Khan al-Ahmar: Last Tent in Battle for Greater Jerusalem

Khan al-Ahmar community in the heart of the West Bank (Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories - B’Tselem)
Khan al-Ahmar community in the heart of the West Bank (Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories - B’Tselem)
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Khan al-Ahmar: Last Tent in Battle for Greater Jerusalem

Khan al-Ahmar community in the heart of the West Bank (Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories - B’Tselem)
Khan al-Ahmar community in the heart of the West Bank (Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories - B’Tselem)

On the road to the impoverished Bedouin community of Khan al-Ahmar, in the heart of the West Bank, the upscale Israeli settlement of Maale Adumim occupies a large, elevated and commanding stretch of land.

But that is no longer enough for Israel’s far-right government, which now plans to annex everything, Maale Adumim, Khan al-Ahmar and the surrounding area, to Jerusalem under the controversial E1 project.

The plan aims, among other things, to realize the dream of Greater Jerusalem, the most important step in a project to change the face of the West Bank by cutting through it with a settlement belt.

That would strengthen the presence of settlers and settlements in what Palestinians describe as a new state of settlers, end the dream of a contiguous Palestinian state, and isolate Jerusalem, the hoped-for capital, from it.

No one in the West Bank has faced more demolition orders and threats than the residents of Khan al-Ahmar, which now finds itself in a battle larger than itself. Over many long years, they have fought several legal battles and ground confrontations, holding on to their land and tents and trusting in victory.

That confidence has been shaken only by Israel’s fierce and sweeping assault on everything Palestinian since Oct. 7.

“The situation is different”

Tension hung over Khan al-Ahmar days after a decision by Bezalel Smotrich. Eid al-Jahalin, also known as Abu Khamis, the head of the Bedouin council, had no clear answers for hundreds of calls, messages and questions from journalists and activists, some of whom came to the area to document what was happening inside and around the temporary tents and structures.

He told Asharq Al-Awsat that he did not know exactly what would happen.

Abu Khamis, who speaks several languages, including English and Hebrew, was trying hard to deliver one message: that demolishing this simple and poor place would open the door to the most dangerous plan in the West Bank, “Greater Jerusalem.”

In his modest tent, among many others, there are maps, a coffee pot, journalists, visitors, solidarity activists and foreign delegations. He has grown used to such scenes with every Israeli threat to demolish Khan al-Ahmar. This time, however, he is more worried than ever.

“The situation this time is completely different and very dangerous,” Abu Khamis said. “In 2018, all Palestinians were with us. The government and civil society were sleeping here. I had 5,000 people with me. International pressure was strongly present, and our cause was at the top of the Middle East agenda. Today, the situation is different.”

Explaining his fears, he said: “After Oct. 7, Israel became more aggressive, and the West Bank has been turned into a state of settlers. This is a state war against us, not a problem caused by individuals. In the West Bank, we now have a thousand Khan al-Ahmars: killing, displacement and fire consuming every part of the West Bank, while the Palestinian effort is scattered.

“Internationally, too, there is the Gaza war, the war in Lebanon and the Hormuz war. The world is also busy and distracted. Governments have changed in America, Israel and elsewhere.”

He said the occupation believes this is the right time.

For Abu Khamis, Smotrich’s latest decision “was issued for actual implementation, and only real international pressure will stop it.”

Evacuation order and declared war

Smotrich, who is leading what Israelis describe as a revolution to change the status quo in the West Bank, signed an evacuation order for Khan al-Ahmar last month as part of the “beginning of a war” he declared against the Palestinian Authority.

He accused the PA of being behind a secret arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court, which had earlier rejected the matter.

Speaking at a news conference about 10 days ago, against the backdrop of reports that the ICC in The Hague had issued a secret request for an arrest warrant against him, Smotrich said: “The hands are the hands of The Hague, but the voice is the voice of the Palestinian Authority, the terrorist organization wrongly called the Palestinian Authority.”

Smotrich claimed that issuing arrest warrants against Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, former Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, and himself amounted to “a declaration of war.”

“In the face of a declaration of war, we will respond with an all-out war,” he said.

“I am not a submissive Jew, no. The Palestinian Authority has started a war, and it will get a war. From today, any economic or other target that falls within my powers as finance minister and as a minister in the Defense Ministry, and that I can harm, will be attacked. There will be no words and slogans, only actions.”

He added: “I announce here the first target. As soon as I finish speaking here, I will sign an order to evacuate Khan al-Ahmad under my powers as a minister in the Defense Ministry. I promise all our enemies: this is only the beginning.”

Smotrich immediately signed the decision to evacuate Khan al-Ahmar and ordered that “all necessary measures” be taken to demolish it.

The decision to demolish Khan al-Ahmar can only be seen as part of a campaign Smotrich has led for years against Palestinians in the West Bank.

It has included seizing large areas of land, changing laws related to control, ownership, land registration procedures and possession of property, as well as powers related to law enforcement.

It has also included his relentless work to weaken and dismantle the Palestinian Authority and turn the West Bank into a state of settlers by advancing major settlement plans and giving settlers a free hand in the area.

But Khan al-Ahmar’s significance is exceptional because it is a major obstacle to implementing the huge E1 settlement project, which involves a dangerous linking of a group of large surrounding Israeli settlements with Jerusalem, forming Greater Jerusalem.

The plan would connect Jerusalem to the large settlement of Maale Adumim in the central West Bank, in a way that Israeli rights group B’Tselem has said would severely threaten the possibility of a future Palestinian state and entrench a binational apartheid state.

The Palestinian National Information Center said that, in addition to the historically declared goal of linking Maale Adumim settlement with Jerusalem and excluding Palestinian neighborhoods from their natural development space, the plan serves the broader vision of “Greater Jerusalem,” covering about 600 square kilometers, or around 10% of the West Bank, through road belts, industrial zones and new neighborhoods.

Implementation depends on the settlement project known as the “fabric of life” road and alternative routes to separate Palestinian movement from the center of the West Bank, while connecting nearby Palestinian areas through controlled corridors in tunnels.

An old plan revived

Since 2009, Israel has sought to demolish the site. Each time it came close, however, it faced a storm of Palestinian, Arab and international reactions and criticism, until Khan al-Ahmar became a symbol of the conflict.

Israel therefore avoided demolishing it, even though an Israeli court gave the green light for the demolition.

Every time the court asked for an explanation as to why the site had not been demolished despite a judicial ruling, the Israeli government offered a different explanation for not evacuating the residential compound.

Yedioth Ahronoth said the evacuation of Khan al-Ahmar, which has become a global symbol, had turned into a diplomatic headache for the government because of international public opinion.

Even this time, 85 members of the US House of Representatives called on President Donald Trump’s administration to use all available diplomatic tools to halt the Israeli colonial construction project known as E1, warning that implementing it would impose a permanent reality on the ground and undermine the prospects of a two-state solution.

The appeal came in a letter from the lawmakers to US Secretary of State Marco Rubio.

The signatories said the E1 area, which extends over about 12 square kilometers east of Jerusalem, is one of the most sensitive areas in the West Bank because settlement construction there would separate the northern West Bank from its south and strengthen geographic contiguity between Jerusalem and the settlement of Maale Adumim, entrenching Israeli control over a strategic area in the heart of the West Bank.

They also pointed to other Israeli measures linked to the project, including plans to build what is known as the “Sovereignty Road,” as well as steps targeting the Bedouin community in Khan al-Ahmar. They said these measures were part of an accelerating process aimed at imposing new facts on the ground that would be difficult to reverse in the future.

In the view of the lawmakers, implementing the E1 settlement project would undermine the possibility of establishing a geographically contiguous Palestinian state. They called on the US State Department to clearly inform the Israeli government that moving ahead with the project contradicts declared US positions on the future of the West Bank.

Before them, more than 400 ministers, ambassadors and European officials called in an open letter to European Union leaders to “act now” against Israel’s “illegal annexation” of the occupied West Bank through the E1 project, under which it plans to build thousands of homes.

The 448 signatories, including former European Commission Vice President Josep Borrell and former Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt, wrote: “The EU and its member states, in cooperation with their partners, must take immediate steps to deter Israel from continuing its illegal annexation of Palestinian land in the West Bank.”

The signatories said that “at a minimum, the EU must impose targeted sanctions, including visa bans and bans on conducting business activities in the EU, against all persons involved in illegal settlement operations, especially those promoting, participating in tenders for and implementing the plan related to the E1 area.”

These calls came after Israel took another practical step toward beginning the plan by issuing an official notice to demolish 50 structures and commercial premises in the town of al-Eizariya, southeast of occupied Jerusalem, that fall within the settlement plan.

These repeated international positions are what currently complicate the demolition of Khan al-Ahmar.

The decision to demolish may not be in Smotrich’s hands alone, according to Yedioth. It goes back to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, in coordination with Defense Minister Israel Katz and the Israeli army, and would require explicit approval from the cabinet because of its consequences, which could complicate matters for Israel, embroil it politically and lead to very severe sanctions against it by the European Union.

But Meir Deutsch, director-general of Regavim, the movement founded by Smotrich that petitioned the High Court on the issue months ago, said: “The situation is different now and there is an opportunity.”

“Over the past two years, the Israeli government has taken unprecedented and historic decisions to ensure the future of the State of Israel,” he added. “Now, more than ever, the time has come to enforce the law against the aggressors in this field, and thus thwart the Palestinian Authority’s plan to seize this important site as part of establishing a terrorist state in the heart of the country.”

The Palestinian Authority understands this situation better than anyone. In previous years, when the situation was very different, the PA threatened to cancel agreements if Israel proceeded with the E1 project because it would kill the Palestinian state. It organized major campaigns to maintain a presence at the site, unlike what is happening now.

Geopolitical significance

Attorney Hassan Mlihat, the general supervisor of the Al-Baidar Organization for the Defense of Bedouin Rights, told Asharq Al-Awsat that “what must be understood is that Khan al-Ahmar is an area of enormous geopolitical importance. It is located northeast of occupied Jerusalem, specifically on the vital road linking Jerusalem and Jericho.”

“The extreme danger of this area lies in the fact that it falls within the E1 settlement plan, the most dangerous project targeting the Palestinian cause and the West Bank in the history of the conflict,” he added.

Mlihat said the danger of the project also lies in the fact that it would form Greater Jerusalem by taking control of 12,000 dunams in the heart of the West Bank and create continuous geographic contiguity between Jerusalem and Maale Adumim settlement all the way to the Dead Sea. This, he said, is the practical implementation of the Greater Jerusalem project.

For Mlihat, the project has other catastrophic consequences because it “re-engineers the demographic composition of these areas by expelling Palestinians and replacing them with settlers, and divides the West Bank into two separate parts, north and south. This means that the establishment of any geographically contiguous Palestinian entity or state would become impossible. The occupation’s success in this area would also become a starting point for isolating and targeting the rest of the West Bank.”

“This is a dangerous and huge project, and Khan al-Ahmar is the biggest obstacle,” he said.

Khan al-Ahmar at the heart of Greater Jerusalem

But it is not only Khan al-Ahmar. Mlihat believes the assault on Khan al-Ahmar is part of a wider attack on Palestinian Bedouins. While Israel has not demolished Khan al-Ahmar so far, it has already displaced more than 88 Bedouin communities in the West Bank.

Mlihat said that since 2019, specifically after the announcement of the “Deal of the Century,” the targeting of Bedouins had intensified, with the fierce assault on them escalating in an unprecedented manner after the events of October.

“This war targets the Bedouin presence in all areas and pockets of Area C, especially in the central West Bank east of Jerusalem because of the E1 plan, and in Jericho and the Jordan Valley because of their border and security dimensions,” he said.

Dozens of families have already been forced to leave their homes in the Palestinian Jordan Valley after several attacks by the army and settlers, in a recurring scene Mlihat described as an ongoing Nakba.

It was striking that the Bedouins were forced to face their fate alone in a battle larger than themselves, the same situation Jahalin pointed to in Khan al-Ahmar.

“Alone in the battle”

Abu Khamis looks after about 300 Bedouins in Khan al-Ahmar, who live in a place that includes a school, a mosque and a health clinic. These also serve many Bedouins from outside the community who come for education or treatment.

Abu Khamis looked toward the simple school as children played there, trying to steal a little space for joy, and asked many questions about whether the Israelis would really attack the place.

“We are alone in this battle,” Abu Khamis said.

“The war today is focused and directed specifically against the Bedouins,” he added. “It is the product of the consequences of the Oslo Accords and the division of the land into Areas A, B and C. Area C makes up about 62% of the West Bank. And who is in it? The Bedouins.”

“The problem of Khan al-Ahmar is that it lies at the heart of the Greater Jerusalem project, from al-Eizariya to the border of the Dead Sea. In this vast area, there is no Palestinian village or camp except Khan al-Ahmar,” he said.

Abu Khamis understands the matter well.

“If we are uprooted from here, the occupation will connect the settlements of Maale Adumim, Kfar Adumim, Mishor Adumim and Alon to form a settlement belt that clamps down on the eastern gate of Jerusalem and closes it completely,” he said.

“It will then cut up the West Bank and separate its north from its south. Jerusalem today is being surrounded by a massive settlement bloc, and Khan al-Ahmar lies at the heart of this most dangerous settlement project since the beginning of the occupation until today.”

This awareness is present among all residents of Khan al-Ahmar, even its children.

Ali had just finished his school day when he went to check on his family’s livestock. Ali told Asharq Al-Awsat: “They attack us from time to time, insult us and threaten us.”

The young Ali refused to accept moving where he lives, saying he loves the place and will not leave.

“We will not leave,” he said. “Even if they demolish the houses, we will not leave. It’s fine, let them demolish, but we will not leave. We want to stay here. This land is ours, and we will not leave it.”

Ali represents the fifth generation born in Khan al-Ahmar since its residents arrived there in the 1950s, displaced from Tel Arad in the Negev.

Sheikh Mohammed Abu Dahouk, 56, who was born in Khan al-Ahmar, told Asharq Al-Awsat: “My grandfather and my father were here. I was born here, and now my children and grandchildren were born here.”

Abu Dahouk does not intend to leave the place, although he expects them to demolish it at any moment.

“We expect anything from them,” he said. “Today, blood is flowing everywhere. But if they demolish, we will remain here in the sun. We will sit here. If they demolish, there is nowhere for us to go. Where would we go? There is nowhere for us to go. We will stay sitting in the sun.”

Like others, Abu Dahouk rejects the idea of moving to what Israel calls a “proper area.”

“Give us permits here,” he said. “We are the owners of the land. This is our land, and our land is dear to us. We are not leaving for any other place, whatever it may be.”

Alongside many previous legal battles, the residents of Khan al-Ahmar and the Arab al-Jahalin communities filed an objection to a plan to concentrate Bedouin communities in a “planned urban compound.”

The objection, filed through the Israeli group Bimkom, said the plan does not suit the communities’ way of life and could lead to their forced removal from the space where they have lived for decades.

Architect Alon Cohen-Lifshitz of Bimkom told Yedioth Ahronoth that this was “a plan of uprooting under the cover of planning,” stressing that it was part of a broader policy to shape the space in East Jerusalem and the West Bank.

Meanwhile, the saga of Khan al-Ahmar continued. Jahalin continues to receive European and local officials and activists, takes many calls, holds Zoom meetings with institutions and activists abroad, and has met, among others, Palestinian Prime Minister Mohammad Mustafa at his office. Mustafa, for his part, promised to support the residents’ steadfastness.

But none of this was new to Jahalin.

“Our struggle is not new,” he said. “It has continued since 1967, when Israel declared the area a closed military zone. They used to shoot to frighten them, before they were later surprised that those ‘military lands’ had turned into large settlements, including Maale Adumim and Kfar Adumim.”

Jahalin repeated what he had said several times: “It is a state of settlers, and this time is different from those before it.”

Yet despite everything that changed after Oct. 7, the Bedouin mentality has not changed.

Abu Khamis said it plainly: “I am a Bedouin, and I have spent 60% of my life in the sun. It will not hurt me if I spend 100% of it in the sun. I will be here or at the closest possible point to Khan al-Ahmar. Even if I remain suspended between the sky and the earth, I will not leave.”

 



Lebanon Enters Conflict Management Phase as End Remains Elusive

The aftermath of a bombing in the Eastern sector of south Lebanon Fronts (AP)
The aftermath of a bombing in the Eastern sector of south Lebanon Fronts (AP)
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Lebanon Enters Conflict Management Phase as End Remains Elusive

The aftermath of a bombing in the Eastern sector of south Lebanon Fronts (AP)
The aftermath of a bombing in the Eastern sector of south Lebanon Fronts (AP)

Negotiations to cement the ceasefire in southern Lebanon, alongside talks on the future of the south, the role of the Lebanese army and international guarantees, are raising a central question: Is Lebanon heading toward a repeat of the model that followed the July 2006 war, or has the latest conflict pushed it into a wholly different phase?

Nearly two decades after the 2006 war led to UN Resolution 1701, the deployment of the Lebanese army south of the Litani River and a long effort to regulate the confrontation between Israel and Hezbollah, today’s conditions look starkly different. The scale of destruction in the south is deeper, and the international approach to what comes next appears more forceful.

Speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat, university professor and lawyer Ali Mourad said the reality on the ground, away from “point-scoring speeches and declarations of victory,” demands a new reading of the war and the future of the south.

The south, he said, remains occupied, devastated on an unprecedented scale, and trapped in a displacement crisis likely to drag on.

Israel targets Tyre (Reuters)

 

“Talk of ending the conflict in Lebanon can only be achieved through a set of basic goals: ending the war definitively, withdrawing Israeli forces from occupied Lebanese territory, returning prisoners, launching reconstruction and securing the safe and sustainable return of displaced people to their areas,” Mourad said.

Mourad, who comes from the southern border town of Aitaroun, said the main fear was “Iran’s attempt to take hold of the Lebanese file.” Such a move, he said, could prolong the management of the conflict rather than end it, keeping the roots of tension alive and blocking a final, stable settlement.

Hezbollah’s weapons at the heart of the deadlock

Mourad said there would be “no real end to this conflict without a clear and decisive handling of Hezbollah’s weapons.”

Leaving the issue unresolved, he said, would place Lebanon before a model entirely unlike the one that followed the 2006 war. Comparing the two phases is no longer realistic, he added, given the changes now in place.

“The south today is destroyed on an unprecedented scale, while the battlefield and military realities clearly show that the existing equations are difficult to overturn in the foreseeable future,” he said.

That reality, Mourad said, requires sustainable political solutions that address the roots of the crisis, rather than simply managing it. Ending the conflict, he added, depends on resolving the core unresolved issues, not merely halting military operations or containing current tensions.

“Any approach that does not address the causes of the crisis will lead to its reproduction in one form or another,” he said.

 

Israel targets Tyre (AFP)

 

The post-2006 phase is over

Retired Maj. Gen. Hisham Jaber, head of the Middle East Center for Studies, said the situation in southern Lebanon “differs radically from the phase that followed the July 2006 war.”

Talk of returning to the formulas of Resolution 1701 as applied then is no longer realistic, he said, given the military and political changes produced by the latest war.

“What happened after 2006 is completely different from what is happening today,” Jaber told Asharq Al-Awsat. “At that time, Israel quickly withdrew from the Lebanese territory it had occupied, and political and diplomatic tracks were launched with broad Arab and international support. Today, Israel is holding on to the areas it occupies and does not seem ready to give them up easily.”

 

A photograph taken from the southern Lebanese region of Marjayoun shows smoke rising following an Israeli airstrike on the village of Choukine on June 19, 2026. (Photo by AFP)

 

Jaber said Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu faces domestic pressure that pushes him to keep the war going and avoid concessions.

“Netanyahu cannot appear as someone who fought a long war that ended without clear gains,” he said. “Continuing military pressure is therefore a way for him to improve negotiating terms and force the Lebanese position into submission.”

A pause, not an end to war

Jaber, who is from Nabatieh, said the current situation does not amount to a comprehensive end to the war. Rather, he called it “a temporary halt to some military operations.”

Israel, he said, still claims the right to strike whenever and wherever it chooses against targets it considers linked to Hezbollah.

“The Israelis say clearly that they retain freedom of military action in Lebanon,” he said. “So we cannot speak of an end to the war as much as we can speak of managing the conflict and controlling the level of confrontation.”

Jaber said the comparison with 2006 no longer stands.

“The post-2006 phase is over,” he said. “We are facing a completely different new reality, and Israel will not accept a return to the previous equations or to the situation that existed before the latest war.”

Washington manages the conflict

Jaber said the United States is managing the conflict more than trying to end it.

“If it wanted to end it completely, it would have applied sufficient pressure to stop the war definitively,” he said. “What we are seeing today is conflict management and an attempt to prevent it from exploding, nothing more.”

Israel, he said, is treating the border strip and destroyed villages as “a buffer security zone.”

“There are dozens of villages that are almost completely destroyed, and their residents cannot return because of the scale of destruction and the absence of reconstruction capacity, making the crisis likely to continue for a long time,” he said.

The aftermath of a bombing in the Eastern sector of South Lebanon Fronts (AFP)

 

A difficult test for Lebanon’s army

On the Lebanese army’s role, Jaber said the military faces challenges that exceed its current capabilities.

Some proposals under discussion, especially those related to moving Hezbollah fighters away from areas south of the Litani, cannot be carried out without a full Israeli withdrawal and clear security guarantees, he said.

“The army cannot be asked to carry out unilateral measures while Israeli occupation continues and attacks persist,” he said. “This is unrealistic, and the army cannot resolve the problem alone in this way.”

Jaber said the next phase would remain governed by mutual attrition.

“We are facing a phase of managing the conflict, not ending it,” he said. “I do not expect a major breakthrough in the foreseeable future. The war has effectively turned into a low-intensity war of attrition between Israel and Hezbollah, but the real price is being paid by the Lebanese people, especially the people of the south, who have been drained by war, displacement and destruction.”

Talks unlike any earlier phase

While Jaber’s view starts from the military and field realities created by the latest war, Brig. Gen. Khaled Hamadeh, a researcher in security and political affairs, links the future of this phase to the negotiations themselves.

He said the talks differ radically from all previous rounds, and that their success remains tied to US-Iranian understandings.

Hamadeh told Asharq Al-Awsat that the current negotiations between Lebanon and Israel are unlike the 2000, 2006 or 2024 arrangements linked to Resolution 1701.

“The military, political and regional circumstances have completely changed, while the outcome remains tied to the path of US-Iranian dialogue,” he said.

“In 2000, indirect negotiations took place between Hezbollah and Israel with German mediation to implement Resolution 425. Israel withdrew without conditions, and the border was demarcated. Today, the scene is completely different because the Lebanese state is conducting the negotiations, not the party.”

After the 2006 war, he said, Resolution 1701 called for UNIFIL to deploy alongside the Lebanese army south of the Litani, with a mechanism to monitor implementation and prevent any armed presence outside the state in that area.

“But this mechanism later proved ineffective, and war returned and fighting resumed,” he said.

Hamadeh said the current process is not a new international resolution, but understandings based on Resolution 1701. The difference, he said, is that they are being built through negotiations led by the Lebanese state, with security responsibility gradually shifting to the state after earlier monitoring mechanisms failed.

“The main difference today is that the negotiations are moving toward ending the conflict,” he said.

The latest US memorandum, he added, speaks for the first time of ending the state of war between Lebanon and Israel and addressing border issues between the two states — points not included in Resolution 1701.

From Resolution 1701 to the armistice agreement

“If we compare the current texts with the 1949 armistice agreement, we find a great similarity,” Hamadeh said.

The armistice agreement, he said, was based on a commitment by Lebanon and Israel not to use regular or irregular forces in military action against the other side. Today, he added, the principle being established is that the Lebanese state alone should assume responsibility for security, and that no weapons should remain outside its framework.

Hamadeh also pointed to a major difference on the ground.

“In the 2006 war, Israeli military achievements were limited, and Israeli forces did not penetrate deep into Lebanese territory in the way that has happened today,” he said. “In the latest confrontation, Israeli forces went beyond southern Litani and reached deeper areas, while Hezbollah suffered major field losses, making the balance of power completely different from what it was in 2006.”

US-Iranian understanding remains decisive

Hamadeh said the current agreement is also unfolding “under a US-Iranian understanding,” a factor that was absent in earlier phases. Iran’s role in the Lebanese file, he said, has become deeper and more influential than before.

On the chances of success, Hamadeh said it was “far too early” to speak of definitively ending the conflict, because the Lebanese negotiations cannot be separated from the US-Iranian track.

“We must wait to see where those talks lead, and only then can we judge their repercussions for Lebanon,” he said. “If the US-Iranian negotiations fail, Iran may return to using the Lebanese arena again. Therefore, the most influential element in the scene has not yet stabilized, and no final results can be built before the picture becomes clear.”

Hamadeh said any disruption in implementing the proposed understandings — whether on cementing the ceasefire, full withdrawal, or Hezbollah’s weapons — would lead to another round of fighting.

“Any agreement that is not completed through the implementation of all its stages will not be viable,” he said.


Afghans Come Home But Risk Exclusion Without any ID

Most of the 6.1 million Afghan returnees who have arrived from Pakistan and Iran since September 2023 are listed as undocumented. Aimal ZAHIR / AFP
Most of the 6.1 million Afghan returnees who have arrived from Pakistan and Iran since September 2023 are listed as undocumented. Aimal ZAHIR / AFP
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Afghans Come Home But Risk Exclusion Without any ID

Most of the 6.1 million Afghan returnees who have arrived from Pakistan and Iran since September 2023 are listed as undocumented. Aimal ZAHIR / AFP
Most of the 6.1 million Afghan returnees who have arrived from Pakistan and Iran since September 2023 are listed as undocumented. Aimal ZAHIR / AFP

Lugging suitcases across the border after packing up in Pakistan, Afghans are returning home with their worldly possessions but often lack one key item to restart their lives: an identity card.

On the Afghan side of the Torkham border crossing, children and adults wheeled their luggage or carried belongings atop their heads, as they moved from desk to desk to log their arrival, reported AFP.

"I don't know how and where to get the ID card; now I'll go and check," said 17-year-old Abdulrehman Sudais, standing beside a crate of chickens he had carried across the border for his mother.

The Pakistan-born teenager had been to Afghanistan just once before, but his cousin had already told him he would need ID to access work or education.

Out of 6.1 million Afghan returnees who have arrived from Pakistan and Iran since September 2023, more than 86 percent are listed as undocumented by the International Organization for Migration (IOM).

At the crossing point, which still bears the shrapnel marks of this year's war between the neighboring countries, officials and aid workers were taking down everyone's details.

While border officials contact authorities nationwide to verify the identity of those who don't have any form of ID, the process for newly arrived Afghans can be bewildering.

Sardar Khan, 41, was sitting in a large tent at Omari camp near the crossing, where people get a return certificate and are fingerprinted.

"We are blind; we don't know what to do," he told AFP, as his son fell asleep at his side.

"We've never been to Afghanistan before; we'll get to know the importance of ID cards," he said.

As well as a requirement for getting a job or school place, an ID card is essential for Afghans trying to prove they own land or a home, claiming inheritance, accessing state benefits, and travelling through the myriad of checkpoints across the country.

Outside the tent, as the temperature hit 40C, people waiting to be processed huddled in the limited shade available.

Ziad Salih, regional coordinator at IOM, described the ID card as "one of the essential pieces of the puzzle" for Afghans.

"Many returnees are arriving without a valid ID document and this is placing them at risk of administrative and social exclusion," he told AFP at the agency's Torkham transit center.

Afghanistan's Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation Affairs did not respond to AFP's request to comment on the documentation issue.

'Difficult decisions'

Near the Torkham crossing, colorful trucks were piled high with families' furniture and other possessions from Pakistan.

Once Afghans reach their destination -- often the places their relatives fled years ago -- organizations have helplines and projects to support them with their paperwork.

Murat Khan Safi, an octogenarian who returned a few months ago, found rooms to rent on the outskirts of Jalalabad, the closest city to the border crossing.

"We were given a number at Torkham, then we contacted WADAN, and we made the ID cards," he told AFP, referring to the Welfare Association for the Development of Afghanistan that works with the UN refugee agency (UNHCR).

Surrounded by sons and grandsons under a clattering ceiling fan, Safi showed the tattered identity document he has kept since fleeing the Soviet occupation more than four decades ago.

Processing the new ID cards only took a couple of days, he said, but paying a fee of 500 Afghanis ($7.80) for each relative was hard.

"I made some difficult decisions... I had to sell household belongings," said Safi, his white beard matching the color of his clothes.

The family has been reimbursed for the ID card fees by the Welfare Association, and is due to receive additional support.

In June, the United Nations launched an initiative that aims to help Afghans get 1.5 million identity documents over the next three years.

Arafat Jamal, UNHCR's representative for Afghanistan, described the lack of documentation as an "almost invisible" phenomenon.

"The absence of documentation is a serious impediment to continuing your lives," he told AFP in the capital Kabul.

The UN appeal comes as global aid cuts hit hard in Afghanistan, with those crossing the border entering a country where jobs are scarce and support has been shrinking.

At Omari camp, Nazamin Baloch didn't know how to get an ID card but knew from other Afghans that it was "important for everything".

"This is the first time I am coming to Afghanistan," said Baloch, in her sixties.

"No one in the family has an ID card... We have not even seen our country before."


What Are the Key Challenges Facing NATO?

National flags of NATO members flutter at the alliance's headquarters in Brussels, Belgium April 2, 2025. (Reuters)
National flags of NATO members flutter at the alliance's headquarters in Brussels, Belgium April 2, 2025. (Reuters)
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What Are the Key Challenges Facing NATO?

National flags of NATO members flutter at the alliance's headquarters in Brussels, Belgium April 2, 2025. (Reuters)
National flags of NATO members flutter at the alliance's headquarters in Brussels, Belgium April 2, 2025. (Reuters)

NATO leaders gathering for a summit in Ankara on July ‌7-8 will discuss a host of challenges facing the alliance, from Europe taking on more responsibility for the continent’s security to boosting defense industrial production.

Some officials worry the Iran war could overshadow the gathering, but hope leaders will remain focused on the alliance’s core business: defense and deterrence.

Here is a look at the main challenges facing NATO in the months and years to come:

KEEPING TRUMP IN

NATO officials say one of their primary goals is to maintain unity and keep the US committed to the alliance’s Article 5 clause, which specifies that an attack on one of its members is an attack on all.

The alliance faced two crises this year which have fueled tension in the transatlantic relationship: US President Donald Trump’s demands for ownership of Greenland, an autonomous territory of NATO-member Denmark, and his anger at NATO allies over their response to the Iran war.

The US president branded the alliance a "paper tiger" and said he was considering withdrawing from NATO. The alliance's Secretary-General, Mark Rutte, has sought to smooth over tensions, using a ‌mix of flattery ‌and data to persuade Trump that European NATO members are fulfilling their promises.

BURDEN-SHIFTING

The Trump ‌administration ⁠has pushed European ⁠governments to take on primary responsibility for the conventional defense of Europe as Washington seeks to dedicate more resources to the Indo-Pacific.

Some changes are already under way: Washington has decided to shrink the pool of US military capabilities available to NATO in a crisis, and European NATO members have filled almost all the gaps.

US Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has also announced a new review of America's troop deployments in Europe and threatened to withhold some US dues to NATO if "free-riding" allies did not meet their defense spending commitments.

European officials say they are working to step up on defense. But some have also questioned the US approach, arguing that a transition ⁠requires time and raising concern about the unpredictability of policy coming from Washington.

SPENDING MORE

European ‌NATO members and Canada are under significant pressure to boost defense investment both ‌to improve deterrence and defense against Russia and to demonstrate to Trump that they are taking his demands for burden-shifting seriously.

At a ‌summit in the Hague last year, NATO leaders backed the big increase in defense spending that Trump demanded, pledging to ‌spend 5% of GDP on defense and defense-related measures within a decade. Countries pledged to spend 3.5% of GDP on core defense — such as troops and weapons — and 1.5% on broader defense-related measures.

NATO's European allies and Canada increased defense spending by 20% in 2025 compared with the previous year in real terms, according to alliance data. But not everyone is on a trajectory to meet the new goals, and ‌a number of governments are starting to run into political difficulties with defense spending.

INDUSTRY

With European NATO countries boosting defense investment, a major challenge for the alliance is how to ⁠turn money into new military ⁠capabilities in a short timeframe.

In Ankara, NATO members are expected to announce tens of billions of dollars in new contracts. But some officials have expressed frustration that production has not increased at the pace they had hoped and that it still takes years to get some orders.

NATO's leadership has called on industry to work together, open new production lines and deliver more quickly.

DETERRING RUSSIA

NATO leaders meeting in Ankara are expected to reiterate that Russia poses a long-term threat to Euro-Atlantic security.

While alliance officials say Russia is grappling with significant economic problems and Ukraine has strengthened its position, Rutte has cautioned that nearly half of Russia’s state budget is now dedicated to defense and that the alliance cannot be naive about Moscow.

UKRAINE

European NATO members are continuing to finance aid for Kyiv, more than four years since Russia’s full-scale invasion.

Money is channeled in various ways, including bilateral assistance, a European Union loan and the Prioritised Ukraine Requirements List initiative where European countries pay to supply Ukraine with US weapons.

While most European leaders say they are committed to continuing to support Kyiv, sustaining a high level of funding remains a challenge amid other demands on national budgets and concern in some capitals that some European governments are contributing disproportionately more than others.