Tsurkov’s Final Night in Baghdad: Alone Near the Tigris

Elizabeth Tsurkov is taken by ambulance to a hospital after her release in Ramat Gan, Israel, September 10, 2025. REUTERS
Elizabeth Tsurkov is taken by ambulance to a hospital after her release in Ramat Gan, Israel, September 10, 2025. REUTERS
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Tsurkov’s Final Night in Baghdad: Alone Near the Tigris

Elizabeth Tsurkov is taken by ambulance to a hospital after her release in Ramat Gan, Israel, September 10, 2025. REUTERS
Elizabeth Tsurkov is taken by ambulance to a hospital after her release in Ramat Gan, Israel, September 10, 2025. REUTERS

In the first week of September 2025, Iraq’s Kataib Hezbollah concluded it had no option but to release Israeli-Russian researcher Elizabeth Tsurkov even if it meant surrendering a valuable bargaining chip without reward, multiple officials and faction insiders told Asharq Al-Awsat.

According to sources, the decision marked the end of the group’s fraught relationship with what is known as the “Iraqi resistance coordination,” and followed weeks of increasingly complex arrangements for her handover. These included security contacts, factional negotiations and discreet transfers between sites.

On Sept. 9, Tsurkov was left alone for four hours in one Baghdad property before a government-designated force arrived to collect her.

Asharq al-Awsat spoke with a US State Department official, Iraqi government advisers, security personnel and members of two armed factions to piece together what was described as a “liberation operation.”

Those interviews suggested Iraq’s government opened a security track against the abductors in parallel with “tough” American warnings over the consequences of prolonged detention. Kataib Hezbollah, sensing it had exhausted potential gains from holding her longer, delivered her under pressure.

Advisers and militia elements told Asharq Al-Awsat that Kataib Hezbollah was effectively forced into releasing Tsurkov “after a political siege and negotiations that escalated since August, under pressure from the Iraqi government and the United States.”

“The release of Princeton University student Elizabeth Tsurkov came after a decisive partnership with Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani,” a US State Department spokesperson told the newspaper.

On Sept. 11, as photographs circulated showing Tsurkov en route to an Israeli hospital, a Kataib Hezbollah official said the faction had made “a concession for the sake of public security, to avoid embarrassing the government and to support it.”

Tsurkov, a Princeton doctoral student, had vanished in Baghdad in March 2023. Israel later accused Kataib Hezbollah of abducting her. In May 2025, Asharq Al-Awsat reported that negotiations for her release were in their final stage.

After she was handed to the US embassy in Baghdad, supporters of Kataib Hezbollah spread word that the release was part of a wider bargain: a US troop withdrawal pledge and an Israeli prisoner swap. Iranian outlet Tasnim cited Iraqi sources to claim Israel would release Lebanese and Iraqi detainees, including naval officer Imad Amhaz, captured in Lebanon in late 2024.

But political sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that Lebanon had received no notice of any such return. Hezbollah officials did not mention Amhaz in a speech on Sept. 10.

A commander of another Iraqi faction allied with Kataib Hezbollah confirmed to the newspaper that Tsurkov was freed “without any deal.”

A politician within the Coordination Framework – the coalition of Shiite parties that dominates government and is aligned with the “resistance axis” – told Asharq al-Awsat the handover to Israel heralded “an unprecedented split” inside the camp.

“For years, these factions operated together under Revolutionary Guard direction,” he said. “Now some are siding with the government, while Tehran has shown no reaction. Kataib Hezbollah feels bitter, even toward pro-Iran Shiite factions.”

Accounts gathered by Asharq Al-Awsat reveal that multiple actors became involved in the handover, and their competing agendas produced conflicting narratives. Still, most agreed on one key detail: Tsurkov spent her last hours in Baghdad alone in a rented house in Jadriya, an affluent district by the Tigris River favored by Shiite leaders and militia commanders.

Sources said she was moved there on the final day, near the new Iraqi central bank headquarters. The property was owned by a retired politician and leased by a senior militia figure for sensitive meetings, according to the paper.

Armed men in military garb brought her in, one helping her down from a tinted car due to severe back pain. She had undergone spinal surgery a week before her abduction, and months of shifting between safehouses worsened her condition, Iraqi officials told Asharq Al-Awsat.

The armed men left, later alerting a security body to the location. Initially hesitant, a government unit eventually entered the house and “found Tsurkov alone.”

During her captivity she had been moved between buildings, sometimes disguised by decoy façades. US forces twice located her, but failed to reach her, officials said.

Israeli channel i24 aired footage on Sept. 11 of Tsurkov struggling to walk in a Tel Aviv hospital, leaning on a companion.

Negotiations intensified in recent months, according to a political adviser and a security official who spoke to the paper. Kataib Hezbollah’s leverage had ebbed after a July clash with the Iraqi army in southern Baghdad, in which Sudani accused the militia of “breaking the law.”

Two sources from armed factions said Quds Force advisers urged Kataib Hezbollah not to escalate against the government. Political intermediaries floated swap proposals, but the group concluded Tsurkov had become a burden.

By Sept. 9, both sides “reluctantly reached the end,” an Iraqi mediator said. The government pressed its advantage with US backing.

On Sept. 6, President Donald Trump signed an executive order sanctioning hostage-takers. Secretary of State Marco Rubio warned of “severe” penalties for state or non-state actors. The same day, new US Chargé d’Affaires Joshua Harris met Sudani, raising expectations of a breakthrough.

“The message to Kataib Hezbollah was clear: the government was ready to confront them, backed by Washington,” a government adviser told Asharq Al-Awsat.

Inside Baghdad’s ruling coalition, fears spread of looming US sanctions targeting the Shiite-led political system. While no major measures materialized, some parties began quietly signaling pragmatic readiness to adjust their stance, a Shiite politician told the newspaper.

A US State Department spokesman said the release was “a practical embodiment of peace through strength.” A senior militia commander stressed: “Not a single shot was fired in this liberation.”

One member of Sudani’s team said the government applied “political and security pressure” to block ransom or prisoner-exchange demands. An Iraqi politician called it “a battle in which no trigger was pulled.”

On Sept. 9, government forces and senior officials arrived to take custody of Tsurkov. Exhausted, she listened warily as one officer explained: “You are free now... you can trust everyone in this room.”

Only when reassured in English did she comply. Iraqi authorities checked her documents, ran medical tests, and asked the US embassy to conduct further examinations.

Armored vehicles escorted her to the embassy, and later to the airport. Before departure, she retrieved books and belongings she had bought in Baghdad markets, Asharq Al-Awsat said.

While she rested in a Baghdad hotel under government protection, US diplomats hesitated to receive her without Washington’s green light. Trump abruptly announced her release, catching officials by surprise.

A source close to Sudani said he “resented the US rush” but chose to let Trump “reap the benefits” rather than risk derailing the outcome.

Analysts told the paper that Sudani aims to secure a second term and saw the case as strengthening his credentials with Washington. “The governing coalition is now laying mines for him after the Tsurkov bomb was defused,” one said.

For Kataib Hezbollah, the ordeal ended with humiliation. “They lost their bargaining chip and got nothing,” a Baghdad security official told Asharq Al-Awsat.

The episode, Iraqi politicians say, may mark a realignment. Some factions are tilting toward cooperation with the government, while others cling to Iran’s “resistance” camp.

“This was a battle without gunfire,” a senior official said. “But it may ignite a deeper political war inside the Shiite camp – over Iraq’s future direction.”

Tsurkov, reunited with her family in Israel, thanked those who helped secure her release, Israeli media reported. For Iraq, the affair has underscored Sudani’s precarious balancing act: keeping US ties alive while managing fractious allies who once marched in lockstep under Tehran.



Andy Burnham, a Mayor from England’s North, Is Poised to Become Britain’s Next Prime Minister

Labour MP and challenger for leader of the Labour party, Andy Burnham, waves as he leaves after delivering a speech in Manchester, northern England, on June 29, 2026. (AFP)
Labour MP and challenger for leader of the Labour party, Andy Burnham, waves as he leaves after delivering a speech in Manchester, northern England, on June 29, 2026. (AFP)
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Andy Burnham, a Mayor from England’s North, Is Poised to Become Britain’s Next Prime Minister

Labour MP and challenger for leader of the Labour party, Andy Burnham, waves as he leaves after delivering a speech in Manchester, northern England, on June 29, 2026. (AFP)
Labour MP and challenger for leader of the Labour party, Andy Burnham, waves as he leaves after delivering a speech in Manchester, northern England, on June 29, 2026. (AFP)

Andy Burnham got to the top through a mix of patience and risk-taking.

A decade ago, Burnham abandoned a 20-year climb up the Labour Party ladder in London to head north and run for mayor of Greater Manchester. A month ago, he returned to Parliament by winning a risky special election. On Monday, he will become Britain’s 59th prime minister.

The sudden downfall of Prime Minister Keir Starmer after just two years in office has swept the 56-year-old Burnham into office — unelected and largely untested. He will enter No. 10 Downing St. carrying the heavy weight of expectation, and big questions about how he will shoulder it.

“A whole range of people across the Labour movement and in the country have projected onto Andy Burnham their hopes and their fantasies about how the country should be run and what Labour should stand for and what Andy Burnham stands for,” said Joshi Herrmann, founder of Manchester news site The Mill, who has covered Burnham for years.

“He has got lots of people’s hopes up.”

Burnham has made his name in Manchester, but he was born in Liverpool, and grew up in a commuter village between the rival northwest English cities.

His father worked as a British Telecom engineer and his mother as a receptionist, and he was raised in a close-knit Catholic family.

Burnham and his brothers were the first generation of their family to go to university. And not just any university — Burnham attended Cambridge, one of the country’s oldest and most prestigious institutions.

“He needed a lot of persuading to apply because he felt that as a working-class boy, going off to Cambridge wasn’t for him,” Stephen Harrington, Burnham’s former English teacher at St. Aelred’s Catholic High School, told the BBC. “He didn’t believe in himself. But he did it, and the rest is history.”

Burnham has said he felt out of place at Cambridge, where many of his classmates had gone to posh private schools in the more affluent south of England. But he got a degree in English and met his future wife, Dutch fellow student Marie-France Van Heel, now a marketing executive. The couple married in 2000 and have a son and two daughters.

After graduating, Burnham worked as a journalist at trade magazines before becoming a researcher and adviser to Labour politicians.

Elected to Parliament for the Manchester-area district of Leigh in 2001, he rose through the government ranks under Labour Prime Ministers Tony Blair and Gordon Brown. He served in Brown’s Cabinet between 2007 and 2010 as chief secretary to the Treasury, culture secretary and health secretary.

A formative experience came in 2009, when he was heckled at a commemoration of the 1989 Hillsborough Stadium disaster, when 97 Liverpool football fans were crushed to death. Bereaved families had fought for years to overturn a false narrative offered by police that unruly fans had been to blame.

Burnham became a champion for the families and helped push for a new inquest, an apology and a law that imposes a duty of candor on public officials to tell the truth about tragedies whatever the impact on their reputation.

After Labour lost power in 2010, Burnham ran for leadership of the party that year and in 2015, losing both times. He quit Parliament in 2017, a low ebb for Labour nationally, to run for mayor of Greater Manchester.

Being mayor played to his strengths: an ability to bring people together, a sharp eye for opportunities and a wide streak of pragmatism. His approach became known as “Manchesterism,” a brand of business-friendly socialism that aims to harness private and public money to invest in areas like transport, housing and infrastructure.

Manchester was a former manufacturing powerhouse — known as the birthplace of the Industrial Revolution — that had been hollowed out as British industry crumbled. During his tenure the city boomed, with skyscrapers blooming on vacant post-industrial sites. Burnham won praise for taking a piecemeal public transport system under public control and improving it.

He shed suit and tie for jeans and dark T-shirts, spoke about his love for Oasis, The Smiths and New Order and spent spare time playing football or spinning 1990s tunes during DJ battles.

During the COVID-19 pandemic, he harangued Conservative Prime Minister Boris Johnson over what he called a “London-centric” approach to the crisis that was punishing northern cities. That’s when he gained the nickname King of the North, a “Game of Thrones”-inspired nod both to his championing of his home region and his political ambition.

He has said he saw his work in central government as “unfinished business,” and got his chance when Starmer was pushed to resign by Labour colleagues alarmed at the party’s unpopularity.

But Burnham still needed a seat in Parliament. A Labour lawmaker agreed to resign, triggering a special election for the Manchester-area district of Makerfield. Burnham trounced the candidate from anti-immigration party Reform UK, cementing his credentials as a winner.

In the subsequent contest to replace Starmer as Labour leader, he was the only candidate.

He’s promising to restore hope Now he says he will deliver “a new politics based on unity and hope” and “an economy that works for everybody,” no matter where they live. A key plank is giving regional leaders more powers, and he plans to move part of the prime minister’s office to a “No. 10 North” in Manchester.

Herrmann said Burnham has clear strengths, especially an ability to tell a persuasive story and a sense of empathy that many politicians lack.

He added that the incoming prime minister has “a set of principles about trying to make the country fairer, trying to bring people out of poverty, that he really does believe in.”

Critics claim Burnham’s politics are vague on key points, such as where the money will come from to pay for his pledges. He will face many of the same political and economic challenges that stymied Starmer, including a sluggish economy, overstretched public services and a cost-of-living squeeze. He has little experience of foreign policy issues, from the Ukraine war to dealing with US President Donald Trump.

And running a country of 70 million is a lot different from overseeing a region of 3 million.

But Sacha Lord, a Manchester music entrepreneur who served as Burnham’s nighttime economy adviser, said the politician has a steely side that will help him rise to the occasion.

“He’s not scared of locking horns with people,” Lord said. “Everybody thinks Andy’s this nice, cheeky-chappy guy. But trust me, when he wants something ... he tends to get it.”


How the Yemeni Gov’t Handled Iran’s Sanaa Airport Escalation

Yemen’s armed forces claimed responsibility for targeting the runway at Sanaa airport to prevent the Iranian aircraft from landing. (EPA)
Yemen’s armed forces claimed responsibility for targeting the runway at Sanaa airport to prevent the Iranian aircraft from landing. (EPA)
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How the Yemeni Gov’t Handled Iran’s Sanaa Airport Escalation

Yemen’s armed forces claimed responsibility for targeting the runway at Sanaa airport to prevent the Iranian aircraft from landing. (EPA)
Yemen’s armed forces claimed responsibility for targeting the runway at Sanaa airport to prevent the Iranian aircraft from landing. (EPA)

Yemen’s leadership viewed an Iranian aircraft’s attempt to land at Sanaa airport last Monday as more than an aviation incident that could be overlooked to avoid further escalation.

It saw the attempted landing as a direct challenge to state sovereignty and an effort to impose a new political and military reality outside the country’s legitimate institutions at a time of unprecedented regional tension.

Unlike in previous crises, the government responded through a coordinated mix of calculated military action, organized political measures, and legal and diplomatic efforts. It also sought to avoid a wider confrontation that it believed Tehran wanted in order to turn Yemen once again into an arena for regional conflict.

From the first hours of the crisis, Yemen’s leadership emphasized a central message: defending sovereignty does not conflict with pursuing peace, and the state can enforce the law without abandoning its responsibility to protect civilians or preserve the prospects of a political settlement.

The targeting of Sanaa airport’s runway to prevent the Iranian aircraft from landing was therefore the final step in a long series of political and legal measures that preceded the use of force.

The government said it had exhausted all official channels to operate the airport and had offered alternatives to ensure the continuation of civilian flights via Yemenia Airways, the national carrier legally authorized to operate them.

What distinguished the government’s handling of the crisis was that it did not merely respond to the incident but also sought to shape the political narrative surrounding it.

From the outset, official statements stressed that the dispute was not over the operation of Sanaa airport or citizens’ ability to travel. It concerned an attempt to seize one of the state’s most important sovereign powers: control over its airspace and international ports of entry.

The Yemeni leadership repeatedly said the problem was not the aircraft itself, but the operation of international flights without the approval of the legitimate authorities, in violation of the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation and UN Security Council resolutions on Yemen.

The government also said it had proposed practical solutions before the escalation, including transporting the Houthi delegation from Tehran aboard an aircraft chartered by Yemenia Airways.

It said the group rejected the offer, strengthening the government’s argument before the international community that it had resorted to force only after exhausting other options.

Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) Chairman Rashad al-Alimi said the priority was to protect civilian lives and public property and avoid widening the confrontation in a way that would serve Iran’s goal of drawing Yemen into regional conflicts.

The message was intended to reassure the public and show that the military decision remained subject to careful political calculations rather than emotional reactions.

The government’s continuous meetings and the formation of a national crisis-management team also reflected a shift toward a unified approach combining military, political, diplomatic and media efforts.

This gave the official response greater coherence than in previous crises.

Domestic, International Support

Observers say the Yemeni government also succeeded in turning the crisis from a confrontation between itself and the Houthis into an issue concerning respect for the sovereignty of a UN member state.

Domestically, the House of Representatives, the Shura Council, the Consultation and Reconciliation Commission and the National Bloc of Political Parties and Components quickly declared their full support for the measures taken by the PLC.

They described the incident as a violation of Yemeni sovereignty rather than merely a political dispute.

The significance of this alignment was that it came from official institutions and political parties affiliated with the legitimate authorities, giving the leadership political cover against attempts to portray it as lacking internal consensus in its handling of the crisis.

Internationally, Yemen’s diplomatic efforts appeared to have preceded the UN Security Council meeting, after the government succeeded in persuading several major powers to adopt positions close to its account of the incident.

The United States described the Iranian landing as a violation of Yemeni sovereignty and linked it to the possible transfer of military experts and equipment to the Houthis, saying this would breach Security Council resolutions.

Britain said any flights conducted without the approval of the legitimate government constituted a violation of international law and called for an investigation through UN mechanisms.

France went further, linking the incident to what it described as Iran’s destabilizing conduct in the region.

It renewed its call for an end to the transfer of military equipment to the Houthis while reaffirming its support for Yemen’s unity and sovereignty.

Although the United Nations maintained its traditional call for de-escalation, it also stressed the need to respect Yemen’s unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity, giving the government additional political support in defending its position.

Multiple Messages

The legitimate Yemeni authorities’ handling of the Iranian aircraft crisis can be seen as an attempt to deliver three parallel messages.

The first was directed at Iran: Yemen was no longer an open arena where new realities could be imposed through air traffic or sovereign ports of entry, and any attempt to bypass state institutions would face practical measures, even as the government remained committed to peace.

The second message was aimed at the Houthis: using civilian suffering or Sanaa airport as political leverage would not lead to recognition of authorities operating in parallel to the state.

The government would not allow sovereign powers to be established outside its institutions.

The third message had an international dimension.

The government called on the Security Council to move from condemnation to deterrence by strictly enforcing sanctions and council resolutions, particularly resolutions 2140 and 2216.

It said continued tolerance of violations would encourage their repetition.

Despite the political and diplomatic gains achieved by the legitimate authorities, however, the crisis has not ended in practical terms.

It remains tied to the international community’s ability to translate condemnation into measures that prevent similar incidents and ensure respect for the Yemeni state’s sovereignty over all land, sea and air entry points.

The continuing efforts of UN envoy Hans Grundberg, alongside international positions supporting de-escalation, also reflect growing recognition that preserving the fragile truce requires addressing the roots of the crisis.

These include ending the Houthi coup and preventing humanitarian issues and sovereign ports of entry from being used as tools of conflict.

For the Yemeni government, observers say, the crisis was more a political test than a military one.

Through its response, it sought to establish a new equation: defending sovereignty does not contradict the pursuit of peace, and the state can combine restraint with resolve while respecting international law and asserting its authority.


How Could Growing Egypt-Türkiye Ties Shape Regional Conflicts?

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan sign a military cooperation agreement in Cairo on Feb. 4. (Turkish Presidency)
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan sign a military cooperation agreement in Cairo on Feb. 4. (Turkish Presidency)
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How Could Growing Egypt-Türkiye Ties Shape Regional Conflicts?

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan sign a military cooperation agreement in Cairo on Feb. 4. (Turkish Presidency)
Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan sign a military cooperation agreement in Cairo on Feb. 4. (Turkish Presidency)

A series of high-level meetings between Egypt and Türkiye has culminated in the first visit by an Egyptian defense minister to Ankara in 13 years, raising questions about whether the two countries’ rapidly expanding ties could help ease conflicts across the Middle East.

The visit, which began Sunday, included the signing of a letter of intent on defense cooperation.

Experts interviewed by Asharq Al-Awsat differed, however, on the extent to which the rapprochement has translated into tangible gains. While some argued it has helped reduce tensions, particularly in Libya, others said it has yet to produce meaningful progress in the region’s major crises.

Türkiye and Egypt signed the defense cooperation letter on Monday following talks in Ankara between Turkish Defense Minister Yasar Guler and his Egyptian counterpart, Ashraf Salem Zaher.

The visit followed the conclusion of the Anatolian Eagle 2026 joint air exercise, which brought together the Egyptian, Turkish and Azerbaijani air forces, with the participation of a NATO airborne early warning aircraft. It also came after the fifth meeting of the Egyptian-Turkish Joint Military Committee.

The two countries held the inaugural meeting of their High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council during Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi’s visit to Ankara in September 2024, after reviving the mechanism during Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s visit to Cairo earlier that year.
A second council meeting in Cairo last February produced a joint statement highlighting closer positions on the Palestinian issue and the crises in Syria, Lebanon, Sudan, Somalia and the Sahel, as well as counterterrorism.

Bashir Abdel Fattah, a Türkiye affairs specialist at the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, said the rapprochement had at least prevented confrontation in Libya, where Cairo and Ankara once backed rival interests.

He noted that the growing political understanding between the two countries has helped de-escalate the conflict and support efforts toward a political settlement that preserves Libya’s territorial integrity.

Türkiye analyst Mahmoud Alloush shared that assessment, describing Egyptian-Turkish coordination as a turning point in Libya and noting parallel efforts involving Saudi Arabia to advance a political solution.

Not everyone is convinced. Rokha Ahmed Hassan, a member of the Egyptian Council for Foreign Affairs, said expectations that Egyptian-Turkish understandings would help resolve Libya’s crisis have yet to be realized, largely because of divisions among Libyan parties.

He argued that while bilateral coordination has strengthened political dialogue across the Middle East and the Horn of Africa, it has not yet delivered concrete results.

On July 11, Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty and Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan agreed during a phone call to continue consultations on shared security concerns and work to prevent further military escalation in the region.

On Syria, Abdel Fattah said Cairo and Ankara agree on preserving the country’s unity despite differences over Türkiye’s military presence.

He stressed that expanding political and military coordination is creating the trust needed to address contentious issues, including Israeli actions in Syria, reconstruction and burden-sharing.

Hassan, however, said the rapprochement has yet to produce a positive impact on Syria because Cairo and Ankara continue to differ over Türkiye’s approach to Islamist groups.

The two countries are more closely aligned on Somalia. Hassan emphasized that their shared support for Somalia’s territorial integrity has had positive, albeit gradual, effects, though significant security challenges remain.

Alloush described Somalia as an example of “competitive cooperation,” arguing that managed competition between Egypt and Türkiye could ultimately strengthen stability there.

Abdel Fattah, for his part, noted that the emerging partnership provides a solid strategic framework that could help cool regional conflicts. He called for broader coordination with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan to curb destabilizing external interference and establish a regional order that better serves the interests of Middle Eastern states.

On June 21, El-Sisi called for institutionalizing the consultative mechanism bringing together Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Türkiye and Pakistan, which was launched three weeks after the outbreak of the US-Iran war in late February.