The “secular” and “independent” students’ victories across a few of Lebanon’s private universities are received with jubilation. It is a milestone in the repudiation of the sectarian system with its corruption and spoil-sharing, which have exacerbated in recent years. These milestones, perhaps the first of which was the Beirut Madinati campaign’s strong showing in the 2016 Beirut municipal elections, peaked with last year’s October 17 revolution.
Feeling that someone had begun to nibble at the edges of their traditional support base, whose cohesion is built on kinship solidarity, the sects’ parties did hold back in their smear campaigns against the “secularists” and “independents.” This position had already been prepared and was expected.
However, those celebrating the victories are nonetheless asked to be precise in their assessments of their accomplishments, their limitations, the possibilities they create and the challenges they present. Because averting further disappointment, compounds the need for this precision.
Firstly, longstanding, an unresolved problematic looms over secularism and the efficacy of the remedy that had been proposed for religious conflict in treating sectarian conflict, or, as is the case in other countries; conflict between ethnic groups in our societies and societies like those of the former Soviet Union or Yugoslavia. Those two countries, supposedly secular, turned out to be two engines for producing ethnic and sectarian conflicts. Not to mention other polemics our region witnessed, from Syria to Turkey, which shed light on the complexities of the secularism question: Is it to be imposed from the top, or should we await its ascension from the heart of society in a climate of freedoms? And what about its circumvention by using “civil” instead of secular where that “religious sensitivities should not be offended”?
The enchantment with the terms “secularization” and “secularism”, particularly in urban environments and among youths, does not necessarily imply solving the problems.
Secondly, achievements garnered in private universities, with their importance, might not reflect what takes place in broader society and its “political” circles. Within these parameters, the Lebanese University’s student elections might be more representative than those in private universities. The same applies to the capital’s municipal elections, whereby the parliamentary elections in the periphery are most probably more precise.
Contrary to what many believe, this disparity stems, to some extent, from the fact that educated and urban middle-class milieus are less sectarian than those of social classes that are more prevalent and thus more effective and influential as well.
Thirdly, secularism and “civil-ism” are not without a history in Lebanon. The Lebanese Communist Party was, and still is, secular. The Syrian Nationalist Party, despite its position on Jews and Judaism, was, and still is, considered secular. Before the outbreak of the war in 1975, Joseph Moghaizel, Bassem al-Jisr and others founded a secular party known as the Democratic Party, and the “Awareness Movement” was established in universities. These parties all either ceased to exist or became smaller, less effective and ended up appendages to the sects.
Fourthly, and most importantly since the goal is to remove sectarianism from the epicenter of Lebanese political life, what reinforces sectarianism more than anything else is its ties to regional conflicts and the saturated dose of ideology accompanied by arms and armament, which these ties imply. The tragedy of the secularists was precisely that some were not struck by the vigilance of armed sects and groups, nor were they taken aback by the non-armed sects and groups’ fears, whereas some joined this armament tide under nationalist, class-based or other mantras. The recurring experiences we have undergone since 1969 up to today tell us that secularization cannot succeed without limiting ideologization and neutralizing Lebanon’s engagement with regional conflicts that ricochet and ignite internal wars. Turning a blind eye to this issue is akin to destroying with a left hand what had been built with the right hand.
Today, Hezbollah is the tool of armament and the voice of ideological excess. It is, therefore, a tool for transforming society to one split into the fearful and feared, each protected by their sect and sectarianism. So, while the “parties in power” are bad enough, it is not only the worst among them but also the real hindrance to confronting the “parties in power.” This was crystal clear after the October Revolution: Hezbollah is their strongest, most ardent and stubborn protector; it is also the force behind preventing one of the largest Lebanese sects from joining the revolution. Attaining victory over the “parties in power” has thereby become all but impossible.
What has happened and is happening in Lebanese universities is undoubtedly encouraging and, of course, could be built on. However, it is advisable for those who stand behind this gain to avoid blowing things out of proportion and falling under the illusion that they can shorten a very long road, especially when the illusion of shortening this path is built on ignoring the problem. And it is the biggest one with no close second.
This might be a difficult battle, and it is so. But overlooking it does one thing; making it more difficult!
