel-Basit, a strategic analyst close to Islamist circles, said the movement is confronting unprecedented challenges.

Calls have intensified for Islamists to be excluded from post-war arrangements and even held accountable for their role during decades of rule and the allegations associated with that period.

In recent months, several prominent Islamist figures were detained and later released, while National Congress Party leader Al-Numan Abdel Halim remains in custody.

These developments coincided with what many Islamists believe were externally driven pressures, including the US State Department’s designation of Sudan’s Islamist movement, the National Congress Party, and the Al-Baraa ibn Malik Battalion as terrorist organizations.

Regional and international actors have likewise called for Islamists to be excluded from any future political process.

Such positions have surfaced in consultations involving both the Quad mechanism — comprising Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and United States — and the Quintet mechanism, which includes the United Nations, the European Union, the African Union, the Arab League, and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

Civilian political forces, however, view the decline of Islamist influence primarily as a consequence of Sudan’s democratic transition rather than the war itself.

Bakri Eljack, spokesman for the democratic civilian coalition Somoud (Resilience), argued that army commander Abdel Fattah al-Burhan may be able to distance himself from the Islamists, but their influence within state institutions remains significant.

Any effort to remove them would require a broad political alliance capable of managing the next phase, he explained.

Sharif Mohamed Osman, of the Sudanese Congress Party, said the Islamist project and National Congress Party rule were rejected by the people will during the December 2018 revolution.

He noted that efforts associated with prolonging the conflict have further weakened the movement, while international pressure and sanctions have deepened its political isolation.

Yet, predictions of the Islamists’ complete demise may be premature. The movement still possesses extensive organizational networks, decades of political experience, and influence within parts of the state and society.

Even so, current trends suggest that regaining the dominant position it enjoyed during the Bashir era may be more difficult than ever before.


Can Iran Maintain its Influence in Iraq?

Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi meets Iranian Ambassador Mohammad Kazem Al Sadeq in Baghdad. (Government media)
Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi meets Iranian Ambassador Mohammad Kazem Al Sadeq in Baghdad. (Government media)
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Can Iran Maintain its Influence in Iraq?

Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi meets Iranian Ambassador Mohammad Kazem Al Sadeq in Baghdad. (Government media)
Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi meets Iranian Ambassador Mohammad Kazem Al Sadeq in Baghdad. (Government media)

Iraqi politicians are closely watching what they describe as the potential “side effects” of any future US-Iran agreement and how it could reshape the balance of power inside Iraq.

Some observers argue that a deal would likely strengthen Washington’s influence while diminishing Tehran’s leverage. Others contend that Iran could emerge from the process with a renewed and possibly more durable form of dominance in Iraq over the coming months and years.

With significant ambiguity still surrounding the US-Iran memorandum of understanding - particularly regarding Tehran’s regional proxies and allied armed groups - signals from both capitals have done little to clarify Iraq’s future position within the competing spheres of influence of the two longtime adversaries.

The US Position

Despite repeated American warnings to Baghdad against bringing factions designated on the US terrorism list into government, Washington’s broader position remains unclear.

Asked by Alhurra, the US-funded Arabic-language broadcaster, whether a US-Iran agreement would affect Iraq and whether it might weaken or strengthen armed factions, Joshua Harris, the chargé d’affaires at the US Embassy in Baghdad, declined to speculate on the outcome.
Instead, he said the priority should be an Iraqi government that places the interests of its citizens first, noting that the United States approaches foreign policy by prioritizing its own national interests.

Harris added that the foundation of a mutually beneficial partnership between Washington and Baghdad depends on the Iraqi state confronting the challenge posed by militias and ensuring that weapons remain exclusively under state control. He described this as the essential benchmark that Iraq must meet in order to deepen its partnership with the United States.

A handout photo made available by the Iraqi Prime Minister's Media Office on 17 June 2026 shows Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi (L) meeting with US Special Presidential Envoy for Syria and Iraq Tom Barrack (R) in Baghdad, Iraq, 15 June 2026. EPA/IRAQI PRIME MINISTER'S MEDIA OFFICE

Iran Regains Momentum

At the same time, the Iranian role appears to be returning to the level seen before the war that erupted at the end of February.

Media outlets close to Tehran report that Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi plans to visit Baghdad soon to discuss the talks held in Switzerland and preparations for the funeral procession of Iran’s former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

Earlier, Tehran Mayor Alireza Zakani announced that Khamenei’s body would be transferred in early July as part of the funeral arrangements preceding burial ceremonies.

Even amid uncertainty surrounding those plans, some observers argue that the announcement itself underscores the extent of Iran’s influence in Iraq.

The Militias Question

Although Iran-aligned factions created security challenges through their involvement in the war on Tehran’s side, Iran’s ambassador to Iraq, Mohammad Kazem Al Sadeq, recently insisted that Iran “has not asked any party to intervene because it did not need such intervention.”

The remark suggested that Iraqi armed factions volunteered to support Iran rather than acting at Tehran’s request.

On the issue of restricting weapons to state control - a matter on which Washington has adopted a notably firm position - the Iranian ambassador said it was an internal Iraqi matter and that Tehran would respect any decision taken by the Iraqi government.

At the same time, he stressed the need to understand why armed factions wish to retain their weapons and to address what he described as their concerns and fears.

The source argued that Iran has demonstrated over the past two decades that it knows precisely what it wants from Iraq, unlike what he characterized as inconsistent American policy. He predicted that this situation would continue even after any US-Iran agreement is signed.

According to the source, who requested anonymity, Iran is likely to adopt a less visible approach after an agreement, one that avoids provoking Washington while preserving its traditional influence through allied political parties and figures.

Mourners attend the funeral of members of the Iraqi armed group Kataib Hezbollah who were killed in an airstrike that targeted a PMF headquarters near the western al‑Qaim district on the Syrian border, amid the US-Israel conflict with Iran, in Baghdad, Iraq, March 2, 2026. REUTERS/Thaier Al-Suda

The Oil Card

Opponents of Iranian influence take a different view. They believe the administration of President Donald Trump is both willing and able to curb Tehran’s reach through mounting pressure on Iran and sustained influence over decision-making in Baghdad.

These groups argue that the threat of economic sanctions alone could prompt Iraqi leaders - particularly Shiite political parties - to reconsider the risks associated with continued Iranian influence.

A key factor is Iraq’s dependence on the US-controlled financial system. Revenues from Iraqi oil sales are deposited with the US Federal Reserve before being transferred back to Iraqi banks, giving Washington a powerful source of leverage over Baghdad.