Deal or Strike: Is Military Action Against Iran Drawing Closer?

Military equipment, including helicopters, on board the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln (AP)
Military equipment, including helicopters, on board the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln (AP)
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Deal or Strike: Is Military Action Against Iran Drawing Closer?

Military equipment, including helicopters, on board the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln (AP)
Military equipment, including helicopters, on board the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln (AP)

Despite reports of mediation and back-channel exchanges between Washington and Tehran, what is being described as “negotiations” so far looks more like a bid to keep tensions from boiling over than a diplomatic process.

Signals emerging from Western officials and media indicate the two sides have yet to engage in direct, substantive talks, with the dispute over the very terms of entry itself carrying a political message.

US President Donald Trump’s administration is pressing for an agreement that encompasses Iran’s nuclear program, ballistic missiles, and regional influence. At the same time, Tehran insists that any dialogue be confined strictly to the nuclear file.

That gap has reinforced suspicions in Tehran that Trump’s offer of a deal is little more than a tactical feint, masking serious preparations for military action. This scenario would echo the US strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities in June 2025.

As Trump sharpens his rhetoric, the stalemate revives a central question: Is diplomacy becoming a pretext for war, or a narrowing window to avert it?

A different escalation

The key difference this time lies in the scale and nature of the military posture.

It is not a mere show of force, but a combined offensive-defensive package signaling readiness for multiple scenarios, following the arrival of the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln and its strike group in the US Central Command area of operations, enabling support for strikes or protection of allies against retaliatory attacks.

This has been accompanied by strengthened air defenses, including Patriot and THAAD systems, as well as air drills focused on deployment, operations, and sortie generation under challenging conditions, according to US Central Command.

Such a pattern is typically associated with raising readiness for potential reciprocal responses.

At the same time, Washington is aware that any operation against Iran would not be a “precision operation” like what occurred in Venezuela, where the US previously amassed large forces in the Caribbean in a campaign that ended with the arrest of President Nicolas Maduro in early January 2026.

Iran’s geography is more complex, and its missile capabilities and layered defenses make a “decisive strike” more complicated, even if the US enjoys overwhelming superiority.

Trump’s options

Earlier leaks pointed to the end of this month as a possible date for a US strike, though this remains unconfirmed publicly.

The danger in circulating such reports lies in the political-military dynamic they create. When a force of this size is mobilized, internal and external pressure on the White House grows to justify the cost by achieving some result, even if limited.

At the same time, the leaks may be part of psychological warfare aimed at forcing Tehran to make concessions before the window for de-escalation “closes.”

Accordingly, the practical rule is that absent a clear political decision, the scenario remains open to three graduated possibilities: a limited strike to impose new rules of engagement; a broader campaign targeting nuclear and missile infrastructure and security nodes; or continued military pressure as a negotiating lever without opening fire.

According to the Financial Times, Trump’s options, should he decide to carry out military action, range from a limited punitive strike targeting missile sites, drones, or facilities linked to the Revolutionary Guard, aimed at raising the cost of Iranian refusal without seeking regime change.

Another option would expand the target bank to include nuclear facilities that are being hardened and rebuilt, particularly after Western talk of Iranian attempts to resume work at deeper underground sites.

There is also a set of non-traditional pressure options, such as tightening a maritime blockade or striking state infrastructure as a political message.

These options carry higher risks, as they raise the likelihood of retaliation outside established rules of engagement.

The decisive issue, however, is the “endgame.”

The US administration itself implicitly acknowledges that removing the regime's head does not guarantee its collapse, and that the question of “who comes next” has no ready answer.

This explains repeated warnings in assessments leaked to the media and in statements by US officials that the regime is weaker than ever, but that a decisive blow is not guaranteed.

How might Iran respond?

Tehran has warned in advance that any attack would mark the start of a war, and that retaliation could extend to Israel, particularly Tel Aviv, as well as anyone who supports the aggressor.

Operationally, Iran has a ladder of response, starting with strikes on US bases in the region using missiles or drones, moving through the activation of regional proxies, and culminating in threats to shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, the scenario with the most severe global impact.

The latter possibility may be among the main reasons regional states have sought to avoid war and continue diplomatic efforts while stressing neutrality.

This stance could increase US logistical demands in any large-scale operation and heighten reliance on distant naval platforms.

Markets, however, have already issued an early warning. Oil prices have risen for three consecutive sessions amid fears of supply disruptions, with Brent crude nearing the $ 70-a-barrel threshold and a rise in the geopolitical risk premium, while gold has climbed as a safe-haven asset.

If a strike does occur, the potential fallout would be threefold. Economically, a spike in oil prices, pressure on shipping and insurance, and volatility in Gulf markets. Security-wise, an expansion of theaters of engagement to include Iraq, Syria, the Gulf, and Israel, with heightened risks of miscalculation.

Politically, a narrowing of prospects for any near-term negotiations, or conversely, a limited strike used to force talks under harsher terms.



Unmentioned but Present, Trump is a Common Denominator in Efforts to Strengthen Asia-Europe Ties

US President Donald Trump waves as he walks upon arrival on the South Lawn of the White House in Washington, US, January 27, 2026. REUTERS/Annabelle Gordon
US President Donald Trump waves as he walks upon arrival on the South Lawn of the White House in Washington, US, January 27, 2026. REUTERS/Annabelle Gordon
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Unmentioned but Present, Trump is a Common Denominator in Efforts to Strengthen Asia-Europe Ties

US President Donald Trump waves as he walks upon arrival on the South Lawn of the White House in Washington, US, January 27, 2026. REUTERS/Annabelle Gordon
US President Donald Trump waves as he walks upon arrival on the South Lawn of the White House in Washington, US, January 27, 2026. REUTERS/Annabelle Gordon

Stability. Consistency. Ever-changing complexity.

With language like that, deployed in separate meetings in three Asian capitals this week, government leaders forged closer ties driven in part by a figure halfway around the world: the president of the United States. And much of the time, they didn't even mention Donald Trump's name.

IN BEIJING: The UK and Chinese leaders called Thursday for a “long-term, stable, and comprehensive strategic partnership” between their two countries. The important words are long-term and stable. The two countries committed a decade ago to building a comprehensive strategic partnership but progress has been halting at best.

IN HANOI: About 1,100 kilometers (700 miles) to the south, Vietnam and the European Union used the same phrasing on the same day. They upgraded ties to a comprehensive strategic partnership. The agreement places Vietnam on the same diplomatic footing with the EU as the United States, China and Russia.

IN NEW DELHI: Two days earlier, the EU and India reached a major free trade accord that had been mired in negotiations for years. It covers everything from textiles to medicines and will bring down India's high tariffs on European wine and cars.

Trump was not the only factor behind the agreements, but his shaking up of the global order is worrying friends and foes and driving them closer. From a purely economic perspective, his import tariffs have sent countries seeking new markets to reduce their dependency on the American consumer.

More broadly, all the agreements have been accompanied by words from the leaders referring to the uncertainty that Trump has introduced to global affairs, though mostly without mentioning his name. The systems they have relied on to manage the world since the end of the Cold War and, in some cases since World War II, appear at risk.

British Prime Minister Keir Starmer called for working with China on global stability “during challenging times for the world." Chinese leader Xi Jinping described the international situation as “complex and ever-changing.” In New Delhi, Prime Minister Narendra Modi said the partnership with the EU “will strengthen stability in the international system” at a time of ”turmoil in the global order.”

European Council President António Costa summed up the sentiment Thursday in the Vietnamese capital: “At a moment when the international rules-based order is under threat from multiple sides, we need to stand side by side as reliable and predictable partners.”


‘Too Dangerous to Go to Hospital’: A Glimpse into Iran’s Protest Crackdown

Iranians walk along a street in Tehran, Iran, 27 January 2026. (EPA)
Iranians walk along a street in Tehran, Iran, 27 January 2026. (EPA)
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‘Too Dangerous to Go to Hospital’: A Glimpse into Iran’s Protest Crackdown

Iranians walk along a street in Tehran, Iran, 27 January 2026. (EPA)
Iranians walk along a street in Tehran, Iran, 27 January 2026. (EPA)

Young protesters shot in the back, shotgun pellets fired in a doctor's face, wounded people afraid to go to hospital: "Every family has been affected" by the deadly crackdown on Iran's recent wave of demonstrations, said one protester.

Speaking to AFP in Istanbul, this 45-year-old engineer who asked to be identified as Farhad -- not his real name -- was caught up in the mass protests that swept his home city of one million people just outside Tehran.

With Iran still largely under an internet blackout after weeks of unrest, eyewitness testimony is key for understanding how the events unfolded.

Angry demonstrations over economic hardship began late last year and exploded into the biggest anti-government protests since the 1979 revolution.

"On the first day, there were so many people in the streets that the security forces just kept their distance," he told AFP.

"But on the second day, they understood that without shooting, the people were not going to disperse."

As the protests grew, the security forces began a major crackdown under the cover of a communications blackout that began on January 8.

In an interview on the European side of Istanbul, this quietly-spoken oil industry worker said he was in his car with his sister on the night when the shooting began.

"We saw about 20 military people jumping from cars and start shooting at young people about 100 meters away. I saw people running but they were shooting at their backs" with rifles and shotguns, he told AFP.

"In front of my eyes, I saw a friend of ours, a doctor, being hit in the face by shotgun pellets," Farhad said. He does not know what happened to him.

Both Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch have accused the security forces of firing rifles and shotguns loaded with metal pellets directly at protesters' heads and torsos.

"I saw two people being carried, they were very badly injured, maybe dead," Farhad said.

A lot of people also died "in their cars because the bullets were coming out of nowhere".

- 'Afraid to go to hospital' -

The scale of the crackdown is only slowly emerging.

Despite great difficulty accessing information, the Norway-based NGO Iran Human Rights says it has verified the deaths of 3,428 protesters killed by the security forces, but warned the final toll risks reaching 25,000.

Those who were injured were often too afraid to go to hospital, Farhad said.

"People can't go to the hospital because the authorities and the police are there. Anyone with injuries from bullets or shotgun (pellets) they detain and interrogate," he said.

"Doctors have been going to people's houses to give them medical assistance."

He himself was beaten with a baton by two people on a motorbike and thought his arm was broken, but did not go to hospital because it was "too dangerous".

Many "opened their homes to let the demonstrators inside and give them first aid", including his sister and her friend who took in "around 50 boys, and gave them tea and cake".

There were a lot of very young people on the streets and "a lot of girls and women", he told AFP, saying he had seen children of "six or seven" shouting slogans against Iran's supreme leader Ali Khamenei.

The security forces were also staging spot checks for anyone with protest-related injuries or footage on their phones, he said.

"It's so dangerous because they randomly check phones. If they see anything related to this revolution, you are finished. They are also making people lift their shirts to look for signs of bullet or shotgun injuries.

"If they see that, they are taken for interrogation."

Speaking just before he flew back to Iran -- "because I have a job to go to" -- he insisted he was "absolutely not afraid".

Despite everything, people were still ready to protest "because they are so angry", he explained.

He is convinced US President Donald Trump will soon make good on his pledge to intervene, pointing to recent reports of US warships arriving in the region.

"The system cannot survive -- in Iran everybody is just overwhelmed with this dictatorship. We have had enough of them."


Trump Balances War Threats and Brinkmanship with Iran

US fighter jets aboard the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln (AFP)
US fighter jets aboard the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln (AFP)
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Trump Balances War Threats and Brinkmanship with Iran

US fighter jets aboard the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln (AFP)
US fighter jets aboard the aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln (AFP)

All indications suggest that US military action against Iran may be imminent. Yet the paradox is that edging toward the brink of confrontation may itself be part of negotiations being conducted under intense pressure.

Mutual threats, naval and air deployments, and deterrence messages are carefully calibrated to demonstrate seriousness without sliding into a war that President Donald Trump’s administration does not want.

Trump has repeatedly spoken of an “armada” in the region, while at the same time saying Tehran is sending signals of readiness to negotiate, a deliberate dual track aimed at keeping the adversary uncertain.

This tension between preparing for a strike and keeping the door to a deal ajar aligns with Farzin Nadimi's assessment. Nadimi is a senior Iran analyst at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, Nadimi said he cannot predict what the US president will ultimately decide, adding that regardless of what Trump says to the media, the military buildup points to limited, focused strikes or a scaled-down military campaign.

According to Nadimi, such a campaign would intend to punish and deter the Iranian regime, weaken its ability to retaliate against the United States and its allies, and or disrupt oil flows from the Gulf.

The implication is that the buildup is not mere showmanship but the creation of an operational environment that enables a rapid strike if the political channel fails, without becoming mired in a prolonged war.

Calibrated options

The entry of the US aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln and its strike group into the US Central Command area of operations in the western Indian Ocean shortens the timeline for possible action if a political decision is taken.

This has coincided with additional air reinforcements, including the deployment of F-15 fighter jets.

Together, these elements give Washington a ladder of options: a limited strike, a series of time-phased military strikes, or a defensive posture designed to raise the cost of any Iranian retaliation against US bases and allies.

But a “limited strike” is not just a technical choice; it is a political one, conditioned on answering a central question: what exactly does Washington want to achieve, and what is the “off-ramp” that would allow it to declare success and return to negotiations?

Here, Nadimi voices skepticism. He expressed doubts about the ability to achieve these objectives with such limited means.

A “mini” campaign may appear attractive because it avoids full-scale war, but it may not ensure deterrence or protect energy flows if Tehran opts for asymmetric retaliation, explained Nadimi.

Iran’s threats as a constraint

On the other side, Tehran and its regional allies have raised the tone of their threats. Iranian officials have warned of a “more painful” response if attacked, while statements from Hezbollah, Iraqi factions, and Yemen’s Houthis signal readiness to join any confrontation.

Such rhetoric serves the purpose of deterrence and boosting morale within the axis, but it carries a structural risk: the higher the ceiling of threats, the narrower the space for de-escalation.

The likelihood grows that an undisciplined actor, a faction or militia, could ignite an action that forces everyone into a “a cycle of retaliation,” widening the conflict beyond the calculus of a “limited” strike.

This is why Washington, according to reports, has focused on sending warning messages to Baghdad and to armed actors that any targeting of US forces would be met with direct retaliation against militias. The aim is to curb slippage that could turn a single strike into multiple fronts.

At the core of US concern is not only Iran’s ability to retaliate, but where it might do so. US bases across Iraq, Syria, and the Gulf are vulnerable targets in any escalation.

The buildup, therefore, has a clear defensive dimension, reinforcing interception systems and maritime and air defenses to contain missiles and drones.

While this is meant to protect forces, it also seeks to keep escalation in check: deterring or neutralizing retaliatory strikes so they do not force Washington into larger steps.

Alternatives to war

If force is used, the most likely scenario would involve limited, time-phased strikes targeting air defenses, missile sites, command-and-control nodes, and possibly sensitive facilities, before stopping at a point that allows a return to the political track.

The stated or implicit goal would be “punishment” and “deterrence” without ground entanglement.

Iran, however, always retains room to respond below the threshold but in painful ways, through proxies, disruption of shipping, or gradual attrition that embarrasses Washington and its allies and pushes them toward harder choices.

Here again, Nadimi questions whether limited tools would suffice, noting that success is not measured by the number of missiles launched on the first night, but by Washington’s ability to prevent Tehran from redefining the battlefield and its timing.

Targeting the leadership

In such crises, the question of “decapitation” often arises: could Washington move to target Iran’s leadership?

Nadimi addresses this cautiously, saying that targeting the supreme leader would be conceivable only “if there were a high probability of success and a low risk of casualties among US forces.”

He stresses the need to remember “the fundamental differences between Iran and Venezuela,” underscoring that what might be imagined in one political or security environment cannot be simply transplanted into Iran’s far more fortified and complex system.

Still, Nadimi adds that “the possibility of an internal operation should not be ruled out,” a phrase suggesting that the most dangerous scenarios may not begin with a missile, but with an internal rupture or movement intersecting with external pressure.

The heaviest factor in Washington’s calculations is not fear of immediate military defeat, but uncertainty about “the day after” if the system were shaken or lost control.

Iran is a large country with a complex institutional and security structure. Any major fracture could unleash a chain of scenarios, including factional conflict, security vacuums, economic turmoil, refugee flows, and immediate shocks to energy markets and the region.

Seen through this lens, the US buildup is also a negotiating tool: a threat sufficient to open doors without assuming responsibility for the consequences of collapse.

In sum, the Trump administration appears to be holding two threads at once: building up forces to make a strike an immediate option, and signaling enough pressure to force Tehran to consider negotiations, while trying to keep any confrontation below the threshold of a “mini campaign,” not a full-scale war.