Where Are the Armed Groups That Fought Hamas in Gaza Now?

Hamas police officers patrol a street in Gaza City (Reuters)
Hamas police officers patrol a street in Gaza City (Reuters)
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Where Are the Armed Groups That Fought Hamas in Gaza Now?

Hamas police officers patrol a street in Gaza City (Reuters)
Hamas police officers patrol a street in Gaza City (Reuters)

During the two-year Israeli war on Gaza that followed Hamas’s Oct. 7, 2023, attack, the group faced growing internal challenges, including clashes with armed clans and factions that emerged amid the chaos and sought to spread lawlessness across the enclave.

Two days before the ceasefire took effect last Friday, Hamas fought one of its fiercest internal battles against gunmen from the Al-Majayda clan in Khan Younis, southern Gaza.

When the fighting with Israel stopped, new confrontations erupted, this time with members of the Doghmosh clan south of the city, as Hamas also hunted armed groups it accused of operating under Israeli patronage.

The Abu Shabab Group

In recent months, Yasser Abu Shabab has risen as a key figure leading one of Gaza’s most prominent armed groups, estimated to number in the hundreds. His men, lightly armed, are based in Rafah, at Gaza’s southernmost edge, which remains under full Israeli control even after the ceasefire. Many residents there belong to Abu Shabab’s own Bedouin clan.

Abu Shabab has not spoken publicly since the war ended. Earlier, he had tried to expand his influence into Khan Younis by recruiting members of the Barbakh clan after their attack on Nasser Medical Complex and police forces protecting it in late June. The effort failed, however, and his influence remains confined to Rafah.

Hamas refers to his faction as the “Abu Shabab Gang”, saying it operates within Israeli-controlled areas of Rafah. Although their positions have not changed, their attacks have ceased since the ceasefire. In previous months, the group had repeatedly tried to exploit Israeli bombardments to infiltrate neighborhoods, loot civilians, and target Hamas fighters — notably in the Mawasi area and parts of Khan Younis.

Hamas accuses Abu Shabab’s men of “serving Israel”. Abu Shabab, who calls his faction the “Popular Forces,” has alternated between denying and admitting links to Israel or the Palestinian Authority.

Once a minor criminal figure detained by Hamas police, Abu Shabab had no prior political or militant background. His notoriety grew after his men looted aid trucks near Israeli military zones. Hamas pursued him relentlessly, killing his brother during one of the chases.

Though not yet a major threat, Hamas has continued to strike at his group to demonstrate control and is expected to mount further operations against them.

Hossam al-Astal

Another group operates in southeastern Khan Younis, particularly in Qizan al-Najjar, Jorat al-Lout, and Al-Manara. Led by Hossam al-Astal, a former officer in the Palestinian Authority’s security services, it consists of roughly 40 fighters. The area remains contested, with sporadic Israeli activity.

Reports suggest al-Astal split from Abu Shabab to form his own faction — a claim Abu Shabab denied on Facebook before deleting the post.

In 2022, Hamas sentenced al-Astal to death for allegedly helping Israel’s Mossad assassinate senior Al-Qassam Brigades commander Fadi al-Batsh in Malaysia in 2018. Despite the charges, his group has shown limited activity and carried out no major attacks.

Al-Majayda Clan

The Al-Majayda are one of Gaza’s largest clans, based mainly in Khan Younis. Tensions with Hamas escalated when clan members killed two Al-Qassam fighters and a mediator attempting to defuse the dispute. Hamas gave the clan a brief deadline to hand over the killers. When mediators failed, Hamas launched a large assault days before the ceasefire, killing the suspects and seizing weapons. Israeli airstrikes later hit Hamas forces involved, killing about 20.

Following mediation efforts, the clan pledged on Monday to hand over unlicensed weapons and affirmed support for Hamas in combating “security chaos.”

Central Gaza

In central Gaza, two small armed groups — the Abu Khammash and Abu Moghaiseb factions — surfaced around Deir al-Balah before the January ceasefire and reappeared after fighting resumed in March. Hamas quickly crushed both, killing and wounding several members before tribal elders brokered a truce and arranged for the surrender of their weapons.

The Doghmosh Clan

In Gaza City and the northern parts of the enclave, Hamas also clashed with the Doghmosh clan, which is concentrated in the Tel al-Hawa and al-Sabra neighborhoods. Clan members accused Hamas of killing their elder after he refused to cooperate with an Israeli plan to turn local clans into armed administrators of their neighborhoods.

During the war, Hamas accused Doghmosh gunmen of killing Al-Qassam fighters, seizing their weapons — including Yasin-105 anti-tank rockets — and attempting to assassinate more fighters. The operation was never completed due to Israeli airstrikes and Hamas’s preoccupation with the frontlines.

Before the war, Hamas had praised the clan’s leadership for rejecting Israeli offers to form local militias, a stance that led to Israeli strikes on their homes.

When the ceasefire began Friday afternoon, two Al-Qassam fighters — including the son of a senior commander — were killed by Doghmosh gunmen. Hamas issued an ultimatum to hand over the killers, then launched raids over the following two days.

The fighting left at least 20 Doghmosh members and six Hamas fighters dead, including senior figure Bassem Naim’s son and journalist Saleh al-Jafarawi, who was covering the clashes. Hamas later arrested several clan members and released a video showing executions of alleged “Israeli collaborators,” though it remains unclear if any belonged to the clan.

Northern Gaza

After the Doghmosh battle, Hamas forces stormed positions held by Rami Helles, leader of a militant group operating in Gaza City’s Shujaiya, Zeitoun, and Tuffah districts. The group, numbering in the dozens, retreated eastward as Israeli forces withdrew. On Tuesday, Hamas attacked again, killing and wounding several members.

Simultaneously, another Hamas raid targeted Ashraf al-Mansi’s group in Jabalia, Sheikh Radwan, Nasr, and Beit Lahia. His men, operating under Israeli drone cover, had reportedly looted property and attacked civilians, including near Al-Shifa Hospital.

Israeli Cooperation and Covert Networks

Israeli media have acknowledged that Israel treated wounded Palestinian fighters who collaborated with it against Hamas — particularly in eastern Gaza — and cited one case involving the tunnel explosion that killed members of Helles’s faction.

Hamas sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that a body once believed to belong to an Israeli soldier killed in a tunnel blast in Jabalia in May 2024 was later identified as a Palestinian operative from Shujaiya who had fought alongside Israel for pay.

“These cells were composed of infiltrators and mercenaries recruited by Israel to serve its objectives inside Gaza,” the sources said, adding that Hamas had decided to “deal with them decisively — whether during the previous ceasefire or after the war.”

They confirmed that Hamas is now implementing “a comprehensive plan to eliminate these gangs gradually.”

Trump’s Reaction

During a White House meeting with Argentine President Javier Milei, US President Donald Trump spoke approvingly of the way Hamas “took out two very evil gangs” in Gaza and “killed a number of them.”

Israel has made no official comment on Hamas’s campaign, though some Israeli analysts say the country has “abandoned its allies too quickly.” Hebrew-language media have continued to report extensively on Hamas’s internal security operations in Gaza and its pursuit of groups accused of collaborating with Israel.



How Iranians Are Communicating Through Internet Blackout

 People walk past closed shops at the almost empty traditional main bazaar, in Tehran, Iran, Tuesday, March 10, 2026. (AP)
People walk past closed shops at the almost empty traditional main bazaar, in Tehran, Iran, Tuesday, March 10, 2026. (AP)
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How Iranians Are Communicating Through Internet Blackout

 People walk past closed shops at the almost empty traditional main bazaar, in Tehran, Iran, Tuesday, March 10, 2026. (AP)
People walk past closed shops at the almost empty traditional main bazaar, in Tehran, Iran, Tuesday, March 10, 2026. (AP)

Iran's latest internet blackout has lasted more than 14 days, connectivity monitor Netblocks said Friday.

The nature of the limits on internet activity shows "this is a government-imposed measure" and not the result of damage from US and Israeli airstrikes, Netblocks research chief Isik Mater told AFP.

"It is a deliberate shutdown imposed by the authorities to suppress the flow of information and prevent further dissent," said Raha Bahreini, Iran researcher at Amnesty International.

Here are some of the ways information is still flowing in and out of Iran.

- Shortwave radio -

Amsterdam-based nonprofit Radio Zamaneh began shortwave broadcasts during the January protests, sending a nightly Farsi news program from 11:00 pm Tehran time.

"It's really difficult for the regime to jam shortwave because it's a long-distance broadcast," executive director Rieneke van Santen told AFP.

"People can just listen on a super cheap, small, simple radio... It's one of those typical emergency fall-back solutions."

Declining to specify where the transmitter is located, she said it is "closer to the Netherlands than to Iran" -- although Tehran "can figure it out" if they choose.

- Phone calls -

Many with ties to Iran are still receiving landline phone calls from inside -- "quite surprising" given the internet blackout, said Mahsa Alimardani of global rights organization Witness.

Fearing the authorities listening in, people often avoid speaking directly about political topics, such as the killing of Ali Khamenei, she added.

"It's not possible to communicate about sensitive issues through these brief phone calls," Amnesty's Bahreini said.

The required prepaid international calling cards are expensive and often fail to provide their face value in minutes.

"You buy a phone card for 60 minutes, but in eight minutes, it's out," van Santen said.

"It's really just phone calls from family members saying, after the bombing, we're still alive."

- VPN or other internet services -

Virtual private networks (VPNs) -- widely-used services that encrypt internet traffic -- can't create an internet connection where none is available.

But even at around one percent of typical levels, Iran's connectivity is "still a large figure in absolute terms", Netblocks' Mater said.

Iranians suspected of using VPNs since the war began have received warning text messages claiming to be from the authorities.

Before the war, millions turned to Toronto-based company Psiphon, which creates specialist tools more capable than typical "off-the-shelf" VPNs.

Offering techniques including disguising users' data as different types of internet traffic, Psiphon "is able to evade detection more successfully", data and insights director Keith McManamen told AFP.

With up to six million unique daily users in Iran before the latest internet shutdown, connections have now tumbled to fewer than 100,000.

Few but the most tech-savvy users can reach Psiphon's network for now.

Nevertheless, "the situation is extremely dynamic. We're seeing changes not just day to day, but hour by hour," McManamen said.

A similar service, US-based Lantern, is also widely used in Iran.

- Satellite broadcasts -

Created by US-based nonprofit NetFreedom Pioneers, Toosheh is a "filecasting" technology using home satellite TV equipment to broadcast encrypted data to people in Iran.

Users record from the Toosheh satellite TV channel onto a USB stick plugged into their set-top box, which they can then decrypt using a special app installed on their phone or computer.

From that initial download, the data can be copied and shared across multiple households.

The group estimated around three million active users in Iran across 2025, with "thousands to hundreds of thousands... since the (internet) shutdown in January," the group's director of projects Emilia James told AFP.

From its usual educational repertoire ranging from English lessons to news, content these days includes more on "personal safety and digital security... helping people to stay safe," she added.

Since people are tuning in to a broadcast signal, there is no way for the government to track them, she added.

- Starlink -

Elon Musk-owned satellite internet service Starlink was used during this year's protests to get information out, while the government attempted to jam its signals.

At around $2,000 on Iran's black market, the terminals are expensive and very rare in poorer regions like Balochistan or Kurdistan that have suffered the most government repression, Alimardani said.

Meanwhile, Amnesty has received reports of "raids on houses... arrests of people who had Starlink devices," Bahreini said.

Charges for those caught communicating with the outside world range from prison sentences to the death penalty, she added.

Starlink did not respond to AFP's request for comment on usage in Iran.


How Iranians Are Communicating Through Internet Blackout

 People walk past closed shops at the almost empty traditional main bazaar, in Tehran, Iran, Tuesday, March 10, 2026. (AP)
People walk past closed shops at the almost empty traditional main bazaar, in Tehran, Iran, Tuesday, March 10, 2026. (AP)
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How Iranians Are Communicating Through Internet Blackout

 People walk past closed shops at the almost empty traditional main bazaar, in Tehran, Iran, Tuesday, March 10, 2026. (AP)
People walk past closed shops at the almost empty traditional main bazaar, in Tehran, Iran, Tuesday, March 10, 2026. (AP)

Iran's latest internet blackout has lasted more than 14 days, connectivity monitor Netblocks said Friday.

The nature of the limits on internet activity shows "this is a government-imposed measure" and not the result of damage from US and Israeli airstrikes, Netblocks research chief Isik Mater told AFP.

"It is a deliberate shutdown imposed by the authorities to suppress the flow of information and prevent further dissent," said Raha Bahreini, Iran researcher at Amnesty International.

Here are some of the ways information is still flowing in and out of Iran.

- Shortwave radio -

Amsterdam-based nonprofit Radio Zamaneh began shortwave broadcasts during the January protests, sending a nightly Farsi news program from 11:00 pm Tehran time.

"It's really difficult for the regime to jam shortwave because it's a long-distance broadcast," executive director Rieneke van Santen told AFP.

"People can just listen on a super cheap, small, simple radio... It's one of those typical emergency fall-back solutions."

Declining to specify where the transmitter is located, she said it is "closer to the Netherlands than to Iran" -- although Tehran "can figure it out" if they choose.

- Phone calls -

Many with ties to Iran are still receiving landline phone calls from inside -- "quite surprising" given the internet blackout, said Mahsa Alimardani of global rights organization Witness.

Fearing the authorities listening in, people often avoid speaking directly about political topics, such as the killing of Ali Khamenei, she added.

"It's not possible to communicate about sensitive issues through these brief phone calls," Amnesty's Bahreini said.

The required prepaid international calling cards are expensive and often fail to provide their face value in minutes.

"You buy a phone card for 60 minutes, but in eight minutes, it's out," van Santen said.

"It's really just phone calls from family members saying, after the bombing, we're still alive."

- VPN or other internet services -

Virtual private networks (VPNs) -- widely-used services that encrypt internet traffic -- can't create an internet connection where none is available.

But even at around one percent of typical levels, Iran's connectivity is "still a large figure in absolute terms", Netblocks' Mater said.

Iranians suspected of using VPNs since the war began have received warning text messages claiming to be from the authorities.

Before the war, millions turned to Toronto-based company Psiphon, which creates specialist tools more capable than typical "off-the-shelf" VPNs.

Offering techniques including disguising users' data as different types of internet traffic, Psiphon "is able to evade detection more successfully", data and insights director Keith McManamen told AFP.

With up to six million unique daily users in Iran before the latest internet shutdown, connections have now tumbled to fewer than 100,000.

Few but the most tech-savvy users can reach Psiphon's network for now.

Nevertheless, "the situation is extremely dynamic. We're seeing changes not just day to day, but hour by hour," McManamen said.

A similar service, US-based Lantern, is also widely used in Iran.

- Satellite broadcasts -

Created by US-based nonprofit NetFreedom Pioneers, Toosheh is a "filecasting" technology using home satellite TV equipment to broadcast encrypted data to people in Iran.

Users record from the Toosheh satellite TV channel onto a USB stick plugged into their set-top box, which they can then decrypt using a special app installed on their phone or computer.

From that initial download, the data can be copied and shared across multiple households.

The group estimated around three million active users in Iran across 2025, with "thousands to hundreds of thousands... since the (internet) shutdown in January," the group's director of projects Emilia James told AFP.

From its usual educational repertoire ranging from English lessons to news, content these days includes more on "personal safety and digital security... helping people to stay safe," she added.

Since people are tuning in to a broadcast signal, there is no way for the government to track them, she added.

- Starlink -

Elon Musk-owned satellite internet service Starlink was used during this year's protests to get information out, while the government attempted to jam its signals.

At around $2,000 on Iran's black market, the terminals are expensive and very rare in poorer regions like Balochistan or Kurdistan that have suffered the most government repression, Alimardani said.

Meanwhile, Amnesty has received reports of "raids on houses... arrests of people who had Starlink devices," Bahreini said.

Charges for those caught communicating with the outside world range from prison sentences to the death penalty, she added.

Starlink did not respond to AFP's request for comment on usage in Iran.


Will Ahmadinejad Return to the Political Scene in Iran?

Iranian former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. (AFP)
Iranian former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. (AFP)
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Will Ahmadinejad Return to the Political Scene in Iran?

Iranian former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. (AFP)
Iranian former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. (AFP)

A report by The Atlantic said the strike that hit a region close to Iranian former President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s residence in the first days of the war on Iran has returned to the spotlight a still controversial political figure even though he left office for over a decade ago.

On the first day of the Iran war, the assassination of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei overshadowed news of a strike near Ahmadinejad’s home, said the report.

“Many who remembered his term in office - marked by Holocaust denial, atom-bomb fetishism, and shoving revolutionary ideology down the throats of a country already weary of it - celebrated his reported assassination,” it added. He was president from 2005 to 2013.

“Among those who have followed Ahmadinejad’s post-presidential career, however, his targeting was more of an enigma. Since leaving office, Ahmadinejad has harshly criticized the Iranian government, and as a result, Iran’s Guardian Council has formally excluded him from running for president,” said the report.

For more than a decade, he has been known more as a regime opponent than as a supporter. “I don’t understand why Israel would want to kill him in the first place,” Meir Javedanfar, who co-wrote a biography of Ahmadinejad, told The Atlantic. “Perhaps to settle scores? It makes no sense.”

Contrary to early reports, Ahmadinejad is alive, his associates revealed, requesting anonymity. “The circumstances of his survival may prove significant as the war drags on. Whatever the intent, Ahmadinejad’s associates say the strike was in effect a jailbreak operation that freed the former president from regime control.”

“Long before the war, the government had posted a small number of bodyguards near Ahmadinejad, nominally to protect a prominent citizen but also to keep tabs on him. The regime has never been sure what to do with him,” said the report.

About a month ago, after the January protests, his freedom of movement was further reduced, his phones confiscated, and the contingent of bodyguards increased from single digits to about 50. The bodyguards were based a few hundred meters from Ahmadinejad’s residence itself, at the entrance to a cul-de-sac in Narmak, in northeast Tehran. They established a checkpoint to monitor the houses and high school on that street.

“A February 28 strike hit not the residence, but the security forces nearby. In the ensuing mayhem, Ahmadinejad and his family evidently escaped their home and went underground. The government believed he had died, and his death was announced by official channels, as well as the reformist daily Sharq.”

“When rumors arose that Ahmadinejad had escaped, regime elements immediately suspected that he had been spirited away to take part in a coup,” said The Atlantic. “Ahmadinejad’s only public statement since the attack has been a brief eulogy for the supreme leader, calculated to show that Ahmadinejad was alive and to dispel speculation that he had declared himself an enemy of the state. His location is unknown to the government.”

In 2018, former Defense Minister Hussein Dehghan likened Ahmadinejad to “the door of the mosque, which can’t be burned or thrown away” without torching the mosque itself.

“Arresting Ahmadinejad could unsettle the regime,” Javedanfar said. “He knows a hell of a lot about it.”

“Ahmadinejad’s fans say that he has popular support, and that any postwar government will want him around to lend that support. If the current regime survives, it will need all the legitimacy it can get. If it does not, the United States might need someone with intimate - if outdated - knowledge of the Iranian state to be involved with what comes next. Ahmadinejad could still be useful,” the report said.