Before consociational democracy’s degeneration in Lebanon, there was a convention almost tantamount to a law: religious sects do not come together under one leadership. In the fifties, for example, Hamid Frangieh stood, as his brother Suleiman did after him, against Camille Chamoun, whom most of the other Christians gathered around. Sami Solh also stood against the Sunni consensus to oppose Chamoun. Neither was Frangieh considered a nobody by his sect, nor was Solh.
This was a manifestation of a broader state of affairs. Shiite leadership was divided between a southern leader and another from the Bekaa, and each of them had competitors in his region. Similarly, Druze leadership was split between Jumblatt and Arslan, and the leaders of the Eastern Orthodox (Roum) community were scattered between Ashrafieh, North Metn, and Koura.
This situation made it possible for the state to rise and to have relative independence from the sects, allowing it to manage the game they played amongst themselves. Emile Lahoud's ascension to presidency in 1998 put an end to this equation, though the coup against it had begun before that. What had been required at the time was a constitutional cover for the actual decision-makers, who were the figures of Syria's hegemony. Thus, appointing someone weak who would not be affected in the least by any community’s sentiments became the most suitable course of action.
Lahoud was the most suitable: he did not represent anyone. He became the commander of the army in 1989, when settling the score with Michelle Aoun on Hafez Assad's behalf had been the order of the day. He was appointed based on the fact that he had been commander of the Lebanese Navy. That day, newspapers published a picture or two of a few boats that were promoted as the Lebanese Armada; the Lebanese Nelson, then, awaited us.
Since attributing some qualities to him was unavoidable, Lahoud was made out to be a famous swimmer, diver, and athlete who never stopped running; he was always in a t-shirt, even when it was freezing cold. The occasions on which he spoke reduced his already poor standing, adding nothing but phrases that contradicted with one another or phrases that were inherently contradictory themselves.
Renewing this president's term was the order of the day in 2004. Why? Because he was the only Maronite who was not concerned with the developments in the region subsequent to the Iraq War in 2003. His defenders said: He is the man to confront the conspiracy. The overwhelming majority of the Lebanese responded: his appointment itself is the conspiracy.
The Lahoud scenario was repeated a few months ago with the appointment of the current Prime Minister Hassan Diab. There are two differences between them: the first lacked any Maronite support, the second lacks any Sunni support. Neither is Lahoud a Hamid Franjieh nor is Diab a Sami Solh; but even Lahoud, because of his family's political history, possessed something that the rising figure does not.
Hezbollah and the Aounists wanted to appoint a prime minister during a period of difficult and awkward circumstances, and they found him ready. His history and heritage were conjured up: He was Minister of Education (2011-2014) and he is the "Vice President of the American University of Beirut." Graduate degrees, journal publications, participation in international conferences, and his founding of new colleges were highlighted, giving him a CV full of hot air.
A plethora of social media posts and a few newspaper articles were published to correct the depiction of him. Many of the students whom he had taught wrote things about him that do not “demonstrate veneration”. Employees in the Ministry of Education described him as his students had. The major action taken by the ministry during his tenure was the publication of that expensive two volumes book, which dealt with his inflated ego and "accomplishments". He described himself as "one of the rare technocrat ministers appointed since Lebanon's independence." He also changed the name of a school to his mother's name.
His title of “Vice President” of the American University conceals the reality of the job. He was indeed a Vice President, but for ''Regional and external Programs.'' This vague term refers to nothing more than being tasked with particular responsibilities by the university president. At one point, there were seven vice presidents of the American University of Beirut.
In any case, some news reports refer to Diab’s recent request that the AUB pay him "his dues" and transfer them abroad! Sources at the university were cited as being surprised at his request to have dues paid for services that he had not provided; for the prime minister requested the wages of years during which he had not been working his position, on what is called a sabbatical, meaning that he could return to his teaching position in a year.
The few and general opinions Diab expresses are of little significance. For example, he says: “I am certain that the solution to most of our economic, unemployment, social, financial and even political challenges, lies in education in all its forms”. Recently, he lamented the fact that "we do not have what is called a "deep state" that represents the concept of statehood". It seems that when he mentions a "deep state", he is referring to something different than the generally accepted definition of the term. Fortunately, his general opinions are few.
Hassan Diab is, after all, obedient. He reads his morbid speeches to the letter, barely even raising his head, like a student afraid of losing control, and thus deciding to freeze the expressions of his face. What is important, for the student, is that he passes. As for the professor of professors, we should be looking somewhere else
