Russia to Lease Syria’s Tartus Port for 49 Years

Russian naval vessels taking part in a Russia Navy Day celebration in the Syrian port of Tartus. (Handout picture official Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA)/AFP)
Russian naval vessels taking part in a Russia Navy Day celebration in the Syrian port of Tartus. (Handout picture official Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA)/AFP)
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Russia to Lease Syria’s Tartus Port for 49 Years

Russian naval vessels taking part in a Russia Navy Day celebration in the Syrian port of Tartus. (Handout picture official Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA)/AFP)
Russian naval vessels taking part in a Russia Navy Day celebration in the Syrian port of Tartus. (Handout picture official Syrian Arab News Agency (SANA)/AFP)

Russian Deputy Prime Minister Yuri Borisov met with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and discussed Moscow’s efforts to help the Middle Eastern country’s economic revival, as well as trade and economic cooperation “particularly in the fields of energy, industry and increasing trade,” according to Russian sources.

Assad and the Russian envoy also discussed mechanisms to overcome obstacles including those from the sanctions which “countries against the Syrian people imposed on Syria.”

“We have made considerable progress on that matter and hope that a contract will be signed within a week and the port of Tartus will be used by Russian businesses for 49 years," Borisov was quoted by Russia’s TASS news agency.

In December 2017, Russia’s Federation Council ratified an agreement between Moscow and Assad’s government on Russian forces' access to the naval base in Tartus.

A few days ago, Syrian state media reported a shortage in fuel which caused the rationing of available quantities, pointing out that this was due to the difficulties in importing fuel and the halting of credit line from Iran.

Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al-Mouallem said in a statement on Saturday carried by state-owned Syrian news agency (SANA) that "Syria is always coordinating with Iran".

On the other hand, news of leasing Tartus port caused widespread discontent among Syrians, who have been witnessing unprecedented economic distress for the past two weeks.

Syrian port workers are worried about the future of their work and the consequences of Russia's control over the port.

In 2017, Moscow and Damascus signed an agreement on the deployment of a Russian navy logistics support center in Tartus for the term of 49 years.

Russia and Iran are competing for influence in Syria. Moscow’s intention to lease Tartus port comes after Iran leased from the Syrian regime its commercial port of Latakia in October 2018.

During an unannounced visit to Tehran in February, Assad signed with his Iranian counterpart, Hasan Rouhani, an agreement allowing Iran to manage the commercial port of Latakia, which angered the Russian side.

Russia is looking to explore oil fields in Turkey, Iraq, Lebanon, and Syria, and establish a land bridge to Europe across the Middle East to strengthen its role as a major supplier of gas to Europe.

Moscow is also interested in Lebanon, especially that, over the past two years, trade exchange has doubled between the two countries. It is also eyeing the oil storage facility at Tripoli port, 30 kilometers from the Syrian border and 60 kilometers from the Syrian port of Tartus.

Sources in Damascus said that leasing Tartus port to Russia is a clear indication of the shared influence and control, especially that there are Iranian-Russian interests in using the Syrian territory to extend gas pipelines in the region and resume the railway project linking Iran, Iraq, and Syria.

Various media outlets reported Iranian and Russian forces are clashing in several areas, which SANA categorically denied saying no such thing occurred.

Soon after the news broke of leasing Tartus port, allies and opposition figures denounced the move, prompting social media activists affiliated with the regime to promote that the ports of Tartus and Latakia were operated by the Philippine’s International Container Terminal Services Inc up until 2011 when both ports were classified dangerous areas.

The pro-regime critics considered the lease a “tactical move by Syria” in the face of the economic war declared on it. They argued that this would restore activity to the quasi-paralyzed port as a result of the economic blockade, and will allow the import of food and oil to Syria.

Earlier, al-Watan newspaper, which is close to the Syrian government, disclosed in an article “Unprecedented Disclosure on Oil” that the serious shortage of fuel in Syria is due of Iran halting a credit line to Syria after US sanctions.

The newspaper pointed out that Syria daily needs 4.5 million liters of gasoline, 6 million liters, 7 thousand tons of fuel, and 12 hundred tons of gas, amounting to $200 million every month.

Meanwhile, Moscow has pushed for a political process involving talks on a new constitution and elections as a way to end the conflict, but Assad has played down the possibility that the Turkey-backed opposition or foreign countries might participate.

Russia’s Foreign Ministry said late on Friday that Assad met Moscow’s Syria envoy Alexander Lavrentiev, Deputy Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Vershinin, and several Russian Defence Ministry officials.

They discussed the formation of a constitutional committee, which Syria’s opposition last year agreed to join under UN auspices during Sochi peace conference.

SANA said meetings had focused on the next round of talks in Kazakhstan involving Syria, its allies Russia and Iran, and the rebels’ backer Turkey.



Israeli Army Advances into Lebanon on Four Axes

Israeli artillery fires toward Lebanese territory as forces attempt deeper incursions (AFP)
Israeli artillery fires toward Lebanese territory as forces attempt deeper incursions (AFP)
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Israeli Army Advances into Lebanon on Four Axes

Israeli artillery fires toward Lebanese territory as forces attempt deeper incursions (AFP)
Israeli artillery fires toward Lebanese territory as forces attempt deeper incursions (AFP)

Israeli troops advanced from four directions on Friday into Lebanese territory, as attacks resumed along the Khiam and Taybeh axes, operations restarted on the Maroun al-Ras front, and a new axis was opened in the western sector toward the town of Naqoura.

The push appears aimed at dispersing defending forces confronting the incursions by widening the scope of the assault and diversifying its axes. The move follows a two-day lull in the offensive on Khiam and a lack of progress on the Taybeh front on Thursday, when tanks came under anti-tank missile fire.

Sources in southern Lebanon told Asharq Al-Awsat that heavy strikes on the towns of Yohmor, Arnoun and Zawtar, elevated areas on the western bank of the Litani River overlooking Taybeh, suggest Israeli forces are seeking to neutralize fire directed from those heights at tanks advancing in Taybeh.

They said the Israeli army is trying to reach the Litani bank and Wadi al-Hujair, in a bid to isolate the area from its southern extensions, making it easier to advance into the Hujair and Saluki valleys from the south and southwest, from the outskirts of Mays al-Jabal and Houla.

Hezbollah said in a series of statements that it fired artillery at Israeli troop concentrations in Taybeh and the Taybeh project area, and detonated explosive devices targeting troop gatherings and a bulldozer, indicating its fighters remain present in the town.

On the Khiam front, local sources in Marjayoun said Israeli forces renewed their attacks on the town, where Hezbollah fighters are still holding pockets in its center and north. They said Israeli ground units pushed toward central Khiam in an attempt to tighten control, alongside artillery shelling and airstrikes focused on its northern areas.

The sources said the attack on Khiam unfolded along three axes, from the south toward the north, from the west toward the edge of the plain, and from the east and northeast along the administrative border of Ibl al-Saqi, adding that the attempted advances were accompanied by heavy firepower.

In the central sector, Israeli forces resumed attacks toward Maroun al-Ras and Aita al-Shaab, alongside airstrikes targeting the city of Bint Jbeil and artillery shelling of Maroun al-Ras. This indicates the incursion aims to reach Bint Jbeil from the east and north, a front where Israeli forces had halted their advance last week.

Hezbollah said it detonated explosive devices in Aitaroun and targeted Israeli troop concentrations in Maroun al-Ras and its public garden.

For the first time since the war began, the Israeli army opened an incursion axis in Naqoura, days after expanding operations in the Labbouneh area east of the coastal border town.

The advance was accompanied by intense airstrikes on towns deeper inside Lebanon in the Tyre district, between 15 and 25 km away, in an apparent attempt to prevent supporting fire for defending forces and to stop attacks on advancing troop concentrations.

Since the morning, Israeli warplanes have carried out a series of airstrikes and artillery bombardments targeting at least 12 towns in the Tyre district, and around 25 towns across the Nabatieh, Marjayoun and Bint Jbeil districts.

The Israeli military said on Friday it had struck 2,000 targets in Lebanon since the war with Hezbollah began on March 2. In a statement, it said Israeli forces continue “limited, targeted ground operations” in southern Lebanon as part of what it described as advanced defensive efforts against Hezbollah.

It said that more than 2,000 targets had been hit so far, including 120 command centers, more than 110 weapons depots and more than 130 rocket launchers.

The military added that more than 570 Hezbollah fighters had been killed, including 220 from the Radwan Force, around 150 operators of surface-to-surface missiles, and more than 30 commanders of various ranks.


'Resistance' Axis without Voice as It Loses Narrative, Psychological Warfare Architects

Yemenis watch a speech by “Abu Ubaida,” spokesman for the Qassam Brigades, whom Israel said it killed in August 2024 (file photo, EPA)
Yemenis watch a speech by “Abu Ubaida,” spokesman for the Qassam Brigades, whom Israel said it killed in August 2024 (file photo, EPA)
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'Resistance' Axis without Voice as It Loses Narrative, Psychological Warfare Architects

Yemenis watch a speech by “Abu Ubaida,” spokesman for the Qassam Brigades, whom Israel said it killed in August 2024 (file photo, EPA)
Yemenis watch a speech by “Abu Ubaida,” spokesman for the Qassam Brigades, whom Israel said it killed in August 2024 (file photo, EPA)

Since the Oct. 7, 2023 attacks, the confrontation in the Middle East has not been limited to missiles and drones, but has expanded to a parallel front no less dangerous: the architects of narratives and psychological warfare.

Military spokesmen and media figures emerged, some masked, some officers, others operating in the shadows. Together, they formed the backbone of the “resistance” narrative, shaping the battle over narrative, imagery, and public perception under the broad umbrella of forces allied with Iran.

They were not merely voices for their factions or armies. They acted as architects of an integrated discourse, waging a war that targeted adversaries and audiences alike. Beneath them operated sprawling networks of platforms, activists, and media arms that reproduced and amplified messaging across digital and traditional media, reinforcing the narratives of Iran’s regional allies.

As military operations escalated, from Gaza to Lebanon and on to the latest war involving Iran, this apparatus came under concentrated strikes. Some of its most prominent figures were removed, leaving the axis narrative without many of its key voices.

Naeini, architect of “cognitive warfare”

Ali Mohammad Naini, spokesman for Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, was killed at dawn on Friday, March 20, 2026, in a US-Israeli strike, removing one of the most prominent figures behind the force’s messaging during one of the war’s most sensitive phases.

Naini, 69, had served as the Guards’ official spokesman and deputy for public relations since July 2024, a role that extended beyond traditional media duties to managing political messaging and consolidating the institution’s narrative at home and abroad.

Hours before his death was announced, Fars, the news agency affiliated with the Revolutionary Guards, attributed remarks to him saying the missile industry deserved “full marks.”

Naini stood out during the 12-day war in June 2025 and in the current conflict as a key architect of “psychological warfare” in Iran’s official discourse.

In his media appearances, he framed the confrontation as a multi-layered war, psychological, cognitive, technological, and military, stressing the importance of narrative, imagery, and public perception in shaping battlefield outcomes.

He repeatedly highlighted the media's role in “telling the story of the battlefield” and countering the adversary’s “cognitive warfare,” arguing that the opposing side aimed not only to strike military capabilities but also to dismantle the state and weaken internal cohesion.

Before his death, Naini continued to warn of “surprises” and emphasized Iran’s capacity for deterrence. His killing, therefore, marked not only a media loss, but also a blow to a figure who managed the battle of messaging and psychological influence alongside the military campaign.

“Askari,” the shadow envoy

“Abu Ali al-Askari” was less an individual than a complex media and security function. He acted as a conduit between battlefield decision-making and media messaging, and as a tool for setting the political tempo in line with Iran’s vision in Iraq.

His death was announced on March 16, 2026, after rocket attacks targeted sites in Baghdad, including a house in the Karrada district believed to be hosting a meeting of armed faction leaders. There were also indications he may have been targeted in other strikes east of the capital.

Even so, his identity and the circumstances of his death remained shrouded in the ambiguity that underpinned his influence.

His role extended to setting rules of engagement, defining the political weight of local Sunni and Kurdish actors, and signaling pressure on Iraq’s external alignments, including ties with the Arab world, the Gulf, and the broader international environment.

In that sense, he functioned as an effective instrument guiding Iraq’s political process toward outcomes aligned with Iran’s approach.

Abu Ubaida, the masked voice

Abu Ubaida became a prominent media symbol through his masked appearances and rhetoric that blended threat with psychological mobilization. Over two decades, he led the Qassam media apparatus and helped establish a distinct visual and vocal identity that resonated widely.

His prominence grew sharply during Israel’s 2014 war on the Gaza Strip, which lasted about 55 days. During that conflict, he served as a key link between fighters in tunnels and various combat units, as well as between Gaza’s population and the outside world.

He gained broad popularity within Palestine and across the Arab world for his credibility. He was not prone to exaggeration in describing military operations and was noted for his eloquence and command of Arabic.

Abu Ubaida’s first recorded appearances date back to 2002 and 2003, when he was introduced as a field official in the Qassam Brigades. He later held his first news conference on Oct. 2, 2004, at al-Nour mosque in northern Gaza, where he announced a series of operations carried out against Israeli forces and tanks under the banner “Days of Rage.”

He was killed on Aug. 30, 2025, in an Israeli airstrike targeting a building in Gaza City’s Rimal neighborhood, where he was present, according to the Israeli account.

Mohammad Afif, the message craftsman

Mohammad Afif was among Hezbollah’s leading media strategists, overseeing media relations and shaping political messaging over many years, and maintaining close ties to the group’s leadership.

His role became particularly prominent after the killing of Hezbollah leaders in 2024, when he stepped in to fill a sensitive media vacuum.

Some commentators likened him to former Iraqi Information Minister Mohammed Saeed al-Sahhaf, arguing that he projected “illusory heroics” and that his messaging diverged from reality.

Researchers say Afif held media responsibilities within Hezbollah for more than 30 years, served as a media adviser to Hassan Nasrallah, built extensive ties with Lebanese and Arab journalists, helped develop the group’s media operations, and at one stage managed Al Manar television.

His assassination, they said, marked a significant escalation in Israeli efforts to pressure the resistance in Lebanon.

Afif was killed on Nov. 17, 2024, in an Israeli strike on a building in Beirut’s Ras al Nabaa district, one of several attacks targeting Hezbollah’s media infrastructure.

Abu Hamza, Saraya’s masked spokesman

Abu Hamza was one of the most prominent media figures among Palestinian factions, serving as the military spokesman for Saraya al-Quds since 2014.

He adopted a direct, tightly focused rhetoric linking military operations to psychological impact, particularly in relation to the issue of prisoners.

His real name, Naji Maher Abu Saif, was revealed only after his death, following years in which he was known simply as “the masked man” to protect his identity.

He was killed on March 18, 2025, in an Israeli airstrike targeting his home in central Gaza, which also killed several members of his family.ch


Lebanon: 350 Hezbollah Members Killed Since Start of New Round of War

Mourners chant slogans as they carry the coffin of Ali Ahmad Mousawi, who was killed early Wednesday by an Israeli strike, during his funeral procession in Nabi Sheet village, in Lebanon's eastern Bekaa Valley, Wednesday, Aug. 21, 2024.   (AP Photo/Bilal Hussein)
Mourners chant slogans as they carry the coffin of Ali Ahmad Mousawi, who was killed early Wednesday by an Israeli strike, during his funeral procession in Nabi Sheet village, in Lebanon's eastern Bekaa Valley, Wednesday, Aug. 21, 2024. (AP Photo/Bilal Hussein)
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Lebanon: 350 Hezbollah Members Killed Since Start of New Round of War

Mourners chant slogans as they carry the coffin of Ali Ahmad Mousawi, who was killed early Wednesday by an Israeli strike, during his funeral procession in Nabi Sheet village, in Lebanon's eastern Bekaa Valley, Wednesday, Aug. 21, 2024.   (AP Photo/Bilal Hussein)
Mourners chant slogans as they carry the coffin of Ali Ahmad Mousawi, who was killed early Wednesday by an Israeli strike, during his funeral procession in Nabi Sheet village, in Lebanon's eastern Bekaa Valley, Wednesday, Aug. 21, 2024. (AP Photo/Bilal Hussein)

The war between Hezbollah and Israel has seen a shift in media handling, particularly regarding announcements of casualties. After initially adopting, at the start of the 2024 war, a policy of near-daily announcements, the group later gradually reduced such statements before halting them altogether. This approach continues in the current fighting, with obituary notices largely absent or confined to a limited local scope in the villages and towns from which the members originate, for security, psychological and political reasons.

From public obituaries to limited disclosure

In the first weeks of the 2024 war, Hezbollah issued successive statements naming those killed, publishing their photos and hometowns, alongside public funeral ceremonies. This approach later receded, with fewer statements issued before they nearly stopped entirely by late September 2024, when the announced toll stood at 450.

By the end of the war in November 2024, estimates put the death toll at about 4,000, including those killed in what is referred to as the “pager operation,” according to estimates rather than official figures from Hezbollah.

On Thursday, Israeli military spokesman Avichay Adraee said on X that forces from the 36th Division and the air force had “eliminated more than 20 Hezbollah members within 24 hours in southern Lebanon.”

350 members killed since start of war

Researcher Mohammad Chamseddine, from the International Information organization, told Asharq Al-Awsat the number of Hezbollah members killed so far was estimated at around 350, out of 1,001 deaths announced by Lebanon’s health ministry.

He said most were killed in the “Nabi Sheet landing” on March 7 and in clashes along the border, particularly in Khiam, where 53 members were killed. The estimates are based on the number of bodies transferred to hospitals across regions, excluding a very small number buried immediately, he added.

He said the majority of those killed were civilians or supporters rather than members, amid Israeli strikes targeting areas close to the group, while it has adopted strict measures to protect its members. Since September 2024, Hezbollah’s announcements have been limited to “senior figures,” as part of a policy aimed at reducing the impact on its support base as the toll rises.

Reducing security exposure

Retired brigadier general and military expert Hassan Jouni said Hezbollah’s decision not to announce the deaths of its members during the war was due to overlapping factors.

“The first is morale. Daily announcements, with rising casualties, have a negative impact on the support base and reflect losses that may be interpreted as an indicator of the enemy’s superiority,” he told Asharq Al-Awsat.

He also cited security considerations, saying such statements could reveal sensitive information about identities, family ties and places of residence that could be exploited using modern technology to identify and target specific communities.

“Missing without a trace”

Jouni also pointed to those classified as “missing without a trace,” whose fate remains unknown and whose deaths are not announced due to the uncertainty surrounding their status.

He said the nature and intensity of the fighting, along with Hezbollah’s decentralized structure, made it difficult to determine the fate of some individuals. Loss of contact does not necessarily indicate death, as individuals may still be alive or captured, he said, requiring caution before any official announcement.

After a ceasefire took effect on Nov. 27, 2024, estimates indicated around 1,500 individuals were classified by Hezbollah as of “unknown fate,” with families informed of lost contact. This was followed by the recovery of bodies and DNA testing to confirm identities before announcements were made.

Most bodies were returned and buried, while some families were informed their relatives remained “missing without a trace,” meaning no remains had been found or recovery was unlikely due to destruction caused by strikes on homes and villages. Their number is estimated at about 45.