Confrontation lines between the three poles of influence in Syria may witness some skirmishes, without leading to major changes.
The West is not really concerned about these “borders”; it is rather afraid of collapses, chaos, and a severe economic crisis in a divided Syria, which has no strength to wait until the end of the transitional phase in Washington and the forging of a US-Russian deal.
For the first time since the beginning of 2011, no fundamental change took place in the “borders” between the three Syrian regions… Those remained fixed in north-eastern Syria, thanks to the US-Russian-Turkish agreements that were concluded in October last year. They also remained steady despite their fragility in the northwest of the country, as a result of the understandings between Ankara and Moscow in early March. Harassments, skirmishes, reinforcements, and patrols did not lead to major breakthroughs.
There is a prevailing belief that the coming weeks may witness tests, raids, and visits to these borders. The players want to benefit from America’s preoccupation with arranging its internal home to impose a ‘fait accompli’ on Syrian soil. Damascus wants to advance from northern Hama towards southern Idlib and the Aleppo-Latakia road. Ankara wants to further intrude and extend the “Peace Spring” area east of the Euphrates. A new tradeoff might take place under Russian auspices: south of the Aleppo-Lattakia road granted for Damascus, in exchange for giving Ankara Manbij and Tal Rifaat in the countryside of Aleppo or the “Peace Spring”.
Some of this analysis is based on the conviction of Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Turkish counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, that Joe Biden will be more difficult to deal with than President Donald Trump in several arenas, including Syria.
This analysis is met with another scenario, which says that Putin and Erdogan do not want to welcome the “master of the White House” with tense squares. The signs are not reassuring and need no further complications. Therefore, there is a prevailing belief that some clashes would take place on the “contact lines”, but without developing into major confrontations.
However, this does not dispel the worries, but take them to another level. There is an American opinion that the policy of maximum pressure on Damascus - which includes the Caesar Act, political isolation, economic neglect, military presence, and Israeli raids - would ultimately push the regime to make internal political and geopolitical concessions.
Others in Europe believe that “maximum pressure” will not force Damascus into concessions, but rather lead to collapses in government-controlled areas. Some give as example chaos and assassinations taking place in southern Syria and the living crisis in Damascus.
Therefore, some observers offer a mixed recipe: to impose a balance between pressure and incentives in order to achieve the major interests of international players, namely: preventing the flow of migrants and terrorism, achieving regional stability, and addressing the roots of the Syrian political crisis and the source of international concern over chemical weapons and international law.
What does this mean? Conceiving a Western policy towards Syria that would be painful for Moscow in order to push it towards making difficult decisions. Until now, Russia has been wary of exerting maximum pressure on Damascus, fearing the “collapse of the state.”
Therefore, there is a Western call to coordinate the rhythm of pressure and isolation in a way that would change Putin’s calculations in Syria. This was expressed by European officials who discussed the Syrian file and the US elections in recent days.
If Biden achieves victory, it is believed that he will invest more in the Syrian political process, put more pressure on Turkey, negotiate deeply with Russia and Iran, and leave the American military presence east of the Euphrates in a stable state.
The bet is that Washington and Moscow engage in negotiations to forge a Syrian deal that would also include political changes and concessions over Iran’s presence. This means maintaining the political process and constitutional reform within the “Geneva track”, despite all the American and European comments on its performance. This would also mean that the US would try to hamper Russian initiatives by securing an Arab, European, and international boycott of the Syrian refugee conference scheduled in Damascus on Nov. 11-12 and exert pressure to keep Damascus in a state of political isolation.
Between the American preparedness and the Russian patience, Europe is concerned about three matters: The first is that Syria is no longer able to wait for a US-Russian deal as sudden collapses between the players might take place at any time. Second, the depth of incursion and regional interference, whether by Iran, Turkey, or Israel, can no longer be ignored; and third, Syria’s ailment is irreversible and no medicine can cure it anymore.