Iran and Turkey Will Leave Syria, Russia’s UN Ambassador Tells Asharq Al-Awsat

Russian Ambassador to the United Nations Vasily Nebenzya. UN media office
Russian Ambassador to the United Nations Vasily Nebenzya. UN media office
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Iran and Turkey Will Leave Syria, Russia’s UN Ambassador Tells Asharq Al-Awsat

Russian Ambassador to the United Nations Vasily Nebenzya. UN media office
Russian Ambassador to the United Nations Vasily Nebenzya. UN media office

In his first ever interview with an Arab media outlet, Russian Permanent Representative to the United Nations Vasily Nebenzya said that the world order "has been the same" since its inception following the Second World War despite the emergence of "new centers of power." However, he acknowledged "new challenges and threats" such as terrorism, drug trafficking and uncontrolled migration.

While defending the "legitimacy" of the Russian presence in Syria, he stressed that everyone, including the Iranians, Turks and others, should eventually leave that country. He asserted that the current situation in Idlib "cannot be held frozen forever," adding that the Astana process is "the only effective mechanism to achieve stability" in Syria, and expecting that the UN Special Envoy Geir Pedersen will "soon" announce the composition of the Constitutional Committee.

He said that Moscow had called for a "platform" to discuss regional problems in the Middle East and North Africa, and that will happen "sooner or later". He noted that UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has been advocating an idea similar to the "Helsinki process."

He revealed that intensive political contacts between the Russian and Saudi leaderships show that both Moscow and Riyadh consider that "the potential of conflict... has a very negative impact, not only on regional security, but also on global security and stability." He asserted the Russian Federation's appreciation to the role played by Saudi Arabia "as one of the most influential countries in the Middle East and the Gulf region" in many issues, particularly in Yemen, Syria and other countries in the region, pointing out that the Kingdom has a "very constructive role" in the Yemeni crisis.

In an interview with Asharq al-Awsat about the return of Russia in the last ten years as a superpower, the Russian diplomat, whose country has veto power, has spoken about other issues such as Libya, Venezuela and other crises in the world.

* Russia has reemerged in the past 10 years as a global superpower, including in the Middle East. We hear people talking about going back to the Cold War. Others may say: we’re heading towards a new world order. What are your insights?

- The central element of the system of global relations that emerged in the aftermath of the Second World War is the UN and its Charter.

A new world order was born every time after devastating wars. That was the case with the Peace of Westphalia, the Vienna Congress and the Concert of Nations or the United Nations. I would hate even to contemplate another similar reason for a new world order. As Albert Einstein once said: I don’t know what the weapons of a Third World War will be, but in the Fourth they will fight with sticks and stones.

We had tectonic events in the past, like crumbling down of a colonial system, the end of the Cold War and associated ideological divide. Yet nobody was saying that we entered a new world order then. And history didn’t end as Francis Fukuyama claimed.

Of course, things change. Balances of power shift. New centers of power emerge.

This is reflected in the debate on the reform of the UN Security Council where we advocate its manageable expansion with the developing countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America, which are clearly underrepresented. However, there is another troubling trend. The art of compromise has been severely compromised in recent years. The unwillingness and inability to recognize that the world is not unipolar anymore, that it is not one-bloc dominated lead to attempts to create various “coalitions of the willing”, alliances of like-minded that pay lip service to international law while acting with total disregard to it. A new concept has been invented – “a rules-based order” which provides for the establishment of some “rules” cherished in a like-minded group, but unaccepted by a large part of the international community, let alone adopted anywhere.

Besides, new challenges and threats emerge, like terrorism, drug trafficking, uncontrolled migration. New political technologies are employed, like naming and shaming states whereby the accusation itself becomes the verdict. We live in what many call a “post-truth” world.

Still, regardless of this, the world order remains the same as it was created after World War II.

* Syria probably has been the clearer manifestation on Russia’s rise in today’s world. Have you accomplished your mission in Syria’s war? Do you expect Iran, Turkey, the US and others to leave Syria?

- Russia’s presence in Syria is legal. It is there on the request of the legitimate government to assist it in countering the terrorist threat. Iran, by the way, is present there legally too. No one else was invited, as we all know. All those who are present in Syria without invitation, should eventually leave the country.

Despite severe damage caused to ISIS in Syria, the terrorist threat is not completely eradicated and remains significant. Another terrorist group, Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (aka Nusra), has strengthened its positions in the North of Syria. It is now enclaved in Idlib, where Nusra militants established their rules and basically assumed the functions of local authorities. The situation cannot be held frozen forever. It should be addressed. That is why recently we have intensified contacts with our Turkish partners on the Idlib de-escalation zone. We fully realize that Idlib is home to a large civilian population, including IDPs from other parts of Syria. We know that they suffer under the rule of terrorists and dream to be spared of their “authority”. But of course, civilians should not become “collateral damage” of the legitimate fight against terrorists.

Our partners are urging the Syrian authorities and Astana guarantors to honor their agreements and spare civilians, alarming of a humanitarian disaster in case of large-scale hostilities. At the same time, they are not as consistent when they conduct military operations against terrorists in the Northeast of Syria where, as you know, a large number of civilians fell victim to aerial bombing of the Coalition.

* What do you expect specifically from the new UN special Envoy Geir Pedersen?

- We maintain dialogue with Special Envoy Geir Pedersen on the political settlement in Syria both bilaterally and through the Astana process. Astana format turned out to be the only effective mechanism to achieve stabilization “on the ground” in Syria. We stand ready to further assist the Special Envoy in making the political settlement sustainable. We expect that soon he will be able to announce the conclusion of the composition of the Constitutional Committee and to start its work. We count on the Special Envoy and hope he will establish trust with all the stakeholders while remaining impartial. This is the key to success for any mediator.

* You said that the Astana Process turned out to be the only effective mechanism on the ground. Do you want the Special Envoy to embrace the Astana Process?

- The Astana Process is part of a larger settlement, starting with UNSC resolution 2254 and through the Congress of National Dialogue, which gave birth to the Constitutional Committee. Special Envoy Pedersen is willing to participate in Astana, because this process discusses important issues, which he in particular is interested in, like prisoners exchange for example. As far as I know, he is planning to participate in the upcoming meeting in Astana, Nur Sultan now, on the 25-26 of this month.

* Mentioning the name of Kazakhstan capital, is the name of the process going to be changed?

- No, they are keeping the name as the Astana Process.

* You also mentioned that the Constitutional Committee will be formed soon, when should we expect that?

- There is no exact timeline, but the Special Envoy himself said there are a few little brush strokes that have to be applied before he can announce that the issue is closed, and start the work of the Committee.

* What would you say about what happened recently regarding the US recognition of Golan as part of Israel? Are you in Russia trying not to touch anything in relation with Israel, including when they hit targets deep in Syria? The Russian army is there but not protecting Syria’s sovereignty when it comes to Israel. You are asking all the uninvited to leave Syria except the Russians, the Iranians and the Israelis.

- I think we will eventually go too when time is right and when the conditions are ripe, and we will do this in consultation with the Syrian government. Iranians are there legitimately too because they were invited. They will go when the Syrian government decides their assistance is no longer necessary.

* They will leave?

- I think eventually all should leave when Syria is stabilized. But there are parties in Syria who were never invited there, like the US, the French and some others. Israel’s presence in the Golan began before the Syrian conflict. It is a long story. We never recognized Golan as part of Israel. It is part of Syria. We supported all the resolutions that say so. And indeed we condemned the US decision. But we are having good relations with Israel. Israel is our partner in the Middle East, as much as all the Arab states. We are lucky and proud that we are one of the major powers that enjoys good relations with anyone and everybody in the region without exception.

* What about Turkey?

- Yes, Turkey also was not invited. That’s true. But Turkey is an important partner in the Astana Process, in the process of the Syrian settlement. Turkey has its own concerns regarding its security. But, of course, we believe that eventually they will have to leave Syria as any other foreign presence in the country.

* What can you tell us about the remains of the Israeli soldier who what killed in Lebanon in 1982? What happened?

I don’t know the details but as President (Vladimir) Putin said openly; that was a Russian Special forces operation that made it possible to locate and excavate the remains…

* From Lebanon?

- Frankly, I don’t know where from. That was a great humanitarian gesture which was really much appreciated by the Israelis.

* How do you describe the situation of the Arab countries with Russia? How would Russia address the concerns regarding Iran’s meddling in the internal affairs of Arab countries?

- As I said Russia is in a privileged position among major powers to maintain close friendly relations with all Arab countries without exception. We interact both bilaterally and within such formats as “Russia-LAS” and “Russia- GCC”. We have established an effective political dialogue and exchange of views regarding the settlement of regional crises. Our commercial and economic ties are developing fast.

We are interested in the unity of the Arab world, which we advocate relentlessly. Power grows from unity. Regional problems can be effectively solved only on the basis of common approaches.

* There are a lot of questions about Iran’s role in the region. The US administration is raising its voice about Iran’s threats to other countries including Israel. Are you worried about any serious confrontations?

- Iran is a part of the region, not an alien entity. Iran has legitimate interests that go beyond its national borders and are aimed, among other things, at ensuring their national security. Arab States, Israel or Turkey – they all have such interests. The reason is in the transnational nature of global threats today.

You talk about threats that Iran poses. But don’t forget about the threats that Iran faces. Today they are clear and imminent. They are announced and proclaimed openly. Do you think Iran should not take them seriously? Unfortunately, recent steps and rhetoric from Washington, including withdrawal from the JCPOA and the initiation of large-scale sanction pressure only increase risks of escalating tensions and making further developments of the situation totally unpredictable.

As for the concerns about interference of Iran in the internal affairs of States in the Middle East, there are diverging views on this, even among the Arabs themselves.

Our approach can be described as very simple, even standard. All the countries of the region have their own interests. They should be taken into consideration. The only requirement is that those interests should be legitimate. If there are any concerns, they should be resolved by political and diplomatic means. For this, we need a convenient platform to discuss the whole range of existing problems.

Several years ago Russia proposed a security concept for the ... Gulf that envisages a dialogue platform for all the countries of the region, which would be eventually joined by other States of the Middle East and North Africa. This could be the first step towards establishing a regional security architecture that would help maintain peace and security in this part of the globe.

We are discussing this idea with our Arab friends. It has not been put into life yet, but it is going to happen sooner or later.

UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has been advocating a similar idea of a “Helsinki-type process” for the Middle East.

* Would you kindly describe the relations between Russia and Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia? How can the two countries cooperate to solve the current crises and strengthen the relationship politically and economically?

- Russia maintains friendly relations with all Arab States, including in the Gulf. Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov reiterated our commitment to step up interaction with these countries during his recent trip to KSA, Kuwait, Qatar and UAE.

Over recent years, we considerably increased our economic and political cooperation with Saudi Arabia. We coordinate our position on the situation on the world oil market through the “OPEC plus” process. Foreign Minister Lavrov discussed prospects of fostering cooperation during his visit to Saudi Arabia on March 4-5, where he was received by the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud, met with Saudi colleagues (Ibrahim) Al-Assaf and (Adel) Al-Jubeir.

Intense political contacts between the Russian and Saudi leaderships show that both Moscow and Riyadh proceed from the assumption that the remaining conflict potential in the Middle East and North Africa has an extremely negative impact not only on regional, but also on global security and stability. Both of us are firmly committed to combat terrorism in all of its manifestations and to eradicate terrorist ideology.

Russian and Saudi views on the Middle East settlement coincide, which lays the groundwork for further interaction. We support the two-State solution of the Palestinian issue that would rest on the international legal basis and the Arab peace initiative.

We coordinate activities on regional crisis settlement. We appreciate efforts of Riyadh to facilitate political settlement in Syria, specifically with regard to unifying the Syrian opposition. We share the understanding that the Syrian political process should be based on UN Security Council resolution 2254. We respect the views of Saudi Arabia and keep our friends updated about the work of the guarantors to the Astana process, including activities to establish the Constitutional Committee.

From the very beginning of the crisis in Yemen, we have maintained constructive dialogue with KSA and other members of the Arab coalition. We have unleashed and continuously use the potential of working contacts that the Russian side established with the stakeholders of the conflict, including “Ansar Allah”, in order to bring peace back to the country. Both Moscow and Riyadh support efforts of Special Envoy of the Secretary-General Martin Griffiths. We hope he will manage to achieve progress soon.

We will be enhancing our cooperation on all tracks. Saudi Arabia is one of the most influential States of the Middle East and the Gulf region.

* Are you avoiding a condemnation to sending arms to the Houthis in Yemen, or even mentioning resolution 2216, or targeting Saudi Arabia with ballistic missiles by the Houthis?

- We condemn targeting Saudi Arabia with missiles. We say it every time it happens, as it is inadmissible. On 2216, if you remember, we abstained because we were not in total agreement with some parts of the resolution but the resolution was adopted. We did not block it. On the arms procurement, Yemen is a country which was full of arms since before the conflict started and nobody yet gave a hundred percent proof that they still continue to obtain weapons directly from Iran. They have other means to equip themselves. They are armed beyond their needs. Yemen is a country which was a market for arms even in the old times. Everybody was competing to procure arms to Yemen, including the Soviet Union. So they are not in dire need of arms.

* Are you hopeful the situation will be solved?

- It is all very difficult there, of course. But what plays favorably is the unity of the UN Security Council on it, the strong push from the Security Council to resolve the conflict politically. The way the coalition approached it, especially recently. We know that the coalition, Saudi Arabia in particular, plays a very constructive role. We support what Martin Griffiths is doing. It is a job next to impossible, mission impossible, but he is trying to navigate in those very difficult circumstances aggravated by complete and total mistrust by the parties, which is one of the reasons why the Stockholm agreements were not realized till the present day on Hodeidah and the other ports. Of course, it is very important to continue steps towards the political settlement. These steps should not be hostage to reach the implementation of the agreement on Hodeidah. But implementing Hodeidah is very important. We are working to make it happen.

* We saw media reports that Russia is supporting General (Khalifa) Haftar in Libya. Is that the case?

- Don’t believe the media (laughter). Russia supports Libya’s reconciliation and the national unity. Haftar is a very important player, but there are other parties in that country that play an important role. We are not siding with any particular party in Libya. We hope that recent developments will not lead to violence and be resolved peacefully through political dialogue.

* Russia has bitter memories in Libya because of how the Gaddafi regime was deposed by the west in 2011. There is this rift…

- There is not much rift between us and the West on Libya. There is a lot of uncertainty and lack of understanding on how to put the country back together. It was broken like a piece of glass, and now we have to put back together all those small pieces which were scattered. We do not have major contradictions on Libya with our colleagues in the Security Council today. But we have been saying continuously and consistently that what happens in Libya is a result of the policies that they implemented in 2011 when they basically cheated on us in the Security Council and bombed the country and let it be destroyed. Not only Libya suffered in the aftermath but the whole region south of it. What happened in Sahel and many countries in western and central Africa is a product of the intervention in Libya. Those jihadists went down south from Libya. That is openly recognized by the African leaders themselves.

* What are the Russian military advisers and experts doing in Venezuela?

- We have an agreement on military cooperation. They went to serve what we procured for them before. They are military specialists that came for the service of equipment that we earlier provided to the Venezuelans.

* The international multilateral system is being seriously challenged. Are the United Nations and the Security Council still relevant today? Why?

- There is no alternative to the UN and its Security Council that is the main body responsible for maintaining international peace and security. It is relevant today as before. We cannot always find solutions in the Council (although on majority of issues we can). But that is not because the Security Council is ineffective or irrelevant, but because this inability reflects the divides that the world is facing. However, there is no alternative to this mechanism. We should learn again the art of compromise and account of mutual interests, somewhat forgotten today.

We should base our work on the UN Charter and international law. All should realize and accept that the world is not unipolar anymore. It is multipolar with new centers of power willing to be recognized, heard and respected. This understanding will help bring multilateralism back to the center of international cooperation.

* What is your expectation from the new US ambassador to the UN?

- I never met her. But we are ready to work with any US ambassador who will be appointed to the UN. I am sure we will be able to work together to solve issues of common concern.

* You had tough moments with Nikki Haley…

- Tough moments with Nikki Haley in the Security Council. But we had our sweet moments outside the Security Council (Laughter).



Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: I Left Saddam Meeting Sensing he Misread Threat

There were exceptional communication channels between Saddam Hussein and King Hussein (AFP)
There were exceptional communication channels between Saddam Hussein and King Hussein (AFP)
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Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: I Left Saddam Meeting Sensing he Misread Threat

There were exceptional communication channels between Saddam Hussein and King Hussein (AFP)
There were exceptional communication channels between Saddam Hussein and King Hussein (AFP)

In the final part of his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, former Jordanian prime minister Ahmad Obeidat, who died earlier this month, recounted in detail his meetings with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and Syrian President Hafez al-Assad, and disclosed an alleged attempt by Rifaat al-Assad to assassinate former Jordanian prime minister Mudar Badran.

Obeidat began with his impression of Saddam following a 2001 meeting in Baghdad. He said he left convinced that the Iraqi leader “did not accurately understand the reality of the international situation, the trap that had been set for Iraq, nor the magnitude of the danger surrounding the country and what was coming.”

He also described how strong ties between the late King Hussein of Jordan and Assad deteriorated as the Iran-Iraq war intensified. “Exceptional channels of communication” opened between King Hussein and Saddam Hussein, he said, and those channels “thwarted Assad’s efforts to build an axis against Iraq.”

Obeidat further revealed that Rifaat al-Assad “sent a group to assassinate Mudar Badran” on the pretext that Jordan was harboring the Muslim Brotherhood and hosting training camps. “All of that was false,” he said, adding that the attempt was foiled and those involved were arrested.

Turning to the file of the Palestinian militant Abu Nidal, who split from Fatah, Obeidat recalled how Abu Iyad once “protected him from arrest,” before “the tables were turned,” in a reference to Abu Iyad later becoming one of Abu Nidal’s victims.

Asked about his history with Abu Nidal, Obeidat described him as “not an easy adversary.” Abu Nidal attacked Jordanian embassies and diplomats, he said, and was responsible for killing two or three ambassadors. He was also behind the assassination of the son of former prime minister Saeed al-Mufti, a diplomat at the Jordanian embassy in Bucharest, and wounded two ambassadors in separate operations.

When Obeidat served as prime minister in 1983-1984, Abu Nidal assassinated Fahd al-Qawasmi, the mayor of Hebron, during a visit to Amman.

Abu Nidal, Obeidat said, worked at different times for Syrian, Iraqi and Libyan intelligence services. “He was ready to work for the benefit of any intelligence service in any country and allowed them to control him,” he said. Syrian, Iraqi and Libyan intelligence used him more than once, and the Iraqis deployed him against Fatah in an effort to create splits and internal problems.

Abu Iyad had shielded Abu Nidal from detention when Fatah sought to arrest him, Obeidat said. “But in the end the tables were turned,” and Abu Iyad became one of his victims. It was said, he added, that Abu Iyad came to believe that Abu Nidal had begun working for “Zionist intelligence.”

As for Jordan’s response when its diplomats were targeted, Obeidat said that at the time he was prime minister and did not follow the security file closely due to the pressures of government. He was aware, however, that contacts were made to reach a deal to halt Abu Nidal’s operations in Jordan. “Their operations did indeed stop,” he said.

On coordination with major powers, Obeidat said Jordan cooperated with “any party that possessed information of interest to us,” except the Zionists. Relations with Syrian intelligence fluctuated between competition and brief periods of cooperation, after earlier periods of no contact.

He then recounted his 1979 meeting with Hafez al-Assad over accusations that Jordan was training members of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. Acting on instructions from King Hussein, Obeidat, then intelligence chief, and Prime Minister Mudar Badran met Assad to address the issue.

“We made clear to Hafez al-Assad that it was impossible for us to have camps training the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood,” he said. Jordan informed Assad that such camps were in Iraq and that Syrians were traveling via Jordan to Iraq using forged passports. Without lists of those names from Damascus, Jordan could not act.

“This is a Syrian problem, not a Jordanian one,” Obeidat said he told Assad. Jordan would not allow armed activity on its soil but needed Syrian intelligence cooperation and names to intervene effectively.

He acknowledged that tensions were aggravated when Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood leader, Mohammed Abdul Rahman Khalifeh, brought Syrian cleric Saeed Hawwa to meet King Hussein without informing the royal court or intelligence services. The move surprised the palace and embarrassed the intelligence service.

After investigating, Jordan discovered that a group of Syrians had entered the country, most intending to travel onward to Iraq. To prevent escalation with Damascus, Jordan asked them to leave, allowing limited humanitarian cases time to arrange residence elsewhere.

Obeidat described Assad as “a good listener” who did not comment during their meeting but later instructed Syrian intelligence to cooperate with Jordan. His dealings with Syrian intelligence chief Ali Duba were limited but manageable.

He dismissed suggestions that Ahmed Jibril was behind operations against Jordan, saying the more serious problem involved Rifaat al-Assad. Rifaat’s alleged plot to assassinate Badran was uncovered, with suspects arrested at the border and in an apartment in Amman’s Sweileh district. They possessed weapons and explosives and were tried before Jordan’s State Security Court.

In an earlier incident, Obeidat said, members of Rifaat’s force assassinated a Syrian political refugee in Amman.

Asked about challenges upon assuming the premiership, Obeidat cited financial strain. Arab and Gulf aid declined to near zero, while Jordanian workers returned from the Gulf after losing their jobs, placing heavy pressure on living conditions.

Security challenges included Abu Nidal’s activities. At the same time, relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization improved. King Hussein allowed the Palestinian National Council to convene in Amman in 1984, triggering a political crisis with Syria.

Several attempted attacks targeting Jordan and council members were foiled, Obeidat said. Syria exerted pressure to prevent attendance, but Jordan ensured the session’s success. Supporting the PLO after its recognition as the legitimate representative of the Palestinians became, in his words, a Jordanian necessity to prevent a political vacuum.

Obeidat described a later meeting with Yasser Arafat as cordial after earlier strained ties, and said he also met Abu Iyad at the royal court during the council’s session. He met George Habash later in Beirut, outside office.

He then revisited the 1968 Battle of Karameh. Fighters from Fatah “stood firm and fought bravely,” he said, though many were killed. Some trainees were left without weapons or guidance despite warnings that battle was imminent, leading to heavy casualties.

King Hussein, he said, “was very resolute” during the battle.

On his relationship with the monarch, Obeidat said King Hussein “respected those who respected themselves.” Their relationship cooled after the 1994 Wadi Araba peace treaty, which Obeidat opposed.

Jordanian intelligence, he stressed, did not conduct operations in Beirut in response to the assassination of Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tal, though he noted military intelligence operated separately.

Obeidat listed foreign leaders he met as prime minister, including Assad, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and Saddam Hussein. Meetings with Britain’s queen, Austria’s president and Spain’s king were protocol visits.

He described relations between King Hussein and Assad as once “good, frank and continuous,” with almost weekly contact, before shifting during the Iran-Iraq war as close ties formed between King Hussein and Saddam.

Recalling his 2001 Baghdad visit, Obeidat said Saddam spoke at length about sanctions and support for Palestinians. He reproached Jordan over its peace treaty and alluded to Hussein Kamel’s defection. Obeidat insisted Jordan had no role in that defection or in his return.

When Iraqi officials called for cutting oil supplies to Jordan, Obeidat told Saddam that such a move would effectively besiege the Jordanian people. Saddam responded, “I will never abandon the Jordanian people under any circumstances.”

In Obeidat’s final reflection, the meeting left a lasting impression. From Saddam’s remarks that day, he said, he concluded that the Iraqi leader did not fully comprehend the scale of the international threat facing his country, a judgment he carried with him long after the encounter.


Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Gaddafi Tried to Assassinate King Hussein with Missile Given to Wadie Haddad

King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).
King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).
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Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Gaddafi Tried to Assassinate King Hussein with Missile Given to Wadie Haddad

King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).
King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).

In the second installment of his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, former Jordanian prime minister and intelligence chief Ahmad Obeidat recounts details of a missile plot to assassinate King Hussein, which he says was backed by Muammar Gaddafi and carried out through operatives linked to Wadie Haddad, head of the external operations arm of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

Obeidat, who also served as head of intelligence and as minister of interior and defense, revisits the confrontation between Israeli forces, the Jordanian army, and Palestinian guerrillas (fedayeen) in the border town of Karameh in March 1968, asserting that the Jordanian army “decided the battle,” but suffered a “moral defeat amid the fedayeen’s claims of victory.”

Obeidat died earlier this month. The interview was recorded before the “Al-Aqsa Flood,” whose aftermath delayed its publication. Below is the text of the second installment.
 

King Hussein inspects an Israeli tank left behind by occupying forces during the Battle of Karameh (Getty)

“Battle of Karameh”

Obeidat calls Karameh “a pivotal point of utmost importance,” especially for an army still reeling from the 1967 defeat and its withdrawal from the West Bank.

“The army lived the bitterness of that defeat,” he says. “It felt a moral, national, and pan-Arab responsibility.”

Karameh, he argues, offered a chance to restore the army’s fighting morale and reclaim some of its lost dignity.

“It was the army that settled the battle,” Obeidat says.

He credits Jordanian forces with thwarting Israeli attempts to build crossing bridges, destroying their vehicles on Jordanian soil and forcing, for the first time in Israel’s history, a request for a ceasefire. “The late King Hussein refused,” he adds.

Israel, he says, did not acknowledge a fifth of its casualties. Helicopters were evacuating the wounded who were “dripping with blood.”

He singles out artillery observation officers who advanced to the closest possible positions, relaying precise coordinates even as they effectively marked their own locations for shelling.

“The Jordanian soldier would identify his position near the Israeli army to be shelled,” he says, describing a willingness to die in order to restore dignity after the 1967 setback.

He says the declaration of “armed struggle” effectively erased the army’s role, presenting Palestinian fedayeen as the victors over Israel. “They monopolized the victory and ignored the army’s role entirely,” Obeidat says. “We emerged with a moral defeat in the face of their claims.”

He alleges that hundreds of millions of dollars in donations collected afterward, much of it going to Fatah, did not reach the Palestinian people but went to organizations and their leaders.

When the army entered Amman in September 1970, Obeidat says, it aimed to end what he describes as chaos: armed displays, roadblocks, arrests of soldiers on leave and interference in courts.

"When the army entered and began expelling the fedayeen from Amman, it swept through everything in its path. Even my own home, which I had recently rented after my abduction incident and which was close to the army’s command headquarters, was entered by the Jordanian army to search for fedayeen, while my family was inside the house at the time of the raid. My wife told them that her husband was an intelligence officer, but the Jordanian soldier replied, “Don’t lie.”

Obeidat says they did not leave the house until she contacted him, at which point he assigned one of his officers, the commander of an intelligence company, to speak with the army.

"Only then did they leave the house. The point is that the army swept areas without distinguishing between Jordanian and Palestinian; it wanted only to restore control over security. All of this forced me to send my family to my parents’ home in Irbid, in the north of the Kingdom."

He later describes what he calls a “state within a state,” extending from the Jordan Valley to Amman, after armed groups asserted authority over courts, roads, and civilian life.

On Syria’s intervention, Obeidat says Syrian forces entered northern Jordan flying Palestine Liberation Organization flags.

He later learned the decision was political, taken by the Baath Party, and that then-Defense Minister Hafez al-Assad complied reluctantly before Syrian tanks withdrew.

Iraq, he says, did not intervene. Obeidat affirms that he was told by Iraqi officials that neither the Iraqi state nor its forces intended to participate in any operation aimed at ending the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan.

According to one account, Iraqi leaders did not want to shoulder the political and diplomatic burden of the Palestinian issue or risk an uncalculated adventure.

He recounts another account, which he says he cannot adopt, according to which the operations command in the army was handled by a Pakistani figure. Under this account, Zia ul-Haq was receiving operational communications and sending messages that caused confusion among Iraqi and other forces, leading them to believe they would confront powerful strike units, prompting them to remain in a state of alert rather than engage.

He also recalls a meeting in which Palestinian figures, including Abu Iyad, reproached Iraqi President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr. Al-Bakr replied: “We are a state with one life. If we make a fundamental mistake, we end. You are like cats with seven lives.”

As director of intelligence, Obeidat says he dealt directly with operations attributed to Haddad.

Between 1975 and 1977, he says, a missile was sent to Jordan with a group led by a Jordanian, Brik al-Hadid, affiliated with the PFLP. The target was King Hussein’s aircraft.

“The intention was to strike the plane, with Gaddafi’s knowledge and approval,” Obeidat says.

Jordanian intelligence monitored the group from the outset and later arrested its members. The king’s aircraft departed Marka military airport as scheduled but flew in the opposite direction to its planned route as a precaution, using jamming devices against any incoming missiles.

When confronted by Mudar Badran, then head of the Royal Court, Gaddafi denied knowledge. “I have no information,” Obeidat quotes him as saying.

Obeidat describes the aircraft hijackings orchestrated by Haddad as “the straw that broke the camel’s back,” contributing to the army’s intervention.

He says Jordanian intelligence had infiltrated Fatah and monitored its leaders, including Abu Iyad and Abu Yusuf al-Najjar.

In mid-1972, intelligence learned that Abu Dawood and a group were planning to enter Jordan from Baghdad to seize the Jordanian cabinet during a session and hold ministers hostage in exchange for the release of detained Fatah members.

The group crossed in three Mercedes cars, dressed in traditional Arab attire, with weapons concealed inside the seats and forged passports in hand. They were arrested at the border after a thorough search.

Obeidat rejects claims by Abu Iyad that Abu Dawood was tortured, insisting that “not a single hair on his head was touched,” and says Abu Dawood confessed only after realizing the operation had been fully uncovered.

Later, King Hussein met Abu Dawood’s parents, who pleaded for clemency. The king read the full confession and then met Abu Dawood himself. He ultimately ordered his release, honoring a promise he had made to Abu Dawood’s parents.

In Obeidat’s view, Abu Dawood was affected by the king’s treatment of his parents and “did not pose any future threat to Jordan.”

Obeidat describes a direct relationship between King Hussein and the General Intelligence Department.

The king met with officers regularly, not only to hear briefings but also to hear their personal views. 

Obeidat says he would submit reports to the prime minister and also meet with the king. When addressing the king, however, it was sometimes necessary to elaborate verbally on certain issues so that such information would not circulate among staff. 

When he was asked to present a security briefing before the king, the late King Hussein would summon Crown Prince Hassan. The king’s advisers would also attend, along with senior army commanders, the public security leadership, the head of the Royal Court, and the prime minister. The briefing of the security report would include an explanation of the security situation and any external or internal challenges.

 


Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Mystery Sniper Killed Wasfi Tal

Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Mystery Sniper Killed Wasfi Tal

Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Former Jordanian Prime Minister Ahmad Obeidat, who died earlier this month, was both a key player and a witness to sensitive chapters in his country’s history.

Obeidat began his career in the 1970s as an assistant director of intelligence, later serving as head of the General Intelligence Department until 1982. At the height of the Palestinian-Jordanian confrontation, he was abducted by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine before the events of September 1970.

He also served for two years as interior minister before King Hussein appointed him prime minister in early 1984, a post he held until April 1985, concurrently serving as defense minister.

For more than 15 years, Obeidat remained at the center of decision-making. He later took on roles drawing on his legal background, from chairing the Royal Commission that drafted the National Charter in the early 1990s to serving in human rights and judicial positions, most recently as head of the board of trustees of the National Center for Human Rights until 2008.

Weeks before Oct. 7, 2023, the day of the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation, Asharq Al-Awsat met Obeidat in Amman. The interview had been scheduled for publication in October 2023, but the major developments that followed led to its postponement, particularly as Obeidat addressed contentious issues, notably Jordanian-Palestinian relations.

In the first part of the interview, Obeidat revisits his formative years, when his political and professional journey began as a law student in Baghdad on the eve of the July 14, 1958 revolution, before returning to Iraq after the fall of the monarchy amid sweeping regional transformations.

The account moves to his early professional life in Jordan, from a brief stint in legal practice to joining the Public Security Directorate, then serving in the Political Investigations Office, which formed the nucleus of organized intelligence work. It concludes with a detailed narrative of the establishment of the General Intelligence Department in 1964, its early structure and founding members, at a time when the Jordanian state was rebuilding its institutions in an intensely turbulent region.

Asked where he was when the 1958 revolution broke out in Iraq, Obeidat said he had completed his first year in law studies and returned to Jordan for the summer break.

“While I was in Irbid, news arrived of the July 14 revolution in Iraq that overthrew the monarchy. After the summer break ended, I went back to Baghdad, where a republican government under Abdul Karim Qassem had taken power,” he recalled.

The return was not easy. “We faced difficulties on the road. The border between Jordan and Iraq was nearly closed, so we had to return via Damascus and then through desert routes to Baghdad. It was an exhausting journey,” he added.

Obeidat left Baghdad in 1961 after completing his final exams. “On the last day of exams in the fourth year, I went home, packed and returned to Jordan the same day. The border between Baghdad and Amman had reopened.”

Among his contemporaries at law school was Saddam Hussein, who studied in the evening section. Obeidat said he saw him only once by chance. “He was with others, one of whom later became a governor,” he revealed.

He returned to Baghdad again in 1983 as Jordan’s interior minister to attend a conference of Arab interior ministers, more than two decades after graduating. There, he met his Iraqi counterpart, Saadoun Shaker. “It was an ordinary relationship,” Obeidat said, describing the ties as largely ceremonial.

From customs to intelligence

After returning to Jordan in 1961, Obeidat initially considered practicing law. But limited opportunities in Irbid and his family’s financial constraints led him to seek public employment.

He was appointed to the Customs Department in Amman, where he worked for several months before joining the Public Security Directorate in April 1962 as a first lieutenant following three months of training at the police academy.

At the time, there was no separate intelligence agency. Public Security included a branch handling general investigations. Soon after, the Political Investigations Office was formed, staffed by legal officers from the army and Public Security, including Mudar Badran and Adeeb Tahaoub from military justice, alongside Obeidat and Tariq Alaaeddin from Public Security.

The office handled cases referred by security and official bodies, including military intelligence and the Royal Court. After reviewing its work, the late King Hussein ordered the establishment of a legally grounded intelligence body. The General Intelligence Law was issued in 1964, formally creating the department, explained Obeidat.

Mohammad Rasoul Al-Kilani became its first director, followed by Mudar Badran, then Nadhir Rashid. Al-Kilani briefly returned before Obeidat assumed the post, succeeded later by Tariq Alaaeddin.

The shock of 1967

Recalling the 1967 war, Obeidat described it as “a defeat, not a setback. A military, political, psychological, and social defeat in every sense.”

He said there was no institutional intelligence view on Jordan’s participation. “The political opinion of a figure of Wasfi Tal’s stature was that entering the 1967 war was a mistake. He was not in office, but he remained close to the king and influential,” said Obeidat.

According to Obeidat, King Hussein believed Israel would occupy the West Bank whether Jordan participated or not.

“Participation was a gamble that might succeed or fail. The catastrophe was discovering that the Egyptian air force had been destroyed within half an hour,” he added.

Despite the bitterness, he said: “We did not fear for the regime, but we sought to contain public anger and absorb the shock.”

September and the assassination of Wasfi Tal

Obeidat first met Yasser Arafat after the events of September 1970. He confirmed that Arafat left Amman with an official Arab delegation to attend the Cairo summit and returned immediately afterward.

He recalled being informed mid-flight of the death of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. “King Hussein was deeply affected.”

On the assassination of Prime Minister Wasfi Tal in Cairo, Obeidat said the gunmen who confronted Tal at the hotel entrance were not responsible for the fatal shot. “The fatal bullet came from behind, from a sniper in another unseen location. To this day, the sniper has not been identified,” he added.

He rejected the notion that Tal had been reckless. “Wasfi was not a gambler. He had a distinct political project,” he stressed.

Obeidat said the Black September Organization accused Tal of ordering the expulsion of fedayeen from forested areas in Jerash and Ajloun. He denied that Tal was directly responsible, saying the clashes began after fedayeen attacked a police station and killed officers, prompting a spontaneous army response.

Abduction without interrogation

Before September 1970, Obeidat was abducted by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine while serving as assistant intelligence director.

Armed vehicles stopped his car as he was leaving his home in Jabal Al-Taj with his family. He and his brother-in-law were taken to the Wehdat camp. “We were treated politely. We drank tea. No one asked me a single question,” he recalled.

After several hours, he was driven to another house in Amman and later returned home. The next morning, members of Fatah took him briefly to one of their offices, only to release him on foot without explanation.

“Not a single question was asked,” Obeidat said. “It was bewildering.”

He resumed his duties after ensuring his family’s safety. “At the time, intelligence, like any official institution, was threatened and targeted,” he said, reflecting on one of the most volatile periods in Jordan’s modern history.