Seif al-Islam al-Gadhafi: Why Shouldn’t I Trust Them?

Seif al-Islam al-Gadhafi speaks during a news conference in Tripoli on Aug. 4, 2010 (EPA)
Seif al-Islam al-Gadhafi speaks during a news conference in Tripoli on Aug. 4, 2010 (EPA)
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Seif al-Islam al-Gadhafi: Why Shouldn’t I Trust Them?

Seif al-Islam al-Gadhafi speaks during a news conference in Tripoli on Aug. 4, 2010 (EPA)
Seif al-Islam al-Gadhafi speaks during a news conference in Tripoli on Aug. 4, 2010 (EPA)

“Why shouldn’t I trust them?” That was Seif al-Islam al-Gadhafi’s blunt reply when asked why he had placed his confidence in Islamist prisoners held in his father’s jails in Libya, men he was negotiating to release.

He then set out, at length, the logic behind his gamble. He said the Islamists had admitted that taking up arms against the Libyan state had been a mistake, and that building “Tomorrow’s Libya” required the participation of all Libyans.

He added that those he had negotiated with and freed had proven worthy of trust and would not return to violence.

Seif spoke during a meeting with him during one of his visits to London in the late 1990s or early 2000s. At the time, he was focused on emptying his father’s prisons of members of Islamist groups, including leaders of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.

That group had waged a guerrilla war in the mid-1990s to overthrow the regime and had nearly succeeded in assassinating Moammar al-Gadhafi.

Libyan security forces eventually defeated it in the late 1990s. Some of the group’s leaders had been imprisoned in Libya for many years, while others were handed over to al-Gadhafi by the United States during the “war on terror” targeting groups based in Afghanistan after the Sept. 11, 2001 attacks.

My question to Seif al-Islam al-Gadhafi about “trust” was rooted in my awareness that there was a current within his father’s regime, which included at least one of his brothers, that was leading a campaign entirely opposed to what Seif was pursuing.

Those holding the opposing view argued that Seif was making a mistake by trusting that those he was releasing would not revolt again when the opportunity arose.

At the time, a senior security official responsible for detaining leaders of the Islamic Fighting Group said, “They will not leave except over my dead body,” in a direct challenge to Seif, believing that the elder al-Gadhafi shared his view rather than that of his son, regarding those the regime referred to as “heretics.”

In any case, Seif’s opponents failed to stop his efforts. Leaders of the Islamic Fighting Group agreed to issue what became known as the “revisions,” in which they declared armed action against ruling regimes in Islamic countries to be forbidden and condemned many practices attributed to al-Qaeda and other groups influenced by its ideology.

Ultimately, it was Moammar al-Gadhafi who settled the matter, siding with what Seif wanted. At the time, Seif was being promoted as a potential successor to his father.

When the February 2011 uprising erupted in Libya, Seif was among those most criticized by people around his father for his “trust in Islamists.” Some of those released were among the first to take up arms and join the rebels.

This, it was said at the time, prompted Seif to adopt a hardline stance against his father’s opponents in his well-known speech at Bab al-Aziziya in Tripoli in the early days of the uprising.

In reality, Seif’s relationship with his brothers had long been the subject of rumors and quiet speculation in the years before the fall of his father’s regime.

Talk circulated of deep disagreements between Seif and his brother Mutassim, who was killed alongside their father in Sirte in 2011. When asked about this, Seif's response suggested a degree of self-assurance.

He spoke with satisfaction about how hard the Americans were trying, but how little they understood about what was really going on between him and his brothers. He did not deny the existence of differences, but his answer suggested that the family ultimately remained united under their father.

Seif was a frequent visitor to London at the time.

He was reaping the results of efforts by Libyan negotiators working to resolve cases in which his father’s regime had been implicated.

These included the Lockerbie bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 in 1988, the bombing of a French UTA airliner in 1989, and the case of the Bulgarian nurses and the Palestinian doctor accused of infecting children at a Benghazi hospital with HIV.

Seif’s efforts succeeded in settling most of those cases, which involved compensation totaling millions of dollars. But his work was bound to collide eventually with the reality that he was trying to present a different image of Libya from the one shaped by his father’s rule.

That was the focus of a question he was asked during a public event before an audience of students at a London college. He replied, “I don’t like this question.”



What Safe Havens Remain for the Islamic Jihad?

The late Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei receives the late «Hamas» leader Ismail Haniyeh and the leader of the «Jihad» movement, Ziad al-Nakhala, in Tehran, July 2024 (AFP)
The late Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei receives the late «Hamas» leader Ismail Haniyeh and the leader of the «Jihad» movement, Ziad al-Nakhala, in Tehran, July 2024 (AFP)
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What Safe Havens Remain for the Islamic Jihad?

The late Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei receives the late «Hamas» leader Ismail Haniyeh and the leader of the «Jihad» movement, Ziad al-Nakhala, in Tehran, July 2024 (AFP)
The late Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei receives the late «Hamas» leader Ismail Haniyeh and the leader of the «Jihad» movement, Ziad al-Nakhala, in Tehran, July 2024 (AFP)

The US-Israeli war against Iran has reshaped the landscape for Palestinian factions aligned with Tehran, with the Palestinian Islamic Jihad among the most affected. The group has faced financial and security setbacks in both Syria and Lebanon, even as fighting continues in the Gaza Strip.

Sources in the movement told Asharq Al-Awsat that the regional security changes and the war against Iran have further complicated the organization’s remaining safe havens.

While Hamas maintains close ties with Tehran, Islamic Jihad’s relationship with Iran runs deeper. The connection dates back to the group’s founding in the 1980s by Fathi Shaqaqi.

For decades, Islamic Jihad maintained a military and human presence in both Syria and Lebanon, gaining additional protection as Iranian influence expanded in the two countries over the past ten years.

However, the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, the head of Hamas’ political bureau, in Tehran in July 2024, followed by an attempted attack on Hamas leaders in Doha in September, served as a major warning to Palestinian faction leaders, particularly Islamic Jihad.

Three countries

According to sources in the group, Secretary-General Ziad al-Nakhalah has sharply reduced his visits to Iran, traveling there only three times since Haniyeh’s assassination. One visit involved a joint delegation from Islamic Jihad and Hamas and lasted several days, while the other two were brief.

Previously, Nakhalah and several senior figures — particularly Akram al-Ajouri, who oversees the group’s armed wing, the Al-Quds Brigades — considered Iran a key safe haven, along with other capitals, such as Beirut. In recent years, however, the group has also expanded its contacts with Qatar and strengthened ties with Egypt.

A source close to Nakhalah said the leader has recently been moving between Doha and Cairo, staying for extended periods, especially in Doha, where his deputy Mohammed al-Hindi is based almost permanently.

Hindi also travels between Qatar, Egypt and Türkiye, with his role in Egypt largely focused on Gaza-related discussions with Egyptian intelligence officials.

Sources declined to confirm whether Ajouri, who had been based in Beirut’s southern suburbs in recent years, has left the area because of security concerns.

Israel recently killed Adham al-Othman, a commander in the Al-Quds Brigades in Lebanon, in a strike on an apartment used by Hezbollah in Beirut’s southern suburbs. He was known to be close to Ajouri.

Pressure in Syria

Israel had already tightened pressure on the Islamic Jihad in Syria before the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government. A November 2024 airstrike on a group facility in Damascus killed senior figures Abdul Aziz al-Minawi and Rasmi Abu Issa, along with other members.

After the regime’s collapse in December 2024, the pressure intensified. Syria’s new authorities arrested the Islamic Jihad’s representative in the country, Khaled Khaled, and his deputy Abu Ali Yasser in April 2025, holding them for several months.

Movement sources say many of its members in Syria were detained and later released, with interrogations focusing on their weapons and where they were stored.

Some Israeli strikes in recent months have also targeted senior operatives, including field commanders in the Al-Quds Brigades who had previously been wounded in Gaza and remained in Damascus for treatment.

Facing continued Israeli pressure, some Islamic Jihad activists have relocated from Syria to Lebanon or Türkiye. Others have joined Hezbollah fighters in southern Lebanon.

All of this comes as the Islamic Jihad faces a severe financial crisis. Iranian support has largely stopped, affecting salary payments for fighters and limiting the group’s operational budgets both inside Gaza and abroad.


Syrians on Alert to Prevent Accommodation of Displaced Hezbollah Supporters from Lebanon

 Syrians living in Lebanon wait outside the Ministry of Interior Immigration and Passports Department, at the Syrian-Lebanese border, as they return to Syria due to ongoing hostilities between Hezbollah and Israeli forces, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in Jdaydet Yabous, Syria, March 3, 2026. (Reuters)
Syrians living in Lebanon wait outside the Ministry of Interior Immigration and Passports Department, at the Syrian-Lebanese border, as they return to Syria due to ongoing hostilities between Hezbollah and Israeli forces, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in Jdaydet Yabous, Syria, March 3, 2026. (Reuters)
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Syrians on Alert to Prevent Accommodation of Displaced Hezbollah Supporters from Lebanon

 Syrians living in Lebanon wait outside the Ministry of Interior Immigration and Passports Department, at the Syrian-Lebanese border, as they return to Syria due to ongoing hostilities between Hezbollah and Israeli forces, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in Jdaydet Yabous, Syria, March 3, 2026. (Reuters)
Syrians living in Lebanon wait outside the Ministry of Interior Immigration and Passports Department, at the Syrian-Lebanese border, as they return to Syria due to ongoing hostilities between Hezbollah and Israeli forces, amid the US-Israeli conflict with Iran, in Jdaydet Yabous, Syria, March 3, 2026. (Reuters)

Syrians in Damascus, its countryside, and western Homs countryside are on alert to prevent displaced Lebanese supporters of Hezbollah from entering Syrian territory or being hosted by locals.

The stance marks a sharp departure from previous Israeli wars on Lebanon, when Syrian cities received tens of thousands of Lebanese fleeing the fighting.

As Israel broadened its strikes in the region to include Hezbollah, not just Iran, displacement from southern Lebanon and Beirut's southern suburbs has resumed. This time, however, those fleeing include not only Lebanese but also Syrians who had been living as refugees in Lebanon.

The scene in and around Damascus appears markedly different from past years. No private cars carrying Lebanese displaced people have been seen in the capital Damascus and its outskirts, unlike during earlier Israeli wars on southern Lebanon under the rule of ousted leader Bashar al-Assad.

In previous waves of displacement, tens of thousands of Lebanese fled to Damascus. Some stayed in hotels, others rented apartments, while a small number were housed in shelters.

The same pattern now applies to Eastern Ghouta. Hezbollah and Iran had turned the area into a strategic rear base while fighting alongside Assad's government during the years of the Syrian uprising.

Hezbollah also housed large numbers of fighters' families there during its war with Israel.

Omar Mohammad Safi, known as Abu Firas, from the town of Beit Sahm in Eastern Ghouta, said the town has not seen the arrival of any Lebanese during the current war, whether Hezbollah supporters or others.

“When Israel attacked Hezbollah the last time, large numbers of fighters' families came and stayed in homes the party had seized in Ghouta, Sayeda Zeinab and elsewhere, but in this war, we have not seen any of them at all in any town,” he told Asharq al-Awsat.

Over the past two days, activists circulated a statement purportedly issued by residents of Damascus and its countryside, especially Eastern Ghouta, warning against renting property to or hosting strangers from southern Lebanon, or Lebanese individuals or families, particularly those linked to Hezbollah.

The statement said Hezbollah, during its support for the former regime, had “committed crimes and massacres,” adding: “We will not forget the massacres of Eastern Ghouta and the chemical massacre.

“Whoever dared to kill us and gloat over us will have no place among us, and we will expel him from the area immediately, along with anyone who shelters him, by all means,” it warned.

During the war in Syria, Hezbollah turned the western Qalamoun area in the Damascus countryside, adjacent to Lebanon's Bekaa region, into a strategic regional rear base.

During the previous war with Israel, the area also hosted tens of thousands of displaced people from Beirut's southern suburbs and southern Lebanon, with facilitation from Assad's government.

But Mahmoud Qusaibiya, known as Abu Alaa, from the town of Jarjir in western Qalamoun, said the town has not seen the arrival of any displaced Lebanese Hezbollah supporters.

“A warning was circulated by elders and prominent figures telling residents not to receive anyone from Hezbollah or their families, because we supported the revolution and they stood with the former government and its remnants,” he told Asharq al-Awsat.

The clearest development has been in the city of Qusayr in western Homs countryside, which Hezbollah seized during the Syrina war.

Rashid Jammoul, known as Abu Mohammad, who comes from the city, said Syrians at the border with Lebanon around Qusayr were on high alert to prevent Hezbollah members, their families, or people linked to them from entering Syrian territory.

“There have been some attempts, but there is an alert by the army and by residents at all legal and illegal crossings,” the man in his sixties told Asharq al-Awsat.

“We will not allow any of them or anyone linked to them to enter or be received after they committed massacres against us, destroyed our villages, and burned our homes.”

Since Israel launched its new war on southern Lebanon, more than 25,000 Syrians have returned to their country.

Syria’s General Authority for Ports and Customs denied that families of Hezbollah members were among those arriving from Lebanon.

Mazen Alloush, director of relations at the authority, said two days ago that since the first day families began fleeing from Lebanon to Syria, social media had been flooded with rumors claiming that families of Hezbollah fighters and supporters were entering Syrian territory through border crossings.

As the rumors spread, some buses leaving the Jousieh border crossing were stopped by young men in the city of Qusayr and attacked on that pretext.

Seeking to clarify the situation, Alloush said all the passengers on those buses were Syrians who had been living in Lebanon and who came from different Syrian provinces.

He said they had entered the country legally.


This Is How Ukraine Has Countered Russia’s Iran-Designed Drones

An Iranian Shahed exploding drone launched by Russia flies through the sky seconds before it struck buildings in Kyiv, Ukraine, on Oct. 17, 2022. (AP)
An Iranian Shahed exploding drone launched by Russia flies through the sky seconds before it struck buildings in Kyiv, Ukraine, on Oct. 17, 2022. (AP)
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This Is How Ukraine Has Countered Russia’s Iran-Designed Drones

An Iranian Shahed exploding drone launched by Russia flies through the sky seconds before it struck buildings in Kyiv, Ukraine, on Oct. 17, 2022. (AP)
An Iranian Shahed exploding drone launched by Russia flies through the sky seconds before it struck buildings in Kyiv, Ukraine, on Oct. 17, 2022. (AP)

Ukraine is preparing to dispatch military drone specialists to Gulf states to help them fend off Iranian-designed drones -- something the Ukrainian army has been doing since the start of Russia's invasion.

The military assault launched in February 2022 spawned a cat-and-mouse game of aerial drone warfare that has forced both sides to constantly innovate -- or perish.

Moscow has dramatically scaled-up the production and sophistication of its drones, based on Iranian-designed Shaheds drones that Tehran has launched at Israel and Gulf states over the last week.

That has forced Ukraine to develop cheap and versatile defense systems that allows it to down hundreds of drones in a single barrage -- experience Kyiv says is unmatched anywhere in the world.

- Interceptors vs Shaheds -

Private Ukrainian arms companies have spearheaded the development of drone interceptors -- cheap, light single-use drones that are designed to knock Russian unmanned aerial vehicles out of the sky.

The interceptors -- usually winged or propeller-like helicopters -- are mainly controlled with inbuilt cameras that beam real-time images to pilots on the ground.

Late last year, President Volodymyr Zelensky released grainy, black-and-white images recorded from interceptors as they crashed into Shaheds. He has instructed manufacturers to produce up to 1,000 a day.

This method of air defense is becoming increasingly prevalent: Ukraine's commander-in-chief Oleksandr Syrsky said this week that some 70 percent of all drones launched by Russia at Kyiv and its surrounding region in February were downed by interceptors.

Individual interceptors can cost around as little as $700 or as much as $12,000. But even the most expensive varieties are a fraction of the price of a single missile fired from US Patriot air defense batteries, which are estimated to cost more than $1 million.

"The warfare shifted a lot. First it was drones against humans, soldiers and tanks. Now it's mostly drones against drones," Konstantyn, a deputy commander of an anti-aerial unit deployed in eastern Ukraine recently explained to AFP.

- Anti-aircraft guns, pick-ups -

Ukrainian air defense units also deploy traditional, tried-and-tested weapons: anti-aircraft guns.

These come both in the form of heavy machine guns set on wheels, and make-shift solutions, where troops attach any high-caliber weapon they have onto the back of a pick-up truck.

AFP journalists in Kyiv have seen -- and heard -- these air defense units work during nighttime Russian attacks.

Ukrainian troops also deploy man-portable air-defense systems: guided surface-to-air missiles that are shoulder-launched and originally designed to take down low flying aerial targets.

These portable weapons are used alongside tracking and radar systems.

- F-16s, choppers, Yaks -

Ukraine lobbied its Western allies for supplies of advanced fighter jets for months before finally receiving its first batch of F-16s in mid-2024.

Kyiv has not received many F-16s and there have been reports of issues in training Ukrainian pilots but they are among the aerial arsenal that Ukraine uses to down Shaheds.

The Ukrainian air force also deploys ageing Soviet-era aircraft to down Russian drones, including helicopters like the Mi-24 and Mi-8 or the Yak-52 plane.

- Electronic jamming -

Ukraine has for years deployed a variety of electronic systems that disorientate the navigation systems used by Shaheds to lock onto and fly towards their targets.

By scrambling the networks used by Shaheds inside Ukraine's borders, these means of electronic warfare force Moscow's drones to alter their course and fly back towards Russia.

According to Ukraine air force data, the military has been consistently intercepting or shooting down more than 80 percent of all incoming Russian drones -- hundreds of which are fired every night.