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Mazloum Abdi to Asharq Al-Awsat: We Urge the US to End the Syrian ‘Holocaust’

Commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Mazloum Abdi. (AFP)
Commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Mazloum Abdi. (AFP)
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Mazloum Abdi to Asharq Al-Awsat: We Urge the US to End the Syrian ‘Holocaust’

Commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Mazloum Abdi. (AFP)
Commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Mazloum Abdi. (AFP)

Commander of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Mazloum Abdi hoped that the administration of US President Joe Biden would “rectify the errors” of its predecessor when it gave the greenlight to Turkey to “occupy” regions in northeastern Syria.

In a telephone interview to Asharq Al-Awsat on Thursday, he called on the Biden administration to adopt a “new strategy” to reactivate America’s role and “put an end to the Syrian holocaust.”

Are SDF forces still cracking down on ISIS cells east of the Euphrates River?
After ISIS was geographically defeated in the battle of Baghouz, there was a need to eliminate its sleeper cells and end its popular support. This prompted the SDF to begin to coordinate with the international coalition against terrorism. We achieved the desired results by arresting several leaders and members of the organization, which was carrying out murders and bombings. Our campaign is still ongoing.

We noted, however, that the sleeper cell attacks increased after Turkey occupied Ras al-Ain and Tal Abyad in northeastern Syria.

The operations against the cells have not ended. On the contrary, there is a need for us to intensify the operations, especially after the organization started to expand its attacks to the Syrian Badia (desert) and its attempts to expand to regions that were liberated by our forces. The threats are still present. This is our vision and that of the coalition, as well. Our efforts at this time are therefore focused on expanding operations against the cells.

Is everything being coordinated with the coalition?
We can say that the coordination is good at this time. Nothing has changed since the new American administration took office. Based on the meetings we held with coalition officials, it appears to be leaning towards expanding its counter-terrorism operations, especially after ISIS threatened to carry out attacks in various regions and several countries.

We noticed an uptick in ISIS attacks east of the Euphrates and other regions. Why is that?
There are two reasons. The first, as we have said, is the Turkish occupation of Ras al-Ain and Tal Abyad that has reinvigorated the organization, which is receiving support from Turkish occupation forces. We have confirmed reports that ISIS members, who had fled northern and eastern Syria, had arrived in regions that are occupied by Turkey, such as Afrin, Azaz, al-Bab, Ras al-Ain and Tal Abyad. ISIS has regrouped under the so-called Syrian National Army and has been provided with military and logistic support by Turkey. Turkey has facilitated the terrorists’ passage to our regions where they have carried out murders and attacks that have mostly targeted civilians.

The second reason is our preoccupation with resisting the Turkish occupation that targets our regions every day. This has allowed ISIS to carry out some operations. Other sides are also seeking to exploit these attacks in order to weaken the SDF and autonomous administration.

Some say that Arabs are being marginalized in regions east of the Euphrates.
This is not true. On the contrary, our Arab brothers make up the majority of the SDF. We do not distinguish between ethnicities. They all live together in peace and harmony while still preserving their national and cultural identities.

You are sometimes accused of labeling anyone opposed to you as being affiliated with ISIS.
I believe the facts on the ground refute these claims. Freedom exists in Rojava and northeastern Syria. All political views, including opposition to the autonomous administration, are welcome. Their rights are guaranteed in the freedom to hold rallies and protected under the autonomous administration’s laws.

What about the increased ISIS attacks in the Badia? Is coordination taking place with the Syrian government or Russia in the war against ISIS west of the Euphrates?
No, there is no cooperation in this issue. This is due to the geographic divide between us. But another more significant reason is that any coordination in this regard should entail comprehensive agreement on other files. We believe that these files are a priority over military coordination, which does not exist at this moment.

How do you view the current American troop presence?
We believe that the deployment is part of the war against terrorism. It helps restore stability in Syria. The US is also a major power and plays a great and central role in resolving the crisis. It cannot be sidelined.

American officials say that the deployment in Syria is not permanent and that it is tied to the complete defeat of ISIS. Did you receive word of this?
No such discussions were held between us. We believe that the American presence in Syria hinges on the defeat of terrorism and restoration of security and stability in northern and eastern Syria. It also hinges on resolving the Syrian crisis according to United Nation resolutions and participation in the reconstruction of the country.

In October 2019, the Americans pulled out from some regions east of the Euphrates. How did that affect your forces?
The American administration committed a major mistake by withdrawing from the Ras al-Ain and Tal Abyad regions. Let us be more clear: former President Donald Trump granted Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan the greenlight to occupy those regions. There is no doubt that the move impacted our forces’ ability to fight terrorism as we became preoccupied with defending those regions. The withdrawal negatively reflected on the US and its strategy in Syria and the Middle East.

So what are your expectations from the Biden administration?
We believe the administration will work on rectifying the massive amount of errors that were committed by the Trump administration. This includes the whole approach towards the Syrian crisis. We urge the new administration to adopt a new strategy that would reactivate America’s role in pushing for an end to the Syrian “holocaust.”

Some say that the Biden team is more sympathetic of your demands. What are your expectations?
The US has interests in Syria and the region. We share similar views on important issues, such as the fight against terrorism. The long-term strategy, however, does not change with a change in presidents and administrations. Some minor changes do take place that could alter some goals and policies. At this point, the new administration’s policy has not been shaped, despite some positive and encouraging signs shown to our forces and autonomous administration.

Agreements in the east of the Euphrates region have been reached between Russia and Turkey, the US and Turkey and Damascus and the SDF. What is the situation like amid all of these deals?
We are preserving the balance in the region through contacts with all parties. Each side enjoys its area of influence. The Russian and regime forces entered our regions through an understanding with us. On October 23, 2019, Russia signed a deal with Turkey that asks it to preserve the ceasefire between our forces and the Turkish occupation and the international coalition forces. The regime forces, meanwhile, are tasked with protecting the Syrian border in line with its role in preserving Syrian state sovereignty.

What about the Peace Spring Operation region? Did you carry out what was asked of you?
The so-called “peace spring” region refers to Ras al-Ain and Tal Abyad, but the Turkish occupation is trying to impose its labels on the area. It announced similar labels when it referred to Afrin as the “olive branch” region. We do not recognize such labels. We are committed to the agreement signed between former US Vice President Mike Pence with Erdogan and another signed between Russian President Vladimir Putin with Erdogan.

In line with the agreements, we withdrew 30 kilometers away from the region. The other side was required to fully pull out as well, with Syrian border guards set to deploy. Turkey, however, did not respect the understandings. In fact, it is trying to expand its occupation. The two state sponsors of the agreements are morally bound to pressure Turkey to implement them. Turkey’s attacks against our forces and unarmed civilians in Ain Issa, Tal Tamr and Kobani reveal its intentions to destabilize the region.

What about Turkey and Russia’s patrols near Kobani and their understanding on Afrin?
The patrols in the Kobani countryside are part of the agreement with Moscow. They are part of an attempt to impose a sort of calm between us and Turkey after its occupation of Ras al-Ain and Tal Abyad.

The violations against Kurdish civilians in Afrin – the region’s true locals – are, however, unprecedented throughout history due to their atrociousness. The only side responsible for this is the Turkish occupier. Russia is also partly to blame because it has not deterred Turkey from committing those crimes. The Turkish occupation has cordoned off Afrin, even preventing rights and humanitarian groups and the media from uncovering the crimes committed there. I therefore, call on Russia to assume its moral responsibility in ending the Turkish occupation of Afrin.

Russia’s military recently expanded to Derik where US forces are deployed.
As we have said before, the Russian military police carries out patrols along the border in line with the October 23, 2019 agreement.

We have, however, seen run-ins between the Russian and American forces.
We constantly stress to both sides the need to focus on operations aimed at restoring stability and combating ISIS.

Does Russia coordinate with you amid the deployment east of the deployment and presence of a large Russian base in al-Qamishli?
Yes, coordination is ongoing with us over the deployment and mobilization of patrols. All of their movements are taking place according to a mechanism that was agreed between us.

Who is your ally today, Russia or the US?
We do not oppose either side. We have established relations with them in pursuit of the interests of our people and their aspirations for freedom and a dignified life, as well as security and stability.

What about the efforts to reunite Kurdish internal ranks?
We have come a long way in the dialogue that we had launched. The most significant achievement is restoring trust between the two sides. We also completed the memorandum over the political leadership, which will be the basis for any future agreement. Other disputed issues are secondary affairs and agreements will be reached over them during future rounds of dialogue that will be launched soon.

Is the SDF ready to meet the military demands and include other factions in its ranks?
Our doors are open to all forces that believe in the principles and goals of the SDF. These forces should not have goals that contradict with ours and the principle of coexistence. They must also defend our territories against all forces that seek to violate them.

Some sides criticize you for following leader of the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK), Abdullah Ocalan.
The PKK is a fraternal Kurdish party. We enjoy ties with it along with other Kurdish parties in the southern Kurdistan region. We are not affiliated with it. We are the Syrian Democratic Forces. We are independent in our decisions and have a clear strategy that we are implementing Syria, which is the sole area of our operations. We do, however, adhere to the idea and democratic nation project proposed by Ocalan.

What about your alleged siege of the “security square” in al-Hasakeh? Is it true that the regime has you surrounded in Aleppo?
We have never besieged Hasakeh. Movement between our regions and those held by the regime had never come to a halt. The regime, however, is imposing an oppressive and unjustified siege of the Shahba region, where refugees from Afrin have fled. A similar siege is being imposed on the al-Sheikh Maksoud and Ashrafiyeh neighborhoods in Aleppo whereby no food, fuel and medical supplies are allowed in. The regime has set up checkpoints to limit the movement of the locals after its hopes for the fall of Ain Issa were dashed.

I believe the main reason for the siege is the regime’s mentality of elimination that drives it to restore the situation in Syria to the way it was before 2011. The provocations and tensions that it is stoking in Hasakeh and Qamishli and attempts to spark Arab-Kurdish strife are all part of efforts to pressure the autonomous administration and turn back the hands of time. On our end, we are trying to restore calm, avoid being dragged towards strife and seeking serious dialogue over fateful issues. We are not pursuing further escalation.

Rounds of dialogue were previously held with the regime. Are they still ongoing?
The dialogue came to halt due to the regime’s stubborn and backwards mentality. Just days ago, a Syrian Democratic Council delegation was in Damascus, but it left emptyhanded because the regime rejects all solutions and initiatives that could lead to a political resolution of the Syrian crisis. We believe this stubbornness will not do it any good.

But military agreements with Damascus still stand.
The understandings hinge on Russia because it ensures that they continue. These understandings have not expanded to become comprehensive agreements because the regime is shirking its commitments and refuses to make any concessions that could build trust with it. This is hindering the possibility of military agreements being expanded to launch serious national political dialogue. We believe that any military understanding that is not backed by a political one will not last long, which we hope would never come to pass.

In the bigger picture, there has been talk about the formation of a Syrian military council. Is the SDF ready to take part in such a council that includes you, the regime and opposition?
I had previously said that we do not oppose joining any Syrian national military structure that achieves Syrian national goals in restoring security and stability in the country and preserves that the SDF. Such a council should not have a nationalist, religious or sectarian identity. It should instead believe in defending the nation and should not be subject to foreign agendas.

Is that possible?
Yes, as long as the will and determination are available and intentions are sincere.

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Interviews

Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: I Left Saddam Meeting Sensing he Misread Threat

There were exceptional communication channels between Saddam Hussein and King Hussein (AFP)
There were exceptional communication channels between Saddam Hussein and King Hussein (AFP)
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Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: I Left Saddam Meeting Sensing he Misread Threat

There were exceptional communication channels between Saddam Hussein and King Hussein (AFP)
There were exceptional communication channels between Saddam Hussein and King Hussein (AFP)

In the final part of his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, former Jordanian prime minister Ahmad Obeidat, who died earlier this month, recounted in detail his meetings with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and Syrian President Hafez al-Assad, and disclosed an alleged attempt by Rifaat al-Assad to assassinate former Jordanian prime minister Mudar Badran.

Obeidat began with his impression of Saddam following a 2001 meeting in Baghdad. He said he left convinced that the Iraqi leader “did not accurately understand the reality of the international situation, the trap that had been set for Iraq, nor the magnitude of the danger surrounding the country and what was coming.”

He also described how strong ties between the late King Hussein of Jordan and Assad deteriorated as the Iran-Iraq war intensified. “Exceptional channels of communication” opened between King Hussein and Saddam Hussein, he said, and those channels “thwarted Assad’s efforts to build an axis against Iraq.”

Obeidat further revealed that Rifaat al-Assad “sent a group to assassinate Mudar Badran” on the pretext that Jordan was harboring the Muslim Brotherhood and hosting training camps. “All of that was false,” he said, adding that the attempt was foiled and those involved were arrested.

Turning to the file of the Palestinian militant Abu Nidal, who split from Fatah, Obeidat recalled how Abu Iyad once “protected him from arrest,” before “the tables were turned,” in a reference to Abu Iyad later becoming one of Abu Nidal’s victims.

Asked about his history with Abu Nidal, Obeidat described him as “not an easy adversary.” Abu Nidal attacked Jordanian embassies and diplomats, he said, and was responsible for killing two or three ambassadors. He was also behind the assassination of the son of former prime minister Saeed al-Mufti, a diplomat at the Jordanian embassy in Bucharest, and wounded two ambassadors in separate operations.

When Obeidat served as prime minister in 1983-1984, Abu Nidal assassinated Fahd al-Qawasmi, the mayor of Hebron, during a visit to Amman.

Abu Nidal, Obeidat said, worked at different times for Syrian, Iraqi and Libyan intelligence services. “He was ready to work for the benefit of any intelligence service in any country and allowed them to control him,” he said. Syrian, Iraqi and Libyan intelligence used him more than once, and the Iraqis deployed him against Fatah in an effort to create splits and internal problems.

Abu Iyad had shielded Abu Nidal from detention when Fatah sought to arrest him, Obeidat said. “But in the end the tables were turned,” and Abu Iyad became one of his victims. It was said, he added, that Abu Iyad came to believe that Abu Nidal had begun working for “Zionist intelligence.”

As for Jordan’s response when its diplomats were targeted, Obeidat said that at the time he was prime minister and did not follow the security file closely due to the pressures of government. He was aware, however, that contacts were made to reach a deal to halt Abu Nidal’s operations in Jordan. “Their operations did indeed stop,” he said.

On coordination with major powers, Obeidat said Jordan cooperated with “any party that possessed information of interest to us,” except the Zionists. Relations with Syrian intelligence fluctuated between competition and brief periods of cooperation, after earlier periods of no contact.

He then recounted his 1979 meeting with Hafez al-Assad over accusations that Jordan was training members of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. Acting on instructions from King Hussein, Obeidat, then intelligence chief, and Prime Minister Mudar Badran met Assad to address the issue.

“We made clear to Hafez al-Assad that it was impossible for us to have camps training the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood,” he said. Jordan informed Assad that such camps were in Iraq and that Syrians were traveling via Jordan to Iraq using forged passports. Without lists of those names from Damascus, Jordan could not act.

“This is a Syrian problem, not a Jordanian one,” Obeidat said he told Assad. Jordan would not allow armed activity on its soil but needed Syrian intelligence cooperation and names to intervene effectively.

He acknowledged that tensions were aggravated when Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood leader, Mohammed Abdul Rahman Khalifeh, brought Syrian cleric Saeed Hawwa to meet King Hussein without informing the royal court or intelligence services. The move surprised the palace and embarrassed the intelligence service.

After investigating, Jordan discovered that a group of Syrians had entered the country, most intending to travel onward to Iraq. To prevent escalation with Damascus, Jordan asked them to leave, allowing limited humanitarian cases time to arrange residence elsewhere.

Obeidat described Assad as “a good listener” who did not comment during their meeting but later instructed Syrian intelligence to cooperate with Jordan. His dealings with Syrian intelligence chief Ali Duba were limited but manageable.

He dismissed suggestions that Ahmed Jibril was behind operations against Jordan, saying the more serious problem involved Rifaat al-Assad. Rifaat’s alleged plot to assassinate Badran was uncovered, with suspects arrested at the border and in an apartment in Amman’s Sweileh district. They possessed weapons and explosives and were tried before Jordan’s State Security Court.

In an earlier incident, Obeidat said, members of Rifaat’s force assassinated a Syrian political refugee in Amman.

Asked about challenges upon assuming the premiership, Obeidat cited financial strain. Arab and Gulf aid declined to near zero, while Jordanian workers returned from the Gulf after losing their jobs, placing heavy pressure on living conditions.

Security challenges included Abu Nidal’s activities. At the same time, relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization improved. King Hussein allowed the Palestinian National Council to convene in Amman in 1984, triggering a political crisis with Syria.

Several attempted attacks targeting Jordan and council members were foiled, Obeidat said. Syria exerted pressure to prevent attendance, but Jordan ensured the session’s success. Supporting the PLO after its recognition as the legitimate representative of the Palestinians became, in his words, a Jordanian necessity to prevent a political vacuum.

Obeidat described a later meeting with Yasser Arafat as cordial after earlier strained ties, and said he also met Abu Iyad at the royal court during the council’s session. He met George Habash later in Beirut, outside office.

He then revisited the 1968 Battle of Karameh. Fighters from Fatah “stood firm and fought bravely,” he said, though many were killed. Some trainees were left without weapons or guidance despite warnings that battle was imminent, leading to heavy casualties.

King Hussein, he said, “was very resolute” during the battle.

On his relationship with the monarch, Obeidat said King Hussein “respected those who respected themselves.” Their relationship cooled after the 1994 Wadi Araba peace treaty, which Obeidat opposed.

Jordanian intelligence, he stressed, did not conduct operations in Beirut in response to the assassination of Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tal, though he noted military intelligence operated separately.

Obeidat listed foreign leaders he met as prime minister, including Assad, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and Saddam Hussein. Meetings with Britain’s queen, Austria’s president and Spain’s king were protocol visits.

He described relations between King Hussein and Assad as once “good, frank and continuous,” with almost weekly contact, before shifting during the Iran-Iraq war as close ties formed between King Hussein and Saddam.

Recalling his 2001 Baghdad visit, Obeidat said Saddam spoke at length about sanctions and support for Palestinians. He reproached Jordan over its peace treaty and alluded to Hussein Kamel’s defection. Obeidat insisted Jordan had no role in that defection or in his return.

When Iraqi officials called for cutting oil supplies to Jordan, Obeidat told Saddam that such a move would effectively besiege the Jordanian people. Saddam responded, “I will never abandon the Jordanian people under any circumstances.”

In Obeidat’s final reflection, the meeting left a lasting impression. From Saddam’s remarks that day, he said, he concluded that the Iraqi leader did not fully comprehend the scale of the international threat facing his country, a judgment he carried with him long after the encounter.

Interviews

Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Gaddafi Tried to Assassinate King Hussein with Missile Given to Wadie Haddad

King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).
King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).
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Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Gaddafi Tried to Assassinate King Hussein with Missile Given to Wadie Haddad

King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).
King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).

In the second installment of his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, former Jordanian prime minister and intelligence chief Ahmad Obeidat recounts details of a missile plot to assassinate King Hussein, which he says was backed by Muammar Gaddafi and carried out through operatives linked to Wadie Haddad, head of the external operations arm of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

Obeidat, who also served as head of intelligence and as minister of interior and defense, revisits the confrontation between Israeli forces, the Jordanian army, and Palestinian guerrillas (fedayeen) in the border town of Karameh in March 1968, asserting that the Jordanian army “decided the battle,” but suffered a “moral defeat amid the fedayeen’s claims of victory.”

Obeidat died earlier this month. The interview was recorded before the “Al-Aqsa Flood,” whose aftermath delayed its publication. Below is the text of the second installment.
 

King Hussein inspects an Israeli tank left behind by occupying forces during the Battle of Karameh (Getty)

“Battle of Karameh”

Obeidat calls Karameh “a pivotal point of utmost importance,” especially for an army still reeling from the 1967 defeat and its withdrawal from the West Bank.

“The army lived the bitterness of that defeat,” he says. “It felt a moral, national, and pan-Arab responsibility.”

Karameh, he argues, offered a chance to restore the army’s fighting morale and reclaim some of its lost dignity.

“It was the army that settled the battle,” Obeidat says.

He credits Jordanian forces with thwarting Israeli attempts to build crossing bridges, destroying their vehicles on Jordanian soil and forcing, for the first time in Israel’s history, a request for a ceasefire. “The late King Hussein refused,” he adds.

Israel, he says, did not acknowledge a fifth of its casualties. Helicopters were evacuating the wounded who were “dripping with blood.”

He singles out artillery observation officers who advanced to the closest possible positions, relaying precise coordinates even as they effectively marked their own locations for shelling.

“The Jordanian soldier would identify his position near the Israeli army to be shelled,” he says, describing a willingness to die in order to restore dignity after the 1967 setback.

He says the declaration of “armed struggle” effectively erased the army’s role, presenting Palestinian fedayeen as the victors over Israel. “They monopolized the victory and ignored the army’s role entirely,” Obeidat says. “We emerged with a moral defeat in the face of their claims.”

He alleges that hundreds of millions of dollars in donations collected afterward, much of it going to Fatah, did not reach the Palestinian people but went to organizations and their leaders.

When the army entered Amman in September 1970, Obeidat says, it aimed to end what he describes as chaos: armed displays, roadblocks, arrests of soldiers on leave and interference in courts.

"When the army entered and began expelling the fedayeen from Amman, it swept through everything in its path. Even my own home, which I had recently rented after my abduction incident and which was close to the army’s command headquarters, was entered by the Jordanian army to search for fedayeen, while my family was inside the house at the time of the raid. My wife told them that her husband was an intelligence officer, but the Jordanian soldier replied, “Don’t lie.”

Obeidat says they did not leave the house until she contacted him, at which point he assigned one of his officers, the commander of an intelligence company, to speak with the army.

"Only then did they leave the house. The point is that the army swept areas without distinguishing between Jordanian and Palestinian; it wanted only to restore control over security. All of this forced me to send my family to my parents’ home in Irbid, in the north of the Kingdom."

He later describes what he calls a “state within a state,” extending from the Jordan Valley to Amman, after armed groups asserted authority over courts, roads, and civilian life.

On Syria’s intervention, Obeidat says Syrian forces entered northern Jordan flying Palestine Liberation Organization flags.

He later learned the decision was political, taken by the Baath Party, and that then-Defense Minister Hafez al-Assad complied reluctantly before Syrian tanks withdrew.

Iraq, he says, did not intervene. Obeidat affirms that he was told by Iraqi officials that neither the Iraqi state nor its forces intended to participate in any operation aimed at ending the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan.

According to one account, Iraqi leaders did not want to shoulder the political and diplomatic burden of the Palestinian issue or risk an uncalculated adventure.

He recounts another account, which he says he cannot adopt, according to which the operations command in the army was handled by a Pakistani figure. Under this account, Zia ul-Haq was receiving operational communications and sending messages that caused confusion among Iraqi and other forces, leading them to believe they would confront powerful strike units, prompting them to remain in a state of alert rather than engage.

He also recalls a meeting in which Palestinian figures, including Abu Iyad, reproached Iraqi President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr. Al-Bakr replied: “We are a state with one life. If we make a fundamental mistake, we end. You are like cats with seven lives.”

As director of intelligence, Obeidat says he dealt directly with operations attributed to Haddad.

Between 1975 and 1977, he says, a missile was sent to Jordan with a group led by a Jordanian, Brik al-Hadid, affiliated with the PFLP. The target was King Hussein’s aircraft.

“The intention was to strike the plane, with Gaddafi’s knowledge and approval,” Obeidat says.

Jordanian intelligence monitored the group from the outset and later arrested its members. The king’s aircraft departed Marka military airport as scheduled but flew in the opposite direction to its planned route as a precaution, using jamming devices against any incoming missiles.

When confronted by Mudar Badran, then head of the Royal Court, Gaddafi denied knowledge. “I have no information,” Obeidat quotes him as saying.

Obeidat describes the aircraft hijackings orchestrated by Haddad as “the straw that broke the camel’s back,” contributing to the army’s intervention.

He says Jordanian intelligence had infiltrated Fatah and monitored its leaders, including Abu Iyad and Abu Yusuf al-Najjar.

In mid-1972, intelligence learned that Abu Dawood and a group were planning to enter Jordan from Baghdad to seize the Jordanian cabinet during a session and hold ministers hostage in exchange for the release of detained Fatah members.

The group crossed in three Mercedes cars, dressed in traditional Arab attire, with weapons concealed inside the seats and forged passports in hand. They were arrested at the border after a thorough search.

Obeidat rejects claims by Abu Iyad that Abu Dawood was tortured, insisting that “not a single hair on his head was touched,” and says Abu Dawood confessed only after realizing the operation had been fully uncovered.

Later, King Hussein met Abu Dawood’s parents, who pleaded for clemency. The king read the full confession and then met Abu Dawood himself. He ultimately ordered his release, honoring a promise he had made to Abu Dawood’s parents.

In Obeidat’s view, Abu Dawood was affected by the king’s treatment of his parents and “did not pose any future threat to Jordan.”

Obeidat describes a direct relationship between King Hussein and the General Intelligence Department.

The king met with officers regularly, not only to hear briefings but also to hear their personal views. 

Obeidat says he would submit reports to the prime minister and also meet with the king. When addressing the king, however, it was sometimes necessary to elaborate verbally on certain issues so that such information would not circulate among staff. 

When he was asked to present a security briefing before the king, the late King Hussein would summon Crown Prince Hassan. The king’s advisers would also attend, along with senior army commanders, the public security leadership, the head of the Royal Court, and the prime minister. The briefing of the security report would include an explanation of the security situation and any external or internal challenges.

 

Interviews

Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Mystery Sniper Killed Wasfi Tal

Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Mystery Sniper Killed Wasfi Tal

Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Former Jordanian Prime Minister Ahmad Obeidat, who died earlier this month, was both a key player and a witness to sensitive chapters in his country’s history.

Obeidat began his career in the 1970s as an assistant director of intelligence, later serving as head of the General Intelligence Department until 1982. At the height of the Palestinian-Jordanian confrontation, he was abducted by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine before the events of September 1970.

He also served for two years as interior minister before King Hussein appointed him prime minister in early 1984, a post he held until April 1985, concurrently serving as defense minister.

For more than 15 years, Obeidat remained at the center of decision-making. He later took on roles drawing on his legal background, from chairing the Royal Commission that drafted the National Charter in the early 1990s to serving in human rights and judicial positions, most recently as head of the board of trustees of the National Center for Human Rights until 2008.

Weeks before Oct. 7, 2023, the day of the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation, Asharq Al-Awsat met Obeidat in Amman. The interview had been scheduled for publication in October 2023, but the major developments that followed led to its postponement, particularly as Obeidat addressed contentious issues, notably Jordanian-Palestinian relations.

In the first part of the interview, Obeidat revisits his formative years, when his political and professional journey began as a law student in Baghdad on the eve of the July 14, 1958 revolution, before returning to Iraq after the fall of the monarchy amid sweeping regional transformations.

The account moves to his early professional life in Jordan, from a brief stint in legal practice to joining the Public Security Directorate, then serving in the Political Investigations Office, which formed the nucleus of organized intelligence work. It concludes with a detailed narrative of the establishment of the General Intelligence Department in 1964, its early structure and founding members, at a time when the Jordanian state was rebuilding its institutions in an intensely turbulent region.

Asked where he was when the 1958 revolution broke out in Iraq, Obeidat said he had completed his first year in law studies and returned to Jordan for the summer break.

“While I was in Irbid, news arrived of the July 14 revolution in Iraq that overthrew the monarchy. After the summer break ended, I went back to Baghdad, where a republican government under Abdul Karim Qassem had taken power,” he recalled.

The return was not easy. “We faced difficulties on the road. The border between Jordan and Iraq was nearly closed, so we had to return via Damascus and then through desert routes to Baghdad. It was an exhausting journey,” he added.

Obeidat left Baghdad in 1961 after completing his final exams. “On the last day of exams in the fourth year, I went home, packed and returned to Jordan the same day. The border between Baghdad and Amman had reopened.”

Among his contemporaries at law school was Saddam Hussein, who studied in the evening section. Obeidat said he saw him only once by chance. “He was with others, one of whom later became a governor,” he revealed.

He returned to Baghdad again in 1983 as Jordan’s interior minister to attend a conference of Arab interior ministers, more than two decades after graduating. There, he met his Iraqi counterpart, Saadoun Shaker. “It was an ordinary relationship,” Obeidat said, describing the ties as largely ceremonial.

From customs to intelligence

After returning to Jordan in 1961, Obeidat initially considered practicing law. But limited opportunities in Irbid and his family’s financial constraints led him to seek public employment.

He was appointed to the Customs Department in Amman, where he worked for several months before joining the Public Security Directorate in April 1962 as a first lieutenant following three months of training at the police academy.

At the time, there was no separate intelligence agency. Public Security included a branch handling general investigations. Soon after, the Political Investigations Office was formed, staffed by legal officers from the army and Public Security, including Mudar Badran and Adeeb Tahaoub from military justice, alongside Obeidat and Tariq Alaaeddin from Public Security.

The office handled cases referred by security and official bodies, including military intelligence and the Royal Court. After reviewing its work, the late King Hussein ordered the establishment of a legally grounded intelligence body. The General Intelligence Law was issued in 1964, formally creating the department, explained Obeidat.

Mohammad Rasoul Al-Kilani became its first director, followed by Mudar Badran, then Nadhir Rashid. Al-Kilani briefly returned before Obeidat assumed the post, succeeded later by Tariq Alaaeddin.

The shock of 1967

Recalling the 1967 war, Obeidat described it as “a defeat, not a setback. A military, political, psychological, and social defeat in every sense.”

He said there was no institutional intelligence view on Jordan’s participation. “The political opinion of a figure of Wasfi Tal’s stature was that entering the 1967 war was a mistake. He was not in office, but he remained close to the king and influential,” said Obeidat.

According to Obeidat, King Hussein believed Israel would occupy the West Bank whether Jordan participated or not.

“Participation was a gamble that might succeed or fail. The catastrophe was discovering that the Egyptian air force had been destroyed within half an hour,” he added.

Despite the bitterness, he said: “We did not fear for the regime, but we sought to contain public anger and absorb the shock.”

September and the assassination of Wasfi Tal

Obeidat first met Yasser Arafat after the events of September 1970. He confirmed that Arafat left Amman with an official Arab delegation to attend the Cairo summit and returned immediately afterward.

He recalled being informed mid-flight of the death of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. “King Hussein was deeply affected.”

On the assassination of Prime Minister Wasfi Tal in Cairo, Obeidat said the gunmen who confronted Tal at the hotel entrance were not responsible for the fatal shot. “The fatal bullet came from behind, from a sniper in another unseen location. To this day, the sniper has not been identified,” he added.

He rejected the notion that Tal had been reckless. “Wasfi was not a gambler. He had a distinct political project,” he stressed.

Obeidat said the Black September Organization accused Tal of ordering the expulsion of fedayeen from forested areas in Jerash and Ajloun. He denied that Tal was directly responsible, saying the clashes began after fedayeen attacked a police station and killed officers, prompting a spontaneous army response.

Abduction without interrogation

Before September 1970, Obeidat was abducted by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine while serving as assistant intelligence director.

Armed vehicles stopped his car as he was leaving his home in Jabal Al-Taj with his family. He and his brother-in-law were taken to the Wehdat camp. “We were treated politely. We drank tea. No one asked me a single question,” he recalled.

After several hours, he was driven to another house in Amman and later returned home. The next morning, members of Fatah took him briefly to one of their offices, only to release him on foot without explanation.

“Not a single question was asked,” Obeidat said. “It was bewildering.”

He resumed his duties after ensuring his family’s safety. “At the time, intelligence, like any official institution, was threatened and targeted,” he said, reflecting on one of the most volatile periods in Jordan’s modern history.