Askari, Iran Revolutionary Guards’ Shadow Envoy in Baghdad

Iraqi security personnel stand beside the coffin of a Popular Mobilization Forces member killed in an attack in al-Qaim district (AFP)
Iraqi security personnel stand beside the coffin of a Popular Mobilization Forces member killed in an attack in al-Qaim district (AFP)
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Askari, Iran Revolutionary Guards’ Shadow Envoy in Baghdad

Iraqi security personnel stand beside the coffin of a Popular Mobilization Forces member killed in an attack in al-Qaim district (AFP)
Iraqi security personnel stand beside the coffin of a Popular Mobilization Forces member killed in an attack in al-Qaim district (AFP)

Abu Ali al-Askari, whose death was recently announced by Iraq’s Kataib Hezbollah, may not have been a single man, but a full diplomatic apparatus representing Iran’s Revolutionary Guards in Baghdad.

Most likely, Askari, a covert account on X, functioned as a banner for a group rotating the role of a “shadow ambassador,” enforcing the policies of Iran’s Revolution in Baghdad, including setting a strict tempo for political decision-making.

Kataib Hezbollah, one of the Iran-aligned armed groups, said on March 16 that Askari had been killed, without giving details of time or place.

The announcement is believed to have followed a rocket strike on a house in Baghdad’s Karrada district, where influential figures from armed factions were holding an “operational” meeting. Security sources, however, said he may have been targeted in one of two attacks, one on a vehicle and another on a separate house east of the capital.

In a statement signed by Ahmad al-Hamidawi, who is the group’s leader, Askari was described as “the artery linking battlefields with media platforms.”

For about five years, this pseudonym issued a stream of hardline positions that helped entrench rigid policies in Iraq, often reflecting Iran’s unofficial stances, not those of its ambassador in Baghdad.

The account was repeatedly deleted or suspended and re-created, with its statements often circulating through media outlets or screenshots rather than directly from the source.

A lingering mystery

Askari remained an enduring enigma, the subject of constant speculation about his identity.

Iraqi researcher Hisham al-Hashimi, who was shot dead by a Kataib Hezbollah member in the summer of 2020, had said Askari was MP Hussein Moanes of the Huqooq Movement, the group’s political wing.

Many denied any link. Over time, a different narrative took hold, portraying Askari as a shadowy operative handling highly sensitive roles, while identifying himself online as “the security official of Kataib Hezbollah in Iraq.”

After the announcement of his death, conflicting accounts emerged. Initial reports said he was among those killed in the Karrada strike, naming him as Abu Ali al-Amiri, a special adviser and aide to the group’s leader.

Later, platforms close to armed factions said he was one of Abu Hussein al-Hamidawi's brothers. Other assessments suggested the group fabricated his death to cover up the killing of several faction leaders in precise strikes across Baghdad since the outbreak of the war with Iran.

In the end, Abu Ali al-Askari appears to be a collective identity. The multiplicity of personas fits a media strategy that mirrors the Revolutionary Guard’s use of ambiguity to project intimidation. It also raises the possibility that the reported death masks a significant internal development, since the death of a “virtual account” can be concealed.

Sources say the figure, or figures, behind the account likely included a security official within the group, a member of its shura council, and a military adviser trained by the Revolutionary Guard to shape both field and political strategies.

In all cases, Askari stands as one of the Guard’s most significant political investments in Baghdad.

An Iranian yardstick

Abu Ali al-Askari may not even be a pseudonym, but a functional title for one of Iran’s most sensitive roles in Iraq. By weight of influence, it acted as a tool steering political outcomes toward Tehran’s approach.

Days before his reported death, Askari wrote that “the appointment of the next prime minister will not take place without the fingerprint of the Islamic resistance.”

At a time when the Coordination Framework was deadlocked over the rejected nomination of Nouri al-Maliki, his position set the tone for Shiite political behavior and signaled a threshold aligned with Iran’s vision, including the selection of a premier approved by Tehran first.

He kept alive his drumbeat of criticism to the government of Mustafa al-Kadhimi, then softened rhetoric toward the government of Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, which emerged after violent clashes between supporters of Muqtada al-Sadr and security forces in the Green Zone. He had endorsed the current government early.

Over the years, Askari commented on nearly every domestic decision, including opposing plans to extend an Iraqi oil pipeline to Jordan.

With similar force, he helped derail the “majority government” project that Muqtada al-Sadr sought after the 2021 elections, calling it “exclusionary toward the factions’ weapons and aligned with the American vision.”

In 2019, when protesters demanding an end to Iranian influence were killed in operations attributed to a “third party,” Askari described them as infiltrators pursuing suspicious foreign agendas, rhetoric widely seen as incitement against hundreds of young demonstrators.

In that sense, identifying his true identity may matter less than understanding the scale of influence Kataib Hezbollah has built.

Askari’s role extended to setting rules of engagement, defining the political weight of Sunni and Kurdish actors, and signaling red lines in Iraq’s external relations, including ties with Arab, Gulf, and international actors. At one stage, he warned against “reintegrating Syria and rehabilitating its new leadership within the international community.”

Iran’s shadow ambassador

After the 2017 independence referendum in Iraq’s Kurdistan Region, Askari took a hardline stance against Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani, effectively giving an informal green light for punitive measures, calling the move a “division project backed by the United States and Israel.”

For Askari, the rise of Mohammed al-Halbousi to the speakership in 2018 reflected non-national balances in an externally backed deal. In his view, the Sunni leader of the Taqaddum party paid the price for what he described as an “intersection with a suspicious external project.”

In January 2020, after the killing of Qassem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, Askari wrote that “US forces in Iraq have become legitimate targets.”

Five years on, these positions read as if issued by a “shadow embassy” for Iran, articulating hardline stances that are acted upon literally, without being voiced by official diplomats.



Iran's Postponed War: Who Holds the Power to Ignite It?

A US F-15E Strike Eagle fighter jet refuels from a KC-135 tanker aircraft during an aerial patrol over the Middle East (CENTCOM)
A US F-15E Strike Eagle fighter jet refuels from a KC-135 tanker aircraft during an aerial patrol over the Middle East (CENTCOM)
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Iran's Postponed War: Who Holds the Power to Ignite It?

A US F-15E Strike Eagle fighter jet refuels from a KC-135 tanker aircraft during an aerial patrol over the Middle East (CENTCOM)
A US F-15E Strike Eagle fighter jet refuels from a KC-135 tanker aircraft during an aerial patrol over the Middle East (CENTCOM)

With Israel preparing for possible military strikes against Iran, and Washington showing restraint ahead of the US midterm elections, questions are mounting over whether the region is experiencing a temporary pause dictated by electoral calculations or a final opportunity for a political settlement.

While one strategic affairs expert expects a major confrontation by the end of November, two others downplay the influence of election results on decisions by US President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, arguing that strategic considerations will ultimately prove decisive.

The question in Washington and Tel Aviv is no longer simply whether war with Iran will resume, but when, on what scale and with what objectives.

Reports that Israel prepared a large-scale bombing campaign against Iranian targets before postponing it following Trump's objections have revived a sensitive question: Is the war awaiting the conclusion of the US and Israeli elections, or does its postponement reflect deeper disagreements over the merits of escalation?

These questions are gaining urgency as elections approach in both countries. Assessments by three American experts reveal differing expectations about military developments and political calculations, but converge on one central point: Election results alone will not determine the outcome of the confrontation.

US President Donald Trump greets Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as he arrives at the West Wing of the White House in Washington, DC on September 29, 2025. (Photo by Jim WATSON / AFP)

A War Awaiting Its Moment

The Financial Times reported Wednesday that Netanyahu had instructed the Israeli military to prepare a large-scale bombing campaign against Iran, initially scheduled for October 10, before the operation was canceled after Trump objected to resuming military action ahead of the US elections.

According to the newspaper, the plan included strikes on nuclear facilities, civilian infrastructure and sites associated with the Iranian regime.

Israeli officials also presented US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth with a list of targets based on new intelligence during his unannounced visit to Israel on Monday.

Axios had previously reported that the Pentagon requested the completion of preparations for extensive military operations without setting a date for their execution.

The outlet cited officials as saying that Hegseth and US military commanders in the region were pushing for renewed strikes, while most of Trump's advisers favored continuing sanctions and economic pressure.

These developments suggest that the disagreement concerns the timing and necessity of military force more than the ultimate objectives.

Washington wants to secure Iranian concessions on Tehran's nuclear program and the Strait of Hormuz, while Israel fears that continued negotiations could allow Iran to rebuild its military capabilities.

Scenarios for Escalation

Offering a more pessimistic assessment, Farzin Nadimi, an expert on Iranian military and security affairs at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, told Asharq Al-Awsat that all indicators point toward a major military confrontation involving the United States, Israel and Iran, and potentially other regional countries, by the end of November.

Nadimi did not rule out the possibility that intensive diplomatic efforts could prevent escalation, but considered the chances of success extremely slim.

He outlined a scenario beginning with a renewed wave of strikes targeting senior leaders and command-and-control centers, followed by attacks on nuclear and missile facilities and air defense systems, eventually escalating into a comprehensive bombing campaign against Iranian military and security installations.

Whether the campaign would expand to infrastructure, oil and gas facilities, and petrochemical plants would depend on the nature of Iran's response, he said.

Nadimi warned that Tehran might make a more determined effort this time to sink US warships and shoot down manned aircraft, while also deploying longer-range, medium-range ballistic missiles.

He raised an even more dangerous possibility: a ground incursion into Kuwait or Saudi Arabia from Iraq, carried out by Shiite factions linked to the Popular Mobilization Forces.

This remains a hypothetical scenario proposed by the researcher, rather than confirmed evidence of an Iranian plan to carry out such an operation.

At the same time, Nadimi ruled out a US ground invasion of Iran, suggesting that the next confrontation would more closely resemble the previous 39-day war.

Washington's Calculations

Brian Katulis, a foreign policy and regional affairs expert at the Middle East Institute, downplayed the significance of election results in determining the course of the war.

He told Asharq Al-Awsat that the US midterm elections were unlikely to substantially affect decisions by the Trump administration or Israel regarding Iran, because the threats posed by Tehran would remain the primary factor shaping their next steps.

Katulis noted that Trump is experiencing his weakest political position across his two presidential terms, amid declining approval ratings and the possibility that Republicans could lose seats in Congress.

In his view, however, that does not mean the election results will constrain the president's ability to take military action, given the executive branch's broad national security powers relative to those of Congress.

Katulis identified two more consequential factors in the administration's calculations.

The first is a shortage of certain types of ammunition and military equipment following the previous phase of the war, which has left US forces more exposed in the region and elsewhere. The second is the economic cost of another confrontation.

These concerns are particularly significant amid continuing tensions surrounding the Strait of Hormuz and global energy markets, as renewed operations against Iranian facilities could cause further disruptions to oil supplies.

As for Israel, Katulis argued that disagreements among political leaders tend to diminish when the perceived Iranian threat is at issue.

Beyond the Ballot Box

Michael Rubin, director of policy analysis at the Middle East Forum, went further, dismissing the possibility that the elections would fundamentally change the political dynamics governing decisions about war.

He told Asharq Al-Awsat that Trump would remain the ultimate decision-maker regardless of developments in Congress.

Indeed, Rubin suggested that Trump might feel greater freedom to make military decisions after the elections, given that he would not face another presidential election.

In Israel, Rubin argued that widespread opposition to Netanyahu does not necessarily translate into comparable divisions over Iran.

In his assessment, there is broad agreement among Israeli candidates on both the right and left regarding the nature of the threats posed by Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah.

Rubin also pointed to a striking possibility: Another Israeli prime minister might be able to act more effectively than Netanyahu because some objections from members of Congress, diplomats and foreign ministers are directed more at Netanyahu personally than at Israel itself.

Consequently, Netanyahu's electoral defeat would not necessarily reduce the likelihood of confrontation, just as Republican losses in Congress would not automatically give lawmakers the power to prevent Trump from resuming military operations.

Ultimately, the elections appear more likely to influence the timing of a confrontation than to determine its objectives.

Trump's decision to postpone military action does not mean the military option has been abandoned, just as Israel's preparations do not mean that a final decision to go to war has been made.

Negotiations remain the alternative path, despite continuing disagreements over nuclear concessions and the conditions for ending the war.

The conclusion of the elections could remove one reason for postponement, but it would not eliminate the military, economic and political obstacles.

The central question remains whether Washington will use its military preparations to secure a negotiated settlement or view the failure of diplomacy as justification for resuming the war.

In either case, Trump's decision, rather than election results alone, will be the most influential factor in determining the direction of the crisis.


What's Holding Up Washington's $14 bn Arms Sale to Taiwan?

Washington -- Taipei's most important security backer -- has held off on an arms sale package worth $14 billion. I-Hwa Cheng / AFP/File
Washington -- Taipei's most important security backer -- has held off on an arms sale package worth $14 billion. I-Hwa Cheng / AFP/File
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What's Holding Up Washington's $14 bn Arms Sale to Taiwan?

Washington -- Taipei's most important security backer -- has held off on an arms sale package worth $14 billion. I-Hwa Cheng / AFP/File
Washington -- Taipei's most important security backer -- has held off on an arms sale package worth $14 billion. I-Hwa Cheng / AFP/File

Taiwan has been waiting months for US President Donald Trump to approve a $14 billion sale of weapons and equipment, which the island democracy would use to fend off a potential Chinese attack.

Washington -- Taipei's most important security backer -- has sold many billions of dollars' worth of arms to Taiwan, most recently in December when it approved a record $11.1 billion package, said AFP.

China opposes American military support for Taiwan, which Beijing claims is part of its territory and has threatened to seize with force.

Trump, who last month hailed his "great friendship" with Chinese President Xi Jinping, has resisted US political pressure, including from Republican lawmakers, to give the green light for the current arms package.

AFP takes a look at what's in it and why it's being held up:

- Why is Taiwan buying US arms? -

Taiwan is spending huge sums upgrading its defense capabilities and expanding its domestic weapons production capacity, but it still needs US arms to deter China.

Since Washington switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing in 1979, the United States has stuck to its commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act to provide weapons to Taiwan for its defense.

But Trump said in May that US arms sales to Taiwan could be a bargaining chip with China, setting off alarm bells across the world.

Taipei has reminded Trump of US commitments, and US officials including Secretary of State Marco Rubio have insisted American policy on Taiwan has not changed.

The sale would signal US support for Taiwan and send a message to Beijing that if it launched an attack, it would not face "Taiwan alone", said Wang Ting-yu, a senior lawmaker in President Lai Ching-te's Democratic Progressive Party.

- What's in the package? -

Taiwan is developing a multi-layered air defense system, known as the T-Dome, that it hopes could counter a potential Chinese attack.

Patriot missiles, an automated command and control system and a 360-degree air defense radar system are seen as critical components of this system and are among the items in the $14 billion package.

"Together these systems can strengthen the resilience of Taiwan's strategic air defenses," said Su Tzu-yun, a military expert at the Taipei-based Institute for National Defense and Security Research.

Money for the weapons system is expected to come from a $25 billion defense spending bill passed by Taiwan's parliament in May after months of political wrangling.

- Why has it been delayed? -

Trump and Xi met in Beijing in May -- the first of four expected meetings for 2026 -- as the rival leaders sought to ease trade tensions between their countries.

Xi issued a blunt warning to Trump that missteps on Taiwan could push the US and China into "conflict".

A record $14 billion arms sale to Taiwan could threaten the US-China trade truce.

"I'm going to make a determination. I'm going to see," Trump said after the summit in response to a question about whether he would go ahead with arms sales to Taiwan.

Rubio said in June that the proposed package was "under review", while officials said in May they were assessing whether American weapons stockpiles were sufficient for its Iran operations.

A US official said recently that the chances of the package being split into smaller chunks "have gone way up".

Some Taiwanese officials have said they do not care if the US bundles the arms into a single package or multiple -- they just want the weapons.

"Militarily... Taiwan is racing against time," said the analyst Su.

"Acquiring weapons is not like ordering at a drive-through. Production, delivery and training all take time before the systems can enter service and become effective."


Israel's Election May Change Its Leader, But Not Iran War Policy

21 October 2026, Israel, Mitzpe Ramon: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu delivers an address during the Israeli army officer course graduation ceremony at the Bahad 1 Officers School. Photo: Kobi Gideon/Israel Gpo via ZUMA Press Wire/dpa
21 October 2026, Israel, Mitzpe Ramon: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu delivers an address during the Israeli army officer course graduation ceremony at the Bahad 1 Officers School. Photo: Kobi Gideon/Israel Gpo via ZUMA Press Wire/dpa
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Israel's Election May Change Its Leader, But Not Iran War Policy

21 October 2026, Israel, Mitzpe Ramon: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu delivers an address during the Israeli army officer course graduation ceremony at the Bahad 1 Officers School. Photo: Kobi Gideon/Israel Gpo via ZUMA Press Wire/dpa
21 October 2026, Israel, Mitzpe Ramon: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu delivers an address during the Israeli army officer course graduation ceremony at the Bahad 1 Officers School. Photo: Kobi Gideon/Israel Gpo via ZUMA Press Wire/dpa

Israel's election next week may change its leader, but not its strategy: Iran will remain its chief adversary, military force will continue to be its preferred tool and Palestinian statehood a distant prospect, regional policymakers and analysts say.

That is because the strategic assumptions underpinning Israeli policy were hardened by the October 7, 2023, attacks on southern Israeli communities by Palestinian group Hamas and by the wars in Gaza, Lebanon and Iran.

If anything, Israel could toughen its security policy, the analysts said, as victory for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu with the backing of far-right coalition partners could embolden him to step up the war with Iran, tighten Israel's grip on the occupied West Bank and push diplomacy further to the margins.

Israel's security doctrine now rests on three pillars: breaking Iran, holding buffer zones beyond its borders and using force to deter enemies.

The real divide is one of degree rather than direction — how aggressively Israel fights its wars, how far it expands Jewish settlements in the West Bank and whether any leader opts for diplomacy, the analysts said.

From Tehran to Riyadh, Tuesday's election is not seen as a potential turning point but as a test of whether the Middle East is settling into a long confrontation, where wars ‌ebb and flow while ‌the underlying conflicts are unresolved.

"If Netanyahu is elected, he'll do whatever he thinks he wants to do," said Aviv ‌Bushinsky, a ⁠former adviser to Netanyahu. "Expansion ⁠of the settlements will continue. The wars against Iran, Hamas and Hezbollah will continue."

"What you see now is what you'll see after the election, maybe even more aggressively," he said. "As long as Iran is in such a situation, it's a waste of time talking about Palestine.”

Netanyahu said on Sunday that Israel must prioritize “prevention and offence over containment and defense”, including pre-emptive strikes to thwart emerging threats, while establishing Israel as a regional power and maximizing its independence in armaments.

WHY THE COURSE IS UNLIKELY TO CHANGE

The election pits Netanyahu's right-wing Likud and its ultranationalist allies against an opposition led by former military chief Gadi Eisenkot's Yashar party. Palestinian analyst Ghassan al-Khatib sees no prospect of a fundamental shift in policy towards the Palestinians, with Israeli political parties competing to project harder-line positions as public opinion moves further to the right.

“The substance of the policy remains the same: No to a Palestinian state and yes to further ⁠settlement expansion. On this, they are all in agreement,” he said.

A government led by Netanyahu's opponents might seek to repair ‌Israel's international standing by curbing some settler violence or pursuing settlement expansion with less fanfare. But such changes would ‌be a shift in style rather than substance, al-Khatib said.

In response to Reuters questions on Iran and the West Bank, a State Department spokesperson said Washington would continue to pressure Tehran "as long ‌as Iran devotes its energy revenues to financing attacks on our allies, supporting terrorism around the world, and pursuing other destabilizing actions, we will use all the tools ‌at our disposal to hold the regime accountable."

The spokesperson also said the  United States did not support Israel annexing the West Bank.

"A stable West Bank keeps Israel secure and is in line with this administration’s goal to achieve peace in the region," they said.

Michael Young of the Carnegie Middle East Center said Israel's security establishment and much of its political class share a common strategic outlook, centered on confronting Iran, maintaining "forward defense" and preserving military deterrence, reducing the scope for big policy shifts.

Joost Hiltermann of the International Crisis Group, who has conducted research in the West Bank, said ‌growing settler violence, mounting Palestinian frustration and the absence of a "political horizon" had created combustible conditions, where even a minor trigger could spark a wider uprising.

'VENOMOUS OCTOPUS'

Some regional policymakers ask whether Israel's confrontation with Iran has become the organizing ⁠principle of Middle East security, regardless of who ⁠wins the election.

US President Donald Trump's praise of Netanyahu as a "great warrior prime minister" has reinforced expectations that the Israeli leader will try to finish the campaign against Tehran if he retains power.

Netanyahu has made clear his ambitions extend beyond containing Iran to toppling its clerical rulers.

"There is only one way to remove this threat once and for all: overthrow the regime in Iran," he said at a military officer graduation ceremony on Wednesday, adding it was his directive to the military, Mossad and other security agencies.

“Completing the task means toppling the terrorist regime in Iran, the head of the venomous octopus,” he said in another speech this week.

But military and political analysts question whether anything short of a US-Israeli ground invasion would force Tehran to abandon what it views as its core security interests in what it sees as an existential fight. After surviving months of war, Iran may be betting it can outlast its opponents while continuing to exert pressure through regional allies.

"This is a quagmire," Young said. "The Iranians can outlast Trump."

Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza have been weakened, but the broader network of Iran-aligned groups has survived and the conflict could strengthen Tehran's determination to pursue a nuclear deterrent, the analysts said.