Mazloum Abdi to Asharq Al-Awsat: We Urge the US to End the Syrian ‘Holocaust’

Commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Mazloum Abdi. (AFP)
Commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Mazloum Abdi. (AFP)
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Mazloum Abdi to Asharq Al-Awsat: We Urge the US to End the Syrian ‘Holocaust’

Commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Mazloum Abdi. (AFP)
Commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Mazloum Abdi. (AFP)

Commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Mazloum Abdi hoped that the administration of US President Joe Biden would “rectify the errors” of its predecessor when it gave the greenlight to Turkey to “occupy” regions in northeastern Syria.

In a telephone interview to Asharq Al-Awsat on Thursday, he called on the Biden administration to adopt a “new strategy” to reactivate America’s role and “put an end to the Syrian holocaust.”

Are SDF forces still cracking down on ISIS cells east of the Euphrates River?
After ISIS was geographically defeated in the battle of Baghouz, there was a need to eliminate its sleeper cells and end its popular support. This prompted the SDF to begin to coordinate with the international coalition against terrorism. We achieved the desired results by arresting several leaders and members of the organization, which was carrying out murders and bombings. Our campaign is still ongoing.

We noted, however, that the sleeper cell attacks increased after Turkey occupied Ras al-Ain and Tal Abyad in northeastern Syria.

The operations against the cells have not ended. On the contrary, there is a need for us to intensify the operations, especially after the organization started to expand its attacks to the Syrian Badia (desert) and its attempts to expand to regions that were liberated by our forces. The threats are still present. This is our vision and that of the coalition, as well. Our efforts at this time are therefore focused on expanding operations against the cells.

Is everything being coordinated with the coalition?
We can say that the coordination is good at this time. Nothing has changed since the new American administration took office. Based on the meetings we held with coalition officials, it appears to be leaning towards expanding its counter-terrorism operations, especially after ISIS threatened to carry out attacks in various regions and several countries.

We noticed an uptick in ISIS attacks east of the Euphrates and other regions. Why is that?
There are two reasons. The first, as we have said, is the Turkish occupation of Ras al-Ain and Tal Abyad that has reinvigorated the organization, which is receiving support from Turkish occupation forces. We have confirmed reports that ISIS members, who had fled northern and eastern Syria, had arrived in regions that are occupied by Turkey, such as Afrin, Azaz, al-Bab, Ras al-Ain and Tal Abyad. ISIS has regrouped under the so-called Syrian National Army and has been provided with military and logistic support by Turkey. Turkey has facilitated the terrorists’ passage to our regions where they have carried out murders and attacks that have mostly targeted civilians.

The second reason is our preoccupation with resisting the Turkish occupation that targets our regions every day. This has allowed ISIS to carry out some operations. Other sides are also seeking to exploit these attacks in order to weaken the SDF and autonomous administration.

Some say that Arabs are being marginalized in regions east of the Euphrates.
This is not true. On the contrary, our Arab brothers make up the majority of the SDF. We do not distinguish between ethnicities. They all live together in peace and harmony while still preserving their national and cultural identities.

You are sometimes accused of labeling anyone opposed to you as being affiliated with ISIS.
I believe the facts on the ground refute these claims. Freedom exists in Rojava and northeastern Syria. All political views, including opposition to the autonomous administration, are welcome. Their rights are guaranteed in the freedom to hold rallies and protected under the autonomous administration’s laws.

What about the increased ISIS attacks in the Badia? Is coordination taking place with the Syrian government or Russia in the war against ISIS west of the Euphrates?
No, there is no cooperation in this issue. This is due to the geographic divide between us. But another more significant reason is that any coordination in this regard should entail comprehensive agreement on other files. We believe that these files are a priority over military coordination, which does not exist at this moment.

How do you view the current American troop presence?
We believe that the deployment is part of the war against terrorism. It helps restore stability in Syria. The US is also a major power and plays a great and central role in resolving the crisis. It cannot be sidelined.

American officials say that the deployment in Syria is not permanent and that it is tied to the complete defeat of ISIS. Did you receive word of this?
No such discussions were held between us. We believe that the American presence in Syria hinges on the defeat of terrorism and restoration of security and stability in northern and eastern Syria. It also hinges on resolving the Syrian crisis according to United Nation resolutions and participation in the reconstruction of the country.

In October 2019, the Americans pulled out from some regions east of the Euphrates. How did that affect your forces?
The American administration committed a major mistake by withdrawing from the Ras al-Ain and Tal Abyad regions. Let us be more clear: former President Donald Trump granted Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan the greenlight to occupy those regions. There is no doubt that the move impacted our forces’ ability to fight terrorism as we became preoccupied with defending those regions. The withdrawal negatively reflected on the US and its strategy in Syria and the Middle East.

So what are your expectations from the Biden administration?
We believe the administration will work on rectifying the massive amount of errors that were committed by the Trump administration. This includes the whole approach towards the Syrian crisis. We urge the new administration to adopt a new strategy that would reactivate America’s role in pushing for an end to the Syrian “holocaust.”

Some say that the Biden team is more sympathetic of your demands. What are your expectations?
The US has interests in Syria and the region. We share similar views on important issues, such as the fight against terrorism. The long-term strategy, however, does not change with a change in presidents and administrations. Some minor changes do take place that could alter some goals and policies. At this point, the new administration’s policy has not been shaped, despite some positive and encouraging signs shown to our forces and autonomous administration.

Agreements in the east of the Euphrates region have been reached between Russia and Turkey, the US and Turkey and Damascus and the SDF. What is the situation like amid all of these deals?
We are preserving the balance in the region through contacts with all parties. Each side enjoys its area of influence. The Russian and regime forces entered our regions through an understanding with us. On October 23, 2019, Russia signed a deal with Turkey that asks it to preserve the ceasefire between our forces and the Turkish occupation and the international coalition forces. The regime forces, meanwhile, are tasked with protecting the Syrian border in line with its role in preserving Syrian state sovereignty.

What about the Peace Spring Operation region? Did you carry out what was asked of you?
The so-called “peace spring” region refers to Ras al-Ain and Tal Abyad, but the Turkish occupation is trying to impose its labels on the area. It announced similar labels when it referred to Afrin as the “olive branch” region. We do not recognize such labels. We are committed to the agreement signed between former US Vice President Mike Pence with Erdogan and another signed between Russian President Vladimir Putin with Erdogan.

In line with the agreements, we withdrew 30 kilometers away from the region. The other side was required to fully pull out as well, with Syrian border guards set to deploy. Turkey, however, did not respect the understandings. In fact, it is trying to expand its occupation. The two state sponsors of the agreements are morally bound to pressure Turkey to implement them. Turkey’s attacks against our forces and unarmed civilians in Ain Issa, Tal Tamr and Kobani reveal its intentions to destabilize the region.

What about Turkey and Russia’s patrols near Kobani and their understanding on Afrin?
The patrols in the Kobani countryside are part of the agreement with Moscow. They are part of an attempt to impose a sort of calm between us and Turkey after its occupation of Ras al-Ain and Tal Abyad.

The violations against Kurdish civilians in Afrin – the region’s true locals – are, however, unprecedented throughout history due to their atrociousness. The only side responsible for this is the Turkish occupier. Russia is also partly to blame because it has not deterred Turkey from committing those crimes. The Turkish occupation has cordoned off Afrin, even preventing rights and humanitarian groups and the media from uncovering the crimes committed there. I therefore, call on Russia to assume its moral responsibility in ending the Turkish occupation of Afrin.

Russia’s military recently expanded to Derik where US forces are deployed.
As we have said before, the Russian military police carries out patrols along the border in line with the October 23, 2019 agreement.

We have, however, seen run-ins between the Russian and American forces.
We constantly stress to both sides the need to focus on operations aimed at restoring stability and combating ISIS.

Does Russia coordinate with you amid the deployment east of the deployment and presence of a large Russian base in al-Qamishli?
Yes, coordination is ongoing with us over the deployment and mobilization of patrols. All of their movements are taking place according to a mechanism that was agreed between us.

Who is your ally today, Russia or the US?
We do not oppose either side. We have established relations with them in pursuit of the interests of our people and their aspirations for freedom and a dignified life, as well as security and stability.

What about the efforts to reunite Kurdish internal ranks?
We have come a long way in the dialogue that we had launched. The most significant achievement is restoring trust between the two sides. We also completed the memorandum over the political leadership, which will be the basis for any future agreement. Other disputed issues are secondary affairs and agreements will be reached over them during future rounds of dialogue that will be launched soon.

Is the SDF ready to meet the military demands and include other factions in its ranks?
Our doors are open to all forces that believe in the principles and goals of the SDF. These forces should not have goals that contradict with ours and the principle of coexistence. They must also defend our territories against all forces that seek to violate them.

Some sides criticize you for following leader of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), Abdullah Ocalan.
The PKK is a fraternal Kurdish party. We enjoy ties with it along with other Kurdish parties in the southern Kurdistan region. We are not affiliated with it. We are the Syrian Democratic Forces. We are independent in our decisions and have a clear strategy that we are implementing Syria, which is the sole area of our operations. We do, however, adhere to the idea and democratic nation project proposed by Ocalan.

What about your alleged siege of the “security square” in al-Hasakeh? Is it true that the regime has you surrounded in Aleppo?
We have never besieged Hasakeh. Movement between our regions and those held by the regime had never come to a halt. The regime, however, is imposing an oppressive and unjustified siege of the Shahba region, where refugees from Afrin have fled. A similar siege is being imposed on the al-Sheikh Maksoud and Ashrafiyeh neighborhoods in Aleppo whereby no food, fuel and medical supplies are allowed in. The regime has set up checkpoints to limit the movement of the locals after its hopes for the fall of Ain Issa were dashed.

I believe the main reason for the siege is the regime’s mentality of elimination that drives it to restore the situation in Syria to the way it was before 2011. The provocations and tensions that it is stoking in Hasakeh and Qamishli and attempts to spark Arab-Kurdish strife are all part of efforts to pressure the autonomous administration and turn back the hands of time. On our end, we are trying to restore calm, avoid being dragged towards strife and seeking serious dialogue over fateful issues. We are not pursuing further escalation.

Rounds of dialogue were previously held with the regime. Are they still ongoing?
The dialogue came to halt due to the regime’s stubborn and backwards mentality. Just days ago, a Syrian Democratic Council delegation was in Damascus, but it left emptyhanded because the regime rejects all solutions and initiatives that could lead to a political resolution of the Syrian crisis. We believe this stubbornness will not do it any good.

But military agreements with Damascus still stand.
The understandings hinge on Russia because it ensures that they continue. These understandings have not expanded to become comprehensive agreements because the regime is shirking its commitments and refuses to make any concessions that could build trust with it. This is hindering the possibility of military agreements being expanded to launch serious national political dialogue. We believe that any military understanding that is not backed by a political one will not last long, which we hope would never come to pass.

In the bigger picture, there has been talk about the formation of a Syrian military council. Is the SDF ready to take part in such a council that includes you, the regime and opposition?
I had previously said that we do not oppose joining any Syrian national military structure that achieves Syrian national goals in restoring security and stability in the country and preserves that the SDF. Such a council should not have a nationalist, religious or sectarian identity. It should instead believe in defending the nation and should not be subject to foreign agendas.

Is that possible?
Yes, as long as the will and determination are available and intentions are sincere.



Al-Qirbi to Asharq Al-Awsat: Saddam Told Me Iraq Fight Was for Arab Dignity

Saddam Receives Yemen’s then-Foreign Minister Abubakr al-Qirbi in Baghdad in 2001 (AFP)
Saddam Receives Yemen’s then-Foreign Minister Abubakr al-Qirbi in Baghdad in 2001 (AFP)
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Al-Qirbi to Asharq Al-Awsat: Saddam Told Me Iraq Fight Was for Arab Dignity

Saddam Receives Yemen’s then-Foreign Minister Abubakr al-Qirbi in Baghdad in 2001 (AFP)
Saddam Receives Yemen’s then-Foreign Minister Abubakr al-Qirbi in Baghdad in 2001 (AFP)

When al-Qaeda’s planes tore through New York’s skyline on September 11, 2001, Yemen’s then-Foreign Minister Abubakr al-Qirbi cut short a visit to Berlin and rushed back to Sana’a, confronting a moment that would reshape global politics and Yemen’s foreign policy for years to come.

The attacks – among their many repercussions – pushed Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh to fully align with the United States in its war on terror. One of Saleh’s first moves was to seek an urgent meeting with President George W. Bush, hoping to convince the White House that Yemen was not a breeding ground for al-Qaeda.

In the first part of an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, al-Qirbi, who served as Yemen’s top diplomat from April 2001 until 2014, recounts his experience navigating regional upheaval, from the USS Cole bombing off Aden in October 2000 to the US-led invasion of Iraq.

He also reflects on Saleh’s last-ditch attempt to persuade Saddam Hussein to cooperate with the United Nations – a message the Iraqi leader rejected, declaring instead: “This is a battle for the dignity of the nation, and we will pay the price.”

Below are excerpts from the interview:

Q: Your first major test as foreign minister was the September 11 attacks. Where were you when they happened, and how did you react?

A: I was on an official visit to Berlin, having lunch with the German foreign minister at the time. We were preparing for a river cruise and a reception with German officials and Arab diplomats when we were stunned by the news. We gathered around the television and immediately cancelled the event.

Q: How did President Saleh respond to the 9/11 attacks?

A: I wasn’t in Yemen at the time, so I can’t speak to his immediate reaction. But it was deeply concerning for all of us, especially coming so soon after the USS Cole bombing. That incident had already cast Yemen as a hub for al-Qaeda and terrorism. We knew the attacks in New York would only intensify that perception.

Q: When you returned from Berlin and met President Saleh, was the potential fallout from 9/11 your main concern?

A: Absolutely. We were not only concerned about Yemen but also the wider region. Our priority was to shield Yemen from the consequences. That’s why our first step was to arrange a swift visit for President Saleh to Washington. He was among the first Arab leaders to arrive there after the attacks, meeting President Bush in November of that year.

Saleh’s Confrontation with Bush at the White House

Q: How would you describe the meeting between President Saleh and President Bush?

A: It was, in many ways, a confrontation – but a diplomatic one. Saleh aimed to convince Bush that Yemen was not a terrorist haven and should not be punished for the 9/11 attacks.

Q: Did Bush accuse Saleh directly?

A: No, he didn’t. But he did emphasize the importance of fighting terrorism and acknowledged the presence of extremists in Yemen. In the end, President Saleh defused the situation by pledging Yemen’s cooperation with the international community in combating terrorism. That marked the beginning of a new chapter in Yemen-US relations.

Q: Did the US make specific demands during President Saleh’s visit to Washington in late 2001?

A: Not at that time. But eventually, the main concern became how to cooperate in combating al-Qaeda operatives within Yemen.

Q: Did Yemen take serious action on that front?

A: Absolutely. We launched operations to pursue the group responsible for the USS Cole bombing, and our security services arrested some of them. Investigations began shortly thereafter. The US requested direct participation in those interrogations, but Yemen declined, insisting that the investigations were the government’s responsibility. However, we allowed US observers to attend the sessions and submit questions through Yemeni investigators.

Q: Did the investigations uncover anything significant about 9/11?

A: I can’t recall specific details from the security files, but there was definitely intelligence exchanged between the two countries’ agencies.

From Security Cooperation to Military Invasions

Q: Intelligence cooperation between Yemen and the US became more structured. As foreign minister, did you anticipate that the US would launch military campaigns in Afghanistan and then Iraq?

A: We knew the US was deeply wounded by 9/11, but I didn’t expect it to act so hastily. In my view, the rush into war dragged the US into complications later on.

Q: Did President Saleh view the US as both a powerful partner and a potentially dangerous one?

A: Definitely. During his visit to the US, Saleh recognized how volatile the American position was for Yemen and the wider region. That was reflected in his positions on many Arab issues—whether the Palestinian cause or later the Iraq war. We were constantly trying to avoid provoking the US Our main concern was to spare Yemen from becoming a target.

Saleh’s Final Message to Saddam Hussein

Q: After the US invaded Afghanistan and toppled the Taliban, did you grow concerned as Washington turned its focus to Iraq?

A: The Iraq campaign came later, around 2003, and stemmed from different motives. It wasn’t directly linked to Afghanistan. The US seemed determined to expand its influence in the region—politically, strategically, and economically. After 2001, there was a clear shift toward targeting Arab regimes, including through initiatives like the “Greater Middle East Project” and what former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice called “creative chaos.” That deeply unsettled many Arab governments.

In the Arab League, we foreign ministers discussed how to send clear messages to Washington—that Arab states were not sponsors of terrorism and that we supported political and economic reform.

Q: As the US prepared to invade Iraq, how did President Saleh and the Yemeni government respond?

A: Our role was first through the Arab League. We wanted a unified Arab position to confront the looming US aggression, but unfortunately, the region was divided.

The second step was to try to convince Saddam Hussein to avoid war. I was the last Arab official to visit Iraq carrying a personal message from President Saleh to Saddam—this was about six to eight weeks before the invasion.

Q: Was that message directly from President Saleh?

A: Yes, it was.

Q: And you personally handed it to Saddam Hussein?

A: Yes, I delivered it to him in person. The message urged Saddam to preserve Iraq and its achievements and avoid dragging the country into a destructive war.

Saddam, however, refused. He thanked President Saleh for his concern and support. But he said: ‘This is a battle for the dignity of the Arab nation. We must pay the price to defend it.’ Saddam’s only request was that Saleh protect Yemen’s national unity.

Saleh’s Plea Rejected

Q: What exactly did Saleh’s message to Saddam Hussein contain?

A: It urged him to comply with United Nations demands—demands largely driven by the United States at that point.

Q: Did Saddam show any willingness to compromise?

A: No. He saw meeting American demands as a humiliation to the Arab nation.

Q: As a foreign minister hearing that this was about Arab dignity, did you feel Iraq was in danger?

A: Absolutely. After I delivered the message in an official capacity, I asked to speak to him as an Arab citizen speaking to an Arab leader. I told him: yes, this may be a battle for dignity, but it also requires wisdom. Iraq had built institutions, achieved development, and possessed military capabilities—those gains could be lost. I warned that the war wouldn’t end with an invasion and that all Arabs might pay the price. Saddam replied: “We in Iraq will bear that responsibility.”

Q: Did you meet with any Iraqi officials on that trip?

A: No, only President Saddam Hussein.

Q: When you relayed his response to President Saleh, how did he react?

A: He was pained by it. He sensed Iraq was heading toward war and feared the consequences.

Q: What is it like for an Arab foreign minister to sit face-to-face with Saddam Hussein?

A: You’re sitting with a leader who achieved much for his country. But in the Arab world, decisions of war and peace are often made by one man. That’s a core problem in our region—decisions are taken unilaterally, without consultation with military, security, or political institutions.

Q: Did you have the same feeling about Saddam’s 1990 invasion of Kuwait?

A: Certainly. Much of what we suffer from today stems from that same tragedy: the concentration of power.

Q: Do Arab leaders feel they are entrusted with historic missions? Was Saleh also a unilateral decision-maker?

A: Sometimes, yes. But Saleh evolved. After years of war and political conflict, he initiated a national dialogue to bring political forces together. Still, some decisions remained personal.

Q: Did Saleh ever describe Saddam as stubborn or autocratic?

A: He didn’t say that explicitly, but I believe he thought Saddam had made a grave mistake.

Preparing for the Inevitable

Q: As the invasion of Iraq loomed, how did Saleh respond?

A: For months, the Arab League debated ways to avert war. Some states tried to contain the conflict, while others, I wouldn’t say encouraged it, but refrained from opposing the US. Yemen believed war was inevitable. We viewed it as a disaster and sent several envoys to Iraq before I went personally.

Q: After Saddam’s regime collapsed, did Saleh fear for his own future?

A: No.

Q: Yet when Saddam was executed, Saleh was visibly affected. What do you recall of that?

A: I remember it well—I was in Amman at the time. His execution on Eid had a strong emotional impact on Saleh. He felt it was vengeful and driven by deep hatred. We had hoped for a fair trial and a more humane process.

Q: In an Arab summit, Saleh made a comment: “Before they shave your head, shave it yourself.” Was that a reference to Saddam’s fate?

A: Yes, that was his phrasing. He meant: before others impose their will on you, take the initiative and fix things yourself.

A Bond Forged in Shared Causes

Q: What was behind the strong personal bond between Saleh and Saddam? Was it Yemen’s support for Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War?

A: That support stemmed from an already close relationship between the two leaders. They shared a pan-Arab stance, a firm position on Israel, and solidarity with the Palestinian cause. Their chemistry was real—and they were very close.

Saddam’s Support for Yemen? “I Don’t Know”

Asked whether Saddam Hussein ever provided concrete support to Yemen, al-Qirbi said he was not aware of such assistance. Yemen, however, joined Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq in the so-called “Arab Cooperation Council,” a bloc seen by some as an effort to reshape regional balances.

“Unfortunately, the Arab world was facing one crisis after another,” he said. “Some leaders formed new councils either to escape collective Arab action or to strengthen it. In reality, these councils achieved little on the ground.”

A Trusted Ally: Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah

Among Arab leaders, Saleh’s closest relationship in the 2000s was with Saudi Arabia’s then-Crown Prince and later King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz. Their bond deepened after Yemen signed a border agreement with the Kingdom.

“That trust translated into tangible support,” al-Qirbi said. “With Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal, we worked to strengthen Yemen’s position, alongside Qatari FM Hamad bin Jassim and UAE’s Abdullah bin Zayed.”

But the relationship began to sour around 2008 during the war with the Houthis. Miscommunication, al-Qirbi suggested, led Saudi Arabia to question Saleh’s stance on ending the conflict.

Outside the Gulf, Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi was another key ally. Both he and Saleh viewed Eritrea’s actions—particularly its threats to Yemeni islands and its war with Ethiopia—as destabilizing to the region.

Post-Eritrea Tensions, Quiet Mediation

Saleh also had cordial ties with Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki until territorial disputes soured the relationship. Yemen later attempted to mediate between Eritrea and Ethiopia, with al-Qirbi visiting both countries several times in an effort to mend relations.

Syria, Iraq, and the Perils of Foreign Intervention

During his tenure, al-Qirbi said Yemen maintained only limited ties with Hafez al-Assad. But when Syria plunged into conflict years later, Saleh opposed any external military intervention.

“Saleh believed—whether in Iraq or Syria—that foreign intervention ultimately destroys the country,” he said.

Saleh and Gaddafi: A Strained Arab Brotherhood

The relationship between Saleh and Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi was marked by what al-Qirbi called “political sparring.”

“Gaddafi saw himself as the heir to Nasser’s Arab nationalist mantle,” he said. “Saleh thought he exaggerated his role as a pan-Arab leader.”

Q: Did Saleh mock Gaddafi privately?

A: No. He didn’t mock him but did criticize his frequent calls for Arab unity, especially after so many failed attempts.

Q: Why did Gaddafi support the Houthis?

A: I don’t know his motives. Perhaps to pressure Saleh—or to put pressure on Saudi Arabia.

Q: Did Gaddafi send weapons or money to the Houthis?

A: I have no information, but he did have contact with them.

Putin, China, and Yemen’s Future

In 2008, al-Qirbi accompanied Saleh on a visit to Russia, where he met President Vladimir Putin amid growing unrest in Yemen.

“The atmosphere was very warm. Putin understood Yemen’s political situation,” he said. “Yemen relied heavily on Russian military equipment, and the two leaders discussed ways to strengthen that cooperation.”

Putin invited Saleh to a military parade showcasing advanced weaponry. “It was clear that Putin saw Saleh as one of the Arab leaders closest to Moscow,” al-Qirbi said, adding that Saleh greatly admired the Russian president. “He said Putin would restore Russia’s global role.”

While Saleh held some admiration for Western leaders like France’s Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and US President George W. Bush—whom he met multiple times—his primary focus remained the Arab world.

China was another rising partner. In one of Saleh’s final visits to Beijing, he sought to open Yemen to Chinese investment. The Chinese agreed to lend Yemen $1 billion for development projects as part of their Belt and Road Initiative, but Yemen’s parliament ultimately stalled the agreement over repayment terms.

Arab Diplomacy Through Al-Qirbi’s Eyes

Reflecting on fellow Arab diplomats, al-Qirbi spoke warmly of Saudi Arabia’s late foreign minister, Prince Saud al-Faisal.

“He was known for his wisdom and patience, even when hearing views he didn’t like,” al-Qirbi said. “He always sought consensus.”

Other standout figures included Oman’s Yousef bin Alawi, Sudan’s Mustafa Osman Ismail—“a leading figure during the Iraq crisis”—and Libya’s Ali Treki, a staunch Arab nationalist often at odds with Gaddafi’s more erratic stances.

Q: Did you know Libya’s former foreign minister Abdel Rahman Shalgham?

A: Yes. A cultured man. I remember once in Cairo, during a dinner gathering, he played the oud and sang for us.

Q: What about Amr Moussa?

A: I admired him when he was Egypt’s foreign minister—especially his firm stance on the Palestinian cause. That admiration only grew when I worked with him at the Arab League. I consider him among the League’s best secretary-generals during my time—not just as foreign minister but as an observer of the League’s work. He always held firm to Arab principles.

Unfortunately, decisions at the Arab League are shaped by powerful member states and their foreign ministers—not the secretary-general.

From Medicine to Diplomacy... and Arabic Poetry

A physician by training, al-Qirbi’s love for classical Arabic poetry has endured.

Q: Who is your favorite poet?

A: Al-Mutanabbi.

Q: Why him?

A: His verses are full of timeless wisdom and values. To me, they are like proverbs for life.