Egypt and Jordan to Bolster Trade, Economic Cooperation

The Egyptian President and the Jordanian Prime Minister in Amman on Tuesday, January 19, 2021 (Egyptian Presidency)
The Egyptian President and the Jordanian Prime Minister in Amman on Tuesday, January 19, 2021 (Egyptian Presidency)
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Egypt and Jordan to Bolster Trade, Economic Cooperation

The Egyptian President and the Jordanian Prime Minister in Amman on Tuesday, January 19, 2021 (Egyptian Presidency)
The Egyptian President and the Jordanian Prime Minister in Amman on Tuesday, January 19, 2021 (Egyptian Presidency)

Jordan and Egypt have affirmed their efforts to bolster bilateral economic and trade cooperation within the framework of the tripartite cooperation mechanism that includes Iraq.

One day after the summit between Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El Sisi and Jordanian King Abdullah II in Amman, Sisi met on Tuesday with Jordan’s Prime Minister Bisher al-Khasawneh.

According to Presidential spokesperson Bassam Rady, Khasawneh expressed his country’s appreciation for Egypt at the official and popular levels and his pride in the extended ties between the brotherly countries.

For his part, Sisi expressed appreciation for the warm reception and praised the strong fraternal bilateral relations.

Egypt looks forward to deepening and boosting these relations in a way that contributes to achieving the interests of both countries and peoples, Sisi noted.

They reviewed the overall bilateral relations and stressed bolstering the economic aspects and increasing trade exchange to rise to the level of the political relations and historical ties that bring the kingdom and Cairo together.

The meeting also tackled cooperation between competent health and medical authorities to confront the repercussions of the coronavirus pandemic.

The President and the PM further discussed the recent regional developments in Syria, Libya, and Yemen and exchanged views on means of fighting terrorism and extremist ideologies.

They agreed on the importance of intensifying coordination and exchanging expertise and information between competent authorities to face the challenges posed by this phenomenon on regional security.



Kurdish Silence over Negotiations Paves Way for Conflict in Syria

Kurds wave the flags of the SDF and the new Syrian regime during a celebration in the city of Qamishli in northeastern Syria (AFP).
Kurds wave the flags of the SDF and the new Syrian regime during a celebration in the city of Qamishli in northeastern Syria (AFP).
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Kurdish Silence over Negotiations Paves Way for Conflict in Syria

Kurds wave the flags of the SDF and the new Syrian regime during a celebration in the city of Qamishli in northeastern Syria (AFP).
Kurds wave the flags of the SDF and the new Syrian regime during a celebration in the city of Qamishli in northeastern Syria (AFP).

The Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) are facing limited options as they grapple with increasing pressure from Türkiye and Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) to disarm and transition into a political entity.
At the same time, the SDF is dealing with tensions involving rival Kurdish factions, raising fears of a potential escalation into armed conflict. Clashes are already threatening a fragile ceasefire in northeastern Syria.
Since the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, the balance of power in Syria has shifted significantly. Today, the SDF is facing an existential threat, despite US efforts to buy time and mediate agreements between the SDF and other actors in Syria.
Interviews conducted by Asharq Al-Awsat reveal that the SDF has so far failed to establish a negotiation channel with HTS or its leader, Ahmad al-Sharaa, who now heads the transitional government in Damascus.
Recently, SDF envoys were sent to Damascus in an attempt to hold meetings with members of the transitional government, but they were unsuccessful. These efforts have led the SDF to the conclusion that HTS has become the “de facto authority” in Syria.
A source involved in the transitional process told Asharq Al-Awsat that communication between the SDF and HTS was abruptly halted following the visit of Ibrahim Kalin, Türkiye’s intelligence chief, to Damascus on December 12, 2024. Before this, the contact between the two parties was reportedly exploratory in nature.
Sources close to the SDF believe that Ankara pressured the transitional government in Damascus to avoid engaging with the Kurdish faction, likely anticipating a policy shift when Donald Trump assumes the US presidency in January 2025. Türkiye appears determined to block the Biden administration’s attempts to normalize the SDF’s status, assuming that Trump will prioritize regional players—particularly Türkiye—in Syria.
A member of the Syrian transitional government confirmed to Asharq Al-Awsat that a short-term ceasefire was recently agreed upon between the SDF and other conflicting parties in areas such as Manbij, Kobani, and others. However, he warned that the situation remains precarious, with fears that fighting could erupt at any moment. He added that HTS is seeking to disarm the SDF peacefully, noting that HTS itself is expected to lay down its weapons within the next two months as part of ongoing arrangements to form a unified Syrian army. The source emphasized that the SDF must follow suit.
Syrian activists warn that the issue of disarmament is likely to become a major flashpoint in Syria, not only with the SDF but also with other factions reluctant to surrender their weapons to either HTS or the still-forming Syrian state.
Clashes of varying intensity have already been reported in areas of contact between the SDF and the Turkish-backed National Army. Field sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that skirmishes have occurred in Manbij, near the Tishrin Dam, in Tall Tamr, and at various points along the M4 highway.
Ankara has increased its pressure on the SDF to disarm. On December 19, the Turkish Ministry of Defense reiterated its commitment to “taking measures to force terrorist organizations to lay down their weapons.”
Members of the SDF fear that the current escalation, coupled with the absence of political dialogue with the new Damascus government, could lead to major clashes, particularly in Kobani. Kurdish sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that the SDF is willing to make concessions to Türkiye, such as maintaining only its internal security forces, known as Asayish, in Kobani.
In northeastern Syria, two key international players are actively involved: France and the United States. France is working to unify Kurdish factions under a proposed framework, while the US is focused on extending the fragile ceasefire until a regional agreement can determine the SDF’s role in the new political order.
An earlier US-brokered agreement allowed the SDF to retain positions east of the Euphrates while ceding areas west of the river to Arab tribes. However, reports suggest that the SDF has withdrawn from some areas due to pressure from Arab tribes.
French delegations have visited SDF-controlled areas to encourage Kurdish factions to draft a unified agreement. On December 18, representatives from the SDF, the Kurdish National Council (KNC), and self-described “independent” Kurdish groups met to negotiate. However, according to sources in Hasakah, Qamishli, and Erbil (in Iraqi Kurdistan), the meeting failed to yield an initial agreement.
Kurdish activists have proposed three key measures for aligning the SDF with the new phase in Syria: renaming the SDF as a military force under the new Ministry of Defense, severing ties with Qandil (northern Iraq) and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), and repatriating non-Syrian Kurdish fighters to their home countries.
However, the SDF reportedly opposes these conditions, preferring to negotiate directly with Türkiye or HTS rather than make concessions to other Kurdish factions within Syria. This stance could lead to internal conflicts over which group will represent Kurdish interests in the evolving Syrian political landscape.
When asked by Asharq Al-Awsat about potential dialogues with the KNC or their proposals, SDF spokesperson Farhad Shami declined to comment.
Members of the factions now in power in Damascus suggest that the SDF’s challenges extend beyond disarmament. One issue is its prior alignment with the ousted Assad regime, which undermines its position in the transitional phase.
A senior Kurdish official in Iraq, speaking anonymously, noted that the SDF’s options have significantly diminished following the withdrawal of Shiite factions and the defection of Arab allies from its ranks. These developments have reduced the SDF’s territorial control.
The official argued that while the SDF continues to rely on US support, Türkiye has become the dominant player in the Syrian arena. Many Kurds fear that escalating tensions in northeastern Syria could result in infighting among Kurdish groups, particularly as they struggle to find a unified approach.
Although Ankara appears poised to make further moves into Kurdish areas, such actions would likely provoke a direct challenge to US interests in the region.