There are still remaining reactions and questions among Syrians on the prolonged meeting that was held between the International Crisis Group (ICG) and Abu Mohammad al-Julani, commander-in-chief of Tahrir al-Sham (formerly Al-Nusra Front). The ICG had recently published the proceedings of the meeting and it seemed as if Julani was critically reviewing some of his organization’s practices while clarifying others. This was taking place while the Syrian regime and its allies were achieving substantial advances in Idlib and Aleppo countryside.
There are some who believe that the purpose behind Julani’s media appearance, in terms of time and content, is an address to the exterior to exhibit some moderation and good intention. They think that perhaps it is an attempt to lessen the reasons behind Nusra being classified as a terrorist organization by the international community and Western governments that have no interest in a war in Idlib or overcoming the regime, to reduce the sanctions against it and weaken the anti-terrorism banner that the regime gets legitimacy to escalate its military operations. This could be to meet Erdogan’s wish, who is attempting to use Julani’s flexibility in order to justify his direct military intervention in Syria and to justify his running away from dismantling Nusra as long as it remains useful for him to improve the position of the Ankara government in Syria and at the regional level. Perhaps he is using it as a message get along with and reassure international aid organizations that Julani fought and eliminated in the areas under his control or push them to freeze their activities or reduce them to a minimum, expressing his wish to reconcile with them and facilitate the work of any international organization that wishes to return to Idlib, including stopping Tahrir al-Sham from taking over any aid provided for those in need.
In all cases, it is not so far fetched considering al-Julani’s pragmatism and maneuvering. He has changed his skin for the same reason before when he publicized that he refused to annex his organization to al-Qaeda in 2013 in order for it to remain local with local agendas and so that Syria does not become an arena for foreign fights against regional and international parties against al-Qaeda. He also did so a second time when he suddenly announced that he is cutting ties with al-Qaeda in 2016 and forming a new group named Fateh al-Sham Front, in an attempt to use the new name to get rid of the terrorism stigma, and a hird time when he fought ISIS in order to show that he is different and that he rejects ISIS’s approach, then annexing armed Islamic groups that are considered moderate and changing his group’s name in 2017 to Tahrir al-Sham so that it receives understanding and acceptance.
On the other hand, there are some who find that Julani’s media appearance is directed towards the Syrian interior, as a confession of the mistakes that he had committed under the pressure of war and that he wanted to make up for them. In this regard, he criticized some of his military ventures that ended by force the presence of other armed Islamic groups that disagreed with Nusra and then explicitly called for dialogue with the opposition on the basis that his group cannot rule Idlib on its own. This made it seem that these stances hit two birds with one stone: First, joining the forces of his organization after it became clear that his supporters were complaining of his stances on peace and his unexplained defeatist positions, especially that most of his militants were Syrian and the majority of them joined his ranks in order to provide material and military support that allowed continued fight against the regime. Second, in order to appeal to the opposition factions that still rely on Islamic groups and their military role in change. Third, in order to restore the status of the group that has become subject of popular ridicule after having made claims about its unique capability in fighting the regime and then incurring incredible losses, making it subject to accusations of treason after unjustified military withdrawals from some areas that the regime controls, and worse, stopping other armed opposition factions from reaching the battlefronts and confiscating their weapons.
Julani said what he thought would be in his favor, but what about his killing of elite activists, journalists, and opposition civilians and ending their existence and role in areas under his control? What about the violent ways he responded with to the protests against him in Morek, Saraqib, and Maarat al-Numan before the regime took over?
What could he possibly say about the repressive and terrorist role of his group against people in areas under his control or the communal graves that were discovered and Nusra confessed to committing on the grounds that they were pro-regime people, atheists, or had confessed crimes of bombing civilians or opposition headquarters? What can be said about their targeting of Alawite, Druze, Christian, and Shiite civil committees and killing them on a sectarian basis? Most prominently, when Nusra confessed to killing tens of Shiite and Druze villagers in Idlib countryside in order to terrorize minorities and push them to escape and become displaced? Finally, what can he say about his aggression against the Kurds and turning his Front into a cheap instrument in the hands of Erdogan to use as he pleases?
If some opposed in principle using religion for politics and rejects all groups that have ambitions of religious rule and a Khilafah, and if others demanded that one distinguishes between different religious-political groups who may have some national interests that are in the interest of Syrians and want to participate in the building of a democratic state of freedom, justice, and equality, then the majority today agree on warning against the dangers of allowing Julani’s media appearance to just pass and to expose him and not to co-exist with such Islamist groups that have and still stand against the rights of Syrians to freedom and dignity and live off a nurturing environment characterized by sectarian strife in the region and prioritizes violence over tangible politics.
Finally, after bitter years of Nusra’s saboteur role and its supporters in mutilating the Syrian revolution and undermining their resources, assets, and demands, and enabling their enemies, nobody will disagree that there is nothing that Julani or his group have to say to the Syrian people!
