Iraq PM to Asharq Al-Awsat: We Are Destined to Rid Ourselves of Foreign Hegemony

Kadhimi condemns rocket attacks, underlines close cooperation with Saudi Arabia

Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi at his office in Baghdad on June 4, 2020. (Reuters)
Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi at his office in Baghdad on June 4, 2020. (Reuters)
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Iraq PM to Asharq Al-Awsat: We Are Destined to Rid Ourselves of Foreign Hegemony

Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi at his office in Baghdad on June 4, 2020. (Reuters)
Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi at his office in Baghdad on June 4, 2020. (Reuters)

Baghdad is preparing to welcome on Friday Pope Francis I, who will be embarking on a historic visit that underlines “coexistence and tolerance” and highlights Iraq’s efforts to restore the authority of its state institutions and its role in the region and world. Iraq is bracing for a number of developments, starting with how the relations between Iran and the new American administration will unfold. Many believe that the “heated” state of affairs in Iraq can be blamed on the strained relations between Washington and Tehran. How these ties develop or deteriorate will naturally have an impact on the upcoming early elections in Iraq that will reflect the influence enjoyed by parties, factions and the state alike.

Iraqi Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi sat down for an interview with Asharq Al-Awsat to address these issues and more. The interview was supposed to be held in Baghdad, but the coronavirus pandemic forced it to be held virtually:

You are preparing for Pope Francis’ first ever visit. How do you view it?
The visit for us and all of our people, without exception, reflects the pope’s understanding and support for the approach of tolerance and national partnership among all Iraqis, regardless of their religious and sectarian affiliations. The visit is a gesture by the pope aimed at highlighting Iraq’s standing, which has been consolidated throughout history as a cradle of civilizations, human heritage, monotheistic religions, cultures and discoveries.

The pope is expected to meet with top Shiite authority Ali al-Sistani. Is this a message that underlines coexistence? Will a certain document be released to underscore this?
One aspect of the visit as a whole is aimed at stressing coexistence between Christians and Muslims, and religions and sects, in spite of the unfortunate developments that had impacted everyone. The visit aims to highlight the positives. An official source from Sistani’s office had previously said that the pope will not sign any document during his meeting with the high authority.

Will the visit pose a security challenge given ISIS attacks and the practices of armed groups? Do all major political blocs welcome the visit?
The government is not facing any fundamental challenges on the security level. The government and security agencies have taken the necessary measures that should secure the Pontiff’s movement and safety. Moreover, he will be protected by the Iraqis wherever he is because the people of Iraq highly appreciate his humanitarian positions. The preparations to welcome him reflect the high standing and regard in which everyone perceives the pope.

You were credited with helping Iraq avoid an Iranian-American military confrontation during Trump’s tenure. Can you reveal some details?
I did nothing more in this regard than what my duty in protecting Iraq and the Iraqis demand. We have repeatedly firmly stressed our rejection of turning our country into an arena for a proxy war or for Iraq to be used as a platform to launch attacks. This is a constant policy that we have sought to consolidate and we have worked on applying it on the ground.

At the same time, we have invested our positive and balanced ties with all sides towards easing tensions and escalation in the region. The fate of Iraq lies in the hands of the Iraqis alone. There is a regional and international understanding of Iraq’s role and standing and its people’s desire that no one meddle in their country’s internal affairs. We have told everyone: We are not an open arena. A strong and united Iraq will act as a positive factor in cementing security, peace and cooperation in the region and world.

I would like to add that the attempt to weaken Iraq or take it out of international and regional equations has had dire consequences on all sides. Even though the world viewed ISIS as a dangerous international threat, the Iraqis on the ground confronted and defeated it through the help of their neighbors and friends.

Our intelligence agencies and security forces all came together recently, uncovering ISIS’ movements, cells, leaderships and hideouts, which they surrounded and defeated. This confirms that the stability of Iraq is necessary for the region and world. This is something we seek to underscore and consolidate.

Do you believe the rocket attacks against the the Green Zone and American bases are part of the vengeance for the killing of [Iranian Quds Force commander] Qassem Soleimani or part of pressure on Washington to lift sanctions against Iran and resume negotiations?
From our end and based on our mutual interests, we believe that the best way to restore normal relations in the region lies in diplomatic consultations and negotiations that can reach balanced solutions that meet everyone’s demands. Those resorting to threats and the use of force will eventually find themselves on the losing end, sooner or later. Such an approach does not benefit anyone, rather it goes against the interests of the peoples of the region and only fuels instability and tensions.

Our security agencies are monitoring outlawed groups that are trying to reshuffle cards through their rocket attacks. Suspects have been detained and they will appear before the judiciary. Our one and only choice is the Iraqi state and respect for its laws, agreements and decisions. Decisions of war and peace are taken by the state alone, not individuals or groups. Any violation of the state will be confronted by the rule of law and the judiciary.

Some sides believe that they can usurp the state’s voice and decision-making power. Those sides are nothing more than outlawed criminals. We will pursue them and uncover their malign goals. In fact, some of those bullying the state, its system, laws and sovereignty now believe their illusions, which were shaped during past circumstances. These circumstances have now changed. We will not allow violations to be committed at the expense of the Iraqi people. Our people’s aspirations dictate our actions and choices. Any other option that contradicts the will of the people will be defeated.

The use of Iraqi territories to deliver political messages is only permissible when they are sent through diplomatic channels and political methods. We are doing this out of the sense of responsibility towards our people and based on our drive to cement calm in the region. We will not allow rocket or terrorist messages. No country has the right to deliver messages to others at the expense of the security and stability of our people. The Iraqi government, people and political forces reject any meddling in their internal affairs.

Where are the relations between Baghdad and Washington headed? Is Iran insisting on the United States’ complete military withdrawal from Iraq? Will NATO replace American forces? Is the American military necessary for you in confronting a possible resurgence of ISIS?
Our ties with Washington are bound by agreements that have been ratified by the legislative authority. These agreements underscore our commitment to our national sovereignty and interests. The presence of American and international coalition forces does not go beyond these agreements. We have reiterated this whenever Iraqi-American ties are discussed.

Iraq needed international help in the war against ISIS. This pushed us to launch the strategic dialogue with the US in order to set the arrangements for the post-war phase. The arrangements are mainly tied to training, logistic support and joint efforts to combat ISIS and terrorism.

Iraq and its government alone decide the fate of foreign forces deployed in their country, regardless of their identity. This decision, which is ultimately about national sovereignty, is not connected to other goals.

How do you assess the improvement in relations with Saudi Arabia on various levels? Will you visit Riyadh soon?
We are keen on establishing the best relations with Arab countries, our neighbors and the world. With Saudi Arabia, we are bound with ties of fraternity, joint history, culture and constant interests. We are satisfied with the development of relations between our countries and the growing tangible business cooperation. Visits are constantly being made by officials from both countries. I also held a successful virtual meeting with my brother Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman as part of the Iraqi-Saudi coordination council. We are in constant contact and nothing but the coronavirus pandemic is impeding mutual visits.

Some sides have spoken of the possible formation of an axis that includes Iraq, Egypt and Jordan. Is this currently on the table? Is this the new “Mashreq” (Orient) that you spoke about?
We are not inclined to join axes or groupings that imply alignment or isolation. We only seek agreements that help promote joint efforts that benefit the interests of our people and countries. It may be beneficial to lay the foundation for model relations with an Arab or regional country without it having to devolve into a negative grouping. We are bolstering our ties with Egypt and Jordan based on this approach.

The concept of the new Mashreq is based on prioritizing the common interests of regional countries and dispelling doubts and illusions. Our region boasts all the factors that allow not only the establishment of joint security, but a system of deep cooperation that would allow us all to translate our human, cultural and natural potential into a productive global cooperation system. This would replace the cycle of crises and conflicts. The cooperation can start by building on common factors and modernizing our way of thinking. Terrorism is the region’s main enemy. Doubts, lack of communication and the neglect of common factors are part of the problems of our region that need to be addressed.

Turning to the future requires the use of the tools of the future, not the past. In spite all of its crises, the region is ready to make this choice.

Do you think that the goal to restore the authority of the state is moving forward despite the assassination of activists, rocket attacks and spread of illegal arms? Do you expect actual results from the early elections?
From the moment this government came to power, it acknowledged that Iraq is suffering from the severe tensions between the state - with all of its elements, values, laws, defenders and supporters - and the forces of the “non-state” - with all of their hurdles and deliberate attempts to marginalize and undermine the state or weaken its ability to protect the people and achieve stability and security.

It is no secret that since the ouster of the authoritarian Saddam Hussein regime, Iraq has endured difficult and complicated circumstances. It was not prepared to meet the aspirations of our people that were calling for completing the process of rebuilding the state and its institutions. Takfiri terrorism, remnants of the Baath regime, the unfortunate sectarian conflict, security chaos, corruption, reluctance to introduce reform and positive change and achieve national unity all prevented the rebuilding of a national state system along constitutional lines.

It is also obvious that some of these factors are still present and still obstructing state work. Financial and administrative corruption are other factors at play. The project to restore state authority primarily requires continued political efforts that connect with all economic, social and military elements. It also needs to establish an environment of social reconciliation and a political desire that can restore the state for all Iraqis. Here, we must stress that the project of building a state is an accumulative process that does not come to a halt over a minor detail.

Early elections are a popular demand that has been expressed clearly by all members of society and has been backed by the top Shiite authority and all political forces – whether out of their own conviction or just to humor the people. Transparent and fair elections are at the heart of our duty in this government. Holding them will help rebuild the trust that has unfortunately grown between the people and state institutions.

The Iraqi government appears caught in a tight spot between Tehran, Washington, the Iranian supreme leader and Sistani. Can Iraq become a normal independent state away from foreign hegemony?
Iraq is destined to become an independent state away from foreign hegemony and the fate of peoples has always been the rejection of foreign dictates. We cannot say that Iraq today is living under international or foreign hegemony. Rather, political circumstances and grave errors that have been committed against the people for decades have helped transform the country into an open ground for ambitions and adventures and excessive extremist violence. The state today is trying to regain its balance and seeking success by imposing this balance against opponents. It is seeking to consolidate positive relations with neighbors and the international community and the spirit of dialogue and national responsibility, which are key to reclaiming the state and rejecting its transformation once again into an open arena for others.

Are the armed factions preventing serious efforts to capture those behind the assassination of activists and thwarting efforts to combat major corrupt figures?
We have made strides in cracking down on and arresting those behind the assassinations. We have also recently captured one of the largest death squads in Basra. Dozens of suspects and fugitives have been arrested for their involvement in assassinations. As we have previously said, the state chooses the right time to wage its battle - which has not stopped - against the assassination, kidnapping, extortion and drug gangs.

We started the battle against corruption with boldness despite the objections and threats that we received. We formed a committee to combat corruption and succeeded in uncovering several acts of fraud. Verdicts and sentences have been issued against corrupt figures who were previously thought to be untouchable.

Our way of achieving the government agenda relies on constitutional mechanisms and the law, away from the politicization of the fight against corruption, criminal gangs and illegal weapons. An unbiased reading of the government’s achievements in a short period of time will clearly demonstrate what has been achieved away from the media spotlight or political debates.

Are you seeking a second term as prime minister? Why haven’t you stepped down as head of intelligence? Have the agencies discovered attempts against your life?
I was chosen to lead Iraq through a very specific transitional phase. I hope that I would succeed in this national mission during this critical time. I will in no way allow the results of the elections to impact this mission. My position allows me to oversee the armed forces. This does not contradict with my continued responsibility towards an important apparatus in its security agencies. What I am concerned about is motivating our agencies to be constantly vigilant in uncovering terrorist cells and forces that want to target the security of Iraq and its people.

Today, I am focused on leading the country towards safety and preventing it from sliding towards a dangerous position that would impact the security, unity and future of our people. My duty before our people and history is focused on protecting the state - today and in the future - against attempts to again put it at risk.

Do you think ties between Baghdad and Erbil are as they should be?
If you want me to compare between the current state of relations and our common aspirations for the ties to develop into national partnership based on the constitution and meeting the demands of our people in Kurdistan, then the answer would be no. The ongoing dialogue between Kurdish Region delegations and the federal government aims to achieve the partnership that we aspire for with our brothers in Kurdistan. We want to achieve the goals of the Kurds as we do the goals of Iraqis throughout the country. The government has helped eliminate differences with the Kurdistan Region. Everything ultimately hinges on what the parliament decides on the budget and other issues.

We believe that meeting commitments in line with the constitution and resolving any dispute with Kurdistan is a primary factor in the recovery of political life, consolidating stability and defeating terrorism and all other forces that want to harm Iraq.

How do you assess the situation in Syria and its impact on Iraq’s stability?
Anything that harms Syria and its people will harm us and the interests of our people. We believe that whatever happens in Syria will impact its surroundings, especially Iraq, whether we like it or not. ISIS still has footholds along our border with Syria. This poses a danger to both our countries and people. This is the primary concern in our bilateral relations.

How do you describe current relations between Baghdad and Beirut?
Our relations with our brothers in Lebanon are good and promising. We are in communication with and sympathize with them in all the efforts they are taking to ease their crisis. We are ready to extend a brotherly helping hand as much as our circumstances allow us.

How much are you concerned with the ongoing Turkish operations inside Iraqi territories?
We are concerned with anything that harms our sovereignty and interests. The positive bonds we enjoy with our Turkish neighbor help ease our concerns. The recent statements by the Turkish president that he wanted to dispel our concern over our relations are reassuring.



Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: I Left Saddam Meeting Sensing he Misread Threat

There were exceptional communication channels between Saddam Hussein and King Hussein (AFP)
There were exceptional communication channels between Saddam Hussein and King Hussein (AFP)
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Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: I Left Saddam Meeting Sensing he Misread Threat

There were exceptional communication channels between Saddam Hussein and King Hussein (AFP)
There were exceptional communication channels between Saddam Hussein and King Hussein (AFP)

In the final part of his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, former Jordanian prime minister Ahmad Obeidat, who died earlier this month, recounted in detail his meetings with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and Syrian President Hafez al-Assad, and disclosed an alleged attempt by Rifaat al-Assad to assassinate former Jordanian prime minister Mudar Badran.

Obeidat began with his impression of Saddam following a 2001 meeting in Baghdad. He said he left convinced that the Iraqi leader “did not accurately understand the reality of the international situation, the trap that had been set for Iraq, nor the magnitude of the danger surrounding the country and what was coming.”

He also described how strong ties between the late King Hussein of Jordan and Assad deteriorated as the Iran-Iraq war intensified. “Exceptional channels of communication” opened between King Hussein and Saddam Hussein, he said, and those channels “thwarted Assad’s efforts to build an axis against Iraq.”

Obeidat further revealed that Rifaat al-Assad “sent a group to assassinate Mudar Badran” on the pretext that Jordan was harboring the Muslim Brotherhood and hosting training camps. “All of that was false,” he said, adding that the attempt was foiled and those involved were arrested.

Turning to the file of the Palestinian militant Abu Nidal, who split from Fatah, Obeidat recalled how Abu Iyad once “protected him from arrest,” before “the tables were turned,” in a reference to Abu Iyad later becoming one of Abu Nidal’s victims.

Asked about his history with Abu Nidal, Obeidat described him as “not an easy adversary.” Abu Nidal attacked Jordanian embassies and diplomats, he said, and was responsible for killing two or three ambassadors. He was also behind the assassination of the son of former prime minister Saeed al-Mufti, a diplomat at the Jordanian embassy in Bucharest, and wounded two ambassadors in separate operations.

When Obeidat served as prime minister in 1983-1984, Abu Nidal assassinated Fahd al-Qawasmi, the mayor of Hebron, during a visit to Amman.

Abu Nidal, Obeidat said, worked at different times for Syrian, Iraqi and Libyan intelligence services. “He was ready to work for the benefit of any intelligence service in any country and allowed them to control him,” he said. Syrian, Iraqi and Libyan intelligence used him more than once, and the Iraqis deployed him against Fatah in an effort to create splits and internal problems.

Abu Iyad had shielded Abu Nidal from detention when Fatah sought to arrest him, Obeidat said. “But in the end the tables were turned,” and Abu Iyad became one of his victims. It was said, he added, that Abu Iyad came to believe that Abu Nidal had begun working for “Zionist intelligence.”

As for Jordan’s response when its diplomats were targeted, Obeidat said that at the time he was prime minister and did not follow the security file closely due to the pressures of government. He was aware, however, that contacts were made to reach a deal to halt Abu Nidal’s operations in Jordan. “Their operations did indeed stop,” he said.

On coordination with major powers, Obeidat said Jordan cooperated with “any party that possessed information of interest to us,” except the Zionists. Relations with Syrian intelligence fluctuated between competition and brief periods of cooperation, after earlier periods of no contact.

He then recounted his 1979 meeting with Hafez al-Assad over accusations that Jordan was training members of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. Acting on instructions from King Hussein, Obeidat, then intelligence chief, and Prime Minister Mudar Badran met Assad to address the issue.

“We made clear to Hafez al-Assad that it was impossible for us to have camps training the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood,” he said. Jordan informed Assad that such camps were in Iraq and that Syrians were traveling via Jordan to Iraq using forged passports. Without lists of those names from Damascus, Jordan could not act.

“This is a Syrian problem, not a Jordanian one,” Obeidat said he told Assad. Jordan would not allow armed activity on its soil but needed Syrian intelligence cooperation and names to intervene effectively.

He acknowledged that tensions were aggravated when Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood leader, Mohammed Abdul Rahman Khalifeh, brought Syrian cleric Saeed Hawwa to meet King Hussein without informing the royal court or intelligence services. The move surprised the palace and embarrassed the intelligence service.

After investigating, Jordan discovered that a group of Syrians had entered the country, most intending to travel onward to Iraq. To prevent escalation with Damascus, Jordan asked them to leave, allowing limited humanitarian cases time to arrange residence elsewhere.

Obeidat described Assad as “a good listener” who did not comment during their meeting but later instructed Syrian intelligence to cooperate with Jordan. His dealings with Syrian intelligence chief Ali Duba were limited but manageable.

He dismissed suggestions that Ahmed Jibril was behind operations against Jordan, saying the more serious problem involved Rifaat al-Assad. Rifaat’s alleged plot to assassinate Badran was uncovered, with suspects arrested at the border and in an apartment in Amman’s Sweileh district. They possessed weapons and explosives and were tried before Jordan’s State Security Court.

In an earlier incident, Obeidat said, members of Rifaat’s force assassinated a Syrian political refugee in Amman.

Asked about challenges upon assuming the premiership, Obeidat cited financial strain. Arab and Gulf aid declined to near zero, while Jordanian workers returned from the Gulf after losing their jobs, placing heavy pressure on living conditions.

Security challenges included Abu Nidal’s activities. At the same time, relations with the Palestine Liberation Organization improved. King Hussein allowed the Palestinian National Council to convene in Amman in 1984, triggering a political crisis with Syria.

Several attempted attacks targeting Jordan and council members were foiled, Obeidat said. Syria exerted pressure to prevent attendance, but Jordan ensured the session’s success. Supporting the PLO after its recognition as the legitimate representative of the Palestinians became, in his words, a Jordanian necessity to prevent a political vacuum.

Obeidat described a later meeting with Yasser Arafat as cordial after earlier strained ties, and said he also met Abu Iyad at the royal court during the council’s session. He met George Habash later in Beirut, outside office.

He then revisited the 1968 Battle of Karameh. Fighters from Fatah “stood firm and fought bravely,” he said, though many were killed. Some trainees were left without weapons or guidance despite warnings that battle was imminent, leading to heavy casualties.

King Hussein, he said, “was very resolute” during the battle.

On his relationship with the monarch, Obeidat said King Hussein “respected those who respected themselves.” Their relationship cooled after the 1994 Wadi Araba peace treaty, which Obeidat opposed.

Jordanian intelligence, he stressed, did not conduct operations in Beirut in response to the assassination of Prime Minister Wasfi al-Tal, though he noted military intelligence operated separately.

Obeidat listed foreign leaders he met as prime minister, including Assad, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and Saddam Hussein. Meetings with Britain’s queen, Austria’s president and Spain’s king were protocol visits.

He described relations between King Hussein and Assad as once “good, frank and continuous,” with almost weekly contact, before shifting during the Iran-Iraq war as close ties formed between King Hussein and Saddam.

Recalling his 2001 Baghdad visit, Obeidat said Saddam spoke at length about sanctions and support for Palestinians. He reproached Jordan over its peace treaty and alluded to Hussein Kamel’s defection. Obeidat insisted Jordan had no role in that defection or in his return.

When Iraqi officials called for cutting oil supplies to Jordan, Obeidat told Saddam that such a move would effectively besiege the Jordanian people. Saddam responded, “I will never abandon the Jordanian people under any circumstances.”

In Obeidat’s final reflection, the meeting left a lasting impression. From Saddam’s remarks that day, he said, he concluded that the Iraqi leader did not fully comprehend the scale of the international threat facing his country, a judgment he carried with him long after the encounter.


Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Gaddafi Tried to Assassinate King Hussein with Missile Given to Wadie Haddad

King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).
King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).
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Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Gaddafi Tried to Assassinate King Hussein with Missile Given to Wadie Haddad

King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).
King Hussein and Moammar Gaddafi holding talks on the sidelines of an Arab summit in Cairo in 1970 (AFP).

In the second installment of his interview with Asharq Al-Awsat, former Jordanian prime minister and intelligence chief Ahmad Obeidat recounts details of a missile plot to assassinate King Hussein, which he says was backed by Muammar Gaddafi and carried out through operatives linked to Wadie Haddad, head of the external operations arm of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine.

Obeidat, who also served as head of intelligence and as minister of interior and defense, revisits the confrontation between Israeli forces, the Jordanian army, and Palestinian guerrillas (fedayeen) in the border town of Karameh in March 1968, asserting that the Jordanian army “decided the battle,” but suffered a “moral defeat amid the fedayeen’s claims of victory.”

Obeidat died earlier this month. The interview was recorded before the “Al-Aqsa Flood,” whose aftermath delayed its publication. Below is the text of the second installment.
 

King Hussein inspects an Israeli tank left behind by occupying forces during the Battle of Karameh (Getty)

“Battle of Karameh”

Obeidat calls Karameh “a pivotal point of utmost importance,” especially for an army still reeling from the 1967 defeat and its withdrawal from the West Bank.

“The army lived the bitterness of that defeat,” he says. “It felt a moral, national, and pan-Arab responsibility.”

Karameh, he argues, offered a chance to restore the army’s fighting morale and reclaim some of its lost dignity.

“It was the army that settled the battle,” Obeidat says.

He credits Jordanian forces with thwarting Israeli attempts to build crossing bridges, destroying their vehicles on Jordanian soil and forcing, for the first time in Israel’s history, a request for a ceasefire. “The late King Hussein refused,” he adds.

Israel, he says, did not acknowledge a fifth of its casualties. Helicopters were evacuating the wounded who were “dripping with blood.”

He singles out artillery observation officers who advanced to the closest possible positions, relaying precise coordinates even as they effectively marked their own locations for shelling.

“The Jordanian soldier would identify his position near the Israeli army to be shelled,” he says, describing a willingness to die in order to restore dignity after the 1967 setback.

He says the declaration of “armed struggle” effectively erased the army’s role, presenting Palestinian fedayeen as the victors over Israel. “They monopolized the victory and ignored the army’s role entirely,” Obeidat says. “We emerged with a moral defeat in the face of their claims.”

He alleges that hundreds of millions of dollars in donations collected afterward, much of it going to Fatah, did not reach the Palestinian people but went to organizations and their leaders.

When the army entered Amman in September 1970, Obeidat says, it aimed to end what he describes as chaos: armed displays, roadblocks, arrests of soldiers on leave and interference in courts.

"When the army entered and began expelling the fedayeen from Amman, it swept through everything in its path. Even my own home, which I had recently rented after my abduction incident and which was close to the army’s command headquarters, was entered by the Jordanian army to search for fedayeen, while my family was inside the house at the time of the raid. My wife told them that her husband was an intelligence officer, but the Jordanian soldier replied, “Don’t lie.”

Obeidat says they did not leave the house until she contacted him, at which point he assigned one of his officers, the commander of an intelligence company, to speak with the army.

"Only then did they leave the house. The point is that the army swept areas without distinguishing between Jordanian and Palestinian; it wanted only to restore control over security. All of this forced me to send my family to my parents’ home in Irbid, in the north of the Kingdom."

He later describes what he calls a “state within a state,” extending from the Jordan Valley to Amman, after armed groups asserted authority over courts, roads, and civilian life.

On Syria’s intervention, Obeidat says Syrian forces entered northern Jordan flying Palestine Liberation Organization flags.

He later learned the decision was political, taken by the Baath Party, and that then-Defense Minister Hafez al-Assad complied reluctantly before Syrian tanks withdrew.

Iraq, he says, did not intervene. Obeidat affirms that he was told by Iraqi officials that neither the Iraqi state nor its forces intended to participate in any operation aimed at ending the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan.

According to one account, Iraqi leaders did not want to shoulder the political and diplomatic burden of the Palestinian issue or risk an uncalculated adventure.

He recounts another account, which he says he cannot adopt, according to which the operations command in the army was handled by a Pakistani figure. Under this account, Zia ul-Haq was receiving operational communications and sending messages that caused confusion among Iraqi and other forces, leading them to believe they would confront powerful strike units, prompting them to remain in a state of alert rather than engage.

He also recalls a meeting in which Palestinian figures, including Abu Iyad, reproached Iraqi President Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr. Al-Bakr replied: “We are a state with one life. If we make a fundamental mistake, we end. You are like cats with seven lives.”

As director of intelligence, Obeidat says he dealt directly with operations attributed to Haddad.

Between 1975 and 1977, he says, a missile was sent to Jordan with a group led by a Jordanian, Brik al-Hadid, affiliated with the PFLP. The target was King Hussein’s aircraft.

“The intention was to strike the plane, with Gaddafi’s knowledge and approval,” Obeidat says.

Jordanian intelligence monitored the group from the outset and later arrested its members. The king’s aircraft departed Marka military airport as scheduled but flew in the opposite direction to its planned route as a precaution, using jamming devices against any incoming missiles.

When confronted by Mudar Badran, then head of the Royal Court, Gaddafi denied knowledge. “I have no information,” Obeidat quotes him as saying.

Obeidat describes the aircraft hijackings orchestrated by Haddad as “the straw that broke the camel’s back,” contributing to the army’s intervention.

He says Jordanian intelligence had infiltrated Fatah and monitored its leaders, including Abu Iyad and Abu Yusuf al-Najjar.

In mid-1972, intelligence learned that Abu Dawood and a group were planning to enter Jordan from Baghdad to seize the Jordanian cabinet during a session and hold ministers hostage in exchange for the release of detained Fatah members.

The group crossed in three Mercedes cars, dressed in traditional Arab attire, with weapons concealed inside the seats and forged passports in hand. They were arrested at the border after a thorough search.

Obeidat rejects claims by Abu Iyad that Abu Dawood was tortured, insisting that “not a single hair on his head was touched,” and says Abu Dawood confessed only after realizing the operation had been fully uncovered.

Later, King Hussein met Abu Dawood’s parents, who pleaded for clemency. The king read the full confession and then met Abu Dawood himself. He ultimately ordered his release, honoring a promise he had made to Abu Dawood’s parents.

In Obeidat’s view, Abu Dawood was affected by the king’s treatment of his parents and “did not pose any future threat to Jordan.”

Obeidat describes a direct relationship between King Hussein and the General Intelligence Department.

The king met with officers regularly, not only to hear briefings but also to hear their personal views. 

Obeidat says he would submit reports to the prime minister and also meet with the king. When addressing the king, however, it was sometimes necessary to elaborate verbally on certain issues so that such information would not circulate among staff. 

When he was asked to present a security briefing before the king, the late King Hussein would summon Crown Prince Hassan. The king’s advisers would also attend, along with senior army commanders, the public security leadership, the head of the Royal Court, and the prime minister. The briefing of the security report would include an explanation of the security situation and any external or internal challenges.

 


Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Mystery Sniper Killed Wasfi Tal

Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
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Obeidat to Asharq Al-Awsat: Mystery Sniper Killed Wasfi Tal

Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)
Ahmad Obeidat during the interview with Asharq Al-Awsat's Editor-in-Chief Ghassan Charbel in Amman. (Asharq Al-Awsat)

Former Jordanian Prime Minister Ahmad Obeidat, who died earlier this month, was both a key player and a witness to sensitive chapters in his country’s history.

Obeidat began his career in the 1970s as an assistant director of intelligence, later serving as head of the General Intelligence Department until 1982. At the height of the Palestinian-Jordanian confrontation, he was abducted by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine before the events of September 1970.

He also served for two years as interior minister before King Hussein appointed him prime minister in early 1984, a post he held until April 1985, concurrently serving as defense minister.

For more than 15 years, Obeidat remained at the center of decision-making. He later took on roles drawing on his legal background, from chairing the Royal Commission that drafted the National Charter in the early 1990s to serving in human rights and judicial positions, most recently as head of the board of trustees of the National Center for Human Rights until 2008.

Weeks before Oct. 7, 2023, the day of the Al-Aqsa Flood Operation, Asharq Al-Awsat met Obeidat in Amman. The interview had been scheduled for publication in October 2023, but the major developments that followed led to its postponement, particularly as Obeidat addressed contentious issues, notably Jordanian-Palestinian relations.

In the first part of the interview, Obeidat revisits his formative years, when his political and professional journey began as a law student in Baghdad on the eve of the July 14, 1958 revolution, before returning to Iraq after the fall of the monarchy amid sweeping regional transformations.

The account moves to his early professional life in Jordan, from a brief stint in legal practice to joining the Public Security Directorate, then serving in the Political Investigations Office, which formed the nucleus of organized intelligence work. It concludes with a detailed narrative of the establishment of the General Intelligence Department in 1964, its early structure and founding members, at a time when the Jordanian state was rebuilding its institutions in an intensely turbulent region.

Asked where he was when the 1958 revolution broke out in Iraq, Obeidat said he had completed his first year in law studies and returned to Jordan for the summer break.

“While I was in Irbid, news arrived of the July 14 revolution in Iraq that overthrew the monarchy. After the summer break ended, I went back to Baghdad, where a republican government under Abdul Karim Qassem had taken power,” he recalled.

The return was not easy. “We faced difficulties on the road. The border between Jordan and Iraq was nearly closed, so we had to return via Damascus and then through desert routes to Baghdad. It was an exhausting journey,” he added.

Obeidat left Baghdad in 1961 after completing his final exams. “On the last day of exams in the fourth year, I went home, packed and returned to Jordan the same day. The border between Baghdad and Amman had reopened.”

Among his contemporaries at law school was Saddam Hussein, who studied in the evening section. Obeidat said he saw him only once by chance. “He was with others, one of whom later became a governor,” he revealed.

He returned to Baghdad again in 1983 as Jordan’s interior minister to attend a conference of Arab interior ministers, more than two decades after graduating. There, he met his Iraqi counterpart, Saadoun Shaker. “It was an ordinary relationship,” Obeidat said, describing the ties as largely ceremonial.

From customs to intelligence

After returning to Jordan in 1961, Obeidat initially considered practicing law. But limited opportunities in Irbid and his family’s financial constraints led him to seek public employment.

He was appointed to the Customs Department in Amman, where he worked for several months before joining the Public Security Directorate in April 1962 as a first lieutenant following three months of training at the police academy.

At the time, there was no separate intelligence agency. Public Security included a branch handling general investigations. Soon after, the Political Investigations Office was formed, staffed by legal officers from the army and Public Security, including Mudar Badran and Adeeb Tahaoub from military justice, alongside Obeidat and Tariq Alaaeddin from Public Security.

The office handled cases referred by security and official bodies, including military intelligence and the Royal Court. After reviewing its work, the late King Hussein ordered the establishment of a legally grounded intelligence body. The General Intelligence Law was issued in 1964, formally creating the department, explained Obeidat.

Mohammad Rasoul Al-Kilani became its first director, followed by Mudar Badran, then Nadhir Rashid. Al-Kilani briefly returned before Obeidat assumed the post, succeeded later by Tariq Alaaeddin.

The shock of 1967

Recalling the 1967 war, Obeidat described it as “a defeat, not a setback. A military, political, psychological, and social defeat in every sense.”

He said there was no institutional intelligence view on Jordan’s participation. “The political opinion of a figure of Wasfi Tal’s stature was that entering the 1967 war was a mistake. He was not in office, but he remained close to the king and influential,” said Obeidat.

According to Obeidat, King Hussein believed Israel would occupy the West Bank whether Jordan participated or not.

“Participation was a gamble that might succeed or fail. The catastrophe was discovering that the Egyptian air force had been destroyed within half an hour,” he added.

Despite the bitterness, he said: “We did not fear for the regime, but we sought to contain public anger and absorb the shock.”

September and the assassination of Wasfi Tal

Obeidat first met Yasser Arafat after the events of September 1970. He confirmed that Arafat left Amman with an official Arab delegation to attend the Cairo summit and returned immediately afterward.

He recalled being informed mid-flight of the death of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. “King Hussein was deeply affected.”

On the assassination of Prime Minister Wasfi Tal in Cairo, Obeidat said the gunmen who confronted Tal at the hotel entrance were not responsible for the fatal shot. “The fatal bullet came from behind, from a sniper in another unseen location. To this day, the sniper has not been identified,” he added.

He rejected the notion that Tal had been reckless. “Wasfi was not a gambler. He had a distinct political project,” he stressed.

Obeidat said the Black September Organization accused Tal of ordering the expulsion of fedayeen from forested areas in Jerash and Ajloun. He denied that Tal was directly responsible, saying the clashes began after fedayeen attacked a police station and killed officers, prompting a spontaneous army response.

Abduction without interrogation

Before September 1970, Obeidat was abducted by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine while serving as assistant intelligence director.

Armed vehicles stopped his car as he was leaving his home in Jabal Al-Taj with his family. He and his brother-in-law were taken to the Wehdat camp. “We were treated politely. We drank tea. No one asked me a single question,” he recalled.

After several hours, he was driven to another house in Amman and later returned home. The next morning, members of Fatah took him briefly to one of their offices, only to release him on foot without explanation.

“Not a single question was asked,” Obeidat said. “It was bewildering.”

He resumed his duties after ensuring his family’s safety. “At the time, intelligence, like any official institution, was threatened and targeted,” he said, reflecting on one of the most volatile periods in Jordan’s modern history.