Tsurkov’s Final Night in Baghdad: Alone Near the Tigris

Elizabeth Tsurkov is taken by ambulance to a hospital after her release in Ramat Gan, Israel, September 10, 2025. REUTERS
Elizabeth Tsurkov is taken by ambulance to a hospital after her release in Ramat Gan, Israel, September 10, 2025. REUTERS
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Tsurkov’s Final Night in Baghdad: Alone Near the Tigris

Elizabeth Tsurkov is taken by ambulance to a hospital after her release in Ramat Gan, Israel, September 10, 2025. REUTERS
Elizabeth Tsurkov is taken by ambulance to a hospital after her release in Ramat Gan, Israel, September 10, 2025. REUTERS

In the first week of September 2025, Iraq’s Kataib Hezbollah concluded it had no option but to release Israeli-Russian researcher Elizabeth Tsurkov even if it meant surrendering a valuable bargaining chip without reward, multiple officials and faction insiders told Asharq Al-Awsat.

According to sources, the decision marked the end of the group’s fraught relationship with what is known as the “Iraqi resistance coordination,” and followed weeks of increasingly complex arrangements for her handover. These included security contacts, factional negotiations and discreet transfers between sites.

On Sept. 9, Tsurkov was left alone for four hours in one Baghdad property before a government-designated force arrived to collect her.

Asharq al-Awsat spoke with a US State Department official, Iraqi government advisers, security personnel and members of two armed factions to piece together what was described as a “liberation operation.”

Those interviews suggested Iraq’s government opened a security track against the abductors in parallel with “tough” American warnings over the consequences of prolonged detention. Kataib Hezbollah, sensing it had exhausted potential gains from holding her longer, delivered her under pressure.

Advisers and militia elements told Asharq Al-Awsat that Kataib Hezbollah was effectively forced into releasing Tsurkov “after a political siege and negotiations that escalated since August, under pressure from the Iraqi government and the United States.”

“The release of Princeton University student Elizabeth Tsurkov came after a decisive partnership with Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani,” a US State Department spokesperson told the newspaper.

On Sept. 11, as photographs circulated showing Tsurkov en route to an Israeli hospital, a Kataib Hezbollah official said the faction had made “a concession for the sake of public security, to avoid embarrassing the government and to support it.”

Tsurkov, a Princeton doctoral student, had vanished in Baghdad in March 2023. Israel later accused Kataib Hezbollah of abducting her. In May 2025, Asharq Al-Awsat reported that negotiations for her release were in their final stage.

After she was handed to the US embassy in Baghdad, supporters of Kataib Hezbollah spread word that the release was part of a wider bargain: a US troop withdrawal pledge and an Israeli prisoner swap. Iranian outlet Tasnim cited Iraqi sources to claim Israel would release Lebanese and Iraqi detainees, including naval officer Imad Amhaz, captured in Lebanon in late 2024.

But political sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that Lebanon had received no notice of any such return. Hezbollah officials did not mention Amhaz in a speech on Sept. 10.

A commander of another Iraqi faction allied with Kataib Hezbollah confirmed to the newspaper that Tsurkov was freed “without any deal.”

A politician within the Coordination Framework – the coalition of Shiite parties that dominates government and is aligned with the “resistance axis” – told Asharq al-Awsat the handover to Israel heralded “an unprecedented split” inside the camp.

“For years, these factions operated together under Revolutionary Guard direction,” he said. “Now some are siding with the government, while Tehran has shown no reaction. Kataib Hezbollah feels bitter, even toward pro-Iran Shiite factions.”

Accounts gathered by Asharq Al-Awsat reveal that multiple actors became involved in the handover, and their competing agendas produced conflicting narratives. Still, most agreed on one key detail: Tsurkov spent her last hours in Baghdad alone in a rented house in Jadriya, an affluent district by the Tigris River favored by Shiite leaders and militia commanders.

Sources said she was moved there on the final day, near the new Iraqi central bank headquarters. The property was owned by a retired politician and leased by a senior militia figure for sensitive meetings, according to the paper.

Armed men in military garb brought her in, one helping her down from a tinted car due to severe back pain. She had undergone spinal surgery a week before her abduction, and months of shifting between safehouses worsened her condition, Iraqi officials told Asharq Al-Awsat.

The armed men left, later alerting a security body to the location. Initially hesitant, a government unit eventually entered the house and “found Tsurkov alone.”

During her captivity she had been moved between buildings, sometimes disguised by decoy façades. US forces twice located her, but failed to reach her, officials said.

Israeli channel i24 aired footage on Sept. 11 of Tsurkov struggling to walk in a Tel Aviv hospital, leaning on a companion.

Negotiations intensified in recent months, according to a political adviser and a security official who spoke to the paper. Kataib Hezbollah’s leverage had ebbed after a July clash with the Iraqi army in southern Baghdad, in which Sudani accused the militia of “breaking the law.”

Two sources from armed factions said Quds Force advisers urged Kataib Hezbollah not to escalate against the government. Political intermediaries floated swap proposals, but the group concluded Tsurkov had become a burden.

By Sept. 9, both sides “reluctantly reached the end,” an Iraqi mediator said. The government pressed its advantage with US backing.

On Sept. 6, President Donald Trump signed an executive order sanctioning hostage-takers. Secretary of State Marco Rubio warned of “severe” penalties for state or non-state actors. The same day, new US Chargé d’Affaires Joshua Harris met Sudani, raising expectations of a breakthrough.

“The message to Kataib Hezbollah was clear: the government was ready to confront them, backed by Washington,” a government adviser told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Inside Baghdad’s ruling coalition, fears spread of looming US sanctions targeting the Shiite-led political system. While no major measures materialized, some parties began quietly signaling pragmatic readiness to adjust their stance, a Shiite politician told the newspaper.

A US State Department spokesman said the release was “a practical embodiment of peace through strength.” A senior militia commander stressed: “Not a single shot was fired in this liberation.”

One member of Sudani’s team said the government applied “political and security pressure” to block ransom or prisoner-exchange demands. An Iraqi politician called it “a battle in which no trigger was pulled.”

On Sept. 9, government forces and senior officials arrived to take custody of Tsurkov. Exhausted, she listened warily as one officer explained: “You are free now... you can trust everyone in this room.”

Only when reassured in English did she comply. Iraqi authorities checked her documents, ran medical tests, and asked the US embassy to conduct further examinations.

Armored vehicles escorted her to the embassy, and later to the airport. Before departure, she retrieved books and belongings she had bought in Baghdad markets, Asharq Al-Awsat said.

While she rested in a Baghdad hotel under government protection, US diplomats hesitated to receive her without Washington’s green light. Trump abruptly announced her release, catching officials by surprise.

A source close to Sudani said he “resented the US rush” but chose to let Trump “reap the benefits” rather than risk derailing the outcome.

Analysts told the paper that Sudani aims to secure a second term and saw the case as strengthening his credentials with Washington. “The governing coalition is now laying mines for him after the Tsurkov bomb was defused,” one said.

For Kataib Hezbollah, the ordeal ended with humiliation. “They lost their bargaining chip and got nothing,” a Baghdad security official told Asharq Al-Awsat.

The episode, Iraqi politicians say, may mark a realignment. Some factions are tilting toward cooperation with the government, while others cling to Iran’s “resistance” camp.

“This was a battle without gunfire,” a senior official said. “But it may ignite a deeper political war inside the Shiite camp – over Iraq’s future direction.”

Tsurkov, reunited with her family in Israel, thanked those who helped secure her release, Israeli media reported. For Iraq, the affair has underscored Sudani’s precarious balancing act: keeping US ties alive while managing fractious allies who once marched in lockstep under Tehran.



Why Greenland Is Strategically Important to Arctic Security

Houses covered by snow are seen on the coast of a sea inlet of Nuuk, Greenland, on March 7, 2025. (AP Photo/Evgeniy Maloletka, File)
Houses covered by snow are seen on the coast of a sea inlet of Nuuk, Greenland, on March 7, 2025. (AP Photo/Evgeniy Maloletka, File)
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Why Greenland Is Strategically Important to Arctic Security

Houses covered by snow are seen on the coast of a sea inlet of Nuuk, Greenland, on March 7, 2025. (AP Photo/Evgeniy Maloletka, File)
Houses covered by snow are seen on the coast of a sea inlet of Nuuk, Greenland, on March 7, 2025. (AP Photo/Evgeniy Maloletka, File)

Location, location, location: Greenland’s position above the Arctic Circle makes the world’s largest island a key part of security strategy.

Increasing international tensions, global warming and the changing world economy have put Greenland at the heart of the debate over global trade and security, and US President Donald Trump wants to make sure his country controls the mineral-rich island that guards the Arctic and North Atlantic approaches to North America.

Greenland is a self-governing territory of Denmark, a longtime US ally that has rejected Trump’s overtures. Greenland’s own government also opposes US designs on the island, saying the people of Greenland will decide their own future.

The island, 80% of which lies above the Arctic Circle, is home to about 56,000 mostly Inuit people who until now have been largely ignored by the rest of the world.

Here’s why Greenland is strategically important to Arctic security:

Greenland’s location is key

Greenland sits off the northeastern coast of Canada, with more than two-thirds of its territory lying within the Arctic Circle. That has made it crucial to the defense of North America since World War II, when the US occupied Greenland to ensure it didn’t fall into the hands of Nazi Germany and to protect crucial North Atlantic shipping lanes.

Following the Cold War, the Arctic was largely an area of international cooperation. But climate change is thinning the Arctic ice, promising to create a northwest passage for international trade and reigniting competition with Russia, China and other countries over access to the region’s mineral resources.

Security threats

In 2018, China declared itself a “near-Arctic state” in an effort to gain more influence in the region. China has also announced plans to build a “Polar Silk Road” as part of its global Belt and Road Initiative, which has created economic links with countries around the world.

Then US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo rejected China’s move, saying: “Do we want the Arctic Ocean to transform into a new South China Sea, fraught with militarization and competing territorial claims?”

Meanwhile, Russia has sought to assert its influence over wide areas of the Arctic in competition with the US, Canada, Denmark and Norway. Moscow has also sought to boost its military presence in the polar region, home to its Northern Fleet and a site where the Soviet Union tested nuclear weapons. Russian military officials have said that the site is ready for resuming the tests, if necessary.

Russia's military has been restoring old Soviet infrastructure in the Arctic and building new facilities. Since 2014, the Russian military has opened several military bases in the Arctic and worked on reconstructing airfields.

European leaders’ concerns have been heightened since Russia launched a war in Ukraine on Feb. 24, 2022.

Last year, Russian President Vladimir Putin noted that Moscow is worried about NATO’s activities in the Arctic and will respond by strengthening the capability of its armed forces there. But he said that Moscow was holding the door open to broader international cooperation in the region.

US military presence

The US Department of Defense operates the remote Pituffik Space Base in northwestern Greenland, which was built after the US and Denmark signed the Defense of Greenland Treaty in 1951. It supports missile warning, missile defense and space surveillance operations for the US and NATO.

Greenland also guards part of what is known as the GIUK (Greenland, Iceland, United Kingdom) Gap, where NATO monitors Russian naval movements in the North Atlantic.

Thomas Crosbie, an associate professor of military operations at the Royal Danish Defense College, said that an American takeover wouldn't improve upon Washington’s current security strategy.

“The United States will gain no advantage if its flag is flying in Nuuk (Greenland's capital) versus the Greenlandic flag,” he told The Associated Press. “There’s no benefits to them because they already enjoy all of the advantages they want.

"If there’s any specific security access that they want to improve American security, they’ll be given it as a matter of course, as a trusted ally. So this has nothing to do with improving national security for the United States.”

Denmark’s parliament approved a bill last June to allow US military bases on Danish soil. It widened a previous military agreement, made in 2023 with the Biden administration, where US troops had broad access to Danish air bases in the Scandinavian country.

Danish Foreign Minister Lars Løkke Rasmussen, in a response to lawmakers’ questions, wrote over the summer that Denmark would be able to terminate the agreement if the US tries to annex all or part of Greenland.

Danish armed forces in Greenland

Denmark is moving to strengthen its military presence around Greenland and in the wider North Atlantic. Last year, the government announced a roughly 14.6 billion-kroner ($2.3 billion) agreement with parties including the governments of Greenland and the Faroe Islands, another self-governing territory of Denmark, to “improve capabilities for surveillance and maintaining sovereignty in the region.”

The plan includes three new Arctic naval vessels, two additional long-range surveillance drones and satellite capacity.

Denmark’s Joint Arctic Command is headquartered in Nuuk, and tasked with the “surveillance, assertion of sovereignty and military defense of Greenland and the Faroe Islands,” according to its website. It has smaller satellite stations across the island.

The Sirius Dog Sled Patrol, an elite Danish naval unit that conducts long-range reconnaissance and enforces Danish sovereignty in the Arctic wilderness, is also stationed in Greenland.

Mineral wealth

Greenland is also a rich source of the so-called rare earth minerals that are a key component of cellphones, computers, batteries and other high-tech gadgets that are expected to power the world’s economy in the coming decades.

That has attracted the interest of the US and other Western powers as they try to ease China’s dominance of the market for these critical minerals.

Development of Greenland’s mineral resources is challenging because of the island’s harsh climate, while strict environmental controls have proved an additional hurdle for potential investors.


Protest-Hit Iran Warily Watches the US After its Raid on Venezuela

Iranians protest a 22-year-old woman Mahsa Amini's death after she was detained by the morality police, in Tehran, Sept. 20, 2022, in this photo taken by an individual not employed by the Associated Press and obtained by the AP outside Iran. (AP Photo/ File)
Iranians protest a 22-year-old woman Mahsa Amini's death after she was detained by the morality police, in Tehran, Sept. 20, 2022, in this photo taken by an individual not employed by the Associated Press and obtained by the AP outside Iran. (AP Photo/ File)
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Protest-Hit Iran Warily Watches the US After its Raid on Venezuela

Iranians protest a 22-year-old woman Mahsa Amini's death after she was detained by the morality police, in Tehran, Sept. 20, 2022, in this photo taken by an individual not employed by the Associated Press and obtained by the AP outside Iran. (AP Photo/ File)
Iranians protest a 22-year-old woman Mahsa Amini's death after she was detained by the morality police, in Tehran, Sept. 20, 2022, in this photo taken by an individual not employed by the Associated Press and obtained by the AP outside Iran. (AP Photo/ File)

Iran faces a new round of protests challenging the country's theocracy, but it seems like the only thing people there want to talk about is half a world away: Venezuela.

Since the US military seized Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro, a longtime ally of Tehran, over the weekend, Iranian state media headlines and officials have condemned the operation. In the streets and even in some official conversations, however, there's a growing question over whether a similar mission could target the country's top officials including the supreme leader, 86-year-old Ali Khamenei.

The paranoia feeds into wider worries among Iranians. Many fear that close US ally Israel will target Iran again as it did during the 12-day war it launched against Tehran in June. Israel killed a slew of top military officials and nuclear scientists, and the US bombed Iranian nuclear enrichment sites. Khamenei is believed to have gone into hiding for his protection.

“God bless our leader, we should be careful too," said Saeed Seyyedi, a 57-year-old teacher in Tehran, worried the US could act as it did in Venezuela.

"The US has always been after plots against Iran, especially when issues like oil, Israel are part of the case. In addition, it can be complicated when it is mixed with the Russia-Ukraine war, the Lebanese (group) Hezbollah and drug accusations.”

The US long has accused the Iranian-backed Hezbollah of running drug-smuggling operations to fund its operations, including in Latin America, which the group denies.

‘Please pray’

Immediately after Maduro’s seizure, an analyst on Iranian state television claimed, without offering evidence, that the US and Israel had plans during the war last year to kidnap Iranian officials with a team of dual-national Iranians. Even for conspiracy-minded Iranian television, airing such a claim is unusual.

Then on Sunday night, the prominent cleric Mohammad Ali Javedan warned an audience at prayers in Tehran University that Khamenei's life was in danger.

“Someone said he had a bad dream that the leader’s life is in danger," Javedan said, without elaborating. "Please pray.”

However, Iran is roughly twice the size of Venezuela and has what analysts consider to be a much stronger military and robust security forces. The memory of Operation Eagle Claw, a failed US special forces mission to rescue hostages held after the 1979 US Embassy takeover in Tehran, also haunts Washington.

Then there's the political situation in Iran, with its theocracy protected by hard-liners within the paramilitary Revolutionary Guard, who answer only to Khamenei.

They could launch assassinations, cyberattacks and assaults on shipping in the Middle East, warned Farzin Nadimi, senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy who studies Iran’s military.

And crucially, Iran also still has fissile nuclear material.

“In the grand-strategy scheme of things, they need to think about the day after,” Nadimi said of anyone considering a Venezuela-style raid. “Iran is a much more complex political situation. They have to calculate the costs and benefits.”

Not just the Iranians

Others wonder what part of the world the US might take interest in next, while critics have warned about setting a dangerous precedent.

“The regime in Iran should pay close attention to what is happening in Venezuela,” Israeli opposition leader Yair Lapid posted on social media on Saturday.

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu did not directly link Maduro's detention to Iran but acknowledged the protests sweeping Tehran and other cities, saying: “It is very possible that we are standing at the moment when the Iranian people are taking their fate into their own hands.”

Hours before the US action in Venezuela, US President Donald Trump warned Iran that if Tehran “violently kills peaceful protesters” the US “will come to their rescue.”

On Monday, Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baghaei denounced the comments by Trump and Netanyahu as an “incitement to violence, terrorism and killing.”

US Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene, a Republican who had been close to Trump but resigned Monday after a falling-out with the president, directly linked the Venezuela operation to Iran.

“The next obvious observation is that by removing Maduro this is a clear move for control over Venezuelan oil supplies that will ensure stability for the next obvious regime change war in Iran," Greene wrote on social media.

‘Make Iran Great Again’

US Sen. Lindsey Graham, a Republican, put on a “Make Iran Great Again” hat during a Sunday segment on Fox News. He later posted an image showing him and Trump smiling after the president autographed a similar-looking hat.

“I pray and hope that 2026 will be the year that we make Iran great again," Graham said.


Iran at a Critical Crossroads Testing the Survival of its Regime

Burning debris lies in the middle of a street during protests in Hamedan, western Iran, Jan. 1, 2026. (AFP/Getty Images)
Burning debris lies in the middle of a street during protests in Hamedan, western Iran, Jan. 1, 2026. (AFP/Getty Images)
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Iran at a Critical Crossroads Testing the Survival of its Regime

Burning debris lies in the middle of a street during protests in Hamedan, western Iran, Jan. 1, 2026. (AFP/Getty Images)
Burning debris lies in the middle of a street during protests in Hamedan, western Iran, Jan. 1, 2026. (AFP/Getty Images)

Iran is confronting one of the most consequential junctures since the founding of the republic in 1979. The pressures bearing down on the system are no longer confined to economic sanctions or familiar forms of external coercion, but now cut to the heart of the governing formula itself: how to ensure the regime’s survival without accelerating the very forces that threaten to undermine it.

At the center of this moment lies a stark existential dilemma. A permissive response to internal unrest risks allowing protests to spread and harden into a protracted campaign of political attrition, while a sweeping security crackdown would heighten external dangers, at a time of mounting international hostility and unprecedented US warnings.

Caught between these two paths, Tehran finds its room for maneuver shrinking to levels it has rarely faced before.

Passing protests or structural shift?

The evolution of the current protests raises a central question about their nature: are they a containable social wave, or a deeper expression of a shift in public mood? The spread of demonstrations to small and medium-sized cities, and the widening of their social base, reflect an advanced level of discontent, even if it has not yet reached the threshold of a comprehensive explosion.

Farzin Nadimi, a senior Iran analyst at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, argues that this wave differs from previous ones.

He told Asharq Al-Awsat that the latest protests, unlike earlier waves led by university students or low-income workers in major cities, are now driven by young people in smaller towns and supported by university students nationwide.

He described them as “more entrenched and widespread,” though not yet as large as some previous protests, noting the absence of government employees and oil workers, alongside a strong female presence once again.

This assessment aligns with the reading of Michael Rubin, a scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, who pointed to three key differences defining this wave: the nature of the participating forces, the symbolism of its launch from Tehran’s bazaar, and the impact of Israeli strikes that have punctured the aura surrounding Iran.

By contrast, Michael O’Hanlon, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, cautions against overestimating the street’s ability to bring about rapid change, noting that the Iranian system is highly organized and does not hesitate to use violence to control society.

‘Political fuel’

Iran’s economic crisis is no longer a technical issue that can be separated from politics. The collapse of the currency, the erosion of purchasing power, and declining trust in institutions have turned the economy into a direct driver of protest.

With each new round of pressure or sanctions, the sense deepens that the system is incapable of delivering real solutions without making political concessions.

Alex Vatanka, a Senior Fellow at the Middle East Institute in Washington, argues that what is unfolding goes beyond anger over prices or living conditions.

He told Asharq Al-Awsat that the protests reflect a deeper shift in public opinion, in which opposition is no longer directed at specific policies but at the model of governance itself. This shift, he said, confronts the system with a difficult question: can the economy be saved without rethinking the structure of power?

The security establishment: cohesion or fatigue?

Security institutions, from the Revolutionary Guards and their Basij mobilization arm to the intelligence services, form the backbone of the system’s ability to endure. Historically, these institutions have been the primary guarantor of internal stability, but mounting pressures now raise questions about their moral and ideological cohesion.

Rubin said that cracks are widening, pointing to rumors that Tehran has turned to deploying forces from Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces and Afghanistan’s Fatemiyoun Brigade due to declining confidence in some Revolutionary Guard units’ willingness to carry out orders.

Vatanka, for his part, acknowledged that these institutions remain cohesive for now, but warned that this cohesion is under growing strain from economic and social exhaustion, which over time could erode morale and produce partial fractures, even if open defections remain unlikely in the foreseeable future.

From deterrence to breaking taboos

If internal challenges are pressing on the structure of power, the external environment multiplies the risks. US-Israeli escalation, coupled with the waning weight of regional allies, places Iran before a radically different strategic landscape.

Threats by US President Donald Trump to support Iranian protesters signal a qualitative shift in US rhetoric, in which the focus is no longer confined to the nuclear program, but now includes Iran’s internal dynamics as part of the pressure equation.

Nadimi said that the developments in Venezuela and the arrest of Nicolas Maduro as carrying troubling implications for Tehran, while stressing the differences between the two cases, arguing that Iran is larger and more complex, and that Washington does not believe its system can be easily overthrown without a clear internal alternative.

Vatanka, however, sees a significant psychological impact from that precedent, saying it has weakened the assumption that leaders are immune from personal targeting.

The regional network: asset or burden?

Israeli strikes in June that targeted military leaders and sovereign symbols inside Iran reflect a shift in Israel’s security doctrine, from containment to direct confrontation.

O’Hanlon said that this pattern, following events in Venezuela and attacks on figures linked to Iran’s nuclear program, has become more likely under Trump, reflecting a willingness to break taboos that once held.

At the same time, questions are resurfacing over the effectiveness of Iran’s regional network. According to Vatanka, these arms are no longer a real deterrent, but have become, given their rising costs, a strategic burden.

Rubin agreed, adding that they have drained the state treasury, although he does not rule out the system turning to them if the crisis intensifies on the domestic front.

Amid this complex entanglement between internal and external pressures, the Iranian system’s options are narrowing as never before.

Between those who see this weakness as an opportunity to rebalance the region and those who fear widespread chaos, the core question remains: Is Tehran facing a manageable crisis of governance or an existential crisis that could shape Iran and the region for decades to come?