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Josep Borrell to Asharq Al-Awsat: Regime, Not Sanctions, Responsible for Syrian People’s Suffering

EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Josep Borrell. (Reuters)
EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Josep Borrell. (Reuters)
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Josep Borrell to Asharq Al-Awsat: Regime, Not Sanctions, Responsible for Syrian People’s Suffering

EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Josep Borrell. (Reuters)
EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs Josep Borrell. (Reuters)

High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the European Commission Josep Borrell hoped that Tuesday’s donor conference on Syria will match last year’s pledge of 6 billion euros. In an extensive interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, he said the Europeans have provided some 20 billion euros to Syria since the eruption of its crisis in 2011.

“The Brussels Conference is our most effective tool to maintain the world’s attention on the need to solve this conflict and to continue mobilizing the international community around a political solution,” he said. “We will continue to do our part.”

“As in previous Brussels Conferences on Syria, we have invited neither the regime nor the opposition. This might be reconsidered only and once a political process is firmly under way, including free elections as foreseen under UN Security Council resolution 2254,” he added.

“During all these years, our vital support has reached the Syrian people. The Syrian regime bears responsibility for the humanitarian, economic and healthcare crises in Syria. Not sanctions,” Borrell stated.

What do you expect of the donor conference in Brussels on June 30? How does this one differ from the previous ones?

Syria entered its tenth year of war. In the past nine years, half of the Syrian population had to flee their homes. Over half a million people died. An entire generation of Syrian children has only known war. They all deserve a better, peaceful future. The Brussels Conference is our most effective tool to maintain the world’s attention on the need to solve this conflict and to continue mobilizing the international community around a political solution as called for in UN Security Council resolution 2254. This is the only way to bring back lasting peace and stability for Syrians.

The Conference will be 2020’s main pledging event for Syria and the region, addressing the critical needs generated by the crisis, but it goes way beyond a donor conference. It is about continuing to support, politically and financially, Syria's neighbors and their people, who have shown extraordinary solidarity towards Syrian refugees. It has also grown into a unique opportunity for Syria’s civil society to engage in direct dialogue with the donor community and refugee-hosting countries. We could not gather people physically this year but we built a week of events where Syria’s youth, women and civil society organizations could interact with the international community. This is crucial, not only because they are the voices of the Syrian people but also because they hold the key to a better future for Syria.

A few factors raise the stakes for this year’s Conference. The grave deterioration of the economic and humanitarian situation, the recent military offensive from the part of the regime and its supporters, the destruction of civilian infrastructure, as well as the ongoing coronavirus crisis all further exacerbate already dire living conditions of the Syrians. They have had enough. Together with the United Nations, who play a crucial and leading role, we are sparing no efforts to remain at their side and live up to their hope for a brighter and peaceful future.

Last year’s conference provided aid worth 6.2 billion euros. Do you think that you would get the same pledges this year? Would you be able to respond to the United Nations appeal for humanitarian aid?

It is impossible to give a figure of likely pledging ahead of this year’s Conference. Amounts also vary from year to year, depending on donors’ approaches. We remain as ambitious as we are every year in support of the Syrian people and their host communities in neighboring countries. We are all working together, not least with our co-chair the United Nations, to ensure that Syrians across the whole of Syria, as well as refugees in Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey, can continue receiving the support and protection of the international community over the coming year. That is the least they should expect and the least we can do.

As the European Union, we have provided over 20 billion euros since the beginning of the crisis in humanitarian, stabilization, development and economic assistance. We are the biggest donor for Syrian people. Two thirds of all the money spent to help Syrians and Syria’s neighbors came from the EU and its member states. And we will continue to do our part.

On top of the unprecedented humanitarian and economic crisis and all the suffering they have been going through, Syrians are now also enduring the consequences of the coronavirus pandemic. This year’s Conference will also address this issue. As EU, we have been adapting our current assistance in response to this new and additional challenge, working hard to ensure that life-saving equipment reaches those in need in Syria.

Why was the Syrian government not invited to the Brussels conference?

As in previous Brussels Conferences on Syria, we have invited neither the regime nor the opposition. This might be reconsidered only and once a political process is firmly under way, including free elections as foreseen under UN Security Council resolution 2254.

The resolution clearly states that “the Syrian people will decide the future of Syria”. This is not just nice words for the EU, it is our compass. Nobody should hold their future hostage. This is why we are ensuring a meaningful input and a very large involvement of Syria’s civil society, with extensive online consultations held ahead of the Conference in Syria and in the region. Days of Dialogue also took place virtually on 22 and 23 June, consisting of discussions between civil society, ministers and senior decision-makers from refugee-hosting countries, the EU, the United Nations and other international partners. These contributions will feed in the Ministerial meeting of the Conference on 30 June. Syria’s civil society, its aid workers, its women and youth organizations are the future of the country.

How would you explain Russia's participation in the conference despite its criticism of not inviting the Syrian government?

As in previous years, all those members of the international community with influence in the conflict in Syria and that have expressed a will to support diplomatic efforts, in accordance with UN Security Council relevant resolutions, have been invited. In this regard, the EU welcomes the participation of the Russian Federation.

The conference comes after the European Union renewed economic sanctions against Damascus and the start of implementing the US Caesar Act. Does it have any effect on Brussels conference?

One of the key objectives of the Conference is for the international community to come together behind the UN-facilitated and Syrian-led political process. International pressure on Damascus to fully and genuinely participate in negotiations in the framework of UN Security Council resolution 2254, which is also done through sanctions, is of course part of this effort.

Moscow and Damascus say that these sanctions will harm the flow of the humanitarian and medical aid. What’s your reply?

EU sanctions are neither new nor aimed at the civilian population. They target individuals and entities that have been supporting the repression and the regime, financing them or benefitting from the war economy. They are designed not to impede the delivery of humanitarian and medical assistance, including crucial support in the current situation of the coronavirus pandemic. They do not prohibit the export of food, medicines or medical equipment. Even for potentially dangerous dual-use goods, for example chemicals also needed for pharmaceutical use, a number of exceptions are foreseen for humanitarian purposes.

The EU has been and remains the largest humanitarian donor to the Syria crisis with over 20 billion euros mobilized since 2011. During all these years, our vital support has reached the Syrian people.

The Syrian regime bears responsibility for the humanitarian, economic and healthcare crises in Syria. Not sanctions. On the contrary, it is mostly thanks to international assistance that healthcare, food, education or protection can still be delivered to people in need inside Syria. I could also add that trade has also continued throughout the war between the EU and Syria. We have never placed Syria under any kind of embargo.

What are the conditions that the European Union can lift the sanctions against Damascus?

EU sanctions concerning Syria have been in place since 9 May 2011 in response to the Syrian regime’s violent repression against its own people, including human rights violations, the use of live ammunition against peaceful protesters and the proliferation and use of chemical weapons. These were not imposed lightly. They are the consequence of grave human rights violations and potential war crimes and crimes against humanity, which must be accounted for.

Our list now includes 273 individuals and 70 entities. The goal of these measures is to put pressure on the Syrian regime to halt repression and negotiate a lasting political settlement of the Syrian crisis in line with UN Security Council resolution 2254, under UN auspices. Without a change of behavior and a constructive and genuine commitment to the political process, sanctions will remain. They are part and parcel of the EU’s wider approach to the Syria crisis. We also review them constantly to assess, inter alia, effects and developments on the ground.

EU has linked any contribution to the reconstruction of Syria with the success of the political process in Syria. What is your position on the reconstruction of Syria now?

The EU has been very clear on this. Europeans are willing to support the future of the Syria population and help them reconstruct their country but there are parameters for the EU's engagement. The EU will only participate in Syria's reconstruction when a genuine political transition in line with UN Security Council resolution 2254 is firmly underway. If this is not the case, all efforts will be in vain. Reconstruction requires minimal conditions in terms of stability, governance, public accountability, and representativeness of the governing authorities. Syria currently fulfils none of these criteria.

The EU’s reconstruction support cannot be invested in a context that would exacerbate pre-war inequalities and grievances and would not lead to reconciliation and peace building. The focus of reconstruction is not simply to rebuild infrastructure and housing – it is about restoring Syria’s social fabric, rebuilding trust and creating conditions that will mitigate or prevent the recurrence of violence, as well as responding to the grievances that sparked the conflict. Syrians deserve to live in a country where they all feel safe and protected by an impartial judiciary and by the rule of law and where human dignity is ensured.

The Brussels conference is co-chaired by the United Nations. What is your position on the efforts of the UN Envoy to Syria Geir Pedersen?

Our position remains that only a political solution achieved in the framework of UN-brokered Geneva negotiations can guarantee a peaceful future for Syria. We fully support the work of the United Nations and of UN Special Envoy Geir Pedersen. The Brussels Conferences aim at rallying the international community behind the UN efforts to advance a political solution.

The Conference will also back the calls by UN Secretary-General António Guterres and Special Envoy Pedersen towards a nationwide ceasefire and the release of detainees, especially in light of the coronavirus pandemic.

Russia announced its willingness to negotiate with America to reach a political solution in Syria. What is your position on the American-Russian dialogue on Syria?

Any progress towards the political resolution of the Syria conflict is to be welcomed. We insist that there should be no compromise on certain principles. Both Russia and the US support UN Security Council resolution 2254 and any solution to the Syria conflict must be in line with that resolution. For us in the EU, there can be no normalization of relations with the Syrian regime, and by extension no commitment of international funding for reconstruction, until there is real engagement in a genuine, comprehensive and inclusive political process. Also, the return of refugees to Syria could only be supported by the international community only under the condition that they would be guaranteed to be safe, voluntary and dignified.

Do you think a US- Russia deal, will be enough? How does it look like for you?

Again, the future of Syria is for the Syrians to decide. This is what UN Security Council resolution 2254 says. The political negotiations on Syria's future must be Syrian-owned and Syrian-led. Both the US and Russia, as permanent members of the Security Council, have committed to support the genuine, comprehensive and inclusive political process set out in UN Security Council resolution 2254.

Currently, Syria has three spheres of influence: North East of Syria, North west, and the rest of the country. Does the European Union have the same vision for these zones?

The European Union will not waver in its commitment to the full sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of Syria. Precise governance arrangements within Syria are a matter for the Syrians to decide.

In 2021 there will be presidential election in Syria. How do you see that? How do you see Syria in one year from now?

Meaningful elections in Syria will be those held on the basis of a new Syrian Constitution, as foreseen in UN Security Council resolution 2254. They will mark the opening of a new chapter for the country and for its people.

If other elections are held before that, I encourage the Syrian regime to demonstrate its commitment to genuine political openness, for instance by making sure they are open to all Syrians, including those abroad, and that they are free and fair. However, in no way will this replace the need for real engagement in a political process and for the full implementation of UN Security Council resolution 2254.

How Syria will look a year from now will depend on the commitment of the regime to the implementation of that resolution as the only internationally accepted way forward. Not for our benefit, not for theirs or their supporters’, but for the benefit of all Syrians.

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Interviews

Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: I Left Saddam Meeting Sensing he Misread Threat

There were exceptional communication channels between Saddam Hussein and King Hussein (AFP)
There were exceptional communication channels between Saddam Hussein and King Hussein (AFP)
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Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: I Left Saddam Meeting Sensing he Misread Threat

There were exceptional communication channels between Saddam Hussein and King Hussein (AFP)
There were exceptional communication channels between Saddam Hussein and King Hussein (AFP)

In the final part of his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, former Jordanian prime minister Ahmad Obeidat, who died earlier this month, recounted in detail his meetings with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and Syrian President Hafez al-Assad, and disclosed an alleged attempt by Rifaat al-Assad to assassinate former Jordanian prime minister Mudar Badran.

Obeidat began with his impression of Saddam following a 2001 meeting in Baghdad. He said he left convinced that the Iraqi leader “did not accurately understand the reality of the international situation, the trap that had been set for Iraq, nor the magnitude of the danger surrounding the country and what was coming.”

He also described how strong ties between the late King Hussein of Jordan and Assad deteriorated as the Iran-Iraq war intensified. “Exceptional channels of communication” opened between King Hussein and Saddam Hussein, he said, and those channels “thwarted Assad’s efforts to build an axis against Iraq.”

Obeidat further revealed that Rifaat al-Assad “sent a group to assassinate Mudar Badran” on the pretext that Jordan was harboring the Muslim Brotherhood and hosting training camps. “All of that was false,” he said, adding that the attempt was foiled and those involved were arrested.

Turning to the file of the Palestinian militant Abu Nidal, who split from Fatah, Obeidat recalled how Abu Iyad once “protected him from arrest,” before “the tables were turned,” in a reference to Abu Iyad later becoming one of Abu Nidal’s victims.

Asked about his history with Abu Nidal, Obeidat described him as “not an easy adversary.” Abu Nidal attacked Jordanian embassies and diplomats, he said, and was responsible for killing two or three ambassadors. He was also behind the assassination of the son of former prime minister Saeed al-Mufti, a diplomat at the Jordanian embassy in Bucharest, and wounded two ambassadors in separate operations.

When Obeidat served as prime minister in 1983-1984, Abu Nidal assassinated Fahd al-Qawasmi, the mayor of Hebron, during a visit to Amman.

Abu Nidal, Obeidat said, worked at different times for Syrian, Iraqi and Libyan intelligence services. “He was ready to work for the benefit of any intelligence service in any country and allowed them to control him,” he said. Syrian, Iraqi and Libyan intelligence used him more than once, and the Iraqis deployed him against Fatah in an effort to create splits and internal problems.

Abu Iyad had shielded Abu Nidal from detention when Fatah sought to arrest him, Obeidat said. “But in the end the tables were turned,” and Abu Iyad became one of his victims. It was said, he added, that Abu Iyad came to believe that Abu Nidal had begun working for “Zionist intelligence.”

As for Jordan’s response when its diplomats were targeted, Obeidat said that at the time he was prime minister and did not follow the security file closely due to the pressures of government. He was aware, however, that contacts were made to reach a deal to halt Abu Nidal’s operations in Jordan. “Their operations did indeed stop,” he said.

On coordination with major powers, Obeidat said Jordan cooperated with “any party that possessed information of interest to us,” except the Zionists. Relations with Syrian intelligence fluctuated between competition and brief periods of cooperation, after earlier periods of no contact.

He then recounted his 1979 meeting with Hafez al-Assad over accusations that Jordan was training members of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. Acting on instructions from King Hussein, Obeidat, then intelligence chief, and Prime Minister Mudar Badran met Assad to address the issue.

“We made clear to Hafez al-Assad that it was impossible for us to have camps training the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood,” he said. Jordan informed Assad that such camps were in Iraq and that Syrians were traveling via Jordan to Iraq using forged passports. Without lists of those names from Damascus, Jordan could not act.

“This is a Syrian problem, not a Jordanian one,” Obeidat said he told Assad. Jordan would not allow armed activity on its soil but needed Syrian intelligence cooperation and names to intervene effectively.

He acknowledged that tensions were aggravated when Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood leader, Mohammed Abdul Rahman Khalifeh, brought Syrian cleric Saeed Hawwa to meet King Hussein without informing the royal court or intelligence services. The move surprised the palace and embarrassed the intelligence service.

After investigating, Jordan discovered that a group of Syrians had entered the country, most intending to travel onward to Iraq. To prevent escalation with Damascus, Jordan asked them to leave, allowing limited humanitarian cases time to arrange residence elsewhere.

Obeidat described Assad as “a good listener” who did not comment during their meeting but later instructed Syrian intelligence to cooperate with Jordan. His dealings with Syrian intelligence chief Ali Duba were limited but manageable.

He dismissed suggestions that Ahmed Jibril was behind operations against Jordan, saying the more serious problem involved Rifaat al-Assad. Rifaat’s alleged plot to assassinate Badran was uncovered, with suspects arrested at the border and in an apartment in Amman’s Sweileh district. They possessed weapons and explosives and were tried before Jordan’s State Security Court.

In an earlier incident, Obeidat said, members of Rifaat’s force assassinated a Syrian political refugee in Amman.

Asked about challenges upon assuming the premiership, Obeidat cited financial strain. Arab and Gulf aid declined to near zero, while Jordanian workers returned from the Gulf after losing their jobs, placing heavy pressure on living conditions.

Security challenges included Abu Nidal’s activities. At the same time, relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization improved. King Hussein allowed the Palestinian National Council to convene in Amman in 1984, triggering a political crisis with Syria.

Several attempted attacks targeting Jordan and council members were foiled, Obeidat said. Syria exerted pressure to prevent attendance, but Jordan ensured the session’s success. Supporting the PLO after its recognition as the legitimate representative of the Palestinians became, in his words, a Jordanian necessity to prevent a political vacuum.

Obeidat described a later meeting with Yasser Arafat as cordial after earlier strained ties, and said he also met Abu Iyad at the royal court during the council’s session. He met George Habash later in Beirut, outside office.

He then revisited the 1968 Battle of Karameh. Fighters from Fatah “stood firm and fought bravely,” he said, though many were killed. Some trainees were left without weapons or guidance despite warnings that battle was imminent, leading to heavy casualties.

King Hussein, he said, “was very resolute” during the battle.

On his relationship with the monarch, Obeidat said King Hussein “respected those who respected themselves.” Their relationship cooled after the 1994 Wadi Araba peace treaty, which Obeidat opposed.

Jordanian intelligence, he stressed, did not conduct operations in Beirut in response to the assassination of Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tal, though he noted military intelligence operated separately.

Obeidat listed foreign leaders he met as prime minister, including Assad, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and Saddam Hussein. Meetings with Britain’s queen, Austria’s president and Spain’s king were protocol visits.

He described relations between King Hussein and Assad as once “good, frank and continuous,” with almost weekly contact, before shifting during the Iran-Iraq war as close ties formed between King Hussein and Saddam.

Recalling his 2001 Baghdad visit, Obeidat said Saddam spoke at length about sanctions and support for Palestinians. He reproached Jordan over its peace treaty and alluded to Hussein Kamel’s defection. Obeidat insisted Jordan had no role in that defection or in his return.

When Iraqi officials called for cutting oil supplies to Jordan, Obeidat told Saddam that such a move would effectively besiege the Jordanian people. Saddam responded, “I will never abandon the Jordanian people under any circumstances.”

In Obeidat’s final reflection, the meeting left a lasting impression. From Saddam’s remarks that day, he said, he concluded that the Iraqi leader did not fully comprehend the scale of the international threat facing his country, a judgment he carried with him long after the encounter.

Interviews

Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Gaddafi Tried to Assassinate King Hussein with Missile Given to Wadie Haddad

King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).
King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).
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Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Gaddafi Tried to Assassinate King Hussein with Missile Given to Wadie Haddad

King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).
King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).

In the second installment of his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, former Jordanian prime minister and intelligence chief Ahmad Obeidat recounts details of a missile plot to assassinate King Hussein, which he says was backed by Muammar Gaddafi and carried out through operatives linked to Wadie Haddad, head of the external operations arm of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

Obeidat, who also served as head of intelligence and as minister of interior and defense, revisits the confrontation between Israeli forces, the Jordanian army, and Palestinian guerrillas (fedayeen) in the border town of Karameh in March 1968, asserting that the Jordanian army “decided the battle,” but suffered a “moral defeat amid the fedayeen’s claims of victory.”

Obeidat died earlier this month. The interview was recorded before the “Al-Aqsa Flood,” whose aftermath delayed its publication. Below is the text of the second installment.
 

King Hussein inspects an Israeli tank left behind by occupying forces during the Battle of Karameh (Getty)

“Battle of Karameh”

Obeidat calls Karameh “a pivotal point of utmost importance,” especially for an army still reeling from the 1967 defeat and its withdrawal from the West Bank.

“The army lived the bitterness of that defeat,” he says. “It felt a moral, national, and pan-Arab responsibility.”

Karameh, he argues, offered a chance to restore the army’s fighting morale and reclaim some of its lost dignity.

“It was the army that settled the battle,” Obeidat says.

He credits Jordanian forces with thwarting Israeli attempts to build crossing bridges, destroying their vehicles on Jordanian soil and forcing, for the first time in Israel’s history, a request for a ceasefire. “The late King Hussein refused,” he adds.

Israel, he says, did not acknowledge a fifth of its casualties. Helicopters were evacuating the wounded who were “dripping with blood.”

He singles out artillery observation officers who advanced to the closest possible positions, relaying precise coordinates even as they effectively marked their own locations for shelling.

“The Jordanian soldier would identify his position near the Israeli army to be shelled,” he says, describing a willingness to die in order to restore dignity after the 1967 setback.

He says the declaration of “armed struggle” effectively erased the army’s role, presenting Palestinian fedayeen as the victors over Israel. “They monopolized the victory and ignored the army’s role entirely,” Obeidat says. “We emerged with a moral defeat in the face of their claims.”

He alleges that hundreds of millions of dollars in donations collected afterward, much of it going to Fatah, did not reach the Palestinian people but went to organizations and their leaders.

When the army entered Amman in September 1970, Obeidat says, it aimed to end what he describes as chaos: armed displays, roadblocks, arrests of soldiers on leave and interference in courts.

"When the army entered and began expelling the fedayeen from Amman, it swept through everything in its path. Even my own home, which I had recently rented after my abduction incident and which was close to the army’s command headquarters, was entered by the Jordanian army to search for fedayeen, while my family was inside the house at the time of the raid. My wife told them that her husband was an intelligence officer, but the Jordanian soldier replied, “Don’t lie.”

Obeidat says they did not leave the house until she contacted him, at which point he assigned one of his officers, the commander of an intelligence company, to speak with the army.

"Only then did they leave the house. The point is that the army swept areas without distinguishing between Jordanian and Palestinian; it wanted only to restore control over security. All of this forced me to send my family to my parents’ home in Irbid, in the north of the Kingdom."

He later describes what he calls a “state within a state,” extending from the Jordan Valley to Amman, after armed groups asserted authority over courts, roads, and civilian life.

On Syria’s intervention, Obeidat says Syrian forces entered northern Jordan flying Palestine Liberation Organization flags.

He later learned the decision was political, taken by the Baath Party, and that then-Defense Minister Hafez al-Assad complied reluctantly before Syrian tanks withdrew.

Iraq, he says, did not intervene. Obeidat affirms that he was told by Iraqi officials that neither the Iraqi state nor its forces intended to participate in any operation aimed at ending the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan.

According to one account, Iraqi leaders did not want to shoulder the political and diplomatic burden of the Palestinian issue or risk an uncalculated adventure.

He recounts another account, which he says he cannot adopt, according to which the operations command in the army was handled by a Pakistani figure. Under this account, Zia ul-Haq was receiving operational communications and sending messages that caused confusion among Iraqi and other forces, leading them to believe they would confront powerful strike units, prompting them to remain in a state of alert rather than engage.

He also recalls a meeting in which Palestinian figures, including Abu Iyad, reproached Iraqi President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr. Al-Bakr replied: “We are a state with one life. If we make a fundamental mistake, we end. You are like cats with seven lives.”

As director of intelligence, Obeidat says he dealt directly with operations attributed to Haddad.

Between 1975 and 1977, he says, a missile was sent to Jordan with a group led by a Jordanian, Brik al-Hadid, affiliated with the PFLP. The target was King Hussein’s aircraft.

“The intention was to strike the plane, with Gaddafi’s knowledge and approval,” Obeidat says.

Jordanian intelligence monitored the group from the outset and later arrested its members. The king’s aircraft departed Marka military airport as scheduled but flew in the opposite direction to its planned route as a precaution, using jamming devices against any incoming missiles.

When confronted by Mudar Badran, then head of the Royal Court, Gaddafi denied knowledge. “I have no information,” Obeidat quotes him as saying.

Obeidat describes the aircraft hijackings orchestrated by Haddad as “the straw that broke the camel’s back,” contributing to the army’s intervention.

He says Jordanian intelligence had infiltrated Fatah and monitored its leaders, including Abu Iyad and Abu Yusuf al-Najjar.

In mid-1972, intelligence learned that Abu Dawood and a group were planning to enter Jordan from Baghdad to seize the Jordanian cabinet during a session and hold ministers hostage in exchange for the release of detained Fatah members.

The group crossed in three Mercedes cars, dressed in traditional Arab attire, with weapons concealed inside the seats and forged passports in hand. They were arrested at the border after a thorough search.

Obeidat rejects claims by Abu Iyad that Abu Dawood was tortured, insisting that “not a single hair on his head was touched,” and says Abu Dawood confessed only after realizing the operation had been fully uncovered.

Later, King Hussein met Abu Dawood’s parents, who pleaded for clemency. The king read the full confession and then met Abu Dawood himself. He ultimately ordered his release, honoring a promise he had made to Abu Dawood’s parents.

In Obeidat’s view, Abu Dawood was affected by the king’s treatment of his parents and “did not pose any future threat to Jordan.”

Obeidat describes a direct relationship between King Hussein and the General Intelligence Department.

The king met with officers regularly, not only to hear briefings but also to hear their personal views. 

Obeidat says he would submit reports to the prime minister and also meet with the king. When addressing the king, however, it was sometimes necessary to elaborate verbally on certain issues so that such information would not circulate among staff. 

When he was asked to present a security briefing before the king, the late King Hussein would summon Crown Prince Hassan. The king’s advisers would also attend, along with senior army commanders, the public security leadership, the head of the Royal Court, and the prime minister. The briefing of the security report would include an explanation of the security situation and any external or internal challenges.

 

Interviews

Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Mystery Sniper Killed Wasfi Tal

Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Mystery Sniper Killed Wasfi Tal

Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Former Jordanian Prime Minister Ahmad Obeidat, who died earlier this month, was both a key player and a witness to sensitive chapters in his country’s history.

Obeidat began his career in the 1970s as an assistant director of intelligence, later serving as head of the General Intelligence Department until 1982. At the height of the Palestinian-Jordanian confrontation, he was abducted by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine before the events of September 1970.

He also served for two years as interior minister before King Hussein appointed him prime minister in early 1984, a post he held until April 1985, concurrently serving as defense minister.

For more than 15 years, Obeidat remained at the center of decision-making. He later took on roles drawing on his legal background, from chairing the Royal Commission that drafted the National Charter in the early 1990s to serving in human rights and judicial positions, most recently as head of the board of trustees of the National Center for Human Rights until 2008.

Weeks before Oct. 7, 2023, the day of the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation, Asharq Al-Awsat met Obeidat in Amman. The interview had been scheduled for publication in October 2023, but the major developments that followed led to its postponement, particularly as Obeidat addressed contentious issues, notably Jordanian-Palestinian relations.

In the first part of the interview, Obeidat revisits his formative years, when his political and professional journey began as a law student in Baghdad on the eve of the July 14, 1958 revolution, before returning to Iraq after the fall of the monarchy amid sweeping regional transformations.

The account moves to his early professional life in Jordan, from a brief stint in legal practice to joining the Public Security Directorate, then serving in the Political Investigations Office, which formed the nucleus of organized intelligence work. It concludes with a detailed narrative of the establishment of the General Intelligence Department in 1964, its early structure and founding members, at a time when the Jordanian state was rebuilding its institutions in an intensely turbulent region.

Asked where he was when the 1958 revolution broke out in Iraq, Obeidat said he had completed his first year in law studies and returned to Jordan for the summer break.

“While I was in Irbid, news arrived of the July 14 revolution in Iraq that overthrew the monarchy. After the summer break ended, I went back to Baghdad, where a republican government under Abdul Karim Qassem had taken power,” he recalled.

The return was not easy. “We faced difficulties on the road. The border between Jordan and Iraq was nearly closed, so we had to return via Damascus and then through desert routes to Baghdad. It was an exhausting journey,” he added.

Obeidat left Baghdad in 1961 after completing his final exams. “On the last day of exams in the fourth year, I went home, packed and returned to Jordan the same day. The border between Baghdad and Amman had reopened.”

Among his contemporaries at law school was Saddam Hussein, who studied in the evening section. Obeidat said he saw him only once by chance. “He was with others, one of whom later became a governor,” he revealed.

He returned to Baghdad again in 1983 as Jordan’s interior minister to attend a conference of Arab interior ministers, more than two decades after graduating. There, he met his Iraqi counterpart, Saadoun Shaker. “It was an ordinary relationship,” Obeidat said, describing the ties as largely ceremonial.

From customs to intelligence

After returning to Jordan in 1961, Obeidat initially considered practicing law. But limited opportunities in Irbid and his family’s financial constraints led him to seek public employment.

He was appointed to the Customs Department in Amman, where he worked for several months before joining the Public Security Directorate in April 1962 as a first lieutenant following three months of training at the police academy.

At the time, there was no separate intelligence agency. Public Security included a branch handling general investigations. Soon after, the Political Investigations Office was formed, staffed by legal officers from the army and Public Security, including Mudar Badran and Adeeb Tahaoub from military justice, alongside Obeidat and Tariq Alaaeddin from Public Security.

The office handled cases referred by security and official bodies, including military intelligence and the Royal Court. After reviewing its work, the late King Hussein ordered the establishment of a legally grounded intelligence body. The General Intelligence Law was issued in 1964, formally creating the department, explained Obeidat.

Mohammad Rasoul Al-Kilani became its first director, followed by Mudar Badran, then Nadhir Rashid. Al-Kilani briefly returned before Obeidat assumed the post, succeeded later by Tariq Alaaeddin.

The shock of 1967

Recalling the 1967 war, Obeidat described it as “a defeat, not a setback. A military, political, psychological, and social defeat in every sense.”

He said there was no institutional intelligence view on Jordan’s participation. “The political opinion of a figure of Wasfi Tal’s stature was that entering the 1967 war was a mistake. He was not in office, but he remained close to the king and influential,” said Obeidat.

According to Obeidat, King Hussein believed Israel would occupy the West Bank whether Jordan participated or not.

“Participation was a gamble that might succeed or fail. The catastrophe was discovering that the Egyptian air force had been destroyed within half an hour,” he added.

Despite the bitterness, he said: “We did not fear for the regime, but we sought to contain public anger and absorb the shock.”

September and the assassination of Wasfi Tal

Obeidat first met Yasser Arafat after the events of September 1970. He confirmed that Arafat left Amman with an official Arab delegation to attend the Cairo summit and returned immediately afterward.

He recalled being informed mid-flight of the death of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. “King Hussein was deeply affected.”

On the assassination of Prime Minister Wasfi Tal in Cairo, Obeidat said the gunmen who confronted Tal at the hotel entrance were not responsible for the fatal shot. “The fatal bullet came from behind, from a sniper in another unseen location. To this day, the sniper has not been identified,” he added.

He rejected the notion that Tal had been reckless. “Wasfi was not a gambler. He had a distinct political project,” he stressed.

Obeidat said the Black September Organization accused Tal of ordering the expulsion of fedayeen from forested areas in Jerash and Ajloun. He denied that Tal was directly responsible, saying the clashes began after fedayeen attacked a police station and killed officers, prompting a spontaneous army response.

Abduction without interrogation

Before September 1970, Obeidat was abducted by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine while serving as assistant intelligence director.

Armed vehicles stopped his car as he was leaving his home in Jabal Al-Taj with his family. He and his brother-in-law were taken to the Wehdat camp. “We were treated politely. We drank tea. No one asked me a single question,” he recalled.

After several hours, he was driven to another house in Amman and later returned home. The next morning, members of Fatah took him briefly to one of their offices, only to release him on foot without explanation.

“Not a single question was asked,” Obeidat said. “It was bewildering.”

He resumed his duties after ensuring his family’s safety. “At the time, intelligence, like any official institution, was threatened and targeted,” he said, reflecting on one of the most volatile periods in Jordan’s modern history.