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Ahmadinejad: Resolving Iran, Saudi Arabia’s Issues Would Be a Lasting Favor to the Region, World

Ahmadinejad: Resolving Iran, Saudi Arabia’s Issues Would Be a Lasting Favor to the Region, World
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Ahmadinejad: Resolving Iran, Saudi Arabia’s Issues Would Be a Lasting Favor to the Region, World

Ahmadinejad: Resolving Iran, Saudi Arabia’s Issues Would Be a Lasting Favor to the Region, World

The former Iranian president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, has not left the country’s political scene. The forthcoming presidential election in 2021 along with economic frustrations over Hassan Rouhani’s administration in the past three and half years have once again attracted attention to Ahmadinejad as a possible candidate in the presidential race.

Unlike other former presidents, he has a different perspective towards the region. It is reported that Ahmadinejad was rare among Iranian officials who opposed the country’s interference in Syrian affairs from the start of protests against president Bashar Assad’s regime. It was, however, the Supreme Leader who ordered the army to act upon preventing Assad’s downfall.

In contrast to harsh rhetoric used by other Iranian top officials against countries in the region, in particular Saudi Arabia, Ahmadinejad recently sent a letter to Saudi Crown Prince, Mohammad bin Salman, asking for direct negotiations aimed at de-escalating regional tensions.

In an exclusive interview with the Independent Persian, Ahmadinejad maintains that priority should be given to détente and establishing favorable relations with Saudi Arabia devoid of foreign involvement.

Ahmadinejad’s name in Iran’s political arena has always been accompanied with controversy. It derives in part from his own different performance and attitude, and in part from his particular relationship with the media. But Iran’s former president is adamant that one changes with the passage of time.

In a live Instagram interview with Camelia Entekhabifard, Chief Editor of Independent Persian, Ahmadinejad talks about Iran’s internal and international policies, the coronavirus pandemic and presidential elections in Iran and the United States:

Camelia Entekhabifard: Mr. Ahmadinejad, along with Iran’s nuclear and missile programs, a number of analysts refer to Iran’s issues with its neighbors - in particular Saudi Arabia - as an obstacle on the way of Tehran’s normalization of its relations with the rest of the world. You have repeatedly visited Saudi Arabia and were a guest of King Abdullah at the Makkah Conference. It seemed at the time that the bilateral relationship was on the way of improvement. What are the obstacles that have prevented Iranian presidents from improving relations with Saudi Arabia over the past 41 years?

Ahmadinejad: As you said, Iran’s relations with Saudi Arabia is of utmost importance and a decisive factor in the affairs of our region. The nature of this relationship greatly influences world affairs as well. There are two issues that have adversely affected the bilateral relationship. The first is the element of rivalry. Wherever we have indulged in rivalry, we both suffered from the brunt of it. And the region has also paid for it. There is no winner in such rivalries; there are only losers. These rivalries should transform into constructive cooperation and friendly and brotherly relations. This would be to the benefit of both countries, the region and the world at large.

The other problem is other countries’ interference in the region. A considerable part of our relations is influenced by others. I think both sides should once and for all decide to transform rivalry to cooperation and friendship and not allow any other player to interfere in our bilateral relations.

We share far more than what we differ. I have visited Saudi Arabia several times, taken part in the Gulf Cooperation Council, travelled to all Gulf countries and extended my hand of friendship to all. We tried to strengthen and develop our brotherly relations, and forged cooperation with them. But mistakes on both sides turned relations cold again.

Entekhabifard: Does it mean that forging relations between Iran and the West would face obstacles until such time that the country improves its relationship with regional governments particularly Saudi Arabia? What strategy do you suggest for Iran to exit its current isolation?

Ahmadinejad: If Iran’s foreign relations are hostage to its relations with regional countries, then this would constitute interference by others in our regional affairs. We are brothers who have lived side by side for thousands of years. We should live with each other now regardless of what others think and what plans other countries have for our region.

Entekhabifard: What concerns does Iran have over its relations with its neighbors?

Ahmadinejad: There are no concerns. We should only set aside our past problems and stand shoulder to shoulder, extend our brotherly hands to each other and resolve problems.

Entekhabifard: What are your views about normalization of relations between the Arab governments of the region and Israel? Could it be due to their frustration over any improvement of relations with Iran? How do you assess recent developments in the region vis-a- vis Israel?

Ahmadinejad: There are two points here. If we intend to attach our problems to others, there would always be such problems.

The fact that these countries have established diplomatic relations with Israel is not of much importance. There were many others before them that did the same including those that have the right of veto in the United Nations Security Council that shape its main components. The problem is not resolved. The problem of Palestine is an internal issue that belongs to Palestinians. After all, it is home to people who want the right of self-rule. There are refugees, too. They want to have their own sovereign government. These problems have to be addressed. It may be that some of our neighbors say that such a step was taken with Iran in mind. This would not help in resolving the situation. We are neighbors whatever the circumstances. You cannot eliminate that or remove it from the geographical map. We have no choice but to live together as brothers and friends. As a result, I think whoever embarks on this important path will go down in history in good light.

Entekhabifard: The hot topic of the day is the US presidential election. Joe Biden – the president-elect - was vice president during the entire period of the Obama administration, had been for years chair of US Senate’s Foreign Committee, knows the region and has personal friendships with some of the Middle East’s kings and leaders. He has clearly said that one of the policies of his administration would be de-escalating tensions in the region. Perhaps we could say that Iran will find opportunities under Biden’s administration.

What advice do you have for Iranian politicians for using this opportunity in order to reduce US sanctions against the Iranian population and the improvement of bilateral relations? Is there a realistic chance for it? What are your views and your advice for Iranian officials?

Ahmadinejad: Who decides US foreign policies is a broad question. I do not think that presidents have a major role in forging such policies, or if they do, it is limited. These policies should change.

Then comes the question of neighborly relations. Nobody welcomes tensions, but expecting a foreign hand from thousands of kilometers away to alleviate the existing tensions is giving the opportunity to the very same external elements that history has shown have never intended to resolve problems. On the contrary, they have constantly attempted to intensify them.

Regardless of who resides (in the White House), we are neighbors and should resolve our differences among ourselves. Should we expect someone else to come around (to solve our problems)? That other person would most certainly act on its own interest. After all, one of the main markets for American arms is our region. What are arms and armament for? Arms are not intended for détente. To sell arms, there must be tensions. If they really seek peace, they should first, not sell arms and second, not interfere in our affairs. We resolve our differences among ourselves. We are brothers, friends, share the same culture, live in the same region and are neighbors.

Entekhabifard: What solution do you propose?

Ahmadinejad: Iran and Saudi Arabia should put their rivalries aside and not give external elements the opportunity to interfere. Whatever side takes the initiative for solving the existing problems has done the people of the region and the world great service.

Entekhabifard: So along with resolving issues regarding Iran’s nuclear and missile programs, do you believe Tehran’s foreign policy’s priority should be set on removing differences between Iran and Saudi Arabia?

Ahmadinejad: Do not attach it to international issues. We should keep friendly relations with Saudi Arabia under all circumstances. Our differences work against both countries. Neither Saudi nor Iran has benefitted from the present stand-off. If current problems with Saudi Arabia are resolved, other outstanding issues with other Gulf countries will be resolved as well.

Entekhabifard: What solution do you offer for Iran’s exit from the current US sanctions? The US presidential administration will change on January 20, but Trump has announced new sanctions against Iran in the 70 days that have remained of his presidency. What suggestions do you have for the Iranian government to ease the pressure of sanctions on the people?

Ahmadinejad:I have suggestions that I shall produce in time.

Entekhabifard: Can’t you tell us now?

Ahmadinejad: I believe it is still too soon (to reveal them).

Entekhabifard: Would Rouhani be able to revive the nuclear deal in the months left to his administration?

Ahmadinejad: You should put this to the people.

Entekhabifard: How do you see problems that Iranians are facing today? Are they the outcome of US sanctions or performance of Rouhani’s government?

Ahmadinejad: I think they move together and are part of the same package.

Entekhabifard: What shortcomings do you see on the part of the government that you believe have moved along with the sanctions?

Ahmadinejad: One unified project is being executed. There are no two separate projects.

Entekhabifard: A few months into the new US administration, Iran will have its own presidential election. Are you going to nominate yourself?

Ahmadinejad: I have so far not expressed an opinion about it.

Entekhabifard: …And you do not wish to express an opinion now?

Ahmadinejad: I have always been at the service of my country and my people.

Entekhabifard: Should you wish not to take part in the election, would you support a certain candidate?

Ahmadinejad: I have no views over it yet. I think we have more important national and international issues to consider before the election.

Entekhabifard: What issues?

Ahmadinejad: The world is moving fast and Iran with it, too. We have to be patient.

Entekhabifard: It seems that you have changed greatly in your attitude between the two presidential periods, is that right? And if so, how should it be interpreted?

Ahmadinejad: People should change. Could anybody stay the same throughout their life? People grow, the amplitude of their knowledge, understanding, depth and values change. People should grow and move towards perfection. I reserve the right for myself to move in that direction.

Entekhabifard: You wrote a letter to Saudi Crown Prince Mohammad Bin Salman and asked for a meeting in Saudi Arabia in order to resolve current differences between the two countries. Has he received the letter? Have you had any other correspondence with him? What steps have the United Nations taken in order to relay your message to the Crown Prince?

Ahmadinejad: The letters that I have written have all been published in full. My letter was about Yemen and not a meeting in Saudi Arabia, but I am still waiting to hear from them. The topic (of the letter) was Yemen. The country is in the grip of a difficult situation; people are under pressure, women and children get killed, there is no medical facility, there is poverty and the country’s infrastructure is being destroyed. In my letter to Crown Prince and Mr. Badreddin (leader of Yemen’s Houthi militias), I have invited them to reconciliation and understanding.

Entekhabifard: Have you received a particular answer?

Ahmadinejad: Some have replied and we are still waiting for others.

Entekhabifard: What are your views about the US presidential election and the current conflicts there? Do you see similarities between this election and protests following Iran’s presidential election of 2009?

Ahmadinejad: I have no opinion about the US election because it is a matter for Americans. They have to pursue the matter and the will of the people should prevail. But from watching US developments, I can tell that there are behind the scene differences within the main administration. What we see is the result of conflict within the ruling class.

Entekhabifard: What do you think of Iran’s involvement in Syria? There are 12 million Syrian refugees throughout the world and some 10 million others oppose Assad’s rule. Do you vouch for Iran’s interference in the affairs of the region or do you think that Iran could have spent its resources for its people within the country?

Ahmadinejad: I have repeatedly explained this point. You can refer to them… I fundamentally believe that nations have the right to decide their destiny, and that wherever there is a difference of opinion, it should be put to the majority decision. War and skirmishes are not a solution. They can only deepen and complicate problems further. This is the right of all peoples of the world. Whether in America, in Syria, in Iran, in Africa or Asia, the right of deciding on the destiny (of a region or a country) belongs to the people of that country and there should be no reason for war and conflict. It is true in Syria as well. I fundamentally oppose to interference.

Entekhabifard: Are you banned from traveling?

Ahmadinejad: Where to?

Entekhabifard: Out of Iran?

Ahmadinejad: No, there is no such ban. Why should there be one?

Entekhabifard: What I mean is that should you wish to travel to foreign countries, would you face any restriction or obstacles?

Ahmadinejad: No, so far I have not faced any restrictions.

Entekhabifard: How do you assess the current situation with regard to the coronavirus pandemic in Iran and Rouhani’s inability to combat the disease? Iran is among a handful countries in the world that have failed to keep the first wave of the pandemic under check. What advice do you have for the people and the government?

Ahmadinejad: It is obvious that the coronavirus was developed in a laboratory and spread in the world with political goals. I believe that those who ran the world over the past 100 years, came to the conclusion that their strategies do not work anymore. They have to make fundamental changes. One of the goals for the spread of the virus is preparing the scene for these changes. The instruction they issue in the world are vague and contradictory. Countries that follow these instructions face problems. I think the main problem in Iran is that the management of the pandemic is done according to policies issued by the World Health Organization and that is the reason for the serious problems Iran is facing in reining in the pandemic.

Entekhabifard: What advice do you have for it?

Ahmadinejad: We have scientists and experts who can speedily produce drugs to treat the coronavirus. They can also provide people and organizations with simple health guidance through which we can overcome the pandemic.

Camelia Entekhabifard is Chief Editor of the Independent Persian.

This article has been syndicated from the Independent Persian.

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Interviews

Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: I Left Saddam Meeting Sensing he Misread Threat

There were exceptional communication channels between Saddam Hussein and King Hussein (AFP)
There were exceptional communication channels between Saddam Hussein and King Hussein (AFP)
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Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: I Left Saddam Meeting Sensing he Misread Threat

There were exceptional communication channels between Saddam Hussein and King Hussein (AFP)
There were exceptional communication channels between Saddam Hussein and King Hussein (AFP)

In the final part of his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, former Jordanian prime minister Ahmad Obeidat, who died earlier this month, recounted in detail his meetings with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and Syrian President Hafez al-Assad, and disclosed an alleged attempt by Rifaat al-Assad to assassinate former Jordanian prime minister Mudar Badran.

Obeidat began with his impression of Saddam following a 2001 meeting in Baghdad. He said he left convinced that the Iraqi leader “did not accurately understand the reality of the international situation, the trap that had been set for Iraq, nor the magnitude of the danger surrounding the country and what was coming.”

He also described how strong ties between the late King Hussein of Jordan and Assad deteriorated as the Iran-Iraq war intensified. “Exceptional channels of communication” opened between King Hussein and Saddam Hussein, he said, and those channels “thwarted Assad’s efforts to build an axis against Iraq.”

Obeidat further revealed that Rifaat al-Assad “sent a group to assassinate Mudar Badran” on the pretext that Jordan was harboring the Muslim Brotherhood and hosting training camps. “All of that was false,” he said, adding that the attempt was foiled and those involved were arrested.

Turning to the file of the Palestinian militant Abu Nidal, who split from Fatah, Obeidat recalled how Abu Iyad once “protected him from arrest,” before “the tables were turned,” in a reference to Abu Iyad later becoming one of Abu Nidal’s victims.

Asked about his history with Abu Nidal, Obeidat described him as “not an easy adversary.” Abu Nidal attacked Jordanian embassies and diplomats, he said, and was responsible for killing two or three ambassadors. He was also behind the assassination of the son of former prime minister Saeed al-Mufti, a diplomat at the Jordanian embassy in Bucharest, and wounded two ambassadors in separate operations.

When Obeidat served as prime minister in 1983-1984, Abu Nidal assassinated Fahd al-Qawasmi, the mayor of Hebron, during a visit to Amman.

Abu Nidal, Obeidat said, worked at different times for Syrian, Iraqi and Libyan intelligence services. “He was ready to work for the benefit of any intelligence service in any country and allowed them to control him,” he said. Syrian, Iraqi and Libyan intelligence used him more than once, and the Iraqis deployed him against Fatah in an effort to create splits and internal problems.

Abu Iyad had shielded Abu Nidal from detention when Fatah sought to arrest him, Obeidat said. “But in the end the tables were turned,” and Abu Iyad became one of his victims. It was said, he added, that Abu Iyad came to believe that Abu Nidal had begun working for “Zionist intelligence.”

As for Jordan’s response when its diplomats were targeted, Obeidat said that at the time he was prime minister and did not follow the security file closely due to the pressures of government. He was aware, however, that contacts were made to reach a deal to halt Abu Nidal’s operations in Jordan. “Their operations did indeed stop,” he said.

On coordination with major powers, Obeidat said Jordan cooperated with “any party that possessed information of interest to us,” except the Zionists. Relations with Syrian intelligence fluctuated between competition and brief periods of cooperation, after earlier periods of no contact.

He then recounted his 1979 meeting with Hafez al-Assad over accusations that Jordan was training members of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. Acting on instructions from King Hussein, Obeidat, then intelligence chief, and Prime Minister Mudar Badran met Assad to address the issue.

“We made clear to Hafez al-Assad that it was impossible for us to have camps training the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood,” he said. Jordan informed Assad that such camps were in Iraq and that Syrians were traveling via Jordan to Iraq using forged passports. Without lists of those names from Damascus, Jordan could not act.

“This is a Syrian problem, not a Jordanian one,” Obeidat said he told Assad. Jordan would not allow armed activity on its soil but needed Syrian intelligence cooperation and names to intervene effectively.

He acknowledged that tensions were aggravated when Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood leader, Mohammed Abdul Rahman Khalifeh, brought Syrian cleric Saeed Hawwa to meet King Hussein without informing the royal court or intelligence services. The move surprised the palace and embarrassed the intelligence service.

After investigating, Jordan discovered that a group of Syrians had entered the country, most intending to travel onward to Iraq. To prevent escalation with Damascus, Jordan asked them to leave, allowing limited humanitarian cases time to arrange residence elsewhere.

Obeidat described Assad as “a good listener” who did not comment during their meeting but later instructed Syrian intelligence to cooperate with Jordan. His dealings with Syrian intelligence chief Ali Duba were limited but manageable.

He dismissed suggestions that Ahmed Jibril was behind operations against Jordan, saying the more serious problem involved Rifaat al-Assad. Rifaat’s alleged plot to assassinate Badran was uncovered, with suspects arrested at the border and in an apartment in Amman’s Sweileh district. They possessed weapons and explosives and were tried before Jordan’s State Security Court.

In an earlier incident, Obeidat said, members of Rifaat’s force assassinated a Syrian political refugee in Amman.

Asked about challenges upon assuming the premiership, Obeidat cited financial strain. Arab and Gulf aid declined to near zero, while Jordanian workers returned from the Gulf after losing their jobs, placing heavy pressure on living conditions.

Security challenges included Abu Nidal’s activities. At the same time, relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization improved. King Hussein allowed the Palestinian National Council to convene in Amman in 1984, triggering a political crisis with Syria.

Several attempted attacks targeting Jordan and council members were foiled, Obeidat said. Syria exerted pressure to prevent attendance, but Jordan ensured the session’s success. Supporting the PLO after its recognition as the legitimate representative of the Palestinians became, in his words, a Jordanian necessity to prevent a political vacuum.

Obeidat described a later meeting with Yasser Arafat as cordial after earlier strained ties, and said he also met Abu Iyad at the royal court during the council’s session. He met George Habash later in Beirut, outside office.

He then revisited the 1968 Battle of Karameh. Fighters from Fatah “stood firm and fought bravely,” he said, though many were killed. Some trainees were left without weapons or guidance despite warnings that battle was imminent, leading to heavy casualties.

King Hussein, he said, “was very resolute” during the battle.

On his relationship with the monarch, Obeidat said King Hussein “respected those who respected themselves.” Their relationship cooled after the 1994 Wadi Araba peace treaty, which Obeidat opposed.

Jordanian intelligence, he stressed, did not conduct operations in Beirut in response to the assassination of Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tal, though he noted military intelligence operated separately.

Obeidat listed foreign leaders he met as prime minister, including Assad, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and Saddam Hussein. Meetings with Britain’s queen, Austria’s president and Spain’s king were protocol visits.

He described relations between King Hussein and Assad as once “good, frank and continuous,” with almost weekly contact, before shifting during the Iran-Iraq war as close ties formed between King Hussein and Saddam.

Recalling his 2001 Baghdad visit, Obeidat said Saddam spoke at length about sanctions and support for Palestinians. He reproached Jordan over its peace treaty and alluded to Hussein Kamel’s defection. Obeidat insisted Jordan had no role in that defection or in his return.

When Iraqi officials called for cutting oil supplies to Jordan, Obeidat told Saddam that such a move would effectively besiege the Jordanian people. Saddam responded, “I will never abandon the Jordanian people under any circumstances.”

In Obeidat’s final reflection, the meeting left a lasting impression. From Saddam’s remarks that day, he said, he concluded that the Iraqi leader did not fully comprehend the scale of the international threat facing his country, a judgment he carried with him long after the encounter.

Interviews

Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Gaddafi Tried to Assassinate King Hussein with Missile Given to Wadie Haddad

King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).
King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).
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Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Gaddafi Tried to Assassinate King Hussein with Missile Given to Wadie Haddad

King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).
King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).

In the second installment of his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, former Jordanian prime minister and intelligence chief Ahmad Obeidat recounts details of a missile plot to assassinate King Hussein, which he says was backed by Muammar Gaddafi and carried out through operatives linked to Wadie Haddad, head of the external operations arm of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

Obeidat, who also served as head of intelligence and as minister of interior and defense, revisits the confrontation between Israeli forces, the Jordanian army, and Palestinian guerrillas (fedayeen) in the border town of Karameh in March 1968, asserting that the Jordanian army “decided the battle,” but suffered a “moral defeat amid the fedayeen’s claims of victory.”

Obeidat died earlier this month. The interview was recorded before the “Al-Aqsa Flood,” whose aftermath delayed its publication. Below is the text of the second installment.
 

King Hussein inspects an Israeli tank left behind by occupying forces during the Battle of Karameh (Getty)

“Battle of Karameh”

Obeidat calls Karameh “a pivotal point of utmost importance,” especially for an army still reeling from the 1967 defeat and its withdrawal from the West Bank.

“The army lived the bitterness of that defeat,” he says. “It felt a moral, national, and pan-Arab responsibility.”

Karameh, he argues, offered a chance to restore the army’s fighting morale and reclaim some of its lost dignity.

“It was the army that settled the battle,” Obeidat says.

He credits Jordanian forces with thwarting Israeli attempts to build crossing bridges, destroying their vehicles on Jordanian soil and forcing, for the first time in Israel’s history, a request for a ceasefire. “The late King Hussein refused,” he adds.

Israel, he says, did not acknowledge a fifth of its casualties. Helicopters were evacuating the wounded who were “dripping with blood.”

He singles out artillery observation officers who advanced to the closest possible positions, relaying precise coordinates even as they effectively marked their own locations for shelling.

“The Jordanian soldier would identify his position near the Israeli army to be shelled,” he says, describing a willingness to die in order to restore dignity after the 1967 setback.

He says the declaration of “armed struggle” effectively erased the army’s role, presenting Palestinian fedayeen as the victors over Israel. “They monopolized the victory and ignored the army’s role entirely,” Obeidat says. “We emerged with a moral defeat in the face of their claims.”

He alleges that hundreds of millions of dollars in donations collected afterward, much of it going to Fatah, did not reach the Palestinian people but went to organizations and their leaders.

When the army entered Amman in September 1970, Obeidat says, it aimed to end what he describes as chaos: armed displays, roadblocks, arrests of soldiers on leave and interference in courts.

"When the army entered and began expelling the fedayeen from Amman, it swept through everything in its path. Even my own home, which I had recently rented after my abduction incident and which was close to the army’s command headquarters, was entered by the Jordanian army to search for fedayeen, while my family was inside the house at the time of the raid. My wife told them that her husband was an intelligence officer, but the Jordanian soldier replied, “Don’t lie.”

Obeidat says they did not leave the house until she contacted him, at which point he assigned one of his officers, the commander of an intelligence company, to speak with the army.

"Only then did they leave the house. The point is that the army swept areas without distinguishing between Jordanian and Palestinian; it wanted only to restore control over security. All of this forced me to send my family to my parents’ home in Irbid, in the north of the Kingdom."

He later describes what he calls a “state within a state,” extending from the Jordan Valley to Amman, after armed groups asserted authority over courts, roads, and civilian life.

On Syria’s intervention, Obeidat says Syrian forces entered northern Jordan flying Palestine Liberation Organization flags.

He later learned the decision was political, taken by the Baath Party, and that then-Defense Minister Hafez al-Assad complied reluctantly before Syrian tanks withdrew.

Iraq, he says, did not intervene. Obeidat affirms that he was told by Iraqi officials that neither the Iraqi state nor its forces intended to participate in any operation aimed at ending the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan.

According to one account, Iraqi leaders did not want to shoulder the political and diplomatic burden of the Palestinian issue or risk an uncalculated adventure.

He recounts another account, which he says he cannot adopt, according to which the operations command in the army was handled by a Pakistani figure. Under this account, Zia ul-Haq was receiving operational communications and sending messages that caused confusion among Iraqi and other forces, leading them to believe they would confront powerful strike units, prompting them to remain in a state of alert rather than engage.

He also recalls a meeting in which Palestinian figures, including Abu Iyad, reproached Iraqi President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr. Al-Bakr replied: “We are a state with one life. If we make a fundamental mistake, we end. You are like cats with seven lives.”

As director of intelligence, Obeidat says he dealt directly with operations attributed to Haddad.

Between 1975 and 1977, he says, a missile was sent to Jordan with a group led by a Jordanian, Brik al-Hadid, affiliated with the PFLP. The target was King Hussein’s aircraft.

“The intention was to strike the plane, with Gaddafi’s knowledge and approval,” Obeidat says.

Jordanian intelligence monitored the group from the outset and later arrested its members. The king’s aircraft departed Marka military airport as scheduled but flew in the opposite direction to its planned route as a precaution, using jamming devices against any incoming missiles.

When confronted by Mudar Badran, then head of the Royal Court, Gaddafi denied knowledge. “I have no information,” Obeidat quotes him as saying.

Obeidat describes the aircraft hijackings orchestrated by Haddad as “the straw that broke the camel’s back,” contributing to the army’s intervention.

He says Jordanian intelligence had infiltrated Fatah and monitored its leaders, including Abu Iyad and Abu Yusuf al-Najjar.

In mid-1972, intelligence learned that Abu Dawood and a group were planning to enter Jordan from Baghdad to seize the Jordanian cabinet during a session and hold ministers hostage in exchange for the release of detained Fatah members.

The group crossed in three Mercedes cars, dressed in traditional Arab attire, with weapons concealed inside the seats and forged passports in hand. They were arrested at the border after a thorough search.

Obeidat rejects claims by Abu Iyad that Abu Dawood was tortured, insisting that “not a single hair on his head was touched,” and says Abu Dawood confessed only after realizing the operation had been fully uncovered.

Later, King Hussein met Abu Dawood’s parents, who pleaded for clemency. The king read the full confession and then met Abu Dawood himself. He ultimately ordered his release, honoring a promise he had made to Abu Dawood’s parents.

In Obeidat’s view, Abu Dawood was affected by the king’s treatment of his parents and “did not pose any future threat to Jordan.”

Obeidat describes a direct relationship between King Hussein and the General Intelligence Department.

The king met with officers regularly, not only to hear briefings but also to hear their personal views. 

Obeidat says he would submit reports to the prime minister and also meet with the king. When addressing the king, however, it was sometimes necessary to elaborate verbally on certain issues so that such information would not circulate among staff. 

When he was asked to present a security briefing before the king, the late King Hussein would summon Crown Prince Hassan. The king’s advisers would also attend, along with senior army commanders, the public security leadership, the head of the Royal Court, and the prime minister. The briefing of the security report would include an explanation of the security situation and any external or internal challenges.

 

Interviews

Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Mystery Sniper Killed Wasfi Tal

Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Mystery Sniper Killed Wasfi Tal

Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Former Jordanian Prime Minister Ahmad Obeidat, who died earlier this month, was both a key player and a witness to sensitive chapters in his country’s history.

Obeidat began his career in the 1970s as an assistant director of intelligence, later serving as head of the General Intelligence Department until 1982. At the height of the Palestinian-Jordanian confrontation, he was abducted by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine before the events of September 1970.

He also served for two years as interior minister before King Hussein appointed him prime minister in early 1984, a post he held until April 1985, concurrently serving as defense minister.

For more than 15 years, Obeidat remained at the center of decision-making. He later took on roles drawing on his legal background, from chairing the Royal Commission that drafted the National Charter in the early 1990s to serving in human rights and judicial positions, most recently as head of the board of trustees of the National Center for Human Rights until 2008.

Weeks before Oct. 7, 2023, the day of the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation, Asharq Al-Awsat met Obeidat in Amman. The interview had been scheduled for publication in October 2023, but the major developments that followed led to its postponement, particularly as Obeidat addressed contentious issues, notably Jordanian-Palestinian relations.

In the first part of the interview, Obeidat revisits his formative years, when his political and professional journey began as a law student in Baghdad on the eve of the July 14, 1958 revolution, before returning to Iraq after the fall of the monarchy amid sweeping regional transformations.

The account moves to his early professional life in Jordan, from a brief stint in legal practice to joining the Public Security Directorate, then serving in the Political Investigations Office, which formed the nucleus of organized intelligence work. It concludes with a detailed narrative of the establishment of the General Intelligence Department in 1964, its early structure and founding members, at a time when the Jordanian state was rebuilding its institutions in an intensely turbulent region.

Asked where he was when the 1958 revolution broke out in Iraq, Obeidat said he had completed his first year in law studies and returned to Jordan for the summer break.

“While I was in Irbid, news arrived of the July 14 revolution in Iraq that overthrew the monarchy. After the summer break ended, I went back to Baghdad, where a republican government under Abdul Karim Qassem had taken power,” he recalled.

The return was not easy. “We faced difficulties on the road. The border between Jordan and Iraq was nearly closed, so we had to return via Damascus and then through desert routes to Baghdad. It was an exhausting journey,” he added.

Obeidat left Baghdad in 1961 after completing his final exams. “On the last day of exams in the fourth year, I went home, packed and returned to Jordan the same day. The border between Baghdad and Amman had reopened.”

Among his contemporaries at law school was Saddam Hussein, who studied in the evening section. Obeidat said he saw him only once by chance. “He was with others, one of whom later became a governor,” he revealed.

He returned to Baghdad again in 1983 as Jordan’s interior minister to attend a conference of Arab interior ministers, more than two decades after graduating. There, he met his Iraqi counterpart, Saadoun Shaker. “It was an ordinary relationship,” Obeidat said, describing the ties as largely ceremonial.

From customs to intelligence

After returning to Jordan in 1961, Obeidat initially considered practicing law. But limited opportunities in Irbid and his family’s financial constraints led him to seek public employment.

He was appointed to the Customs Department in Amman, where he worked for several months before joining the Public Security Directorate in April 1962 as a first lieutenant following three months of training at the police academy.

At the time, there was no separate intelligence agency. Public Security included a branch handling general investigations. Soon after, the Political Investigations Office was formed, staffed by legal officers from the army and Public Security, including Mudar Badran and Adeeb Tahaoub from military justice, alongside Obeidat and Tariq Alaaeddin from Public Security.

The office handled cases referred by security and official bodies, including military intelligence and the Royal Court. After reviewing its work, the late King Hussein ordered the establishment of a legally grounded intelligence body. The General Intelligence Law was issued in 1964, formally creating the department, explained Obeidat.

Mohammad Rasoul Al-Kilani became its first director, followed by Mudar Badran, then Nadhir Rashid. Al-Kilani briefly returned before Obeidat assumed the post, succeeded later by Tariq Alaaeddin.

The shock of 1967

Recalling the 1967 war, Obeidat described it as “a defeat, not a setback. A military, political, psychological, and social defeat in every sense.”

He said there was no institutional intelligence view on Jordan’s participation. “The political opinion of a figure of Wasfi Tal’s stature was that entering the 1967 war was a mistake. He was not in office, but he remained close to the king and influential,” said Obeidat.

According to Obeidat, King Hussein believed Israel would occupy the West Bank whether Jordan participated or not.

“Participation was a gamble that might succeed or fail. The catastrophe was discovering that the Egyptian air force had been destroyed within half an hour,” he added.

Despite the bitterness, he said: “We did not fear for the regime, but we sought to contain public anger and absorb the shock.”

September and the assassination of Wasfi Tal

Obeidat first met Yasser Arafat after the events of September 1970. He confirmed that Arafat left Amman with an official Arab delegation to attend the Cairo summit and returned immediately afterward.

He recalled being informed mid-flight of the death of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. “King Hussein was deeply affected.”

On the assassination of Prime Minister Wasfi Tal in Cairo, Obeidat said the gunmen who confronted Tal at the hotel entrance were not responsible for the fatal shot. “The fatal bullet came from behind, from a sniper in another unseen location. To this day, the sniper has not been identified,” he added.

He rejected the notion that Tal had been reckless. “Wasfi was not a gambler. He had a distinct political project,” he stressed.

Obeidat said the Black September Organization accused Tal of ordering the expulsion of fedayeen from forested areas in Jerash and Ajloun. He denied that Tal was directly responsible, saying the clashes began after fedayeen attacked a police station and killed officers, prompting a spontaneous army response.

Abduction without interrogation

Before September 1970, Obeidat was abducted by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine while serving as assistant intelligence director.

Armed vehicles stopped his car as he was leaving his home in Jabal Al-Taj with his family. He and his brother-in-law were taken to the Wehdat camp. “We were treated politely. We drank tea. No one asked me a single question,” he recalled.

After several hours, he was driven to another house in Amman and later returned home. The next morning, members of Fatah took him briefly to one of their offices, only to release him on foot without explanation.

“Not a single question was asked,” Obeidat said. “It was bewildering.”

He resumed his duties after ensuring his family’s safety. “At the time, intelligence, like any official institution, was threatened and targeted,” he said, reflecting on one of the most volatile periods in Jordan’s modern history.