EU Scramble for Anti-Russia ‘Drone Wall’ Hits Political, Technical Hurdles 

A Russian drone flies over the city as Ukrainian servicemen fire towards it during Russian drone and missile strikes, amid Russia's attack on Ukraine, in Kyiv, Ukraine September 28, 2025. (Reuters)
A Russian drone flies over the city as Ukrainian servicemen fire towards it during Russian drone and missile strikes, amid Russia's attack on Ukraine, in Kyiv, Ukraine September 28, 2025. (Reuters)
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EU Scramble for Anti-Russia ‘Drone Wall’ Hits Political, Technical Hurdles 

A Russian drone flies over the city as Ukrainian servicemen fire towards it during Russian drone and missile strikes, amid Russia's attack on Ukraine, in Kyiv, Ukraine September 28, 2025. (Reuters)
A Russian drone flies over the city as Ukrainian servicemen fire towards it during Russian drone and missile strikes, amid Russia's attack on Ukraine, in Kyiv, Ukraine September 28, 2025. (Reuters)

Just hours after some 20 Russian drones entered Polish airspace last month, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said it was time for Europe to build a "drone wall" to protect its eastern flank.

Drone incidents over airports in Denmark and Germany in the following weeks reinforced European leaders’ view that the continent urgently needs better protection against such threats.

But the "drone wall" proposal remains in flux, according to more than half a dozen officials and diplomats familiar with internal EU deliberations who spoke to Reuters about the project.

"Our capabilities are really, for the time being, quite limited," said European Defense Commissioner Andrius Kubilius, who is playing a leading role in fleshing out the proposal.

Kubilius told Reuters the EU would need to draw heavily on Ukrainian expertise, honed over nearly four years countering waves of Russian drones.

The drone project is a test of the EU's ambitions to play a greater role in defense – traditionally the preserve of national governments and NATO – as well as Europe's ability to take more responsibility for its own security, as demanded by US President Donald Trump.

The Commission, the EU’s executive body, has been trying to win over southern and western European governments, which argued the original idea was too focused on the bloc’s eastern border when drones could pose a threat across the whole continent.

The proposal is also caught up in a power struggle over who should control major European defense projects, with Germany and France wary of handing power to the Commission, diplomats say.

Some EU officials questioned the name "drone wall", arguing it implies a false promise of security when no system will be able to repel every drone.

To try to win more support, the Commission has broadened the original concept – from an integrated thicket of sensors, jamming systems and weapons along the eastern border to a continent-wide web of anti-drone systems.

As first reported by Reuters on Tuesday, the Commission plans to switch to the term "European Drone Defense Initiative" in a defense policy "roadmap" to be unveiled on Thursday.

If it goes ahead, the project would be a bonanza for makers of anti-drone systems – from startups in the Baltic states to bigger defense industry players such as Germany’s Helsing and Rheinmetall.

The Commission has not said how much the proposal would cost, but geopolitical consultancy RANE said it could generate billions of euros in orders.

But without broad support from European governments, the plan will struggle to secure access to EU funding, experts said.

"The path to realization remains long and fraught with constraints," said Matteo Ilardo, RANE’s lead Europe analyst, pointing to big challenges “in terms of cost, scale and cross-border integration”.

JETS VS DRONES

Baltic countries, along with Poland and Finland, pitched the idea of a “drone wall” to the European Commission last year, a spokesperson for Estonia's border guard told Reuters.

The countries applied for funding from an EU civilian border management fund, with the aim of deploying sensors and drones to combat people smuggling, the spokesperson said.

The project initially failed to gain traction at EU level.

But the idea evolved into a more defense-focused concept after Ukrainian Deputy Prime Minister Mykhailo Fedorov gave a presentation to von der Leyen in April in Brussels on how Ukraine counters Russian drone attacks, EU officials said.

The Russian incursion into Polish airspace on September 9 highlighted how ill-prepared EU countries currently are to tackle the threat posed by swarms of drones, adding to the sense of urgency.

NATO deployed F-35 and F-16 fighter jets, helicopters and a Patriot air defense system collectively worth billions of dollars to respond to Russian Gerbera drones - based on Iranian Shahed models – that cost a tiny fraction of the price.

"A 10,000-euro drone shot down with a million-euro missile - that's not sustainable," Kubilius told a defense conference in Brussels on Tuesday.

FRENCH, GERMAN SCEPTICISM

Once the Commission has fleshed out its proposal, EU governments will decide whether to give it the green light.

Diplomats say smaller countries see more value in having the Commission as a coordinator on such projects. But big countries such as France and Germany, which are used to handling large procurement initiatives themselves, want to retain control.

Neither German Chancellor Friedrich Merz nor French President Emmanuel Macron has so far embraced the proposal.

At an EU summit in Copenhagen earlier this month, Macron said the threat of drones was “more sophisticated, more complex” than the idea of a drone wall suggested.

Countries wanting to cooperate on an anti-drone system can use national budgets and the EU’s 150-billion-euro SAFE loans scheme for defense projects.

But if the EU gives the project the status of a European Defense Project of Common Interest, countries involved would have access to a broader range of EU funding.

The EU would also have to agree on who would run the project – member countries, the Commission, another EU body or some combination of all of those.

MACHINE GUNS, CANNONS AND ROCKETS

Drawing on lessons from Ukraine, the sensors for the project would likely include cameras, acoustic systems that can detect drone engine noise, specialist radars and radio-frequency detectors, according to interviews with more than a dozen EU officials and industry executives.

“We need to have a layered system that is able to detect, classify, engage and eliminate the target,” said Leet Rauno Lember, chief operating officer of Estonia's Marduk Technologies.

Weapons to counter any attack would include a mix of machine guns and cannons, rockets, missiles and interceptor drones – which can slam into enemy drones or explode close to them – as well as electronic jamming systems and lasers, they said.

Artificial Intelligence is already being used to help identify and target incoming drones and its use in the field is expected to grow, industry executives said.

“There is no one-size-fits-all solution. There is no single technology silver bullet,” said Dominic Surano, director of special projects at Nordic Air Defense, a Stockholm-based firm that has developed a ground-based mobile interception system.

Defense experts said the project would require constant updates as drone warfare is evolving rapidly, with each side constantly adapting to changes made by the other.

It is a story of “counteraction against counteraction,” said Taras Tymochko, a specialist in interceptor drones at Come Back Alive, a Ukrainian charity that has purchased hundreds of millions of dollars worth of military equipment for the country’s armed forces.

Tymochko said Ukrainian forces are experienced users of interceptor drones, which destroy targets by exploding next to them. But they had to evolve quickly.

The first Ukrainian interceptor drone to destroy a Shahed in early 2025 stopped being effective after four months because the Russians realized they could outrun it by increasing the Shahed’s speed from 170 kph to more than 200 kph, Tymochko said.

Now interceptors need to be able to fly between 30 and 50 kph faster than enemy drones to catch them, he said.

Tymochko said training and time on the job was also vital. Top interceptor pilots succeeded because of their experience more than reliance on automated guidance systems, he said.

FIRMS LINING UP

Defense and tech companies have swiftly embraced the drone wall concept, pushing their products as part of the solution.

Some – such as Germany’s Alpine Eagle and Quantum Systems - have even drawn up their own blueprints of how layers of ground and air-based systems would work.

Rheinmetall, Germany’s largest defense company, said a major challenge is detecting small drones and defending against swarm attacks, which have become a feature of the war in Ukraine.

“Cannon-based drone defense must be the focus, as this is the only cost-effective measure,” the company said.

Rheinmetall said it received recent orders from Germany, Denmark, Hungary and Austria for its mobile Skyranger system, which combines sensors and a cannon.

Drone producer Nordyn Group argued that using drones to intercept others was a cost-effective solution.

Ossian Vogel, a co-founder of the German company, warned against developing a “zoo” of different systems that soldiers would have to learn to use.

Many of the systems being proposed are already on the market, so the EU and its member countries would have to determine which systems to buy, where to use them and how to link them all together, officials and industry executives said.

Any such setup would have to fit into NATO’s broader air and missile defense systems, experts said.

“The EU and NATO need to work hand in glove on this one,” said Camille Grand, a former senior NATO official who is now Secretary General of the European Aerospace, Security and Defense Industries Association.

Some officials and executives, like Jan-Hendrik Boelens, CEO of Alpine Eagle, which has developed an airborne early-warning and interception system, said the EU idea could be “up and running within a year if the political will is available”.

Others are more skeptical.

“We are not talking about a concept which will be realized within the next three or four years ... (or) even more,” German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius told a security forum in Warsaw last month.



Sudan’s Muslim Brotherhood at a Crossroads

Ali Ahmed Karti, Secretary General of the Sudanese Islamic Movement. (Facebook)
Ali Ahmed Karti, Secretary General of the Sudanese Islamic Movement. (Facebook)
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Sudan’s Muslim Brotherhood at a Crossroads

Ali Ahmed Karti, Secretary General of the Sudanese Islamic Movement. (Facebook)
Ali Ahmed Karti, Secretary General of the Sudanese Islamic Movement. (Facebook)

Sudan is passing through an exceptionally complex phase as the war enters its fourth year and military and political alliances continue to shift at a rapid pace. With factions that have defected from the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) joining the Sudanese Armed Forces, alongside the Joint Forces of Darfur’s armed movements, the Sudan Shield Forces, and formations linked to the Islamist movement, a new balance of power is gradually emerging within the anti-RSF camp.

This evolving landscape reflects a temporary convergence of interests among actors that differ sharply in their backgrounds, objectives, and visions for Sudan’s future. While confronting the RSF remains the primary factor uniting these forces, underlying political and military differences raise serious questions about the durability of their alliance.

Sudan’s history suggests that wartime coalitions do not necessarily evolve into stable partnerships in peacetime. Instead, they often become arenas for new struggles over influence, power, and postwar arrangements. Understanding the emerging balance of forces is therefore crucial to assessing whether cooperation or confrontation will define the next phase.

In recent months, the Sudanese army has become the principal military umbrella under which a range of disparate groups operate.

The Joint Forces drawn from Darfur’s armed movements bring battlefield experience and significant combat capability. The Sudan Shield Forces have emerged as a growing tribal and military force, while former RSF members are seeking to secure a place within the new order.

Necessary alliance

This configuration has created what amounts to an “alliance of necessity.” Its members are united by a common objective — defeating the RSF — but not by a shared political project. Each faction has its own calculations regarding future power-sharing arrangements and influence.

Within this context, a central question concerns the place of Sudan’s Islamist movement in the postwar landscape.

For decades, Islamists constituted one of the most influential forces within the Sudanese state through their political, organizational, and security networks. Today, however, they no longer monopolize the instruments of power.

Many of the groups that have risen during the conflict do not subscribe to the Islamist project. Some also carry a long history of political rivalry with Islamists dating back to the era of the National Salvation regime led by ousted former President Omar al-Bashir.

This has produced a striking paradox: the broader the coalition supporting the army becomes, the smaller the Islamists’ relative weight within it. They are no longer the sole source of political backing, military support, or social mobilization. Instead, they have become one actor among several competing centers of influence, each pursuing its own interests.

Sudanese army soldiers parade in the streets of eastern Sudan's city of Gedaref on August 14, 2025 to mark the 71st anniversary of the formation of the Sudanese army. (AFP)

Mounting pressure

Signs are growing that the Islamist movement is facing increasing political pressure, both domestically and internationally.

Retired Maj. Gen. Abdel-Hadi Abdel-Basit, a strategic analyst close to Islamist circles, said the movement is confronting unprecedented challenges.

Calls have intensified for Islamists to be excluded from post-war arrangements and even held accountable for their role during decades of rule and the allegations associated with that period.

In recent months, several prominent Islamist figures were detained and later released, while National Congress Party leader Al-Numan Abdel Halim remains in custody.

These developments coincided with what many Islamists believe were externally driven pressures, including the US State Department’s designation of Sudan’s Islamist movement, the National Congress Party, and the Al-Baraa ibn Malik Battalion as terrorist organizations.

Regional and international actors have likewise called for Islamists to be excluded from any future political process.

Such positions have surfaced in consultations involving both the Quad mechanism — comprising Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and United States — and the Quintet mechanism, which includes the United Nations, the European Union, the African Union, the Arab League, and Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD).

Civilian political forces, however, view the decline of Islamist influence primarily as a consequence of Sudan’s democratic transition rather than the war itself.

Bakri Eljack, spokesman for the democratic civilian coalition Somoud (Resilience), argued that army commander Abdel Fattah al-Burhan may be able to distance himself from the Islamists, but their influence within state institutions remains significant.

Any effort to remove them would require a broad political alliance capable of managing the next phase, he explained.

Sharif Mohamed Osman, of the Sudanese Congress Party, said the Islamist project and National Congress Party rule were rejected by the people will during the December 2018 revolution.

He noted that efforts associated with prolonging the conflict have further weakened the movement, while international pressure and sanctions have deepened its political isolation.

Yet, predictions of the Islamists’ complete demise may be premature. The movement still possesses extensive organizational networks, decades of political experience, and influence within parts of the state and society.

Even so, current trends suggest that regaining the dominant position it enjoyed during the Bashir era may be more difficult than ever before.


Can Iran Maintain its Influence in Iraq?

Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi meets Iranian Ambassador Mohammad Kazem Al Sadeq in Baghdad. (Government media)
Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi meets Iranian Ambassador Mohammad Kazem Al Sadeq in Baghdad. (Government media)
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Can Iran Maintain its Influence in Iraq?

Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi meets Iranian Ambassador Mohammad Kazem Al Sadeq in Baghdad. (Government media)
Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi meets Iranian Ambassador Mohammad Kazem Al Sadeq in Baghdad. (Government media)

Iraqi politicians are closely watching what they describe as the potential “side effects” of any future US-Iran agreement and how it could reshape the balance of power inside Iraq.

Some observers argue that a deal would likely strengthen Washington’s influence while diminishing Tehran’s leverage. Others contend that Iran could emerge from the process with a renewed and possibly more durable form of dominance in Iraq over the coming months and years.

With significant ambiguity still surrounding the US-Iran memorandum of understanding - particularly regarding Tehran’s regional proxies and allied armed groups - signals from both capitals have done little to clarify Iraq’s future position within the competing spheres of influence of the two longtime adversaries.

The US Position

Despite repeated American warnings to Baghdad against bringing factions designated on the US terrorism list into government, Washington’s broader position remains unclear.

Asked by Alhurra, the US-funded Arabic-language broadcaster, whether a US-Iran agreement would affect Iraq and whether it might weaken or strengthen armed factions, Joshua Harris, the chargé d’affaires at the US Embassy in Baghdad, declined to speculate on the outcome.
Instead, he said the priority should be an Iraqi government that places the interests of its citizens first, noting that the United States approaches foreign policy by prioritizing its own national interests.

Harris added that the foundation of a mutually beneficial partnership between Washington and Baghdad depends on the Iraqi state confronting the challenge posed by militias and ensuring that weapons remain exclusively under state control. He described this as the essential benchmark that Iraq must meet in order to deepen its partnership with the United States.

A handout photo made available by the Iraqi Prime Minister's Media Office on 17 June 2026 shows Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi (L) meeting with US Special Presidential Envoy for Syria and Iraq Tom Barrack (R) in Baghdad, Iraq, 15 June 2026. EPA/IRAQI PRIME MINISTER'S MEDIA OFFICE

Iran Regains Momentum

At the same time, the Iranian role appears to be returning to the level seen before the war that erupted at the end of February.

Media outlets close to Tehran report that Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi plans to visit Baghdad soon to discuss the talks held in Switzerland and preparations for the funeral procession of Iran’s former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.

Earlier, Tehran Mayor Alireza Zakani announced that Khamenei’s body would be transferred in early July as part of the funeral arrangements preceding burial ceremonies.

Even amid uncertainty surrounding those plans, some observers argue that the announcement itself underscores the extent of Iran’s influence in Iraq.

The Militias Question

Although Iran-aligned factions created security challenges through their involvement in the war on Tehran’s side, Iran’s ambassador to Iraq, Mohammad Kazem Al Sadeq, recently insisted that Iran “has not asked any party to intervene because it did not need such intervention.”

The remark suggested that Iraqi armed factions volunteered to support Iran rather than acting at Tehran’s request.

On the issue of restricting weapons to state control - a matter on which Washington has adopted a notably firm position - the Iranian ambassador said it was an internal Iraqi matter and that Tehran would respect any decision taken by the Iraqi government.

At the same time, he stressed the need to understand why armed factions wish to retain their weapons and to address what he described as their concerns and fears.

The source argued that Iran has demonstrated over the past two decades that it knows precisely what it wants from Iraq, unlike what he characterized as inconsistent American policy. He predicted that this situation would continue even after any US-Iran agreement is signed.

According to the source, who requested anonymity, Iran is likely to adopt a less visible approach after an agreement, one that avoids provoking Washington while preserving its traditional influence through allied political parties and figures.

Mourners attend the funeral of members of the Iraqi armed group Kataib Hezbollah who were killed in an airstrike that targeted a PMF headquarters near the western al‑Qaim district on the Syrian border, amid the US-Israel conflict with Iran, in Baghdad, Iraq, March 2, 2026. REUTERS/Thaier Al-Suda

The Oil Card

Opponents of Iranian influence take a different view. They believe the administration of President Donald Trump is both willing and able to curb Tehran’s reach through mounting pressure on Iran and sustained influence over decision-making in Baghdad.

These groups argue that the threat of economic sanctions alone could prompt Iraqi leaders - particularly Shiite political parties - to reconsider the risks associated with continued Iranian influence.

A key factor is Iraq’s dependence on the US-controlled financial system. Revenues from Iraqi oil sales are deposited with the US Federal Reserve before being transferred back to Iraqi banks, giving Washington a powerful source of leverage over Baghdad.


Undoing the ‘Tangled Nest’ of Iran Sanctions Won’t Be Easy or Quick

A veiled Iranian woman walks past an anti-US mural, depicting an Iranian and US negotiation table, next to the former US embassy in Tehran, Iran, 22 June 2026. (EPA)
A veiled Iranian woman walks past an anti-US mural, depicting an Iranian and US negotiation table, next to the former US embassy in Tehran, Iran, 22 June 2026. (EPA)
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Undoing the ‘Tangled Nest’ of Iran Sanctions Won’t Be Easy or Quick

A veiled Iranian woman walks past an anti-US mural, depicting an Iranian and US negotiation table, next to the former US embassy in Tehran, Iran, 22 June 2026. (EPA)
A veiled Iranian woman walks past an anti-US mural, depicting an Iranian and US negotiation table, next to the former US embassy in Tehran, Iran, 22 June 2026. (EPA)

Tehran stands to gain billions of dollars from a 60-day reprieve from US sanctions announced on Monday, but unwinding more than four decades of restrictions poses legal, political and commercial challenges that could take years.

At issue is whether an interim US deal with Iran can translate into lasting economic relief, given the complexity of dismantling a sanctions regime that spans US law, international measures and private-sector risk concerns.

The United Nations, the US and the European Union have imposed sanctions and trade embargoes and have frozen assets since the late 1970s over Iran's nuclear program, human rights violations and support for armed groups around the region.

Under a 14-point memorandum of understanding signed by the US and Iran last week, Washington is to start abolishing all types of sanctions using a schedule to be forged in a final deal within 60 days, a period that can be extended.

On Monday, the US Treasury issued a temporary general license allowing the production, delivery and sale of crude oil and petrochemical and petroleum products of Iranian origin through August 21.

Removing the remaining sanctions - if it happens - would represent a stark change in US policy toward the Middle East, which has long focused on curbing ‌Iran's influence and ‌using financial pressure to weaken its theocratic government.

It would also be difficult, requiring executive action for some measures, approval ‌by ⁠Congress for others ⁠and close coordination with the UN and other countries that have imposed their own sanctions. Companies, wary after decades of restrictions, could also blunt the impact.

"You have this tangled nest of sanctions, and it's not just executive orders, it's congressional sanctions," said Juan Zarate, deputy national security adviser for combating terrorism under former President George W. Bush.

CONGRESS IS SKEPTICAL

Washington first sanctioned Iran in 1979, after revolutionary students seized the US embassy in Tehran, holding diplomats hostage.

Since then, Congress has passed half a dozen sanctions laws and presidents have issued executive orders over Iran's nuclear program and its support for groups the US deems terrorist organizations including Hamas, Hezbollah and Yemen's Houthis.

Since early 2025, the Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has imposed sanctions on more than 1,000 people, vessels and aircraft, according to Treasury data.

Delisting thousands of entities designated for ⁠sanctions would take OFAC at least a year, said Jeremy Paner, a partner at law firm Hughes Hubbard & Reed ‌and a former US sanctions official.

President Donald Trump can rescind executive orders issued on Iran, but some ‌measures - including sanctions on Hamas and Hezbollah - are mandated by law and will have to be removed or amended by Congress, where the interim deal has already sparked sharp ‌public criticism from his fellow Republican lawmakers.

Undoing 40 years of sanctions would be difficult, added Matt Zweig, managing director of policy at FDD ‌Action, the lobbying arm of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

"Any attempt to comprehensively remove layer upon layer of sanctions will be like peeling back an onion - exposing the administration - not just to legal complexities but political risks," said Zweig, a former aide on the House Foreign Affairs Committee.

The license issued on Monday could be worth up to $3 billion for Iran over two months, by some estimates.

That could swell to "at least tens of billions of dollars" if made permanent, erasing a discount on Iranian oil, allowing Tehran to ‌sell to additional buyers beyond China, and increasing exports, said Edward Fishman, senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. China now buys about 90% of Iranian oil, despite the sanctions.

The new license is broader than ⁠the one issued in March, calling for ⁠inclusion of not just oil and petroleum products, but also banking, insurance and transportation related to the oil trade, giving Tehran quicker access to its revenues.

"There are a number of thorny issues involved," said Stephanie Connor, a former OFAC official now a partner with law firm Holland & Knight, adding that lifting sanctions could mean funds flowing to groups the US considers a threat.

"Are we really going to let money start flowing to Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps?" she asked, referring to the powerful paramilitary force that the US has designated a foreign terrorist organization.

WARY COMPANIES

Banks, oil firms and insurers will face evolving regulations, tougher due diligence and exposure to sanctions-evasion risks tied to Iran links with countries such as China, North Korea and Russia. They also remain subject to separate sanctions from Britain, the UN, the EU and others.

"We've kind of beaten the markets up with the risk of doing business with or through Iran, so you can't just flip a switch and say, 'Oh, now it's okay to do business with Iran,'" Zarate said.

Companies that deal with Iran would still face lawsuits from victims of attacks, who can sue investors and companies for aiding designated groups under the 2016 Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, which aides say is unlikely to be repealed.

Given such risks, companies may steer clear of working with Iran to escape legal and reputational risk as long as the Iranian government remains in power, said Brett Erickson, principal with Obsidian Risk Advisors.

"We're not going to see massive multi-billion-dollar commitments until things are far more cemented and politically stable," he said. "There's just a long way to go."